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William Rowe has argued for atheism as follows: (1) There seem to be evils God could have 
prevented without losing a greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and (2) 
God would not allow such evils. This dissertation examines (2), the “No Gratuitous Evil Thesis,” 
and its role in Rowe’s argument. In Part One I argue that there are crucial ambiguities in the 
notion of a greater good this thesis appeals to and that these present dilemmas for Rowe’s 
argument, as well as for defining gratuitous evil. This leads to my approximation of the notion of 
gratuitous evil. Part Two is a defense of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. I first argue against Eric 
Reitan that a deontological moral perspective does not challenge the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, 
either as formulated by myself or by Rowe. I then argue that chance is irrelevant to the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis via a critique of Peter van Inwagen’s work on chance and divine 
providence and of Daniel Howard Snyder’s revision of Rowe’s thesis. I complete my defense by 
arguing against Peter van Inwagen and William Hasker, the most influential critics of the thesis. 
Van Inwagen has argued that certain arbitrary yet morally permissible decisions show the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis is false. Hasker has argued that it is incompatible with the divine goal of 
humans having significant morality and so should be rejected by theists. I argue that van 
Inwagen and Hasker both implicitly appeal to vagueness and that vagueness is irrelevant to the 




expect non-gratuitous evils to appear gratuitous, which is the subject of Part Three. I offer an 
account of the relations between God’s permission of instances of evil and the general goods of 
traditional theodicies that shows why those relations generally will not make the non-gratuity of 
evils conspicuous to us and moreover make non-gratuitous evils seem gratuitous. In this way my 
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In “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” William Rowe presents the 
following argument for atheism: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being 
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting 
some evil equally bad or worse. 
 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.1 
 
This is widely considered one of the clearest and most forceful arguments for atheism 
based on evil. Most discussion of it has focused on the first premise.
2
  The second premise has 
generally been thought clear and unambiguous. It has also mostly, though not universally, been 
regarded as in need of no further argument. Rowe defends it simply by saying “This premise is, I 
think, held in common by many theists and nontheists … [it]  seems to express a belief that 
accords with our basic moral principles, principles shared by both theists and nontheists …”
3
 
Indeed, this “theological premise” is prima facie fundamental to our understanding of divine 
goodness.  If permitting an evil is not necessary for a good that makes permitting the evil worth 
it then why would a perfectly good permit it? 
The theological premise has been criticized, however. The most influential arguments 
against it are those of William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen.
4
 Hasker thinks it is incompatible 
with the divine goal of humans’ having significant morality and so should be rejected by theists. 
Van Inwagen thinks certain arbitrary yet morally permissible decisions show it is false. Several 




in response to van Inwagen’s arguments. It has also been challenged on the basis of 
deontological considerations by Eric Reitan.
5
    
In Part 1 of this dissertation I will argue that Rowe’s theological premise requires 
clarification. The notion of a greater good this thesis appeals to may be interpreted in different 
ways and identifying these ambiguities is crucial to assessing the plausibility and usefulness of 
Rowe’s claim. After this clarification, I defend Rowe’s theological premise, the more general 
form of which I call the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, in Part 2.  I argue that considerations of 
deontology, chance, and vagueness are irrelevant to the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis.  
This defense then doubles as an explanation for why we should expect non-gratuitous 
evils to appear gratuitous. So my defense of Rowe’s second premise undermines his first. This is 
Part 3. I offer an account of the relations between God’s permission of instances of evil and the 
general goods of traditional theodicies that shows why those relations generally will not make 
the non-gratuity of evils conspicuous to us and moreover make non-gratuitous evils seem 
gratuitous. We should expect God’s permission of individual evils and amounts of specific types 
of evils (solely) for the sake of global goods to appear unnecessary for the offsetting goods that 
justify God’s permission of them, even though that permission satisfies the No Gratuitous Evil 
Thesis. I call this mistaken perception of gratuity the “Local Gratuity Illusion,” and argue it has 
dramatically misdirected current discussion of Rowe’s argument. This explanation shows how 
Rowe’s appeal to individual instances of evil invites misinterpretation of the relevance of his 
examples. It invites the perception that lack of explanation for specific individuating features of 
evils and an evil’s appearing unnecessary for God’s purposes indicates gratuity when it does not. 





These results are significant. The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis is fundamental to our 
understanding of divine goodness. To think it is false or needs to be revised is to be 
fundamentally mistaken about the nature of God’s goodness. This work is also important because 
it shows that Rowe’s argument, by appealing to instances or narrowly defined types of evil, gains 
an illusory credence that can derail and misguide philosophical efforts to understand God’s 
relation to evil. For example, extant theodicies may mistakenly appear to lose credence upon 
consideration of Rowe’s argument.  
My defense of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis and of the Local Gratuity Illusion is drawn 
from my objections to several key responses to Rowe: “Does the Argument from Evil Assume a 
Consequentialist Morality?”
6
 by  Reitan, “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God”
7
 
and The Problem of Evil
8
 by van Inwagen, “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”
9
  by Daniel 
Howard Snyder, “Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence”
10
 by Alan Rhoda, and “The Necessity 
of Gratuitous Evil” and related essays
11
 by Hasker. I articulate the Local Gratuity Illusion in part 
3 as the lesson of my focused analyses of these essays in part 2 after preparing needed 
distinctions in part 1. Implications of this study for the broader literature on Rowe’s argument, as 
well as for atheist greatest possible world arguments, theories of divine providence, skeptical 
theism, and other topics is a continuing research program but lie outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
Now, it would be quite surprising if the work of such excellent philosophers as Rowe, 
van Inwagen, Hasker, and others concealed the crucial ambiguities, inconsistencies, and missteps 
I here claim without also having significant merit. What I claim is that their proposed 




possible relations between God’s purposes and evil, but that they are mistaken about what their 
examples and illustrations demonstrate.  
My aim is not to defend any particular theodicy, though my arguments support the 
project of theodicy. The examples I give of goods justifying God’s permission of evil are meant 
only to help clarify my reasoning. Because of the complexity of inter-relations between events 
and goods, and for other reasons given at the end of my thesis, I believe my examples are overly 
simplistic and represent at best partial reasons for permitting evil that God may have. Relatedly, 
this work is abstract in a manner that may seem inappropriate for a treatment of God’s relation to 
suffering. In particular, the question of how God is benevolent toward those who suffer is not 
directly addressed either by the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis or this dissertation. Nevertheless, 
clarity concerning gratuitous evil can only assist the search for answers to the existential problem 
of evil. So my hope is that this work contributes clarity to this search with minimal insensitivity 

















Part 1  
























A Reformulation of Rowe’s Theological Premise 
To begin, let us examine how Rowe’s formulation of his theological premise differs from 
the following, what I will formally call “The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis”: 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis (NGE): God would only allow an evil if doing so is 
necessary for an offsetting good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
Instances of intense suffering can be particularly forceful examples of seemingly pointless evil, 
but to make Rowe’s thesis more general, the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis replaces “intense 
suffering” with “evil”.  Also, it substitutes “offsetting good” for “greater good” and “an evil no 
better” for “some evil equally bad or worse”.  This change more explicitly allows for the 
permissibility of permitting an evil when doing so is no better or worse than preventing it. These 
changes also better accommodate the possibility of incommensurability and of rough equality 
between goods and evils. For economy of expression, throughout this dissertation I will refer to 
the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis as NGE. 
Justified Morally Arbitrary Permission of Evil 
A reason for replacing ‘greater good’ with ‘offsetting good’ 
NGE substitutes ‘offsetting good’ for ‘greater good’ to allow for the permissibility of 
permitting an evil when doing so is no better or worse than preventing it. Requiring that every 
evil God permits must be necessary for a good that outweighs and not merely counterbalances 
the evil is either implausibly restrictive or else assumes that God is never faced with a choice 




It is natural to think that God must have a positive reason to allow an evil and absent such 
a reason should prevent it. This is because the existence of evil is of course, and by any 
reasonable definition, inherently bad. Evil is something that, considered in itself, is better to not 
be than be. So, necessarily, there is always at least one reason in favor of eliminating any evil: 
the fact that it is evil. This means one cannot be in a position of having no prima facie reason of 
any kind for eliminating evil. So to be justified in allowing evil one needs a reason for doing so.  
However, though it is true that one should eliminate evil unless one has a reason for not 
doing so, there is an ambiguity in the notion of possessing a reason for not eliminating an evil. 
This could mean having an “all things considered” or ultima facie reason to allow the evil or it 
could mean having a reason that is opposed to, and perhaps cancels, the presumption in favor of 
eliminating the evil.
12
 For example, God’s allowing Rob to suffer may result (or likely result) in 
his development of patience whereas God’s preventing Rob’s suffering may result in his spiritual 
enlightenment. The good of Rob’s enlightenment may be roughly equal in value to the value of 
Rob’s development of patience less the negative value of his suffering.
13
 So though there may be 
no reason for God to prefer allowing over preventing Rob’s suffering in this case (because of this 
rough equality), there is a good that allowing Rob’s suffering achieves, namely his development 
of patience. This good cancels the presumption in favor of preventing Rob’s suffering. It is a 
reason for not eliminating Rob’s suffering, and because it fully offsets the reason to eliminate 
that evil, it could justify allowing Rob’s suffering. But it is not an ultima facie reason for doing 
so. In this way, it can be permissible to allow an evil even if allowing it is no better than 
preventing it. 
Perhaps this ambiguity, as well as prevalence of the term ‘greater good’, led Rowe to 




good.” But I think this terminology is unfortunate. Calling the good that justifies God’s 
permission of an evil a “greater good” suggests God must have an ultima facie reason for 
allowing an evil to be justified in allowing it. But in general one does not need an “all things 
considered” reason for allowing rather than preventing an evil to be justified in allowing it. If a 
morally perfect being can make morally neutral choices, his allowing an evil may be justified if 
allowing it is not morally worse than his preventing it. If God can make morally neutral choices, 
why think He would only allow an evil if allowing it makes the world better? This would mean 
that if preventing an evil makes the world no better or worse God must prevent it. It is not 
obvious why one should think moral perfection requires this. Therefore, if God can make 
morally neutral choices NGE should not imply God would only allow an evil if God has an 
ultima facie reason to allow the evil, as it would if allowing an evil must be necessary for a good 
that outweighs the evil in order for the good to justify that permission.
14
 
 Of course, this reason for replacing greater good with “offsetting” good would be 
obviated if we grant that God never chooses between equally good alternatives, as Leibniz 
famously thought, for then His permitting an evil is always either better or worse than preventing 
it. But NGE should avoid commitment to this view, as well as its denial, if it can. Employed as a 
premise in an argument targeting only theism, NGE should be stated as uncontroversially as 
possible and not assume specific metaphysical views or specific views of divine 
praiseworthiness.
15
 Furthermore, much contemporary commentary on Rowe’s NGE, such as 
Peter van Inwagen’s and Daniel Howard-Snyder’s, either states or assumes that Leibniz’s view 
may well be false.
16
 So NGE should not assume God needs a reason in the form of a good that 




good rather than morally neutral. Since every greater good is also an offsetting good, substituting 
the latter for the former in the formal statement of the thesis achieves this.  
Corresponding Notions of Pointless Evil 
 Accordingly, having no reason to allow an evil, so that allowing the evil is “pointless”, 
may mean: 
1. Allowing the evil is morally arbitrary: There is no ultima facie reason to allow 
the evil and there is no ultima facie reason to prevent the evil. In this case (to 
speak loosely, as I will explain) some good must offset the permitted evil; or  
2. Allowing the evil is unjustified: Reasons for preventing the evil (including the 
intrinsic badness of the evil) are not counterbalanced by reasons to allow it. 
There is ultima facie reason to prevent the evil. Allowing the evil is without 
reason in the sense of being unjustified or irrational; or 
3. Allowing the evil is completely pointless: There is no reason at all, not even a 
prima facie reason, to allow the evil, in which case allowing the evil results in 
no good at all. Therefore, there is ultima facie reason to prevent the evil. 
  These senses of having no reason to allow an evil are clearly not equivalent. What 
matters with respect to justifiably permitting an evil is just whether or not one has ultima facie 
moral reason to prevent it, as the example just given illustrates. In this example, God has no 
ultima facie moral reason to allow rather than prevent Rob’s suffering because doing so achieves 
no net good (though God’s allowing Rob’s suffering does result in the justifying good of Rob’s 
patience). So here God’s permitting the evil is only “pointless” in the innocuous first sense of 




  According to NGE as I have formulated it, then, in the specific sense of being arbitrary, 
God’s allowing an evil may be “pointless”! There may be no net good achieved by God’s 
permitting rather than preventing an evil. God’s permitting an evil need not be morally 
preferable to His preventing the evil. Again, the good requiring the permission of evil need not 
outweigh the evil; it need only offset the evil. So, for example, if God is justified in permitting 
Rob to suffer a disappointment because that permission is necessary for Rob’s conversion, Rob’s 
disappointment may be merely offset by his conversion; it need not be better that Rob experience 
disappointment and its resultant conversion rather than neither. In this case, God’s permitting 
Rob to suffer is pointless and God had no reason for permitting it in the sense that God might 
just as well have prevented that evil. God’s permitting Rob to suffer is not pointless in the 
stronger sense that no good at all results from that permission, however. Nor is it pointless in the 
sense that reasons to prevent it outweigh reasons to allow it. By stipulation this is not the case.  
  In this example, is Rob’s suffering, as opposed to God’s permission of it, pointless? This 
is, again, ambiguous. Rob’s suffering is not an “absolutely” pointless evil in the sense that it is 
not a “sheer loss” or something better to have not occurred, all things considered. Its occurrence 
does not make the world any worse. It is also not absolutely pointless in the sense that it does 
make a specific good possible that otherwise would not be, namely Rob’s conversion. However, 
it is pointless in the sense that its occurrence achieves no net good: it is no better (or worse) that 
it has occurred rather than not. Its occurrence serves no purposes that are (in total) morally 






Rowe’s Accommodation of Morally Neutral Divine Permission of Evil 
Rowe mentions in a footnote of “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” 
that the term ‘greater good’ could be interpreted broadly to include goods such that the value of 
permitting the evil and obtaining the good does not exceed the value of preventing the evil and 
losing the good: 
… we should perhaps not fault OG [an omniscient, wholly good being] if the good G, 
that would be lost were s1 prevented, is not actually greater than s1, but merely such that 
allowing s1 and G, as opposed to preventing s1 and thereby losing G, would not alter the 




Here Rowe accepts that the “greater good” may be such that God’s allowing evil e results 
in no worse a balance between good and evil than God’s preventing e. It is important to note that 
Rowe has, inadvertently it seems, shifted attention from the greater good’s relation to the specific 
evil whose justified permission is under consideration to a relation between the net values of 
God’s alternatives in deciding whether or not to permit the evil.  There being a good of no less 
value than the evil whose divine permission is required for the good is not equivalent to God’s 
permission of the evil’s having no less value (balance of good and evil) than God’s prevention of 
it. This is because permitting an evil may result in further evil and loss of good in addition to the 
gain of a specific good that offsets the evil. So Rowe’s explicit proposal is distinct from  
allowing that according to NGE the “greater good” may offset rather than outweigh the specific 
evil under consideration, which he may also have intended. I will discuss the difference between 






Rough Equality and Incommensurability 
The possibility of rough equality and incommensurability between goods and evils 
Another  reason for replacing “greater good” with “offsetting good” and for replacing 
“some evil equally bad or worse” with “an evil no better” is to accommodate 
incommensurability. Referring to comparative magnitudes between goods and evils as either 
equal to, less than, or greater than, as Rowe’s formulation does, suggests  all goods and evils are 
commensurable, but some may not be. Many philosophers believe the value of some goods is 
neither greater than, nor less than, nor equal to the disvalue of some evils.
18
 For example, 
perhaps the goodness of a particular enlightenment may be neither greater than nor less than the 
disvalue of precisely one year of suffering through a particular illness without the value of that 
enlightenment being equal in magnitude to the badness of that suffering. One reason to think this 
is that the benefit of that same enlightenment may not only seem neither greater than nor less 
than the disvalue of the actual suffering but also seem neither greater than nor less than the 
disvalue of that suffering lessened by, say, one week.
19
 Alternatively, rather than say the 
enlightenment and the suffering are incommensurable, one might prefer to say they are in some 
sense equivalent, just not precisely or quantitatively equivalent. One may wish to say that the 
enlightenment and the suffering due to illness are only roughly comparable in magnitude rather 
than incomparable. This is Ruth Chang’s notion of parity.
20
 However one wishes to apply or 
reserve the term ‘equality’, what matters is that though a large increase in one value may make it 
greater than another given value, slight increases may not. This suggests these values may not be 






NGE need not assume the commensurability of all goods and evils and so should not be 
formulated so as to suggest it requires that justifying goods be “equal to” or greater than the 
magnitude of evils (or total disvalue) whose permission they require.
22
 NGE only requires that 
justifying goods are not of less value than the disvalue of the evils they are permitted for the sake 
of. By a good’s “offsetting” an evil I mean just this: that the good does not have less value than 
the evil has disvalue, that the evil does not outweigh the good. Similarly, by “an evil no better” I 
mean an evil that is not worse than the permitted evil. Saying that a good or prevented evil is not 
outweighed by a permitted evil does not necessarily imply that it is either better than or precisely 
equal in magnitude to that permitted evil. This phrasing allows that the values or disvalues 
involved may be incommensurable or only roughly equal and so cannot be compared in a precise 
quantitative manner.  
So, to offer another example, according to NGE, if God permits someone to die of 
cancer, either there must be a good that requires that permission (or that of an evil no better) and 
that offsets that evil or there must be an evil whose prevention requires that permission and that 
is no better than that person’s dying of cancer. This may be satisfied if, for example, the good of 
that person’s serious contemplation of her life requires that God permit her cancer, even if the 
value of that good is not greater than the badness of her dying of cancer, nor in some precise 
quantitative sense equal to the disvalue of that evil. One might think that this good of serious 
self-reflection cannot be precisely equal in magnitude to the evil because some increases of this 
good, in depth or duration, still might not make the magnitude of the good seem greater than that 





The Offsetting Good Need Not Be an Amount of Goodness  
This clarification may seem unnecessary. If NGE is interpreted charitably, being ‘equal 
to’ should perhaps be taken to include being ‘roughly equal to’ or simply ‘not less than’. After 
all, an example of a permission of evil for the sake of preventing an incommensurable, rather 
than “equally bad”, evil or for the sake of obtaining an incommensurable, rather than equal, 
good, would be a transparently spurious proposed counterexample to NGE.  
However, there are (epistemically possible) examples of divine permission of evil 
involving relations of rough equality or incommensurability between magnitudes of goods and 
evils that reveal hidden complexities in NGE. These are worth attending to in order to avoid 
potential misunderstanding. For example, suppose the permission of one year of suffering, e1, 
will bring about great and noble honesty in Sal, good G1, whereas the permission of one year 
and one month of that suffering, e2, will bring about less honesty but also increased courage in 
Sal, compound good G2. Suppose also that goods G1 and G2 are either incommensurable or only 
“roughly equal” in magnitude, G2 being neither better nor worse than G1. Rowe’s theological 
premise may seem to preclude God’s permission of the additional month of suffering for the sake 
of G2. God’s permission of that additional suffering was necessary for G2 but an amount of 
goodness no less, namely, G1, could have been had without permitting that additional evil. Is 
God’s permission of the additional month of suffering necessary for a greater good in a sense 
that satisfies NGE? 
God’s permission of the extra suffering, evil e, is not necessary for any amount of 
goodness that outweighs it. Yet God’s permission of e seems permissible and non-gratuitous. 




world no worse than it would be if God prevented that evil and actualized G1 instead. 
Acknowledging only strict equality, that is, ignoring the notion of rough equality and the 
possibility of incommensurability, the fact that G2 is not greater than G1 would imply that God 
could have made the world better by preventing that additional month of suffering (if no other 
goods and evils are involved). However, by accepting the possibility that goods G1 and G2 are 
only roughly equal in magnitude we may say instead that even though e2 is greater than e1 and 
G2 is not greater than G1, (e1 and G1) is not better than (e2 and G2). So, given the possibility of 
circumstances like this where there is a relation of rough equality or incommensurability 
between values, it seems that Rowe’s theological premise should be formulated in a way that 
does not imply that God’s permission of an evil must be necessary for an amount of goodness 
that outweighs it. So one prima facie viable interpretation of Rowe’s thesis is ruled out by the 
possibility of incommensurability or rough equality between values.  
Although God’s permission of that additional month of suffering, evil e, is not necessary 
for any amount of goodness that outweighs it and even though there is no clearly identifiable 
good that God’s permission of the evil requires and that is equal to e in magnitude, this still 
leaves at least two different senses in which God’s permission of e is not gratuitous:  
God’s permission of e: 
1. makes the world no worse, and  
2. is necessary for a specific good (though not an amount of goodness) that offsets e, 
namely G2.  
 
Both these senses of an evil’s being non-gratuitous block spurious counterexamples to 
NGE based on incommensurability or rough equality. NGE need not be interpreted as requiring 




(per se) no less in magnitude than the evil. Again, given the rough equality or 
incommensurability between the goods involved in the above example, no goodness would be 
lost had God prevented e and allowed only one year of suffering instead, yet God’s permission of 
the evil does not seem unjustified or pointless. This is because His doing so does not make the 
world worse and is necessary for a greater good, namely G2. 
These two senses in which God’s permission of evil may be considered non-gratuitous 
mark an ambiguity in the notion of a “greater good” in Rowe’s thesis. A greater good may be 
understood as the good that makes God’s permitting the evil no worse than His preventing it. A 
greater good may also be understood as some specific good that outweighs the evil permitted. 
This ambiguity was noted previously in my comment on Rowe’s footnote concerning divine 
morally neutral choices (section B1c). To repeat: these interpretations are distinct and not co-
extensive. Permitting an evil may result in further evil and loss of good in addition to the gain of 
a specific good. Therefore, permitting an evil necessary for some specific offsetting good and so 
non-gratuitous in the second sense may result in a worse world than preventing it and so be 
gratuitous in the first sense.  
The considerations of this section illustrate how carefully NGE notion of an offsetting 
good must be defined, despite its surface simplicity. This section also introduces the two 
interpretations of NGE that I will elaborate on in chapter three. In that chapter I will argue these 







Contrast with the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis 
Analysis of the Distinction 
I have expressed the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis (NGE) as:  
NGE: God would only allow an evil if allowing the evil is necessary for an offsetting 
good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
This is distinct from:  
The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis: God would only allow an evil if the evil is necessary 
for an offsetting good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
Rowe, William Hasker, and others have emphasized the significance of this distinction.
23
 
According to the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, for any evil that occurs, if that evil hadn’t 
occurred a good would have been lost, given theism. This is not implied by NGE. NGE only says 
that for every divine permission of evil, if that permission hadn’t occurred a good would have 
been lost.  
These theses are not equivalent. Every evil that occurs is an evil permitted by God, (given 
theism), and so both theses state all actual evils must be required in some sense (given theism), 
but the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis states an absolute requirement, whereas the NGE 
requirement can only plausibly be construed as conditional. Even if it is supposed that a divine 
permission of evil is only necessary for a good if the evil permitted is, (and just because the 
occurrence of the evil follows from its divine permission) the necessity invoked is only 
charitably and naturally understood as conditional on the evil’s occurrence. According to NGE, 
the divine permission of evil need not be absolutely necessary for an offsetting good, in which 




would occur unless God prevents it). That is, God’s permission of an evil may be necessary for a 
good because factors other than God’s permission would bring about the evil unless God 
prevents it. To suppose otherwise would be to lose the point of distinguishing the necessity of an 
evil from the necessity of God’s permission of it.  
This is illustrated by the example of moral freedom given by Hasker and Rowe to 
distinguish the two theses. Given that I choose evil, God must permit my evil choice for the good 
of my having moral freedom. If I don’t choose evil, then the good of my having moral freedom 
does not require the (impossible) occurrence of God’s permission of my evil choice, nor my evil 
choice itself. By contrast, if an evil is necessary for an offsetting good in the sense required for 
God’s justifiably permitting it according to the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, the necessity 
involved is absolute necessity. In the sense relevant to the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, a good’s 
requiring an evil is not conditional on some further circumstance. So, according to this thesis 
some good would, of absolute metaphysical necessity, be lost if I had chosen good instead of the 
evil I chose, given theism. Because the good of my being able to choose between good and evil 
is not lost if I choose good rather than evil, according to the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis there 
must be some other good that obtains if and only if I choose evil, given theism. But on NGE, the 
good of my being able to choose between good and evil may be the only good secured by God’s 
permitting me to choose evil.  
Again, the two theses are not equivalent because the permission of an evil by x requires 
that the evil would occur unless prevented by x and a good may require the permission of an evil 
if this latter condition holds though not if it does not. Of course, if the latter does not hold, that is, 
if it is not true that the evil would occur if not prevented (if I choose good instead of evil, say), 




impossibility should not obscure the fact that a good’s requiring a divine permission can be 
conditional on a circumstance that might not obtain. Again, to interpret NGE as stating that every 
divine permission of evil is absolutely necessary for a greater good would be to lose the 
distinction between NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. Because all divine permissions of 
evil are co-extensive with all actual evils, given theism, the only way the two theses can be 
distinct is if the necessity involved is different, that is, if the evil’s being necessary for a greater 
good may be considered conditional on some actual but possibly contingent circumstance, as per 
NGE. The point of introducing the necessity of God’s permission rather than the necessity of the 
evil is just to make this distinction, that is, to allow, plausibly, that some justifying goods require 
evils not absolutely but given they would occur unless God prevents them. This is why I claim 
the NGE  requirement can only plausibly be construed as conditional. 
Another way to state this then is that by NGE, it is strictly speaking not God’s permission 
that must be required for an offsetting good, but God’s not preventing the evil that is required. 
God’s not preventing an evil obtains if either God allows the evil or if the evil does not occur for 
reasons other than God’s preventing it.  So, to illustrate and make my point in a different way: 
some goods may be lost if God intervenes to prevent evil, say by preventing me from carrying 
out some evil intention, that are not lost if the evil does not occur for other reasons, such as my 
freely choosing to be good. God’s willingness to permit my making an evil choice (which means 
God would permit it should I make that choice) may be necessary for the good of my moral 
freedom, but the evil of my actually making the morally wrong choice is not necessary for that 
good. I still would have been morally free if I had made the right choice instead.  
Rowe and Hasker both point to this good of moral freedom to distinguish the theses, but 




another example that distinguishes NGE from the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, suppose it is 
good that creation be autonomous, or that the order of nature is uniform, and hence that God not 
intervene in nature. Suppose given the state of the natural world a particular natural disaster may 
or may not occur, due to natural indeterminism, provided God does not prevent it. Suppose the 
natural disaster occurs, unprevented by God. On the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis there must be 
some good that offsets the evil of the natural disaster and that would not have occurred if the 
natural disaster had not. This good cannot be the good of creation’s being autonomous, for that 
good would not be at all compromised had the (indeterministic) natural forces not produced the 
natural disaster. NGE does not require such an additional good, for on NGE it is only God’s 
prevention of the natural disaster that necessarily would have compromised a good. So on NGE 
the only good involved may be the uniformity of the natural order. 
NGE serves Rowe’s argument better than the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis 
 NGE serves Rowe’s argument better than the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. First, NGE is 
entailed by the No Unnecessary Thesis and so is at least as plausible. If an evil is necessary for a 
good then so is God’s permission of it. Second, NGE seems prima facie more plausible than the 
No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. As indicated by the above analysis and examples, NGE allows 
justifying circumstances for God’s permission of evil that it seems should be allowed. Prima 
facie, goods that outweigh evils God must permit for them could justify God’s permission of 
those evils even if the evils themselves are not necessary for those goods. Third, and relatedly, 
NGE more directly follows from the theses’ common rationale in a basic understanding of God’s 
moral relation to evil. The common motivation for these theses is just the idea that God 
necessarily prefers less over more evil, all else being equal. It is God’s choice to allow rather 




satisfaction of NGE, then argument would be needed for why more, possibly an additional good, 
is required.  
I do not claim there are no reasonable arguments for the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis . 
One such argument may be that God’s sovereignty would be impugned by any ultimately 
“unredeemed” evil and evil can only be redeemed by good if it ultimately serves some good. 
Perhaps this and similar arguments are sound. My present point is that the No Unnecessary thesis 
needs such support whereas NGE does not. By assuming less, NGE makes Rowe’s argument 
stronger than it would be if it employed the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis instead. 
The Possibility of Evil’s Making the World Worse 
There are very significant differences in what the two theses imply about evil. If the No 
Unnecessary Evil Thesis is true, the occurrence of evil cannot by itself make the world worse 
than it would be without the evil.
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  Only a loss of a good could do so.
 
This is because, again, on 
that thesis, for every evil there is an offsetting good that would be lost without the evil. This is 
not true on NGE. On NGE the world may be made worse by the occurrence of evil (even if the 
occurrence of the evil does not also result in the loss of a good (besides the good of a better 
world)). It may be unfortunate that God had to permit an evil for the sake of a good that could 
have been had without the evil. For example, suppose God permits an unfortunate result of free 
choice in order to preserve significant moral freedom. If the evil choice had not been made (for 
reasons other than God’s intervention) neither the good that justifies God’s actual permission of 
the evil, namely, significant moral freedom, nor any other good need be lost. Or suppose God 
permits an unfortunate result of natural indeterminism in order to preserve the uniformity of 




of natural indeterminism would occur, neither the good that justifies God’s actual permission of 
the evil, namely, the uniformity of nature, nor any other good need be lost.  
In other words, because on NGE, a justifying good may only require God’s permission of 
the evil, given that the evil would occur (apart from God’s possible prevention), and a justifying 
good need not require God’s permission of the evil simpliciter, which would imply the 
occurrence of the evil, on NGE and not on the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, the occurrence of 
evil may make the world worse than it would have been without the evil (even if the evil does 
not also result in the loss of a good (other than the good of a better world)).  
It is easy to conflate the two theses, perhaps because the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis 
entails NGE and if the implicit conditional necessity highlighted here is ignored NGE entails the 
No Unnecessary Evil Thesis.  
For example, in a discussion of Michael Peterson’s argument that gratuitous evil is 
compatible with the existence of God, Alan Rhoda says:  
It is important to observe, however, that an evil event may be included in a larger event 
which is, on the whole, not evil. If this weren’t so there could be no non-gratuitous evils. 
For such to be possible something has to be evil considered in itself, but appropriate, 
fitting, or justified within a larger context.
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 [my italics] 
 
If an evil is necessary for a greater good then although the evil is bad considered by itself, 
considered in the wider context that includes the greater good, it is better that the evil occur than 
not. The sense in which it is better that the evil occur must be construed carefully, though. If the 
evil is an injustice then its being necessary for a greater good does not imply that it is not really 
regrettable or that it is not wrong for someone, including an omnipotent being, to permit it.
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must be a sense in which the occurrence of the evil is not what we might call wide-context-
regrettable or “ultimately regrettable.” By an evil’s being “appropriate, fitting, or justified within 
a larger context”
 27
  I take Rhoda to mean its occurrence is not ultimately regrettable.  
There are at least two ways in which an evil event may be “included” in a larger event 
that is not evil. An evil may be not ultimately regrettable in either  a strong sense and a weaker 
sense corresponding to the distinction Roderick Chisholm has made between evil being defeated 
and being balanced off, respectively.
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 This distinction is important for points I make in chapter 
three, so I take this opportunity to describe it. If an evil contributes to the goodness of the greater 
good it is necessary for, such that that good, considered as a whole, would be less valuable 
without the evil (if that were possible), then the evil may be considered defeated by the greater 
good. Chisholm provides this example: my suffering brought on by my contemplation of my 
misdeeds may heighten the depth of my remorse. Not only is my suffering necessary for my 
remorse, the remorse is made more valuable by the intensity of that suffering. For another 
example, if we suppose that fear is necessary for the virtue of courage, the fear I have may 
ennoble my act of heroism. From the wider perspective of the goods of remorse and heroism of 




This contrasts with a weaker sense of not being ultimately regrettable. In this case, the 
evil is necessary for the greater good but does not contribute to the goodness of that good. For 
example, suppose the existence of pain is necessary for the evolution of human beings. The good 
of the evolution of humans may be worth that pain, but the value of human beings is not 




may be thought compensated by the good and, because it is necessary for the outweighing good, 
the existence of the evil is not entirely regrettable.  
According to my understanding of Chisholm’s contrast between an evil’s being 
counterbalanced by good and an evil’s being defeated by good, the corresponding senses of an 
evil’s not being regrettable is marked by this: the necessity of the evil for a good that merely 
counterbalances it may be seen as unfortunate whereas the necessity of an evil for a good that 
defeats it cannot be coherently viewed as unfortunate. This is because the defeated evil is 
essential to the nature of the good that defeats it. So these are two ways in which an evil may be 
“included” in a larger event which is not evil and so be non-gratuitous.  
But an evil may be non-gratuitous by NGE even if it is not included in a larger event 
which is not evil, even if it is ultimately regrettable. To assume otherwise is to conflate NGE 
with the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. God’s permission of an evil may be justified by that 
permission’s being necessary for a greater good even if the evil itself is not necessary for a 
greater good. If the evil itself is not necessary for a greater good, then the existence of the evil 
may be regrettable, even when viewed from the widest possible perspective. So, again, given that 
humans choose to sin, God must permit moral evil for the greater good of significant moral 
freedom. A sin’s being an actual instance of moral freedom of course entails God permitted that 
sinful choice, but it may be in no sense good that the sinful choice occur rather than the good 
choice. The good of moral freedom does not entail moral evil. Returning to our other example, 
given that indeterministic natural forces would produce natural disasters, God must permit 
natural evil for the greater good of an autonomous creation. But since moral and natural evil are 




permit them. This difference between NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis will be relevant 
to our analyses of the challenge of deontology to NGE. 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis and Divine Middle Knowledge 
Expected Utility as a Greater Good  
The denial of divine middle knowledge provides another way in which evils may be non-
gratuitous and yet not included in a larger event that is not evil. If God does not know what 
would result from each of His choices, God may be justified in permitting an evil for the 
offsetting good of its expected utility, in satisfaction of NGE (or in satisfaction of the No 
Unnecessary Evil Thesis). Events may then unfold so that there is no good event that includes 
the evil, in which case God’s permission of the evil turns out to be unfortunate.  
According to the doctrine of divine middle knowledge there are truths about which 
(completely specified) possible world would result given any of God’s possible actions and God 
knows these truths. If this doctrine is denied, if God does not always know what would occur 
given His choices, it may be that it would have been better not only that a non-gratuitous evil not 
occur but that God not have permitted it. So the denial of middle knowledge allows for another 
sense in which an evil may be non-gratuitous yet not included in a larger good event and 
therefore be entirely regrettable. God may be justified in permitting an evil because at the 
“moment” the choice is made and the evil occurs permitting it is better than not. The expected 
utility of permitting it may be higher than that of not. For example, God’s permitting someone to 
suffer may be worth the small chance of its precipitating a conversion and so God may be 
justified in permitting it for the sake of that good. God may be so justified even if He knows that 




outweigh the badness of the person’s suffering, and even if He knows it is more likely that the 
person will resist conversion than not. The great good of repentance may make the expected 
utility of permitting the suffering positive. Free choices or the results of indeterministic natural 
forces may then unfold so that it would have been better if God had prevented the evil. Here it 
turns out that for reasons that could not have been known beforehand, it would have been better 
if the evil had been prevented. So God’s permission of the evil was justified by a greater good, 
the evil was non-gratuitous, and yet because that greater good was expected utility (prior to the 
actual consequences of the divine permission) rather than a concrete good, such as having the 
opportunity to repent, there is no larger good event that includes the evil.  
 In “Gratuitous Evil and Divine Providence” Alan Rhoda’s treatment of Rowe’s 
theological premise accommodates the denial of divine middle knowledge differently. His initial 
definition of gratuitous evil is: 
 (7) A gratuitous evil =def. An instance of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient  being 
could have prevented in a way that would have made the  world overall  better.
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He then writes: 
… suppose God could have prevented a certain evil E by doing A but that there was 
 no antecedently knowable fact about whether God’s preventing E by doing A would 
 have made the world overall better. Under those conditions, a theist could admit E 
 as gratuitous on the grounds that while God could have prevented E by doing A, and 
 while such prevention would have made the world overall better, God couldn’t have 
 known his preventing E in that way would make the world overall better and so was 
 not obligated to do A. We close this loophole with:  
 (8) A gratuitous evil =def. An instance of evil which an omnipotent, omniscient being 
 antecedently knew he could have prevented in a way that would have made the  world 
overall better.
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 I do not think this is satisfactory. The notion of gratuitous evil is the notion of evil whose 
permission by God is pointless. If there is no divine middle knowledge, then unless determinism 
is true, it is reasonable to think that many significant potential evils could and perhaps should be 
averted by God before God knows His averting them will not make the world worse than it 
would have been if He had not. If there is no divine middle knowledge, God may often know the 
expected utility of preventing an evil is higher, perhaps much higher, than permitting it without 
knowing it is not possible for events to later unfold so that in fact it would have been better if He 
had permitted it. If God were to permit such evil and it turns out that it would have been better if 
God had prevented them, then such divine permissions, and the evils themselves, would be 
pointless. (And if it turns out that it would have been worse if God had prevented them, then the 
divine permission of them could be unjustified and the evils “accidentally” not pointless – which 
would still contravene theism if theism entails that necessarily, if God exists, there is no 
gratuitous evil) Rhoda’s definition does not classify such evils as gratuitous. This is 
unsatisfactory because, as Rhoda remarks, one desiderata for a definition of gratuitous evil is to 
classify as gratuitous as many apparently gratuitous instances of evil as possible.  
 One might object that if God knows preventing an evil will likely make the world better, 
the possible world in which God prevents the evil must at that moment be better. However, 
although the greater likelihood of future good is a reason to prefer one possible world over 
another, it is not obvious that mere probability of future good (as opposed to the goods that 
explain that probability) adds to the actual value of a world. So Rhoda’s definition in terms of 
what God knew He could have prevented in a way that would have made the world better is not 




the denial of divine middle knowledge by allowing offsetting goods to include the expected 
value of God’s permitting an evil. 
NGE does not imply Meticulous Providence 
Rowe unpacks NGE into the following necessary condition for God’s permitting an evil e: 
Either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable by [God] only if  [God] 
permits e,  
or (ii) there is some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable by [God] only if [God] 
permits either e or some evil equally bad or worse, 
or (iii) e is such that it is preventable by [God] only if [God] permits some evil equally 
bad or worse.  
He then explains: 
It is important to recognize that (iii) is not included in (i). For losing a good greater than 
[e] is not the same as permitting an evil greater than [e] And this because the absence of a 
good state of affairs need not itself be an evil state of affairs. It is also important to 
recognize that [e] might be such that it is preventable by [God] without losing G (so 
condition (i) is not satisfied) but also such that if [God] did prevent it, G would be lost 
unless [God] permitted some evil equal to or worse than [e]. If  this were so, it does not 
seem correct to require that [God] prevent [e]. Thus, condition (ii) takes into account an 
important possibility not encompassed in condition (i).  
 
  This seems correct; condition (ii) should be included in NGE. However, it is not 
immediately clear that (ii) is already contained in  Rowe’s formulation of NGE, as he claims. 
“God would only allow an evil if doing so is necessary for a greater good or the prevention of an 
evil no better” is naturally read as: God would only allow an evil if doing so is necessary for a 
greater good or is necessary for the prevention of an evil no better. Condition ii states God’s 
permission of e may not be necessary for either because it may be necessary for both. That is, the 
necessity invoked should not be distributed across the disjunction: God’s permission of e need 




(ii) explicit, NGE reads: God would only allow an evil if doing so is necessary for a greater good 
or necessary for the prevention of an evil no better or necessary for obtaining both a greater good 
and the avoidance of an evil no better. So, according to NGE, if God allows an evil, God had to 
either permit the evil or forfeit a greater good or permit another evil no better.  
Is condition (ii) really distinct from (i) and (iii) ? Is (iii) really distinct from (i)? No evil is 
necessary simpliciter, if God exists. If God hadn’t created there would be no evil. If an evil is 
necessary this is because the good or goods of God’s creation require it. So the occurrence of one 
evil’s being necessary for the non-occurrence of another is always relative to a good that requires 
some evil (of that magnitude). Second, if a good g requires either evil e or evil e’ then evil e is 
necessary for a specific good, namely the good: g and the non-occurrence of e’. If winning the 
battle requires either Pat die or Sol die, then Pat’s death is necessary for the good state of affairs: 
the battle’s being won without Sol’s death, which is distinct from the good of winning the battle.  
Whether or not (ii) and (iii) are really distinct from (i), noting the possibility of a divine 
choice between evils and merely offsetting goods and between equally or incommensurably bad 
evils is important for clarifying the relation between NGE and meticulous providence. To do just 
this, I here distinguish several claims about God’s relation to evil, ordered, roughly speaking, 
from stricter divine control to less “meticulous” types of providence. 
Strict Meticulous Providence: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for a divinely 
unqualifiedly willed concrete instantiation of a greater good (and so is unqualifiedly willed by 
God).  
Because on this view every particular evil and every particular good is part of God’s perfect 
will and God’s perfect will is necessarily actualized, according to this view the occurrence of 




choice to create. This does not imply there are no undetermined evil events however. Strict 
Meticulous Providence holds there is an ultimate contrastive explanation for every event, but that 
explanation need not be causal. If God necessarily knows what would result from any of His 
choices and knows He can actualize the greatest possible world by choosing as He does, the 
ultimate explanation for any event that occurs, including those that result from libertarian free 
will and natural indeterminism, is that it is best for it to occur. One may wonder how it can be 
necessarily true that God can actualize His perfect will (the greatest possible world), if there is 
libertarian free will and natural indeterminism, which lack ultimate contrastive causal 
explanation, but a theist may attribute this to the mystery of the nature of God’s sovereignty and 
of divine middle knowledge. One historically important Christian tradition holds and argues that 
God’s creation is necessarily the greatest possible and so this world, including its causally 
contingent history of sin and suffering, is the greatest possible.  
The No Chance Role for Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil serves a greater good that 
is specifically willed by God. 
 
The No Chance Role for Evil Thesis differs from strict meticulous providence in that it 
allows that God may be indifferent about which evil brings about a greater good. A particular 
instance of evil serves a greater good if it or an evil no better is necessary for the greater good. In 
this way the occurrence of an evil may fill an essential role in God’s purposes, where God’s 
purposes are taken to be particular goods (rather than types of goods). For example, Jo’s 
suffering may be necessary for his conversion. On this thesis Jo’s suffering from rabies need not 
be necessary for God’s purposes, such as Jo’s conversion, but must serve God’s purposes. This is 
possible because although Jo’s suffering from rabies actually leads to Jo’s conversion, Jo’s 




The No Unnecessary Particular Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for a 
greater good. 
 
One difference between this view and the preceding is that this view allows that God may 
be indifferent about how a good may be instantiated or even about which goods are instantiated. 
Perhaps He may be indifferent about this because these may vary without diminishing the total 
of a certain type of goodness or the total (optimal) goodness of creation. So particular 
instantiations of goods may be left to chance by God. Nevertheless, according to this thesis every 
concrete instantiation of a good may be considered part of God’s plan because each may play an 
essential role in the total optimal value of creation.  
It is important to note that this thesis does not state every particular instance of evil is 
necessary for God’s purposes, only for a greater good. The specific greater good a particular evil 
is necessary for may belong to a type and amount of good intended by God without that 
particular good being specifically intended by God. So this allows that God may not specifically 
intend every particular evil because which goods obtain is not necessarily always a matter of 
divine preference. 
The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for a greater good 
or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
This thesis has been contrasted with NGE in the previous section. It seems a natural 
extension of the preceding view of God’s possible indifference between equally valuable goods 
to God’s indifference between equally bad evils (or equally good trade-offs between good and 
evil). By allowing that an evil may be necessary for the prevention of an evil no better the latter 




evil no better or serves a greater good. So this allows that God may not specifically intend every 
particular evil because which evil serves which good is not necessarily always a matter of divine 
preference.  
One may argue that this thesis is equivalent to the previous No Unnecessary Particular 
Evil Thesis, for reasons mentioned earlier: if a good g requires either evil e or evil e’ then evil e 
is necessary for a specific good, namely the good: g and the non-occurrence of e’. Whether these 
theses should be treated as equivalent or not, they both imply the following: 
The No Pointless Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil serves a greater good. 
 
On this view, there is a sense in which, all things considered, the occurrence of evil is 
good. One rationale for this view is that if evil may occur that is not part of God’s plan then 
God’s will may be thought to be thwarted in a way that diminishes God’s sovereignty. For 
example, although injustice is inherently bad and opposed to by God, on this view there remains 
a sense in which every injustice fulfills God’s purposes. Perhaps this is for the reasons adduced 
by Marilyn McCord Adams, including the act of injustice’s revealing the perpetrator’s evil 
will.
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 Unless the occurrence of the injustice ultimately serves a good, then in the end it remains 
a regrettable loss, and a respect in which God has failed to “turn all evil to good”. (One may also 
wish to add that unless it is not true that more good could have been achieved without the evil, 
the occurrence of the evil is regrettable.)  
This dilemma for theism is familiar: if all evil is necessary for good then it seems God, 
and we, cannot appropriately will against it and if not all evil is necessary for good, then God’s 
victory over evil may seem incomplete. The No Pointless Evil Thesis secures clarity regarding 




rightly willing necessary evil. Because this trade-off is a prima facie genuine dilemma for 
theism, The No Pointless Evil Thesis has a rationale that any treatment of chance and providence 
should address.  
NGE does not imply any of these theses: it does not require that the evil permitted is 
specifically and non-arbitrarily willed by God as essential to His purposes. It does not require 
that the greater or offsetting good is specifically and non-arbitrarily willed by God, as essential to 
His purposes either, just that there be an offsetting good. It does not require that the evil 
permitted is necessary for, or even serves, an offsetting good, just that God’s permission of it is 
necessary for or serves an offsetting good. So NGE does not imply meticulous providence, 
strong or weak, in any of these varieties. It does not deny them, either.  
General Policy Theodicies 
William Alston+ has stated: 
Consider the idea that God’s general policy of, e.g usually letting nature take its course 
and not interfering, even when much suffering will ensue, is justified by the overall 
benefits of the policy. Now consider a particular case of divine nonintervention to prevent 
suffering. Clearly, God could have intervened in this case without subverting the general 
policy and losing its benefits. To prevent this particular suffering would not be to lose 
some greater good or permit something worse or equally bad. And yet it seems that the 
general policy considerations of the sort mentioned could justify God in refraining from 
intervening in this case. For if it couldn’t, it could not justify His nonintervention in any 
case, and so He would be inhibited from carrying out the general policy. 
 
I understand this passage to state that God may be justified in permitting a particular evil 
e because permitting a good many evils of that type, e.g. usually letting nature take its course, is 
necessary for some good g, e.g. nature’s being highly regular, even though permitting e is not 




seems to provide counterexamples to NGE. Is there any good such a morally justified divine 
permission of e is necessary for? Alston thinks so. He says such cases are not counterexamples to 
NGE provided one widens the sphere of goods for which e is necessary to include Q “the good of 
maintaining a beneficial general policy except where there are overriding reasons to make an 
exception.”   
I do not think this is correct. Although I agree that for every evil God permits for the sake 
of general policy considerations there is a good that requires God’s permission of that amount of 
evil, I think Alston’s reasoning for this and his description of that justifying good is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of general policy theodicies (though he has just correctly 
described them).  
This is why I think Alston’s accommodation of general policy theodicies is not correct: 
The “beneficial general policy” here must be ‘letting nature take its course’; it can’t be ‘usually 
letting nature take its course’ because permitting extraordinary evils are not exceptions to that, 
and we’ve agreed permitting e is not necessary for that. So, according to Alston, God’s 
permitting e is necessary for the good of policy P: letting nature take its course except where 
there are overriding reasons to make an exception. Now, it certainly is a good to permit only 
those evils that do not have special characteristics or circumstances warranting their prevention, 
what we may call “ordinary evils.” However, e refers to any ordinary evil the permission of 
which is not necessary for Q or for nature’s being highly regular. For the permission of e to be 
necessary for P is for P to require the permission of all such ordinary evils. But why think there 
is a good that requires the permission of all such ordinary evils? Why think P is good? The only 




already agreed permitting e (and hence P) is not necessary for that. If P requires the permission 
of e, then P is not necessary for that good either. 
The idea of a general policy theodicy, as described in Alston’s above paragraph, is that 
there is a certain category of (potential) evils, the divine permission of a vague amount (“most”) 
of which, but no particular amount, is necessary for general good g to obtain, and e‘s belonging 
to this category justifies God’s permission of e. One way of putting this is that God may be 
justified in permitting some evil because He is justified in permitting the type of evil to which e 
belongs, even if He has no reason for permitting that particular instantiation or amount of that 
type of evil. The idea is not that there is some class of potential evils, natural disasters say, which 
may be divided into ordinary and extraordinary, such that the permission of all the former are 
necessary for g.  
Of course, if members of the class of evils natural disasters differ in the net good or evil 
that permitting them would result in, God would have reason to prevent the worst. This means 
He will have reason to prevent all clear-cut exceptionally bad or extraordinary cases or bad 
trade-offs, but this does not mean there exists a determinate amount of ordinary cases such that 
He must permit all of them for general good g. The challenge posed to NGE by general policy 
theodicies, as introduced by Alston, is based on the idea that a general good does not seem to 
require the permission of a determinate amount of evil. We can define some precise class of evils 
and a corresponding specific general policy, such as the divine policy of never preventing natural 
evils below a certain magnitude of disvalue, but the notion of a general good, for the sake of 
which God adopts a general policy, by itself gives us no reason to think that there is a good 
involved in God’s adopting that policy rather than some other, and so seems to give us no reason 




As mentioned, I think this challenge can be answered and I will answer it in chapter six. 
Here I wish to clarify the nature of the challenge. The general policy objection raised by Alston 
is based on the idea of general or vague goods requiring vague amounts of divinely permitted 
evil. I suggest Alston fails to appreciate the centrality of the notion of vagueness in this 
objection. To anticipate chapter six, van Inwagen thinks this apparent counterexample to NGE is 
real and therefore rejects NGE. Interestingly, Alston thinks instead that we should simply 
broaden our notion of goods to accommodate general policy theodicies. Although I think 
Alston’s proposed solution doesn’t work because it ignores the challenge’s appeal to vagueness, 
I think it is closer to the truth than van Inwagen’s response, which does implicitly recognize the 
challenge as an invocation of vague divine purposes. In chapter six I propose that the considered 
class of goods must be narrowed rather than widened: permitting e is necessary for a specific 
instantiation of the good of nature’s being highly regular in satisfaction of NGE. To see how this 





















The Evil Offsetting Good and the Prevention Offsetting Good:  






















What Must the Offsetting Good Offset? Two Views 
 
To accommodate incommensurability and rough equality and the permissibility of 
permitting an evil when that is no better than preventing it, the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis 
replaces “greater good” in Rowe’s formulation with “offsetting good”, again, as follows: 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis (NGE): God would only allow an evil if doing so is 
necessary for an offsetting good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
Although I have argued NGE should allow for the permissibility of permitting an evil 
when that is no better than preventing it, I do not mean to suggest the thesis must be interpreted 
as a requirement concerning the relative goodness of permitting versus preventing an evil. That 
depends on how “offsetting good” and “evil no better” are interpreted, and this raises the 
important issue mentioned earlier: What must the offsetting good offset? Rowe thought the 
greater good must be greater than the evil permitted, and this may seem the obvious and only 
plausible candidate.
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 However, the situation is complex. Just as permitting an evil may be 
necessary for a particular greater good, permitting an evil may also be logically tied to the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of multiple other goods and evils. This makes the requirement for 
the existence of an outweighing or offsetting good ambiguous.  
God’s preventing an evil could be better in some respects than His permitting it not only 
because of the evil prevented but because other goods would be gained by its prevention (and so 
would be lost by its permission). Perhaps God permits Lor’s suffering even though preventing 
Lor’s illness would result, or likely result, in Sam’s increased commitment to God, for example. 
Should “offsetting good” then refer to whatever makes God’s permitting the evil no worse than 




seems necessarily gratuitous for God to permit an evil whose prevention would have made the 
world better and if an offsetting good is thought of as the good that makes God’s permission of 
an evil non-gratuitous. Let us call this the “Prevention Offsetting Good” interpretation because it 
interprets the offsetting good as offsetting whatever good is involved in God’s preventing an 
evil.  
One may think that NGE need not capture the Prevention Offsetting Good sense of an 
evil’s being gratuitous or that God may have a justifying reason for permitting an evil even 
though preventing it would result in a better world. So, alternatively, an offsetting good may be 
understood instead only as some specific good that is not less in magnitude than the evil 
permitted. We may call this the “Evil Offsetting Good” interpretation.  
To illustrate this distinction, suppose God’s miraculously preventing Lor’s illness may 
likely result in Sam’s increased devotion and commitment to God, but God’s permitting the 
illness may be required for Lor’s deeper conversion. On the Prevention Offsetting Good 
interpretation, Lor’s conversion is an offsetting good because and only because it offsets both the 
negative value of the illness and the loss of the good of the optimal chance for Sam’s increased 
commitment. This good (which in other cases could be an avoidance of evil) makes permitting 
the evil result in a world no worse than the world that would result if God prevented it. On this 
interpretation what is necessarily offset by the offsetting good is the total value preventing the 
evil would have(which includes the value of avoiding the evil)  if not for this good.
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 In our 
example, God’s preventing Lor’s illness has the value of the optimal chance for Sam’s increased 
commitment to God plus the absence of Lor’s illness. This value God could have obtained by 
preventing the evil is offset by the good of Lor’s conversion God obtains by permitting the evil 




the loss of Lor’s conversion. On the Prevention Offsetting Good interpretation, Lor’s conversion 
is an offsetting good only because it makes God’s permitting Lor’s illness no worse than 
preventing it and therefore makes it morally permissible or morally best. By contrast, according 
to the Evil Offsetting Good interpretation, Lor’s conversion may be an offsetting good provided 
only it is not of less magnitude than Lor’s illness. It need not offset both Lor’s illness and the 
loss of the good of optimal chances for Sam’s conversion.  
Though Rowe’s elaboration of his thesis in terms of a good (or prevention of evil) that 
outweighs the magnitude of the evil permitted suggests the Evil Offsetting Good understanding 
rather than the Prevention Offsetting Good interpretation, the former seems to admit obvious 
counterexamples. If an offsetting good need only offset the evil permitted, an evil permitted for 
an offsetting good may still seem gratuitous because its permission may entail losses of other 
greater goods and gains of other worse evils.  So one might argue that Rowe’s thesis should have 
been formulated more simply and perspicuously by referring only to the value of God’s 
permitting the evil relative to the value of preventing it, as per the Prevention Offsetting Good 
interpretation. But the Prevention Offsetting Good Thesis also faces significant difficulties. I will 
argue that it implies this is the most valuable world God could actualize, given theism. Though 
my reply to a deontological challenge to NGE will rebut some difficulties for the Prevention 
Offsetting Good Thesis, this interpretation is still much stronger than the thesis Rowe described, 
as I will explain.  
So I will argue NGE faces a dilemma: either an offsetting good need only offset the evil 
permitted, in which case the permitted evil may still seem gratuitous, or else the offsetting good 
must offset all the good preventing the evil would involve, but then NGE seems overly 




and the merits and difficulties of each. This will pave the way for a limited solution to the 
dilemma and a better understanding of NGE and the notion of gratuitous evil in the next chapter. 
The Prevention Offsetting Good and No Better Alternative  
A First Approximation 
Let us try to express the Prevention Offsetting Good notion of an offsetting good more 
precisely, leaving examination of the Evil Offsetting Good for the next section. I will follow 
Rowe in letting ‘offsetting good’ include the avoidance of evil. The justificatory condition 
required by the Prevention Offsetting Good interpretation is that the world in which evil e is 
permitted by God is not worse than the world that would result if e were prevented. One issue to 
consider here is whether there is a fact about which world would be actual if God had prevented 
rather than permitted an evil. This is required to speak meaningfully of a definite (though 
perhaps vague) difference in value (perhaps zero) between permitting rather than preventing the 
evil, to speak of “the” offsetting good. I will argue that this view should not be formulated in 
terms of a definite offsetting good and that this makes it unlikely that this interpretation is what 
Rowe intended. 
How can the Prevention Offsetting Good justificatory condition be adequately and 
helpfully expressed in terms of a good or value that offsets the value of preventing the evil? 
Supposing (against the above reservation) there is a closest possible world P in which God 
prevents e, we may proceed to answer this by describing the offsetting good as follows:  
World A in which e is allowed contains x evils and/or y goods that are not also in the 
closest possible world P in which e is prevented, which in turn contains x’ evils and/or y’ goods 




A not in B are evils avoided by B, and vice versa. Evils gained then need not be tallied in 
addition to evils avoided, for that would be to count the evils twice. Goods in A not in B are 
goods gained by A, and vice versa. Goods in A not in B are also goods lost by B, but goods lost 
should also not be tallied in addition to goods gained in a comparison between A and B, because, 
again, that would be to count them twice. So in comparing two alternatives we need only 
consider the goods gained and evils avoided. 
So we can say world A contains (gained) goods x and/or avoidances of evil(s) y’ and 
world P contains (gained) goods x’ and/or avoidances of evils y (which include e). (We know 
that P includes at least one avoidance of evil, namely e, and so A, to be no worse, must contain at 
least one gained good or avoidance of evil.)  So allowing A is necessary for an offsetting good 
provided goods and avoidances of evils in A but not in P are not of less value than goods and 
avoidances of evils in P but not in A.  
But what is the offsetting good here? It cannot be the difference in value between 
permitting and preventing the evil because NGE claims there must be an offsetting good  but 
there may be no such difference in total value. We are allowing that permitting the evil may be 
no better than preventing it, as described previously. So it seems that if there is an offsetting 
good it must be either those specific goods and avoidances of evils in A but not in P or the value 
of those goods and avoidances of evils in A but not in P. If these are not of less value than the 
goods and avoidances of evils in P but not in A, they offset the good that would have been 






Is There a Determinate Alternative to God’s Permitting an Evil? 
Now let us return to the complication mentioned previously. The reference to an 
offsetting good in this Prevention Offsetting Good interpretation seems to treat as determinate 
what may be indeterminate, namely the complex of goods and evils that would have resulted if 
God had prevented an evil rather than permitted it. Any truth about what would have resulted 
had God (perhaps per impossible if God is necessarily good), not permitted the evil depends on 
what God’s alternative action would have been. Is there in general an objective fact about what 
God would have done had He not permitted an evil?  
In the human case, in which the agent is not unlimited in power and goodness and does 
not have complete control over all of creation, the alternative to preventing an evil is generally 
conceived of as fairly circumscribed and unproblematic. If we do not prevent an evil perhaps we 
simply do not act in a certain way or perhaps we direct our causal influence on a different part of 
the world. We can generally imagine or perhaps form reasonable judgments about what the part 
of the world containing the evil would be like. Perhaps it would even go on as if we were absent. 
Likewise, the alternatives to our permitting an evil generally comprise a fairly limited set of 
likely actions and circumstances. But what would God’s preventing an evil He has in fact chosen 
to permit involve? Is there a closest possible world in which God prevents an evil he has in fact 
permitted?  
God may prevent an evil in many different ways and each way can have implications for 
what else God chooses to do. Would God prevent Lor’s illness by aiding his doctor, by directly 
removing Lor’s disease, or by creating a different world? Would God forfeit Lor’s conversion or 




someone else’s? In general, would God have kept the purpose He actually has in permitting this 
evil, but achieved it in a different, worse, way? Or would God have adopted different aims if He 
had prevented the evil? Which aims? Is there a best set of purposes of those that involve God’s 
preventing this evil?  
Supposing there is a fact about what God’s alternative choices would have been which 
determines the value of the world that would have resulted had God not permitted an evil faces 
other significant challenges. Assuming God’s permission of an evil is not morally arbitrary (and 
hence not relevant) God’s actual permission issued from His perfect benevolence, justice, power, 
knowledge, and other perfections. In what sense are divine actions incompatible with these traits 
possible? One difficulty here is that the world in which the evil is permitted is the actual world 
and God’s actual causal activity in general, or in permitting this evil specifically, may issue 
freely but necessarily from his perfect goodness, power, and knowledge. This is at least one 
traditional point of view. If we are to consider counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, 
which impossibilities are to be considered? Would God have acted almost perfectly lovingly? 
Would God have been less than perfectly just? Would God have failed to know permitting the 
evil is best? There being a correct answer to these and other questions depends on what should 
be kept “fixed” in determining the closest possible world in which God prevents the evil and that 
depends on what is most necessary or most fundamental to the divine nature. I suggest it is 
possible that there is no uniquely correct answer, no fact about what God would have chosen 
instead of how He actually has chosen.   
It may be thought that the enormous difficulty of even attempting to answer such 
questions is not relevant. God would prevent the evil in the best way possible and so actualize 




then is the set of goods and avoidances of evil that do not obtain in that alternative and that make 
God’s permitting the evil no worse than this best possible world in which He prevents it. So if 
the best way God can prevent Lor’s illness is by direct miraculous intervention this is what He 
would have done. If the best possible world in which God prevents the evil contains different 
divine purposes, God’s purposes would have been different. We do not need to have any way to 
judge how God would prevent an evil to accurately define the offsetting good required for God’s 
justifiably permitting it. 
But this objection mistakes my point. My aim is not to question our ability to determine 
which possible world would be actual if God had not permitted an evil. That skepticism is well 
justified. Also, I am not challenging the claim that we can reasonably judge that an omnipotent 
being could have obtained some better world by preventing rather than permitting an evil. I am 
also not here challenging the claim that a gratuitous evil should be defined as an evil that could 
have been prevented by God in a way that would have resulted in a better world. I here point out 
that the assumption that there is a fact about what goods and evils would have resulted if God 
had chosen to prevent an evil deserves examination. A formulation of NGE according to which 
God’s permission of an evil must be necessary for the existence of a greater good where that 
good is defined as the good or value achieved by permitting rather than preventing an evil seems 
to make this assumption. So I am here only posing difficulties for the view that there must be 
either a specific amount of good or a specific set of concrete goods (required for an omnipotent 
and perfectly good being to permit an evil), which can be defined in terms of the relative 
goodness of God’s permitting versus preventing the evil. 
To restate my point: although it does seem meaningful to speak of specific goods that 




Offsetting Good Thesis, (and to claim that every instance of divine permission of evil also 
instantiates such goods) it is not obviously meaningful to speak of the total value of the best 
possible world in which God, contrary to actuality, prevents the evil.  It is much less speculative 
to say of an actual particular good that God’s permitting an evil is required for it, than to say that 
there is a fact about what combination of goods and evils would result if God had prevented an 
evil he has in fact permitted.  
To make an analogy, one may argue that defining an offsetting good as the difference in 
value between the actual world in which God permits an evil and the best possible world in 
which God prevents it is like defining one’s “natural speed limitation” as the difference between 
one’s actual best mile run (or even best possible mile run given natural parameters) and one’s 
best mile run if the laws of physics were different. Even if we suppose the “laws of physics” or 
powers in nature could be suspended, the circumstance being referred to is so underspecified as 
to make the difference referred to lack significant meaning. Which laws are being changed? 
Which laws can be changed so that I can still be said to run? Would an instantaneous 
“movement” count? Etc. The circumstance and implications of God’s preventing an evil in the 
best way possible, contrary to God’s actual motives and purposes, is also so underspecified as to 
make the notion of the value of the resulting world not obviously meaningful.  
How should we think about God’s prevention of an evil e He has permitted? Does God 
prevent the evil for a reason? According to the Prevention Offsetting Good Thesis, in deciding 
whether or not to permit an evil, God’s morally best choice is the choice that actualizes the best 
balance of good over evil. God’s reason for preventing evil e cannot then be to actualize the best 
world for then He would have permitted e. Is there a less than best, yet moral, choice God is 




for how long or when God would act upon it? Would it be the best of reasons that are not best? 
Why think there would be an objective best moral reason, or even best family of moral reasons, 
among moral reasons that are not best? If preventing the evil e would result in a worse world 
than permitting it, and this is not morally best, then what would be the reason for God’s 
preventing it that would factor into how God prevents it and how else God would act so as to 
determine the value of the world in which God prevents e? 
If, on the other hand, we take it as a brute unexplained given that God prevents the evil 
(as if God had acted for no reason in preventing the evil), then there is still no determinate 
answer to the questions: How would God prevent the evil? What counts as a divine prevention of 
evil? Given that a better world results from God’s permitting e than preventing it (as the 
Prevention Offsetting Good Thesis supposes), the best possible world in which God prevents e 
might be a world in which God prevents e and then causes a duplicate of e. Though God’s 
causing e may be morally worse than God’s permitting e, whether this rules out this example is 
(doubly) unclear because we had to make an exception to God’s perfect goodness to consider His 
doing what is not morally best. Would this inexplicable prevention and then re-introduction 
count as preventing the evil? Or perhaps the best possible world would be one in which God 
does not reintroduce e but corrects for the mistake of His preventing the evil. So, to refer to our 
previous (perhaps overly simplistic) example, the best possible world in which God prevents 
Lor’s illness may be one in which God first acts in a way contrary to His purpose of bringing 
about Lor’s conversion (by preventing Lor’s illness) and then allows a misfortune in order to 
achieve Lor’s conversion. So we may have competing criteria: coherence of God’s actions and 





The No Better Alternative Formulation 
This difficulty seems to be an artifact of defining the Prevention Offsetting Good Thesis 
as a requirement for the existence of an offsetting good. If we do not assume there is a unique 
possible world that is the world that would be actual had God prevented the evil (or even a 
unique set of worlds of the same value that would be the alternatives to God’s permitting the 
evil), we may state the Prevention Offsetting Good Thesis as: 
God would only allow an evil if, for any world P in which God prevents the evil, the 
goods and avoidances of evils in the actual world in which God permits the evil but not in 
P are not of less value than goods and avoidances of evils in P but not in the actual world.  
 
Since which goods and evils are in A but not in P or what value they have will depend on 
which world P is considered, it does not seem that the notion of an offsetting good has a specific 
application or sense in this thesis. This phrasing expresses the requirement that God’s permitting 
the evil be no worse than any way He can prevent it, but there is no sense in which an “offsetting 
good” makes it so. That is, it does not seem that there is any such thing as “the” offsetting good 
in this definition. Rather, according to this expression of the Prevention Offsetting Good 
Interpretation, for each possible way God could have prevented an evil (that He has permitted) 
there exists a set of goods and avoidances of evil involved in permitting the evil which outweigh 
the goods and avoidances of evil of that way of preventing the evil. So this seems to be a 
needlessly verbose rendering of the claim that God would only allow an evil if the evil could not 
have been prevented in a way that would have made the world better. This is precisely how 
Rowe’s NGE is expressed by Rhoda and also how it is interpreted by Eric Reitan and others.
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 I 
will call this the “No Better Alternative Thesis” because it claims that God would only allow an 




No Better Alternative Thesis (NBA): God would only allow an evil if the evil could not 




I will now examine ways in which the No Better Alternative Thesis differs from Rowe’s 
formulation of his theological premise. For economy of expression, “the No Better Alternative 
Thesis” will be abbreviated ‘NBA.’  
NBA Is Not a Concise Expression of Rowe’s formulation of NGE 
NBA seems very poorly expressed by Rowe’s formulation of NGE, sufficiently poorly to 
warrant thinking that it is not what Rowe intended. On Rowe’s thesis the magnitude of the evil 
permitted must be outweighed or offset by either the gain of a good or the avoidance of evil. 
Although this is also required by NBA, NBA requires more than this. 
NBA requires a certain relation between entire possible worlds: that the total value of the 
actual world in which God permits e is not less than any possible world in which God prevents e. 
What is relevant to the moral goodness of God’s permitting an evil, on this construal, is the value 
of all the goods and avoidance of evil involved in God’s permitting e and the value of all the 
goods and avoidance of evil involved in preventing e. God’s permission of e must gain goods 
and avoidances of evil that offset e, according to NBA, otherwise permitting e would be worse 
than preventing it, but if God’s permission of e involves losses of good and gains of other evils, 
then these too must be offset.  What this means is that (1) the permitted evil must be offset by 
some of the value of the goods gained and evils avoided by permitting the evil and (2) possible 
other evils gained and losses of goods by permitting the evil must also by offset by some of that 
value. So the permitted evil’s being offset by good or avoidance of evil is a poor way to describe 




just that the alternative is no better, and this may be for a variety of reasons.
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 According to 
NBA, what makes this offsetting relation obtain are all the necessary connections between the 
permission of the evil and other goods and evils and the comparative value of the different goods 
and evils brought about in these alternatives.
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 Because a consideration central to Rowe’s 
formulation of NGE, the magnitude of the permitted evil, is not central to the No Better 
Alternative formulation, NBA is not a straightforward paraphrase of Rowe’s formulation.
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This dissimilarity between Rowe’s greater good requirement and NBA is removed only if 
Rowe’s greater good can be a positive sum of values and disvalues.  That is, NBA expresses 
Rowe’s greater good requirement only if God’s achieving a greater good may be God’s, by 
permitting an evil, obtaining a set of goods, evils (which do not include e), forfeited goods, and 
avoided evils, that offset the permitted evil e.
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 This is because what NBA implies is that the 
total value of that set of evils gained, goods gained, goods lost, and evils avoided must not be 
less than the magnitude of that evil. But it is a misuse of words to speak of a gain of evils and 
forfeited goods as components of a good that outweighs (or offsets) the gain of the permitted 
evil.  
It does seem that Rowe should have added another distinct justificatory condition: that 
permitting an evil is necessary for an outweighing combination of good and avoidance of evil. 
God’s allowing Rob to suffer may be necessary for His increased patience, a good that does not 
outweigh the badness of the suffering, as well as for the prevention of Rob’s selfishness to a 
certain degree, a prevention of evil that also does not outweigh Rob’s suffering, where the 
combination of Rob’s increased patience and decreased selfishness does offset that suffering. So 
Rowe’s notion of a greater good must be widened to include good and avoidance of evil 




Rowe’s notion of a greater good with the NBA requirement, Rowe would have to further widen 
the notion of a greater good to combinations of goods, lost goods, avoided evils, and evils 
gained; that is, a greater good would have to be considered a sum over both positive and negative 
values, a net value that outweighs the permitted evil. This sufficiently stretches Rowe’s notion of 
a greater good to warrant doubting that this is what Rowe intended. Being necessary for an 
outweighing good and being necessary for the prevention of a worse evil are two distinct 
justificatory conditions according to Rowe (though for convenience of expression, he often 
called the prevention of a worse evil a greater good), so he could not have intended a greater 
good to be a net value of goods and evils. We will consider whether Rowe should have expressed 
his theological premise as NBA next. 
NGE Does Not Imply the No Better Alternative Thesis  
Alan Rhoda’s Summary of Rowe’s Thesis 
One may argue that Rowe should have expressed his NGE as NBA. In “Divine 
Providence and Gratuitous Evil” Alan Rhoda has briefly argued for the No Better Alternative 
interpretation of Rowe’s NGE.  
According to Rowe’s theological premise, a gratuitous evil is an evil God could have 
prevented without losing a greater good and without permitting an evil as bad. So, for Rowe, a 
gratuitous evil is an instance of evil God could have prevented in a way that would not a) forfeit 
a greater good, b) require a worse evil, or even c) require an equally bad evil. (I have argued 







If an evil may be permitted to prevent something worse, then not to permit it is, in 
effect, to forego a greater good, namely, a world lacking that worse evil. Thus, to 
forego a greater good is to be left with something overall worse than what one 
could have had. And to permit something equally bad is to settle for what is 
overall no better. So the whole phrase boils down to the idea that the evil in 





So Rhoda thinks Rowe’s formulation may be simplified. To obtain a worse evil is to lose 
the good of a world without that evil, so Rowe’s b) (requiring a worse evil) may be subsumed 
under Rowe’s a) (forfeiting a greater good). According to Rhoda, to prevent an evil and lose a 
good that outweighs the evil (Rowe’s a) is to make the world worse, to prevent the evil but gain a 
worse evil (Rowe’s b) is also to make the world worse, and to replace the evil with an evil 
equally bad (Rowe’s c) is to make the world no better. So, according to Rhoda, Rowe’s NGE 
means that if an evil is gratuitous, God’s preventing the evil need not have resulted in a worse 
world by a) losing a good that outweighs the evil, or by b) requiring a worse evil, and need not 
have resulted in a world no better by c) requiring an evil just as bad as the evil prevented. So 
Rhoda thinks the essential idea of Rowe’s theological premise may be concisely expressed by the 
claim that if God exists there is no gratuitous evil, where gratuitous evil is defined: 










Are All Greater Goods World Improvements? 
I now argue against this rendering of Rowe’s theological premise. Rowe’s NGE does not 
imply this definition of gratuitous evil and it is not obvious that it should. If preventing an evil 
only differs from a world in which the evil is permitted by the absence of the evil and the loss of 
a good that outweighs the evil, to prevent the evil is to make the world worse. Likewise, if 
preventing an evil only differs from a world in which the evil is permitted by the absence of the 
evil and the gain of a worse evil, to prevent the evil is to make the world worse. But preventing 
an evil may also differ from permitting it with respect to other goods and evils.  
Rhoda assumes that the goods NGE refers to must be net amounts of good, a positive 
difference in value of possible worlds. In holding that if choosing A over B involves the loss of a 
greater good then A must be worse than B, Rhoda is equating the relevant sense of a greater 
good with a world improvement or a net increase in value. So although of course Rhoda would 
agree A may be worse than B even if A contains particular goods that B lacks, he thinks this is 
not relevant. According to Rhoda, what makes an evil gratuitous is whether preventing it in the 
right way would have resulted in net good. Likewise, in holding that if choosing A, which 
includes an evil, over B, which lacks it, involves the permission of a worse evil then A must be 
worse than B, Rhoda is equating a gain of evil with a world worsening or a net decrease in value. 
(Again, of course Rhoda would agree A may be worse than B even if A contains particular goods 
that B lacks.) So Rhoda equates the goods Rowe refers to with world improvements. 
We can see why these equivalences would be made. It may seem that what matters can 
only be the comparative value of allowing versus preventing an evil: if permitting an evil is 




then permitting that evil may be worse than not. So being necessary for a particular good that 
offsets it is not sufficient for an evil’s being non-gratuitous. It may therefore seem that what 
matters to whether or not an evil should be permitted is the net good that permitting the evil is 
necessary for. And, if God could have prevented an evil so as to make the world better it may 
seem gratuitous for Him to not do so. On Rhoda’s view, the fact that permitting an evil is 
necessary for some good only matters as a component of the total value permitting the evil 
achieves. 
Whether or not these assumptions can be defended, Rowe’s NGE does not entail NBA. 
Rhoda’s assumptions about what counts as a greater good in NGE are not unavoidable. Those 
assumptions may be somewhat favored by taking NGE to define a notion of gratuitous or 
pointless evil, but it need not be so understood. The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is an alternative 
interpretation deserving of consideration, especially since interpreting a greater good as a net 
value or world improvement, despite initial intuitive appeal, is problematic, as I will argue in 
chapter four. 
The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis Alternative Interpretation 
Perhaps a morally perfect being may be justified in permitting an evil only if he has a 
reason to permit the evil in the sense that some good offsets that permission so as to make 
permitting no worse than preventing the evil. Or perhaps a morally perfect being may be justified 
in permitting an evil only provided he has a reason to permit the evil in the sense that some good 
results from permitting that evil that otherwise would not and that good is not of less magnitude 




reason that cancels the (prima facie) presumption in favor of eliminating it. These are distinct 
requirements.  
NBA expresses the former requirement. An “offsetting good” in NGE may be interpreted 
accordingly: as whatever makes permitting the evil result in a world no worse than preventing it. 
That is, NGE may be interpreted such that it precludes the possibility that God permits an evil 
even though a net amount of goodness is thereby lost. For example, suppose if Rob loses his job 
he will reorder his life priorities, a good that exceeds the disvalue of his suffering due to his job 
loss and that would be lost without that suffering, but if God prevents Rob’s job loss, some even 
greater good, such as the deeper conversion of his wife, will ensue. On this interpretation of 
offsetting good, Rob’s conversion is not an offsetting good because it does not make preventing 
the evil no better than permitting it. In this example although God’s permitting Rob’s job loss is 
necessary for the good of Rob’s conversion, it still involves a net loss of goodness: it makes the 
world worse than it otherwise would be.  
Alternatively, an offsetting good may be interpreted not as whatever makes preventing an 
evil no better than permitting it, but simply as any good that requires the permission of the evil 
(or one no better) and that is not of less magnitude than the evil permitted. On this interpretation, 
Rob’s conversion is an offsetting good. It offsets the evil permitted, though not necessarily the 
good that would result by preventing it.
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 This interpretation could include as an offsetting good 
the net “good” of all goods gained and lost and evils avoided and gained by permitting rather 
than preventing the evil, but need not. So this interpretation of the No Gratuitous Evil 
requirement does not require that God’s permitting the evil is no worse than God’s preventing it, 
only that God’s permitting the evil is either better than God’s preventing it or else brings about 




less value than the disvalue of  the permitted evil. This more general requirement may be 
expressed as: 
The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis: God would only allow an evil if allowing the evil is 
necessary for a good (which may involve the prevention of evil) that is not of less 
magnitude than the evil. 
 
Is the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis Relevant? 
Is satisfying NBA necessary for God’s justified permission of evil? Should NGE or a 
definition of gratuitous evil only consider net amounts of goodness across entire possible worlds 
as greater goods, as per the No Better Alternative Interpretation? This is to assume particular 
goods cannot be preferred by God over other goods for any reason other than that their 
permission brings about a world with more value, and this seems to assume a consequentialist 
morality that theists need not adopt. Could God have a reason to prefer a worse world over a 
better? Later I will consider deontological reasons to think satisfying the No Better Alternative 
requirement is neither necessary nor sufficient for God’s justified permission of evil. In this 
section I will examine NBA and the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis and then arrive at a better 
understanding of the notion of gratuitous evil and why it is difficult to define in the next chapter.  
In explicating Rowe’s theological premise, Rhoda says “to forego a greater good is to be 
left with something overall worse than what one could have had.” This seems correct because, all 
else being equal, a world without a good is worse than a world with it. But what if all else is not 
equal? The aim here is to articulate a necessary condition for God’s choosing to permit an evil, 
so we must consider all possible divine choice situations. Suppose God must choose between 
possibility A which includes good g and possibility B which does not include good g, but B is 




although choosing B is to forfeit the specific good g, choosing B over A is not forfeiting any 
amount of goodness, and so, in a sense, God is not losing any good. However, if by a good is 
meant an instance of good, then in that sense choosing B is to forfeit a good, namely g.  
Suppose that God’s allowing an evil e will bring about good g that outweighs e and 
God’s preventing the evil will bring about good B. Now, we can speak of the good achieved or 
lost by God’s allowing e as the difference between the goods g and B, provided those are the 
only goods involved. If B is more valuable than g then to allow e is to forfeit the amount of 
goodness by which B exceeds g. But it is also true that by preventing e God would lose good g. 
Suppose B is better than g by more than amount e and allowing e does not prevent any other 
evils. Then allowing e makes the world worse, and so would be gratuitous on Rhoda’s 
formulation. However, allowing e is necessary for token good g, a good that outweighs all the 
evil that must be permitted for it, and so satisfies the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis. Which thesis 
best serves Rowe’s evidential argument from evil? Could g be considered an offsetting good in a 
sense useful to NGE? Or is g’s offsetting e made irrelevant by the fact that preventing e brings 
about a good that outweighs g? In other words, does the requirement that God not make the 
world worse by permitting an evil serve the evidential argument from evil better than the 
requirement that God achieve some good that offsets the disvalue of the evil He permits? To ask 
a different question: Which thesis better defines gratuitous evil? Let us take up this last question 
first. Later sections will address the preceding questions. 
If looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for God’s permission of an evil, or a 
definition of gratuitous evil, as Rhoda is, then NBA may seem superior to the Evil Offsetting 
Good Thesis for admitting fewer obvious counterexamples. For example, suppose God must 




foot and permitting mild pain for that same person to recover the use of her right foot as well as 
of both arms. If the use of her left foot is worth her excruciating pain, then, construed as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for God’s permitting evil, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis 
apparently sanctions God’s choosing the former over the latter. This would be a reductio ad 
absurdum of that thesis, so construed. God’s permission of the additional physical pain (the 
difference between the mild pain and the excruciating pain) seems pointless: it achieves no good. 
The additional pain itself also seems pointless. It seems to serve no purpose because less of the 
same kind of pain could bring about more of the same type of good. So the existence of a good 
that both outweighs and requires divine permission of an evil may not seem sufficient for the evil 
(and for God’s permission of it) to be non-gratuitous. 
But we must be careful. If the same good could have been obtained without the 
permission of an evil (or one no better), the permission of the evil and the evil itself may seem 
gratuitous. But what counts as the same good? If the goods referred to may be individuated not 
by kind and amount, but by specific instantiation, then the requirement that permitting an evil be 
necessary for a greater good, rather than simply in fact resulting in a greater good, is trivially 
satisfied. Any token good that results from a divine permission of evil will be in some respects 
distinct from a token of the same kind and amount of good that does not have the exact same 
causal history. So we may charitably interpret Rowe’s No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, and the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis, as requiring that, for every divine permission of evil, there is an instance 
of a type and amount of good that requires God’s permission of that type and amount of evil 
(where one type of good is the good of resulting in a world no worse than the alternatives). If the 
good of the above example is ‘recovery of the use of a foot’ rather than ‘recovery of the use of a 




outweighs it and is appropriately classified as gratuitous by the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis. So 
such examples need not be construed as counterexamples to that thesis. 
The Gratuitous Offset Sub-Optimal Evils Objection to the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis  
Although this and similar examples need not be construed as counterexamples to that 
thesis, perhaps there are relevant examples where the goods are clearly different.  For example, 
perhaps God must choose between permitting pain that brings about a physical recovery that 
outweighs the disvalue of the pain and preventing that pain to bring about a more valuable 
psychological sense of well-being.  
A proponent of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis could, without inconsistency, discount all 
token offsetting goods that are components of sub-optimal choices as subsumed under a broader 
category. That is, if God’s permitting an evil is necessary for a good that offsets it but God’s 
preventing it would result in a more valuable good (as per my opening abstract formulation in 
terms of goods g and B), so that the permitted evil seems gratuitous, a proponent of the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis could always claim both goods are instances of the same kind of good, 
thereby making permission of the evil unnecessary for that good, and hence gratuitous, to avoid 
counterexample. In our examples the broader good may be ‘use of one’s foot’, ‘limb recovery’, 
‘bodily health’, or ‘well-being’, as needed. After all, one could appeal to goodness as a kind of 
good, if necessary, for the broadest category of good is just goodness itself.  
It may be argued that the arbitrariness of this accommodation of what counts as 
gratuitous evil demonstrates that the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not adequately define 
gratuitous evil. By the above response, if we judge an evil is non-gratuitous because of an 




such cases), we may accept the goods as distinct. If we judge the evil is gratuitous we may treat 
the goods as tokens of the same type. Our judgments of gratuity would then guide our 
classification of offsetting goods rather than the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis’s notion of an 
offsetting good’s expressing what guides our judgment that an evil is gratuitous.  Further, the 
same goods may then be treated as distinct in one context and the same in another, with no 
rationale for doing so. 
For these reasons, one may pose this argument in favor of NBA: Let us call evils whose 
permission is offset by good but where God’s preventing the evil would result in a greater good 
“sub-optimal offset evils.” There is no non-arbitrary way to individuate goods so as to 
distinguish the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis from NBA in a way that does not succumb to  
suboptimal offset evil counterexamples. Consistency and coherence can be had only if only the 
amount of goodness or total value counts in tallying goods for the sake of which God permits 
evil. But given this, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis implies God never chooses a sub-optimal 
possible world in permitting evil. So the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, construed as a definition 
of gratuitous evil, non-arbitrarily evades counterexamples of gratuitous, because sub-optimal, 
offset evils only if equivalent to NBA.  
Reply to the Gratuitous Offset Sub-Optimal Evil Objection 
Is this argument correct? Can offset sub-optimal evils be accommodated by the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis in a principled way? How are goods to be individuated according to the 
Evil Offsetting Good Thesis? Does the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis need a criterion for 
individuating goods to be both substantive and distinct from NBA? To answer these questions, it 




evil), even if defended in the way I have described, by selectively classifying different token 
goods as the same good, is distinct from NBA: its category of non-gratuitous evils is broader. If 
an evil could not have been prevented in a way that would result in a better world, it is offset by 
good (or prevention of evil), the good of resulting in net value no less than the evil has disvalue, 
but permission of an evil may be necessary for a good that offsets the magnitude of the evil even 
if this is not so, and such suboptimal offset evils are candidate non-gratuitous evils as well. So 
the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may be helpfully broader than NBA. It may correct NBA’s 
classification of suboptimal offset non-gratuitous evils as gratuitous, should there be any. If this 
correction is needed, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may offer a better definition of gratuitous 
evil, despite its vagueness. A vague accurate definition is better than a precise inaccurate one.  
The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis would still face the charge of avoiding counterexample 
only with inconsistent (or non-existent) criteria for individuating goods. But how strong is this 
criticism? Perhaps there are no clear and precise simple rules for when an evil is offset by good 
so as to be non-gratuitous in circumstances that violate the No Better Alternative requirement 
(where preventing the evil results in a better world than permitting it). This would not mean the 
Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is unilluminating. There may still be a correspondence between an 
evil’s being offset and its being non-gratuitous. To see this, suppose again that the goods and 
evils of God’s choice alternatives are dissimilar. Suppose God must choose between permitting 
psychological suffering for the sake of a spiritual good and permitting physical pain for the sake 
of physical well-being, where the net value of the latter exceeds the net value of the former. We 
may of course wonder why God would permit the psychological suffering rather than the 
physical, but if He did, would the psychological suffering, or the vague amount by which that 




psychological suffering brings about a good that outweighs it, the spiritual benefit that otherwise 
would not obtain. So the suffering does serve a purpose (in a local rather than a world-
comparative sense).  
The lesson, I think, is this: to the extent it seems that the same good (same in both amount 
and type) could have been obtained without permission of an evil, the evil seems pointless (for 
cases where we cannot think of a non-consequentialist reason God would choose a sub-optimal 
world). But with that same degree of clarity a proponent of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may 
plausibly claim the permission of the evil is not required for an offsetting good. If the same good 
can be achieved without permission of an evil, permission of the evil is not required for that 
good, as in the “foot” example. To the extent it seems that, in a divine permission of evil offset 
by some resultant good, only a dissimilar good could have been obtained without permitting the 
evil, there is a correspondingly plausible sense in which the evil is not pointless (or at least there 
is an unclarity as to whether the permitted evil is pointless). Permitting the evil is necessary for a 
good that offsets it and so serves some purpose. This is illustrated by God’s permission of 
suffering that serves a spiritual good even though a greater good could have been achieved with 
less suffering (of a different kind). So, without having clear criteria for when two tokens of good 
count as the same good, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may still correctly define (and prohibit) 
gratuitous evils as those that achieve no offsetting good. In doing so it would leave out of 




A proponent of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may also add an explanation for this 
proposed correlation between an evil’s being non-gratuitous and its being offset though sub-




are no clear cases in which God’s permission of an evil is necessary for an offsetting good where 
God’s preventing the evil is necessary for a dissimilar (qua good) greater good so that the evil 
seems pointless or gratuitous because the relevant dissimilarity between goods correlates with 
divine moral reasons. Perhaps goods may be naturally divided according to different 
deontological or other moral duties they issue, such as respect for beauty, for truth, and for the 
intrinsic value of persons. For example, if God has no reason to permit Kim’s spiritual well-
being that is distinct from reasons He has to permit Po’s well-being then His permitting an evil 
for the offsetting good of the former rather than the greater good of the latter makes the evil 
gratuitous. But if God has no moral reason that applies uniquely to Kim’s well-being, then the 
good involved may be considered creaturely well-being rather than Kim’s well-being, and if so, 
God’s permitting the evil that brings about Kim’s welfare is not necessary for an offsetting good. 
On the other hand, if God does have a reason to permit that evil for Kim’s well-being that does 
not also apply to Po, this must be because there are relevant differences in God’s moral 
relationship to Kim and these differences plausibly make the good of Kim’s welfare relevantly 
(qua type of good) distinct from the good of Po’s welfare. 
The Gratuitous Evil that is Offset But Sub-optimal Due to Greater Evil Objection 
There are further complications, however.
 
The Evil Offsetting Good requirement may be 
satisfied even if God’s permitting an evil results in more evil than good and is worse than God’s 
preventing the evil for this reason. Because the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not state the 
required good must be a net good, summed across values and disvalues, or entail no net loss of 
value across God’s choice alternatives (as the Prevention Offsetting Good interpretation does), 
permitting an evil may result in an offsetting good in this sense while also resulting in a different 
evil that makes the resultant combination of goods and evils a net evil.
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results in net evil that would otherwise not occur, the occurrence of the permitted evil may seem 
gratuitous for this reason, even if permitting it is necessary for an offsetting good. For example, 
if God’s permission of the evil of a person’s illness is necessary for the outweighing good of the 
person’s gain in mental health, the evil is offset and non-gratuitous according to the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis. But this illness may also necessitate that many other people contract the 
disease in ways that are purely destructive for them. So there may be evils whose permission 
results in both a good that outweighs it and also a greater evil that makes it better for the evil to 
not have been permitted, in circumstances where there are no divine moral considerations other 
than maximizing value. Such cases are counterexamples to the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis 
understood as a definition of gratuitous evil. Therefore, satisfying the Evil Offsetting Good 
requirement is not sufficient for an evil’s being non-gratuitous.  
NBA Construed as a Definition of Gratuitous Evil 
Let us now consider NBA as a definition of gratuitous evil. Why would God prefer a 
worse balance of good and evil over a better? Since God prefers more over less goodness it may 
seem prima facie plausible that necessarily, when choosing between world B of greater value 
than world A, God would choose world B. But even if this is correct, this does not mean an evil 
permitted contrary to this preference is pointless in a sense relevant to the evidential argument. 
Even if NBA does express a necessary and sufficient moral requirement for God’s permission of 
evil, this does not mean it expresses a definition of gratuitous evil. It may assert more than what 
is needed for this, as well as for Rowe’s evidential argument’s theological premise. That NBA is 
not a necessary condition for gratuitous evil is indicated by the psychological suffering example 
given earlier. Let us further consider counterexamples to NBA construed as a definition of 




  Non-Gratuitous Sub-Optimal Evils 
The distinctive force of Rowe’s evidential argument lies in its appeal to apparent 
pointlessness and not all examples of preferring what is over-all worse in permitting evil are 
examples of permitting pointless evil. This may be illustrated by possible divine choices between 
dissimilar goods of differing value, as mentioned. To illustrate this more specifically, suppose 
God chooses to permit Kim to suffer for the sake of her greater enlightenment, though He could 
have chosen to permit Po’s lesser suffering for the sake of Kim’s enlightenment instead. Suppose 
it would be wrong or morally worse for God to permit Po rather than Kim to suffer involuntarily 
for Kim, even though the world would contain a better balance of good over evil if God chose 
the former. God’s permission of Kim’s suffering is clearly not pointless even though His 
preventing it would have resulted in a better world. Kim’s own suffering serves the purpose of 
bringing about her own enlightenment. One may question whether it could be morally worse for 
God to permit Po to suffer for Kim or whether a world in which God did so could be better given 
the badness of God’s doing what is morally worse. My point here is only that the notion of a 
gratuitous  evil is not obviously the same as the notion of a permission of evil that does not result 
in an optimal world. In general, for any example of a non-gratuitous evil, we may imagine (in a 
loose sense) that God could have chosen a better set of goods and evils, without that fact making 
the given non-gratuitous evil seem pointless. 
Non-Gratuitous Sub-Optimal Defeated Evils 
This is also illustrated by possible divine permission of defeated evils. There is a clear 
sense in which evils that contribute to the goodness of the good they are necessary for cannot be 




remorse that entails that suffering, his suffering serves a purpose. In the context of Rob’s life, it 
is good that the suffering occurs.  This is true even if, had his suffering been prevented, the world 
would have been better overall due to other goods and evils. If there is no moral reason for God 
to prefer the less good world containing this defeated evil over its alternative, God’s permission 
of Rob’s suffering is gratuitous. The evil itself does not seem gratuitous, however. If either the 
evil or God’s permission of it is necessary for, and brings about, a good that defeats the evil, the 
evil serves a good purpose. This is true even if it seems God should have chosen a different, 
better purpose instead. Even if it is true that God would never permit an evil when preventing it 
would actualize a better world (because He could have no moral reason for doing so) this 
expresses a different requirement than non-gratuity. An evil can serve a greater good, and hence 
not be gratuitous in an appropriate sense, even if God could have obtained a better world without 
permitting the evil. 
The Definition of Gratuitous Evil Dilemma 
So, though the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may need to be fortified against the charge of 
not prohibiting clearly gratuitous permissions of evil, NBA does not obviously express the notion 
of gratuitous evil either. If evils may be gratuitous despite being offset, satisfying the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis is not sufficient for an evil’s being non-gratuitous. If evils may be non-
gratuitous because they are offset even though permitting them is not optimal as per NBA, 
satisfying NBA is not necessary for an evil’s being non-gratuitous.  I have offered reasons to 
think satisfying the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is not sufficient for an evil’s being non-
gratuitous. I have also presented reasons to think satisfying the No Better Alternative 
requirement is not necessary for an evil to be non-gratuitous. The notion of a gratuitous or 




by God in a way that would have made the world as a whole better, even if the latter is 
impossible.  So I have argued that both the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis and NBA may not 
adequately express the notion of gratuitous evil. If neither thesis offers a viable definition of 
gratuitous evil, this presents a dilemma for taking Rowe’s No Gratuitous Evil Thesis to define 
gratuitous evil, for these seem to be the only two viable interpretations of Rowe’s greater good 
requirement. A partial resolution of this dilemma is the subject of the next chapter where I 
present an approximation to the notion of gratuitous evil. First I raise a different dilemma for 
NGE. 
Rowe’s No Gratuitous Evil Thesis is Not a Definition of Gratuitous Evil
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Should the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis be construed as a definition of gratuitous evil? In 
this section I argue that neither the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis nor the No Better Alternative 
Thesis needs to express sufficient conditions for non-gratuitous evil or for God’s permission of 
evil in order to adequately serve Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil.  
I have argued that because the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not prohibit net losses in 
divine permission of evil when there is no moral reason for God to choose net losses, the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis does not adequately describe the notion of gratuitous evil. This is not a 
reason to reject that thesis as an attempt to isolate and articulate a divine moral requirement 
useful to Rowe’s atheist argument, however. The reasons I have given to think satisfying the Evil 
Offsetting Good Thesis is not sufficient for an evil to be non-gratuitous are also reasons to think 
satisfying the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is not sufficient for God’s permission of an evil to be 




Evil Offsetting Good Thesis for reasons given in the previous section, this would not mean the 
Evil Offsetting Good interpretation should be dismissed.  
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis does not aim to list all necessary conditions for God’s 
justifiably permitting evil. The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, as employed by Rowe, attempts to 
articulate one requirement for an evil’s being permitted by an omnipotent and perfectly good 
being. According to Rowe, if God allows an evil, allowing the evil must be necessary for a 
greater good or for the prevention of an evil no better. So for Rowe, an evil whose permission is 
not necessary for any greater good or prevention of worse evil  may be termed ‘gratuitous’ and 
its permission by God would be unjustified. He does not claim this is a sufficient condition for 
God’s permitting an evil. He explicitly states the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis is only a necessary 
condition for God’s justified permission of evil. So Rowe leaves open the possibility that an evil 
whose permission is necessary for a greater good may be unjustified because there may be other 
moral requirements. 
Rowe states his theological premise is not proposed as a sufficient condition for God’s 
justified permission of evil. I would argue that, in addition, we need not take Rowe’s No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis to describe sufficient conditions for an evil to be non-gratuitous or not 
pointless, only a necessary condition. The requirement of being necessary for a greater good was 
identified and employed by Rowe because it specifies a plausible divine moral requirement that 
seems violated by many instances of evil. Perhaps this requirement is also basic to our notion of 
pointless evil. However, though the notion of evils that contravene this requirement may then be 
labeled ‘gratuitous’ for convenience of expression in discussing Rowe’s argument, it should be 
kept in mind that the defining feature of this category of evils is simply their violating this one 




idea of gratuitous evil but it need not. For an evil to be gratuitous under some common notion its 
permission must be unnecessary for a greater good (in some sense) or for the prevention of an 
evil no better, but perhaps more is required. Attempting to capture a notion of gratuitous evil 
shared by theists may result in a theological premise acceptable to all and an evidential premise 
both forceful and broad in scope, but attempting to reach consensus on a single necessary 
condition for God’s permission of evil and for an evil’s being non-gratuitous may sufficiently 
sharpen focus to achieve these desiderata equally well or better.  
There are two main reasons for this. First, it is not obvious that reaching consensus on a 
notion of gratuitous evil, one that is generally agreed to have no significant counterexamples, is 
feasible.
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 Philosophers may fundamentally and irreconcilably disagree about what it means for 
an evil to be pointless or gratuitous and about God’s moral and metaphysical relation to the evils 
of the world. It would not be surprising to find such disagreement among those who disagree 
over whether God knows the future, whether or not God determines all events, and over which 
fundamentally different theory of morality is correct and how it may apply to God. Second, even 
if there were a sufficiently robust notion of gratuitous evil theists would agree to, this notion may 
not serve the evidential argument as well as a single necessary condition for an evil’s being non-
gratuitous. Both theists and atheists may have a higher degree of confidence in a single 
requirement for divine permission of evil than in a description of what is both necessary and 
sufficient for divine permission of evil. If that single requirement also seems clearly violated by 
many actual instances of evil, it may better present such evil as evidence against theism and 
therefore serve Rowe’s argument better than a full definition of gratuitous evil or of justified 




So we may define a “gratuitous evil” as an evil that does not satisfy Rowe’s theological 
premise or my No Gratuitous Evil Thesis reformulation, but should keep in mind that not 
violating this thesis may not be sufficient for being justifiably permitted by God nor for being 
non-gratuitous in some broader, more common, and less technically specified sense. It may or 
may not be possible to extract or build a definition of a common notion of pointless evil or of 
unjustified divine permission of evil from Rowe’s theological premise, and doing so is not 
needed for Rowe’s evidential argument from evil. So the Evil Offsetting Good Requirement’s 
being necessary but not sufficient for an evil’s being gratuitous in some appropriate sense does 
not mean it is not a viable interpretation of Rowe’s theological premise. 
First Horn of the Premise Dilemma: In Failing to Preclude Clear Instances of Gratuitous 
Evil, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis Weakens Rowe’s Argument  
In the beginning of this chapter I raised the question: Does the requirement that God not 
make the world worse by permitting an evil serve the evidential argument from evil better than 
the requirement that God achieve some good that offsets the disvalue of the evil He permits? Let 
us now address this. Granted the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis need not articulate a common 
notion of gratuitous evil, and even granting its high plausibility, one may still object that it is 
simply unhelpful to Rowe’s argument because it does not preclude significant categories of 
seemingly pointless evil. According to this objection, in not exhibiting the conflict between 
many apparently pointless evils and reasonable belief in God, this thesis weakens the force of the 
evidential first premise of Rowe’s argument.  
Even if we are looking only for a plausible moral requirement and not necessary and 




enough so as to strike the right balance between intuitive plausibility and precluding  as many 
types of apparently pointless evils as possible. The Evil Offsetting Good construal of the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis may seem inadequate for failing the latter. Returning to our earlier 
discussion, what about cases where God’s allowing an evil is necessary for a good that 
outweighs the evil but which also results in additional evil that makes allowing the evil result in 
net evil? What about cases where God’s allowing an evil is necessary for a good that outweighs 
the evil but which also results in the loss of other goods so that it is worse to allow the evil than 
not? One may argue that, at least for many cases, the net amount of good achieved by allowing 
an evil is what crucially matters to whether an evil is considered pointless or not. Not labeling 
such cases gratuitous does not make the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis false, but by inadequately 
expressing the notion of pointless evil in this way it exempts cases that might contribute to the 
force of the evidential argument. The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may be true but unhelpful for 
discussion of the evidential argument from evil. Let us consider this.  
If allowing an evil e1 is necessary for a good but also results in evil(s) e2 that outweigh 
that good and that would otherwise not occur, then allowing the evil e1 seems pointless only if 
evil e2 seems unnecessary for a different good that outweighs it. So for example if God’s 
allowing Joe to suffer (e1) is necessary for Joe’s improved character (good g) but also results in 
Sam’s worsened character (e2) and e1 and e2 outweigh g, then God’s permitting Joe to suffer 
seems pointless only if Sam’s worsened character is itself not necessary for a good that 
outweighs it. So although this kind of case where allowing e is necessary for a good that offsets e 
but results in net evil or net loss of good, is not precluded by the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, 
this fact does not obviously diminish the force of the evidential premise. If Sam’s turpitude is 




seems unnecessary for a greater good. In this sort of case it is e2 that would be appealed to as 
evidence, not e1. If it seems that Sam’s depravity is not necessary for any greater good then, 
although Joe’s suffering would also be a seemingly pointless evil, its being so depends on Sam’s 
depravity’s seeming unnecessary. 
However, we must keep in mind that, as noted in chapter one, e2’s not being necessary 
for a greater good does not mean e2 is gratuitous. Suppose God’s permission of e1 is necessary 
for a greater good but also results in e2 that is not necessary for a greater good though God’s 
permission of e2 is necessary for a greater good. That is, permitting e1 makes it necessary for 
God to permit e2 for some greater good. So, to take the same example, suppose God’s allowing 
Joe to suffer (e1) is necessary for Joe’s improved character (good g) but also results in Sam’s 
choosing to worsen his character (e2) and e1 and e2 outweigh g. Suppose God must permit e2 for 
the good of humans having significant morality and this makes God’s permission of e2 not 
gratuitous. This permission would not have been necessary for this good if Sam hadn’t chosen 
badly. In this case, even though God’s permission of e1 is necessary for a good that outweighs e, 
namely Joe’s improved character, because God’s permitting Joe to suffer also results in e2, 
Sam’s worsened character, which, though it must be permitted for a greater good is not itself 
necessary for any good, God’s permission of e1 results in net evil that would otherwise not 
occur.  
To take another example, suppose God’s permitting a natural disaster is necessary for the 
greater good of the opportunity it affords humans to respond with courage and compassion, but 
as a result another worse disaster threatens that God must permit only for the uniformity of 




God’s permission of the first disaster is not precluded by the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, but we 
may reasonably suppose there may be no moral considerations to justify it. 
So it does seem this objection has some merit: the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not 
forbid some divine permissions of evil that seem gratuitous and unjustified, whose apparent 
gratuity is potential fuel for Rowe’s evidential argument. These are cases where God’s 
permitting an evil is necessary for a good that offsets that evil but that also makes it necessary for 
God to permit further evil (or losses of good) for goods that otherwise would not require them. 
The potential evidence from gratuitous evil against theism is thereby reduced more than it needs 
to be by the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis.  
As stated earlier, I pose a dilemma for the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. This dilemma can 
now be divided into two, according to what is claimed of Rowe’s theological premise: the 
Definition Dilemma and the Argument Requirement Dilemma. The former besets the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis understood to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an evil’s 
being gratuitous; the latter besets the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis understood as filling the role of a 
plausible moral requirement for God’s permission of evil that seems clearly violated. For both 
the dilemma is: either an offsetting good is interpreted as a value or value/disvalue sum that 
offsets the evil permitted or only as a good that offsets the good involved in preventing the evil. 
The former is insufficiently restrictive and the latter is overly restrictive.  
I think the horns of the Definition Dilemma are sharp. How significant is my criticism of 
the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis in this section, signaling a weakness in its adequacy for Rowe’s 
evidential argument from evil? In my view, in the trade-off between plausibility and usefulness 




it. This circumstance is not what is appealed to by any of the famous instances of evil appealed 
to in the literature, such as Rowe’s case of a fawn’s dying in a forest fire or any of the other more 
horrific examples. In the next section I will dramatically sharpen the second horn of the 
Argument Requirement Dilemma, arguing NBA is overly restrictive. 
In this chapter I posed a dilemma for defining gratuitous evil, specified its source in the 
different ways an evil may be considered non-gratuitous, and gave reasons for thinking these 
ways do not admit precise characterization. I presented a new definition of the notion of 
gratuitous evil and explained the difficulties involved in specifying it more completely. I then 
argued that NGE need not be understood as definitive of gratuitous evil and pointed out a 
weakness of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis for serving the role of Rowe’s theological premise. 
In the next chapter I examine the second horn of this new dilemma for NGE: NBA’s being too 
restrictive to serve the role of Rowe’s theological premise. 
Second Horn of the Premise Dilemma:  The No Better Alternative Thesis Implies the No 
Surpassable World Thesis 
I will argue that NBA implies that if God exists, this is the most valuable possible world 
God could actualize. Therefore, NBA is too restrictive to serve as Rowe’s theological premise. 
The No Better Alternative Requirement Must Apply to Divine Permission of Loss of Good  
According to NBA, if an evil is gratuitous, there is a world God could actualize in which 
the evil is prevented that is better than the (actual) world in which it is allowed. The sense in 
which the former is better than the latter according to NBA is that the former is more valuable. 
One possible world is better than another in this sense either because it contains more good or 




worse because it contains more evil is to lose the good of a world with less evil. Should we also 
say that to actualize a world that is worse because it contains less good is to gain the evil of a 
world with less good? It seems not. Though an improvement is always good, the absence of a 
possible improvement is not necessarily an evil. As Rowe remarks, the loss of a good is not 
necessarily the gain of an evil.
48
 Not having more of something good is not necessarily to have 
something bad. So we may say that the gain of an evil is the loss of a good, though the loss of a 
good is not necessarily the gain of an evil. Initially at least, it may therefore seem that NBA does 
not imply: 
Loss of Good NBA: God would only allow a loss of good if the loss of good could not 
have been prevented in a way that would have resulted in a better world 
 
In comparing the overall value of two worlds, the distinction between an absence of an 
evil from the presence of a good and the distinction between the presence of an evil and the 
absence of a good (a distinction Rowe found relevant) makes no difference: all else being equal, 
a world that contains a disvalue of amount x is worse by amount x than a world that does not, 
and a world that lacks a good of amount x is also worse by amount x than a world that does not. 
This may not seem to entail that the No Better Alternative requirement for divine permission of 
evil must also be a requirement for divine permission of losses of good (i.e. that NBA entails 
Loss of Good NBA). One may think that what equivalently satisfies the justificatory condition, 
the requirement that permitting the evil has no less value than any possible way of preventing it, 
may not satisfy a description of what is being justified, namely God’s permission of an evil. That 
is, one might think that though a loss of good in preventing an evil may make permitting an evil 
no worse than preventing it just as well as an equivalent gain of evil would, this does not mean 




morally required for God’s justifiably permitting a loss of good. It is natural to think permitting 
an evil may require a different explanation or justification than not bringing about a good. Most 
common examples of divine permission of evil seem at least prima facie to most directly conflict 
with divine compassion or justice, whereas God’s not bringing about a good seems to more 
directly conflict with divine maximal generosity. However, although in general what is morally 
required for God’s permission of an evil need not be morally required for God’s permission of a 
loss of good, I will argue that a proponent of NBA must accept that the No Better Alternative 
requirement holds for both, that God would only allow a loss of good if the loss of good could 
not have been prevented in a way that would have resulted in a better world (Loss of Good 
NBA).  
A proponent of NBA would be hard pressed to find a rationale for thinking God’s 
permitting a loss of good does not share the same moral requirement as God’s permitting an evil. 
If, in choosing whether to permit an evil or not, God necessarily chooses an optimal world, what 
would warrant a different rationale for God’s choosing whether or not to permit a loss of good? 
The NBA requirement seems based on the fundamental idea that a perfectly good being would 
prefer more good over less and less evil over more. This preference applies equally well to a 
choice to prevent an evil as to a choice to permit a loss of good.  
We can demonstrate this reasoning more rigorously as follows. Let us consider only 
divine choices between better and worse worlds, excluding morally arbitrary choices between 






Let us divide NBA into two more specific theses: 
NBA-Less Evil: God would not allow an evil if the evil could have been prevented in a 
way that would have resulted in a world that is better because it contains less evil 
 
NBA-More Good: God would not allow an evil if the evil could have been prevented in a 
way that would have resulted in a world that is better because it contains more good 
 
Consider possible world A that includes evil e and possible worlds Cn that do not, where 
all Cn contain no more evil than A but are worse than A because they contain less good. Suppose 
NBA’s necessary condition for God’s permissibly permitting e is satisfied; that God could not 
have prevented e in a way that results in a better world. Now let us consider this: Could God 
permissibly choose a world Cn? To choose a world Cn rather than A is to choose a loss of good 
that could have been prevented in a way that results in a better world, namely, A. This is 
prohibited by Loss of Good NBA, which, again, states that God would only allow a loss of good 
if the loss of good could not have been prevented in a way that would have resulted in a better 
world. So to think God could permissibly choose a world Cn one would have to deny Loss of 
Good NBA. To coherently deny this one must think there may be a reason for God to prefer a 
worse world (Cn) over a better world (A) when the former has less good. (If this reason were to 
also imply that God could prefer a worse world over a better world when the former has more 
evil then it would directly contradict NBA (because then God could permit an evil of the worse 
world that could be prevented in a way that results in better world). So this reason must avoid 
this implication.) Now if Cn has no less evil than A then, all other morally relevant factors being 
equal, God’s preferring Cn is to prefer less over more good, which is impossible.
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 So let us 
consider the case where A contains more evil than Cn but is nonetheless of greater value because 




over A, a proponent of NBA must think that God may have reason to prefer a loss of good (of 
Cn) over a gain of evil (of A) of lesser magnitude (lesser disvalue). Since, all else being equal, 
God necessarily prefers more good over less, a proponent of NBA must also think that God may 
have reason to prefer a loss of good (of Cn) over an equivalent gain of evil (of A). (If God may 
prefer loss of good g over e when g has greater disvalue, then God may prefer g over e when g 
has no greater disvalue.) We may term this the “Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim” 
Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim:  God may have reason to prefer a loss of good over an 
equivalent gain of evil. 
 
The Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim means that even if a world is worse than another because 
it contains less good, God may have reason to prefer it because it also contains less evil. This is 
to hold that the avoidance of evil can carry moral force greater than avoidance of an equivalent 
loss of good, that the avoidance of evil is a morally relevant factor in addition to comparative 
goodness or value that may over-ride over-all greater value.  
But if the Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim is true then we have no reason to think NBA 
is true. How can NBA require that there be no better alternative to permitting e if God may have 
a reason to choose a worse world over a better? By the Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim, world 
A, in which evil e is permitted, may be actualized by God even though alternative world B in 
which e is prevented is better. World A may be worse than B because it contains less good than 
B, but still be preferred to B because B contains more evil. That is, although one who denies 
Loss of Good NBA could have reason to accept  
NBA-Less Evil: God would not allow an evil if the evil could have been prevented in a way that 





She would have no reason to accept: 
NBA-More Good: God would not allow an evil if the evil could have been prevented in a way 
that would have resulted in a world that is better because it contains more good 
 
Even if e could have been prevented in a way resulting in more good (though not less evil) and a 
more valuable balance of good over evil, permitting e may be preferred because it brings about 
less evil. (Recall that preventing an evil may necessitate the occurrence of other evils.) Yet NBA 
entails NBA-more good. 
 The denial of Loss of Good NBA implies the Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim. The 
Good and Evil Asymmetry Claim implies NBA-More Good is false. If NBA-More Good is false 
then NBA is false. So NBA implies Loss of Good NBA.  
The Definition of Evil 
The equivalence for NBA of a loss of good with the gain of an evil is suggested by the 
following definition of evil offered by Alan Rhoda to help clarify NBA:  
An evil =
def. 
An event-token which is such that, in relation to the Good, it is objectively 
better that it not occur, than that it occur.  
This definition conveys the reasonable symmetry in application of the NBA moral 
requirement to both loss of good and gain of evil, suggesting NBA and Loss of Good NBA are 
equivalent.   
This is best shown with a reasonable modification of it. In keeping with the aim of 
defining gratuitous evil as broadly as possible so as not to unnecessarily exempt classes of 




bad events. The examples Rhoda gives of evils such as being ugly and being selfish seem best 
classified as states of affairs rather than events and God can prevent the existence or occurrence 
of states of affairs as well as of events. The existence of hatred, people who are unhappy, unjust 
social structures, etc are evil states of affairs that may have been prevented by God and may be 
deemed gratuitous. So it seems Rhoda should agree to define an evil as a state of affairs that, all 
else being equal, is better to not obtain than obtain.
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All else being equal, it is always better that a net amount of evil not occur than occur. 
Likewise, all else being equal, it is always better that a net loss of an amount of good not occur 
than occur. So on this definition of an evil, an amount of evil, an increase of an amount of evil, 
and a decrease of goodness are all evils. By this definition of evil, every net loss of goodness 
across possible worlds is the evil of a worse world. So, by this definition of evil, NBA implies 
Loss of Good NBA.  
Defining evil is difficult, however. Being better to not occur than occur, all else being 
equal, is necessary for an event to be evil, but perhaps more is required that would distinguish 
evils from losses of good. Also, even if Rhoda’s definition should be expanded to include states 
of affairs, it may be argued that only concrete states of affairs and not relations between possible 
worlds, such as losses of good, should be included. For these reasons I think Rhoda’s definition 
indicates NBA is naturally understood to imply Loss of Good NBA, but do not claim it 







NBA Implies the No Surpassable World Thesis  
If a gratuitous evil is an evil God could have prevented in a way that would have made 
the world better and a gratuitous loss of good is a loss of good God could have prevented in a 
way that would have made the world better, then there being no gratuitous evil and no gratuitous 
losses of good means there are no net gains of evil or net losses of good in God’s choice of the 
actual world over other possible worlds (that God could have actualized instead.) This has two 
related important consequences.  
It implies that in choosing between two worlds A and B where A contains some evil or 
lacks some good that B does not and B has less value than A (because B still contains less total 
good, more total evil, or both) God must choose A. That is, there being no optimal alternative to 
God’s permitting the evil or loss of good of A is both necessary and sufficient for God’s 
permitting it. This is because in order for B to have less value than A it must contain some evil or 
loss of good not in A and God’s permission of that evil or loss of good would violate NBA. It 
would violate NBA because by stipulation there is a better alternative to God’s permitting that 
evil or loss of good in B, namely A. So in choosing between worlds that differ in total value (so 
that God’s choice is not morally arbitrary for this reason) NBA implies there being no better 
alternative to God’s permission of an evil (or loss of good) is both necessary and sufficient for 
God’s permission of that disvalue.  
We may also describe this implication in terms of the loss of the good of a better world 
involved in God’s permitting a sub-optimal evil. An evil is either gratuitous or non-gratuitous. 
According to NBA, to prevent a gratuitous evil is to prevent an evil and to actualize a good, the 




a good, the good of a better world and the good of the world’s not containing an evil that would 
make the world worse. Preventing a non-gratuitous evil when that choice is not morally arbitrary, 
then, is to permit a gratuitous loss of good, (by bringing about a world that could have been 
prevented in a way that results in a better world). This is prohibited by Loss of Good NBA. So 
by NBA, God must permit all non-gratuitous evil. By NBA a non-gratuitous evil is an evil whose 
permission is either morally arbitrary or is necessary for an optimal world. If God must prevent 
all gratuitous evil and must permit all non-gratuitous evil, when that choice is not morally 
arbitrary, then an evil’s being gratuitous is both necessary and sufficient for God’s preventing it.  
This precludes the possibility that a moral consideration that is not entailed by 
maximizing value may be required for God’s permission of evil or loss of good. So NBA is far 
more restrictive than what Rowe intended by his theological premise. As mentioned earlier, 
Rowe explicitly stated his No Gratuitous Evil Thesis is only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition, to allow there may be other moral requirements for God’s permission of evil besides 
being necessary for a greater good.  
Now let us consider the second related implication of NBA, given NBA’s equivalent 
treatment of an evil and a loss of good. If NBA implies there are no net amounts of evil or net 
losses of good God could have prevented, then NBA implies God could not have actualized a 
more valuable world than the actual world. I will call this the “No Surpassable World Thesis.”  
No Surpassable World Thesis: God could not have actualized a more valuable world than 
the actual world  
 
One way to see this is to consider that because NBA implies Loss of Good NBA, the 




must prevent all gratuitous loss of good and must permit all non-gratuitous losses of good, when 
that choice is not morally arbitrary, then a loss of good’s being gratuitous is both necessary and 
sufficient for God’s preventing it. Every choice of a less valuable world over a better world is the 
permission of a gratuitous loss of good (a loss of good that could have been prevented in a way 
that would have resulted in a better world), by NBA. Therefore, NBA implies that in any choice 
between worlds of differing value, God necessarily chooses the better world, which  is the No 
Surpassable World Thesis. 
In other words, according to NBA, an evil is gratuitous if it is a component of a net 
amount of evil or net loss of good that God could have prevented in a way that would have made 
the world overall better, but to prevent such a net loss of good or a net amount of evil just is to 
choose a better world over a worse world. So to say that if God exists there is no gratuitous evil 
is just to say that if God exists God could not have chosen to make the world better by 
preventing evil. Since NBA implies Loss of Good NBA, according to NBA God also could not 
have chosen to make the world better by preventing any loss of good. One possible world is only 
more valuable than another because it contains less evil or more good or both. If God could not 
have made the actual world better by choosing a world with less evil (by preventing net evil) or 
by choosing a world with more good (by preventing net loss of good), then there are no possible 
worlds God can actualize that are more valuable than the actual world.  
To clarify, I am not claiming that NBA must say that only amounts of evil or net 
worsening of the world by greater evil, are evils (and likewise for losses of good). For NBA to be 
meaningful, evils must be taken to include particular instances and not just relative amounts of 
evil or “world-worsenings.” If it did not a gratuitous evil would simply be “an amount of evil 






the additional either implausible or poorly worded thesis that there are no evils that God could 
prevent). What I claim instead is that NBA’s assumption that only the resultant net loss of value 
is relevant to whether or not an evil is gratuitous implies the No Surpassable World Thesis 
because it implies Loss of Good NBA. 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis Should Not Entail the No Surpassable World Thesis 
NGE appeals to a more specific consideration than the improvability of the world to 
argue against theism. It appeals to evil whose permission seems to serve no justifying purpose. 
Though God’s elimination of such evil may increase the total value of the world (though, again, 
it need not according to the Evil Offsetting Good alternative interpretation), apparently pointless 
evil is just one reason for thinking the actual world could have been better. Another, different, 
reason is that God could have created or actualized a world with more good. NGE claims only 
that God would not permit pointless evil, not that God would actualize the most good. The latter 
requirement faces the familiar challenge that there may be no greatest possible world. NGE 
should not be formulated so as to inherit this difficulty, if possible. So one respect in which 
NGE, as employed by Rowe, differs from the No Surpassable World Thesis is that the former, 
unlike the latter, concerns only actual evil whose permission by God seems unjustified and not 
the absence of possible good that may seem incompatible with a maximally generous omnipotent 
and perfect creator. 
NGE should not be formulated so as to imply that God would create the most valuable 
possible world, if possible. It seems NGE can be coherently stated without implying that God 
would create the greatest possible world. The requirement that every divine permission of evil 




greater good God must permit the evil. The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, for example, does not 
imply that there can be no good reason to prevent an evil whose permission results in a good that 
offsets it. It only states that if God does permit an evil, there must be an offsetting good. Unlike 
NBA, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not preclude preventing a non-gratuitous evil when 
permitting it is necessary for an optimal world. Because NGE can be coherently stated without 
implying the No Surpassable World Thesis, NBA’s implying the No Surpassable World Thesis is 
a mark against it.  
The Governance vs. Creation Objection 
One may argue that another respect in which NGE prima facie differs from the No 
Surpassable World requirement is in the divine choice context it applies to: the former involves 
only God’s response to the world He has created, the latter involves both this and God’s choice 
in the initial act of creation. It is one thing to think that every divine permission of evil must be 
necessary for a greater good; it is another to think that God necessarily always chooses to bring 
about the best world He can. NGE concerns God’s choice to prevent or permit an evil, a choice 
necessarily made in the context of a world that would contain evil apart from divine intervention. 
It concerns the manner in which God governs or exercises His control over the potential evil of 
the given created world. Perhaps it requires that God permits or prevents the world’s evil so as to 
make the world the best it can be or perhaps it merely requires that God’s permission of evil 
brings about some offsetting good. Both of these requirements are narrower than the requirement 
that God create an unsurpassable world, which involves God’s choice of which possible initial 
world state to bring about. On NGE, the alternatives to God’s choice are how the given created 




One may then object to my claim that NBA implies the No Surpassable World thesis by 
pointing out that NBA speaks of God’s allowing evil.  If God has a choice between creating a 
world x which will have x1 evil or g1 good (or which has expected value x) and creating a world 
y which will have lesser x2 evil or greater g2 good (or which has expected value y), it is not 
accurate to say God allows x1-x2 evil or g1-g2 loss of good by creating x instead of y. The terms 
‘allowing’, ‘permitting’, and ‘preventing’ only describe responses to circumstances, in this case 
to evils that would occur unless God prevents them, and so cannot describe God’s act of 
choosing to create world x rather than y. One may think of God’s “responses” to evil as 
components of a single divine timeless creative act, but this is not required of theism. So the 
distinction between NBA and the No Surpassable World Thesis is built into the wording of 
NBA, one may argue. 
There are three reasons to reject this argument that NBA cannot entail the No Surpassable 
World Thesis. First, this second prima facie difference is more superficial than the first. One may 
think some evils are gratuitous by NGE because God could have prevented them by creating a 
different initial world state, such as a different natural order. Second, distinguishing NBA from 
the No Surpassable World Thesis  by restricting NBA to divine governance of creation rather 
than to both divine governance and an initial act of creation is ad hoc. This is shown by the 
irrelevance to NBA of the notions of permission and prevention as opposed to simply ‘choosing’ 
or ‘actualizing’. Because on NBA what matters is only the comparative goodness of God’s 
choice alternatives, on NBA permitting net evil implies preventing net good. The same choice 
may be described as a permission (of evil) and as a prevention (of good), the good of a better 
world. This indicates the ordinary meanings of permission and prevention are irrelevant to NBA. 




God’s choosing between possible worlds. One component of that choice may be described as the 
permission of an evil but that same choice may also be viewed as the prevention of a good. 
Neither description plays any role in the content of NBA, which, again, concerns a choice 
between possible worlds. Though NBA putatively concerns a subset of divine choices between 
possible worlds, those involving the permission of evil, that appearance dissolves upon closer 
examination, as I have argued.  
Because NBA is not only a requirement for God’s permission of evil, but also for God’s 
permission of losses of good, it cannot differ from the No Surpassable World thesis in the first 
respect I mentioned, namely pertaining to actual evil rather than possible good. Similarly, NBA 
also does not naturally accommodate the second respect in which some may claim NGE prima 
facie differs from the No Surpassable World Thesis: the distinction between God’s choice to 
create one world rather than another and God’s choice to allow a given world to contain an evil 
or not. If by NBA what matters to God’s choice in permitting evil or loss of good, including the 
evil or loss of good of there being a worse world than there could have been, is only the value 
permitting the evil or loss of good has relative to the alternative, then NBA applies equally well 
to God’s decision of which world to create in an initial act of creation. The decision to create one 
world rather than another less good world is one instance of a divine choice between possible 
worlds of differing value. The distinction between choosing to create less good and merely to 
allow less good therefore seems irrelevant to NBA. According to NBA when God is faced with a 
choice to permit an evil what is relevant to that choice is only the comparative value between 
possible worlds in which God permits the evil and worlds in which God prevents it. Likewise, 
according to NBA, when God is faced with a choice to “permit a loss of good” what is relevant 




in which it does not. According to NBA, in both cases God would choose so as to make the 
world the most valuable it can be. So the choice circumstance NBA applies to is general enough 
to include the choice of which world to create (if God has such a choice). For in choosing which 
world to create of worlds of differing value God is choosing between the good of one world and 
the loss of good involved in creating the less good world. According to NBA God would 
necessarily choose the former. This is the third reason one cannot argue NBA does not imply the 
No Surpassable World Thesis on the basis that the former concerns only divine governance and 
the latter both divine governance and creation. 
Finally, even if we restrict NBA to God’s governance of the created world and do not 
apply it to a possible choice made in the initial act of creation, NBA still implies: 
No Improvable World Thesis: Subsequent to the initial act of creating the world God 
could not have actualized a better world than the actual world other than by a new act of 
creation 
 
The No Improvable World Thesis is still much stronger than Rowe’s theological premise. 
The No Surpassable World Thesis and the No Improvable World Thesis claim more than NGE 





























A Better Understanding of the Notion of Gratuitous Evil  
Our discussion has made progress in clarifying the notion of gratuitous (or most 
fundamentally pointless) evil. This clarification explains why it is difficult to define gratuitous 
evil precisely.  I propose the following imprecise definition, followed by an explanation of the 
necessity of its imprecision: 
An evil is gratuitous if and only if the occurrence of the evil is not offset by good in God’s 
choice context.  
 
First I will explain the inelegant inclusion of the qualification “in God’s choice context”, 
which is similar to the qualification “given the evil would occur unless God prevents it” (but 
avoids implying there was an antecedent fact about whether the evil (perhaps a free choice) 
would occur).  I will then explain the imprecision of “not offset by good” and why that 
imprecision is necessary.  
The qualification “in God’s choice alternatives” or “given the evil would occur unless 
God prevents it” is necessary to avoid misunderstanding. Stating that an evil is gratuitous if and 
only if God’s permission of the evil is not offset by good suggests that for an evil to not be most 
basically pointless the net value of God’s permission of it must be offset, which is the prevention 
offsetting good thesis. What we want, though, is to express the idea of an evil’s being pointless 
or gratuitous, which may be different, as I have argued. God’s permission of an evil may be 
pointless if there is no moral reason for God to permit the evil and yet the evil itself may not be, 
if it is a defeated evil, for example. The added complication is that simply stating that an evil is 
gratuitous if and only if the evil is not offset by good suggests that the occurrence of an evil that 




not occurred, is necessarily pointless. This is a kind of pointlessness, namely being regrettable, as 
mentioned in chapter one, but not the kind of pointlessness required of our definition. Our 
definition concerns the justification for an omnipotent being’s permission of evil. My evil choice 
may be unnecessary for an offsetting good and so regrettable, yet God’s permission of it may be 
necessary for an offsetting good, and this latter is sufficient for the evil to be considered non-
gratuitous in the appropriate sense. That is, the evil’s occurrence given that I choose it, may be 
offset by good. The occurrence of the evil in the given divine choice context may have a point 
and be offset by good, say the good of the existence of moral freedom, though not outside that 
context or absolutely. An evil’s being necessary for an offsetting good in the given divine choice 
context is an appropriate sense of having a point or being non-gratuitous in the context of the 
evidential argument from evil. So the least potentially misleading wording is that given. The 
existence of gratuitous evil so defined is incompatible with Rowe’s theological premise and the 
No Gratutitous Evil Thesis formulation of it, given theism.  
 Now I will explain why I think the notion of gratuitous evil precludes specifying 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the criterion of not being “offset by good.” What is 
relevant to whether God’s permission of an evil is offset by good are only the values and 
disvalues gained by God’s permission of the evil.
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  Values are either goods gained or evils 
avoided. Disvalues are either evils gained or goods lost. So what is relevant to whether an evil is 
offset by good is exhausted by the following: goods gained, evils avoided, goods lost, and evils 
gained by God’s permitting the evil. However, there is not one but (at least) three distinct basic 
ways these values and disvalues may offset a divine permission of evil by good, and so three 







An evil may be non-gratuitous if God’s permitting the evil is necessary for: 
1. An Offsetting Value: either a good of no less value than the magnitude of the evil, the 
avoidance of an evil of no less disvalue than the evil, or a set of goods and avoided 
evils whose combined value is not less than the magnitude of the evil. ; or 
2. An Offsetting Value and Disvalue Sum: a positive sum of values and disvalues not 
less in magnitude than the evil permitted; or 
3. The No Better Alternative circumstance: The summed value of all goods gained and 
lost and all evils gained and avoided, with the permitted evil included, is non-
negative.  
 
(1) An Offsetting Value  
An evil’s being necessary for an Offsetting Value (in God’s choice context) is not sufficient for 
its non-gratuity because God’s permitting an evil that is necessary for an Offsetting Value may 
also result in a net disvalue, by resulting in worse evils and losses of good, and those resultant 
disvalues may make the evil permitted gratuitous. This is illustrated by my example of an illness 
that benefits the sufferer but results in purely destructive suffering for others. However, even if 
goods lost and/or evils gained by God’s permitting an evil outweigh the value gained, God’s 
permission of the evil may still serve a good purpose and so the evil may be offset by a good and 
be non-gratuitous. This may be so if the offsetting goods are not the same as the outweighing lost 
goods. For example, God’s permitting Kim’s suffering for Kim’s good may be offset by that 
good of Kim’s spiritual benefit even though God could have permitted Kim’s suffering for Po’s 




gratuitous even if God’s permission of the evil results in evil that outweighs that good. (This is 
so even if God’s permission of the evil is “gratuitous”. Again, a definition of gratuitous evil need 
not comprise necessary and sufficient conditions for God’s permission of evil.) So being 
necessary for an offsetting value is a way of being non-gratuitous distinct from resulting in no 
net disvalue, which NBA requires. 
(2) An Offsetting Value and Disvalue Sum 
One may think the notion of an offsetting good should be expanded to include, not only 
values and sums of values as per 1), but positive sums of values and disvalues. So for example, 
Dor’s disease whose benefit to Dor outweighs the badness of the illness is not thereby non-
gratuitous if Dor’s illness also results in suffering for many others that outweighs his benefit. 
However, if that resultant additional suffering is also necessary for the well-being of those 
additional others or some other outweighing good, Dor’s illness is not a gratuitous evil.  In this 
case a positive sum of resultant evils and goods is what offsets the evil of Dor’s illness. The idea 
here is that God’s permission of an evil’s being necessary for a value that offsets the evil may not 
be what makes the evil non-gratuitous. If permitting the evil brings about further evils and/or 
losses of good the evil may be non-gratuitous only because such disvalues, as well as the 
permitted evil, are offset by goods gained and/or evils avoided.  
This circumstance of non-gratuity is distinct from an evil’s (divine permission’s) being 
necessary for an offsetting value (1). This circumstance is also distinct from there being no better 
alternative to God’s permission of the evil. That is, it is distinct from an evil’s being non-
gratuitous because the sum of all goods and evils gained and lost by its permission by God is 




disvalue even if preventing the evil would have been better (due to relevantly dissimilar goods or 
avoidances of evils). Suppose God’s preventing Dor’s illness would result in a better world due 
to the gain of a different set of goods, including goods achieved by Dor’s descendents. Because 
Dor’s illness is of benefit to Dor and likewise for all others affected by Dor’s illness, for a total 
positive sum of goods and evils (benefits and illness), the fact that God’s preventing Dor’s illness 
would have resulted in different and greater goods would not make Dor’s illness itself 
pointless.
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 So perhaps a sub-optimal evil may be non-gratuitous because permitting the evil 
results in concrete goods and evils (rather than avoided goods and evils) whose summed value, 
with the permitted evil included, is non-negative.  
Or perhaps there is a non-negative sum of goods and evils gained and lost relative to a 
way that God may prevent the evil different from an impermissible optimal way. For example, 
suppose Dor may avoid contracting a disease by missing work and that in this case his work 
substitute, whose life would be defeated by the illness, would contract the disease. Suppose this 
person’s contracting the disease would lead to its cure, making this divine option the most 
valuable, yet it would be wrong for God to allow this person’s life to be on the whole bad for any 
good purpose. So this way in which God may prevent Dor’s illness is optimal but impermissible. 
Suppose another way God may prevent Dor’s illness is by miraculously annihilating the virus 
that would cause the disease, but Dor would in fact benefit spiritually by contracting the disease 
as would someone else who contracts the disease because of Dor, and so God does not prevent 
Dor’s illness. In this case God’s permitting Dor to catch the virus is non-gratuitous because and 
perhaps only because the evil of Dor’s illness is offset by a positive sum of values and disvalues 
relative to this alternative of God’s annihilating the virus. So a permitted evil may be non-




values and disvalues, even though a different greater good (actualizing an optimal world) would 
be served by its prevention.  
It is clear, however, that (2) is not sufficient for non-gratuity. Because (2) requires only a 
non-negative set of values and disvalues, rather than a non-negative sum of all relevant factors, 
an evil may trivially satisfy this condition. Losses of good or gains of evil not included in a non-
negative set may make the evil gratuitous.  
(3) The No Better Alternative circumstance  
(3) is sufficient for non-gratuity. If God’s permitting an evil is necessary for an optimal world, 
the evil is non-gratuitous. But (3) is not necessary because an evil may also be non-gratuitous in 
ways (1) and (2). 
To summarize, an evil may be non-gratuitous because offset by some or all values 
gained (goods gained and/or evils avoided) (1) , by the net good of some of the values and 
disvalues gained (goods and evils gained and/or lost) (2), or by the net good of all the values and 
disvalues gained (goods and evils gained and/or lost) (3). Because this exhausts all possible ways 
of combining all possible factors relevant to the permission of an evil’s being offset by good, we 
may with confidence propose the following as a necessary condition for an evil’s being 
gratuitous: 
An evil is gratuitous if God’s permitting the evil gains no offsetting value nor offsetting 
value and disvalue sum 
 





Why a precise definition of gratuitous evil is not available 
 We can see now why, in addition to the problem of avoiding theological assumptions, it 
is difficult to define the notion of gratuitous evil more precisely. Although an evil must fail to 
satisfy (1) or (2) or (3) to be gratuitous, only satisfying (3) is sufficient for being non-gratuitous. 
So to describe sufficient conditions for an evil’s being gratuitous we would need to describe in 
general terms how an evil that satisfies (1) may still be gratuitous, to preclude those 
circumstances, and likewise for (2). Our definition would then be as follows: 
An evil is gratuitous if and only if: 
a) It is not optimal, and  
b) It is not necessary for an offsetting value, unless x, and 
c) It is not necessary for an offsetting value and disvalue sum, unless y 
How can we specify x? Can we characterize in a general way how an evil that is offset by a 
value may be gratuitous? We could plausibly claim that God’s permission of the evil’s also 
resulting in outweighing disvalues of evils gained and/or goods lost is necessary for this. But 
God’s permission of the evil’s resulting in outweighing or net evil is not sufficient. We would 
then have to claim to exhaust ways of being non-gratuitous despite outweighing evils, to say that 
being a defeated evil is the only way, for example. To specify the circumstances in which an 
outweighing loss of good does not make the evil gratuitous we would need a criterion for 
individuating goods, indicating which outweighing lost goods count as the same type as that 
gained so as to make the evil permitted gratuitous. This was discussed in chapter two. But, as 




is similarly complex. If permitting an evil is necessary for an offsetting non-negative value and 
disvalue sum but this sum is a subset of a sum that is negative, then the evil is gratuitous, unless 
conditions x are satisfied. 
A Reformulation of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis 
We may now return to interpreting “an offsetting good”, the subject of chapter two. We 
may interpret an “offsetting good” liberally as including these three ways in which an evil may 
be offset, and so expand the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis (in ways not intended by Rowe’s 
theological premise, for reasons given in chapter two) as follows:   
The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis: God would only allow an evil e if God’s permitting e is 
necessary for goods and avoidances of evil of no less value than e or if God’s permitting 
e results in a set of goods and evils gained and lost whose sum is not a disvalue 
 
 This rendering of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, a formulation of a necessary condition 
for non-gratuity, incorporates my analysis of the notion of gratuitous evil of this chapter. An 
evil’s being optimal is one way the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis may be satisfied, so this thesis is 














Part 2  
Defense of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis 
 
Chapter 4 













NGE is fundamental to the notion of God’s perfect goodness 
 Describing the notion of gratuitous evil, as I have in the last chapter, is important both in 
itself and for providing a backdrop or frame for our discussion of NGE. It removes potential 
concerns about the scope and relevance of NGE and about what exactly the broader context of 
discussion is. The last chapter has also helped us amplify the content of the Evil Offsetting Good 
Thesis. It is important to keep in mind, though, that NGE does not serve as a definition of 
gratuitous evil. I believe that God necessarily prevents all gratuitous evil in the sense I defined, 
but NGE, whether interpreted as the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis or the No Better Alternative 
Thesis, only needs to articulate one component of that notion and express one necessary 
condition on God’s permission of evil. NGE corresponds to an aspect of the prohibition of 
gratuitous evil. In this way NGE avoids the necessary imprecision of my definition of gratuitous 
evil to present a clear, precise, and compelling requirement on God’s permission of evil so as to 
better, though not ideally, serve Rowe’s argument. 
I want to anticipate and respond to a possible growing suspicion that may later, in the 
light of my defense of NGE and subsequent criticism of Rowe’s argument, bud into criticism. A 
suspicion may arise here and elsewhere that I have contrived a set of distinctions in Part 1 to 
artificially limit the NGE requirement so as to later accommodate appearances of gratuity and 
avoid meaningful counterexample. This is not correct. The distinctions I have made in chapter 
one were well-motivated, as argued there. Rowe allows that God may be indifferent about which 
evil brings about a greater good, in his elaboration of his theological premise, as also noted. As 
described in chapter one, showing theists need not believe the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis or the 




more radical. NGE is importantly distinct from and more fundamental than the other theses I 
have articulated concerning providence and evil.  
In fact, NGE is most fundamental to our understanding of divine goodness. This will 
become clearer as I here argue for the compatibility of NGE and a deontological moral 
perspective. I believe that NGE is based on the view that, all else being equal, a perfectly good 
being prefers less evil to more. Moreover, I think NGE means God would not prefer more evil 
over less for no reason at all. How could this view be doubted? Does NGE really mean simply 
this? The source of possible disagreement is what counts as a good reason. One may think that 
some reasons God may have for choosing more evil over less, e.g.  deontological or benevolence 
reasons, may not involve outweighing goods. So to make plain why I think NGE is fundamental 
to our understanding of divine goodness: what I claim is that NGE is simply the view that God 
prefers less evil over more unless there is a good reason not to, where a good reason must 
involve some good.  
I will argue in this chapter that God’s permitting evil only for the sake of good is a 
consequence of His being the creator. I think the claim that God’s reason for permitting more 
evil rather than less must involve some good is the only component of NGE that requires special 
illumination. It is not necessary to add that the good must be an offsetting good. That the good 
must offset the evil (in the divine choice context)  is trivially true: if the evil is not offset by good 
then there is by definition net evil that is permitted by God for no reason, the impossibility of 
which is just what the view as stated states. I don’t see what ‘being perfectly good’ could mean if 






Eric Reitan has argued that Rowe’s second “theological” premise assumes a 
consequentialist morality and that since it is at least an open question whether theists should be 
consequentialists, this premise should not be employed in atheist arguments from evil.
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 In this 
chapter I will argue that the relation between Rowe’s premise and deontology is more complex 
than Reitan’s argument assumes. I pose a non-consequentialist objection to Rowe’s premise, as 
interpreted by Reitan, that I claim is stronger than Reitan’s. I then respond to both Reitan’s and 
my own challenge, arguing that possible deontological prohibitions against divine prevention of 
evil are grounded in created deontological goods that should be considered offsetting goods, in 
satisfaction of Rowe’s theological premise. I diagnose the failure to consider such deontological 
goods greater goods as a failure to appreciate that whereas a good’s requiring an evil implies the 
evil serves a good, a good’s only requiring that God does not prevent an evil does not imply the 
permitted evil serves a good. I conclude that Rowe’s theological premise does not assume a 
consequentialist morality.  
Reitan’s Intrinsically Immoral Divine Prevention of Evil Argument 
Again, I have reformulated Rowe’s second premise as “The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis” 
or NGE: 
 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis (NGE): God would only allow an evil if doing so is 
necessary for an offsetting good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
In “Does the Argument from Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality?” Reitan summarizes 




Rowe is roughly saying that the moral status of evil-preventing acts is evaluated by 
reference to the overall balance of good over evil which such acts produce. If the evil-
preventing act improves the overall balance of good over evil, then it is morally better to 
do than not (the evil in this case would be a gratuitous evil); if it worsens that balance (by 





Reitan interprets Rowe’s theological premise as the “No Better Alternative Thesis” 
(NBA): 
No Better Alternative Thesis (NBA): God would only allow an evil if the evil could not 




Now, if no world that contains a divine violation of deontological duty can be better than 
a world that does not, deontology clearly poses no threat to NBA. But we should take the world 
good-making properties referred to by NBA to all refer to creation. Otherwise, NBA is the thesis 
that God would only allow an evil if doing so is consistent with moral perfection, which is true 
but uninformative and unuseful. So I will interpret the ranking of goodness of possible worlds in 
NBA as determined by the total balance of good over evil of creation in each world, as Reitan 
does. This also better aligns with Rowe’s formulation. 
Reitan argues that the view that the moral status of evil-preventing acts (that is, whether 
or not they are morally permissible or morally best) is determined by whether preventing the evil 
makes the world as a whole better than permitting it is not compatible with a deontological moral 
perspective. According to deontologism, the moral status of an act depends at least in part on the 
kind of act it is. This is because, according to this view, there are moral rules prohibiting certain 
kinds of actions, such as torturing innocents for example. So some acts may be wrong because of 




them are better than the consequences of not. Reitan argues that it may therefore be morally 
worse for God to prevent an evil than to allow it even if allowing the evil results in a worse 
balance of good over evil, contrary to NGE.  
Although Reitan is not arguing for any particular moral prohibition against divine 
prevention of evil, he does provide an example in a footnote.
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 It is drawn from the theology of 
Simon Weil. Weil thought that the existence of the independent selfhood of created beings 
requires the withdrawal of God’s presence from them. This withdrawal is a necessary expression 
of God’s love for humans and for the goodness of our existence, for to interfere with human free 
will would be to destroy or damage our independent selfhood. Reitan suggests that on this 
perspective God’s interference with human freedom may be thought prohibited by the “law of 
love.” Such a divine moral requirement may be analogous to a perfect duty of nonviolence. Just 
as an absolute prohibition against violence makes it always wrong to violently bring about a 
better world, the ”law of love” to honor the independent selfhood of created persons may make it 
morally best for God to never impinge on creaturely freedom, no matter the cost, Reitan 
suggests. It may be that the greatness of God’s goodness is shown in that God does not violate 
the dictates of love even when horrific and gratuitously evil abuses of freedom offer 
“temptation” to do so.
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Whether or not there are such absolute non-consequentialist divine moral requirements to 
allow certain types of evil is open to debate. Reitan is not arguing that there are. He only argues 
that NGE implies there are no such deontological prohibitions against God’s preventing evil and 
that this makes the thesis open to question. Again, Reitan is not arguing for the particular 
example of a divine deontological constraint he describes, only for the claim that NGE requires 




As Reitan points out, Rowe thought his theological premise does not preclude the 
possibility that moral rules, such as principles of justice, may prohibit God’s prevention of an 
evil, thus making His permission of the evil justified. In a footnote of “The Problem of Evil and 
Some Varieties of Atheism”, Rowe writes: 
By “good” I don’t mean to exclude the fulfillment of certain moral principles. Perhaps 
preventing [evil] s1 would preclude certain actions prescribed by the principles of justice. 
I shall allow that the satisfaction of certain principles of justice may be a good that 




Similarly, in “The Persistent Problem of Evil” Bruce Russell says that the greater goods 
NGE refers to should be interpreted broadly enough to include deontological considerations in 
order to account for the possibility that God’s permitting an evil is necessary to fulfill a duty or 
to satisfy some other deontological requirement.
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These responses are not adequate to allay deontologist misgivings about Rowe’s (or 
Russell’s similar) formulation of NGE, as Reitan argues.
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 On a deontological perspective, it 
may be wrong to prevent an evil though the consequences of preventing it are worse than those 
of allowing it even if the goodness of not violating moral principles is included in the 
consequences of allowing it. For example, Kant thought lying was wrong even if one could 
prevent a murder by lying. He did not think lying was wrong because the goodness of not lying 
necessarily outweighed the bad consequences, such as a murder, of not lying. In general, 
deontologists do not think an action is wrong because not performing it would result in a morally 
better world than performing it would. Deontologists may think that an action is wrong even if it 
would prevent many more instances of the same action. For example, it may be thought wrong to 




So including the good of avoiding the violation of moral principles in the goods that may 
outweigh the disvalue of permitting an evil does not address deontological objections to NGE. 
Including the good of satisfaction of moral principles among the good consequences of allowing 
an evil cannot make a consequentialist view of the morality of divine permission of evil 
compatible with a deontological perspective. 
I agree with Reitan that Rowe’s and Russell’s remarks on how their formulation of NGE 
can accommodate deontological considerations are inadequate and misguided. I also think that 
current discussion of the problem of evil would benefit from asking whether there may be any 
such deontological prohibitions against divine intervention, as Reitan recommends. However, I 
think Reitan is mistaken in thinking that NGE implies a consequentialist morality. Before 
making this argument I will present a stronger deontological challenge to NBA than Reitan’s. 
The Prohibited Optimal Alternative Permission of Evil Argument 
Reitan assumes that the No Better Alternative Thesis is the only adequate interpretation 
of NGE, as made explicit in his summary above. This interpretation is more restrictive than what 
I call the “Evil Offsetting Good” interpretation: 
Evil Offsetting Good Thesis: God would only allow an evil if allowing the evil is 
necessary for a good that offsets the evil or for the prevention of an evil no better than the 
evil. 
 
NBA precludes deontological considerations that the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does 
not. In fact, I will argue that NBA is open to much stronger objections based on non-
consequentialist considerations than those Reitan provides. More specifically, I will argue that 




benevolence, and not only absolute prohibitions against preventing types of evil, provide reason 
to think that allowing an evil may be morally best even if preventing it may have better 
consequences than allowing it, contrary to the No Better Alternative interpretation. However,  I 
will also argue that these and possible other deontological considerations against divine 
permission of evil do not suggest that allowing an evil may be permissible even if no offsetting 
good requires allowing it and so do not undermine the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis. That is, the 
deontological criticism I present does not challenge the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis 
interpretation of NGE. So Reitan could have made a much stronger case against his intended 
target, NBA, though this case does not apply to the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis. Later I present a 
response to both Reitan’s and my non-consequentialist criticisms and argue that NGE, 
interpreted as either NBA or the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is compatible with a deontological 
moral perspective. 
As mentioned, Reitan did not argue for any particular deontological constraints on God’s 
prevention of evil. He only argued that NGE, as formulated by Rowe and others, precludes 
deontological considerations. However, the significance of NGE’s precluding deontological 
constraints on God’s prevention of evil, if indeed it does, depends on how plausible it is that 
there are, or could be, relevant such constraints. It is remarkable that Reitan’s essay has not 
received more attention in the literature on NGE. One would think that such a clearly presented 
argument that NGE assumes a morality many theists do not accept would be remarked upon in 
contemporary discussion of the evidential argument from evil based on NGE. Perhaps 
deontological considerations have been ignored in formulations and discussions of NGE because 
few, if any, philosophers have thought of plausible and relevant examples of the possible moral 






Reitan’s objection appeals to the possibility that moral rules prohibit types of divine 
prevention of evil, thus making God’s permitting the evil morally better even though permitting 
the evil results in a worse world. But that God might be morally prohibited from preventing a 
type of evil though no greater good requires it, no matter what the circumstances, is difficult to 
make both relevant and convincing. To refer to Reitan’s own example, perhaps we can imagine 
how God’s acting directly on a person’s heart and mind to prevent the worsening of that persons 
will may be prohibited by His love for the person whose selfhood would thereby be diminished 
or effaced. But the examples of moral evil appealed to by atheologians are typically the horrific 
evils brought about by abuses of freedom, as Reitan mentions. Even if divine love requires a 
removal of divine presence in order to allow for independent selfhood and self-direction, as Weil 
describes, how could this result in an absolute moral prohibition against God’s preventing, 
through some series of natural events perhaps, a person of evil will’s will from being carried out? 
After all, a person’s ability to affect his environment is circumscribed by many parameters 
having some ultimate causal explanation in God, given theism. Independent selfhood and self-
direction may entail complete control over the responses of one’s heart but cannot entail 
unlimited freedom to affect the world. Given that our freedom in this respect is limited and 
comes in degrees, it is difficult to see how God’s prevention of intended harm, and perhaps the 
knowledge of the harm one is capable of, would be wrong unless the value of that lost freedom 
or knowledge (for increased self-direction, perhaps) was worth its cost. To say this is not to 
assume that only a consequentialist morality can apply to God, only that it is difficult to imagine 
plausible deontological constraints on divine prevention of these evils at issue in the discussion 
of the problem of evil. Perhaps this is one reason why the issue of deontologism has been largely 




But this issue of compatibility with a non-consequentialist perspective is in fact crucial to 
our understanding and evaluation of NGE. There are other significant conceptual connections 
between NGE and non-consequentialist moral theory that need to be examined. Reitan’s 
objection to NGE was shaped by his response to Rowe’s proposal to accommodate deontological 
considerations by including the satisfaction of moral principles as possible “outweighing goods”. 
Reitan considers the deontological possibility that an evil-preventing act may violate moral 
principles, as Rowe implicitly does, and contrasts the moral good of not performing such an act 
over-riding the good consequences of performing it with that moral good’s outweighing those 
good consequences. To restate Reitan’s argument: even if preventing the evil has better 
consequences than allowing it, allowing it may be morally better, not because the moral good of 
satisfying the moral rule has greater value than those good consequences, as per Rowe’s 
proposal, but because the intrinsic immorality of not satisfying the moral rule by preventing the 
evil makes those consequences irrelevant. So Reitan’s argument appeals to the possibility of 
absolute deontological requirements to allow certain types of evils. However, a much stronger 
case against NBA can be made. It is not necessary to appeal to absolute deontological 
requirements to allow certain types of evils (absolute moral prohibitions against God’s 
preventing types of evil), which, as mentioned, are difficult to make both plausible and relevant. 
NBA faces potential counterexamples based on non-consequentialist moral reasons to prevent 
evil commonly voiced by both theists and atheists, as I will now argue. 
NBA states that if an alternative to allowing an evil results in a better world, then God 
would not allow the evil. But plausible and commonly voiced benevolence or justice 
considerations may oppose that alternative. This is because the alternative may itself involve 




the evil that would result in a better world prohibited by justice or benevolence or by the force of 
any duties that outweigh God’s duty to bring about the better world.  
For example, some think it would be unjust or manifest less than perfect benevolence for 
God to allow one person to suffer for the sake of someone else, even if the beneficiary’s good 
outweighed the evil of that suffering. This is a common objection to, for example, John Hick’s 
“soul-making” theodicy, according to which God may allow some people to suffer to provide 
others with the opportunity to respond with generosity or compassion. The belief that God would 
only allow suffering if the sufferer is the primary beneficiary of the suffering seems to have been 
held by Thomas Aquinas, is held by Rowe and Michael Tooley, and is a cornerstone of Eleonore 
Stump’s theodicy in “Wandering in Darkness”.
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 Let us call this claim the “Sufferer’s Good 
Constraint.” 
The Sufferer’s Good Constraint seems at odds with the No Better Alternative 
interpretation of NGE. The Sufferer’s Good Constraint restricts required offsetting goods to 
goods that benefit the sufferer, but there may be greater goods that do not benefit the sufferer. 
Suppose God may permit Kim to suffer for the good of Kim’s conversion or permit Po’s 
suffering for the same good of Kim’s conversion. Suppose the goodness of Kim’s conversion 
would be the same in both cases and suppose Po’s suffering would be less than Kim’s. One 
alternative to God’s permitting Kim’s suffering is His permitting Po’s suffering instead. (God 
could also prevent Kim’s suffering by foregoing the good of her conversion, but suppose God 
justifiably aims at Kim’s conversion.) Suppose this alternative actualizes a better world (because 
it contains less suffering). By the Sufferer’s Good Constraint permitting Po’s suffering is (or may 
be, if construed as prima facie) morally worse than permitting Kim’s. This means God may 




preventing it (by permitting Po’s suffering instead). So, the Sufferer’s Good Constraint gives 
some reason to doubt NBA. By contrast, the requirement that the offsetting good benefit the 
sufferer is perfectly compatible with the less restrictive Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, which states 
only that there must be an offsetting good. 
By this same argument other non-consequentialist moral reasons, including 
considerations less restrictive than the Sufferer’s Good Constraint, also seem incompatible with 
NBA. For example, William Alston, Robert Adams, and Thomas Tracy have all presented 
arguments against the Sufferer’s Good Constraint on the grounds that God may not be able to 
maximize the good of all and so can only achieve the most good by sacrificing the good of some; 
and that if this is true, one cannot reasonably expect God to maximize one’s own good at the 
expense of the good of others.
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 So, according to these philosophers, God may justifiably govern 
the world so as to maximize the goodness of the world at the expense of individual welfare. 
However, they add the constraint that the diminishment of individual welfare for this reason 
cannot make a person’s life on the whole bad: God may justifiably allow you to suffer for the 
good of others provided the life you have been given by God is on the whole good. So these 
philosophers think that justice or benevolence forbids God’s allowing one person to suffer for the 
good of others in ways that make his or her life on the whole bad. Let us call this the “Good Life 
Constraint”. 
This constraint may be interpreted in different ways. According to traditional theism 
one’s existence cannot be on the whole bad involuntarily. Given the goodness and sovereignty of 
God, whatever horrific evil one suffers involuntarily in his life that makes his earthly life on the 
whole bad will be compensated for or redeemed in the afterlife, so long as one chooses in a way 
that makes one capable of receiving such outweighing benefits.
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be interpreted as the claim that God may allow one to suffer for the good of others only because 
one’s existence cannot be on the whole involuntarily bad. This understanding provides a 
potential counterexample to NBA only if God could have achieved more good by creating 
someone whose existence is involuntarily bad (which latter may be a metaphysical impossibility 
on theism). 
However, on theism, one’s earthly life may be on the whole bad involuntarily. Very 
sadly, this seems exemplified by the lives of many infants, children, and adults born into a life of 
suffering. Another interpretation of the Good Life Constraint is that God would not allow a 
person to be born into a life whose unremitting suffering defeats the goodness of that life in a 
way that person has not chosen unless that suffering is necessary for (or the best available means 
God has to achieve) a greater good or to avert a worse (spiritual) harm for that person. In other 
words, on this view, afterlife compensation for a life on the whole bad is not enough: God would 
not permit a person’s earthly life to be on the whole involuntarily bad. This seems the view of 
Marilyn McCord Adams in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God.
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 Let us employ this 
interpretation. 
We can imagine (in at least a loose sense) a circumstance in which a person’s life of 
suffering is not necessary for a greater good for that person, but God’s allowing the horrific evil 
of that person’s life is a component of the best available means for God to achieve a good for 
others. Perhaps a child’s life-defeating suffering through cancer is not needed for the child’s 
moral or spiritual advancement but would best inspire a cure for cancer, for example. Perhaps 
horrors inflicted on civilians in a war do not benefit the persons suffering them but would be part 
of a series of events that lead to the end of the war. In these circumstances, God’s allowing the 




Constraint. Suppose now that the cure for cancer or the end of war could also result, though less 
optimally, from God’s allowing the suffering of others, people whose lives are not defeated by 
their suffering. All else being equal, in this circumstance God is faced with a choice between 
permitting an evil that makes a person’s life on the whole bad (through no choice of their own) 
and permitting an evil that does not, where the former results in a better world than the latter. 
According to the Good Life Constraint, permitting the latter evil is morally best, contra NBA. 
So widely accepted non-consequentialist moral reasons for God to prevent evil 
(constraints on His allowing evil) provide reasons to think that God may justifiably allow an evil 
even though He could have prevented the evil in a way that would have resulted in a better 
balance of good and evil. In considering deontological moral reasons for God’s permission of an 
evil x, Reitan only considers moral prohibitions against God’s preventing  the evil x, but God’s 
preventing an evil can, and plausibly at least sometimes must, involve permission of other evils. 
Because God may need to choose between evils, non-consequentialist moral reasons to prevent 
evils other than evil x may provide reasons to permit evil x. Though the deontological constraints 
against God’s preventing types of evil that Reitan’s argument requires are difficult to identify, 
appeals to deontological constraints against God’s allowing evil are familiar in discussions of the 
problem of evil and are advocated by both atheists and theists. So this “Prohibited Optimal 
Alternative Permission of Evil” argument is a stronger deontological challenge to NBA than 
Reitan’s argument based on intrinsically immoral divine preventions of evil. 
Must such non-consequentialist moral constraints against divine permission of evil as I 
have presented be absolute or can they be prima facie duties? It is not clear that prima facie 
duties can be ascribed to God. If God’s “duties” were prima facie then it may be that although 




considered completely trustworthy for the relational characteristics that goodness is traditionally 
parsed into, such as loving kindness, faithfulness, keeping of promises, etc. It would be possible 
for God to not relate in these ways because it would be possible for acting accordingly to be 
outweighed by other prima facie duties. But let us put this objection aside. 
Can the Sufferer’s Good Constraint make it morally best for God to choose Kim’s 
suffering over Po’s (to benefit Kim) if Kim’s suffering is somewhat greater than Po’s but not if it 
is many orders of magnitude greater? Could one’s earthly life be made on the whole bad by evil 
God has permitted for the sake of the eternal salvation of others even if it is not possible for 
one’s own ultimate happiness in the afterlife to be thereby increased? If the answer is yes, as 
seems to me not obviously wholly unreasonable, would these constraints still challenge NBA? 
One might think deontological prima facie duties pose no threat to NBA because, 
following Rowe’s proposal, the satisfaction of such moral duties may be considered greater or 
offsetting goods. Could Rowe’s proposal be satisfactory if restricted to prima facie, rather than 
absolute, duties? Let us consider mundane examples. My duty to be truthful may conflict with 
my prima facie duty to alleviate suffering. If my moral duty to be truthful is not absolute but 
prima facie, the strength of that duty may be said to outweigh, or be outweighed by, the strength 
of my latter duty. Since the force of my duty to alleviate suffering increases with, among other 
factors, how much suffering I can alleviate, in such cases we may say that the good of my telling 
the truth outweighs the evil of the suffering I allow. But this does not literally mean that the 
value of my being truthful less the disvalue of the suffering is greater than the disvalue of my 
being untruthful and the value of the suffering’s being removed. The term ‘outweighing’ here 
refers to a comparison between strengths of obligation, not a comparison between amounts of 




only shorthand for the idea that my obligation to be truthful in this case trumps my obligation to 
prevent suffering. This comparison suggests, to me at least, that prima facie divine moral duties, 
if possible, may also offer apparent counterexamples NBA. 
So to challenge NBA we need not appeal to absolute moral prohibitions against divine 
prevention of evil, or the intrinsic immorality of preventing evil, so that there is no 
deontologically sanctioned way that God could prevent the evil. We also need not appeal to 
prohibitions against preventing certain types of evil. To challenge NBA, which, again, states that 
God would only allow an evil if there is no way that God could have prevented the evil that 
would have resulted in a better world, we need only appeal to the possibility that one way that 
God could have prevented the evil that would have resulted in a better world involves allowing a 
different evil, and there is some non-consequentialist moral injunction, not necessarily absolute, 
against allowing that evil. 
We can see why this is so in more general terms. NBA describes both God’s actual 
permission of evil and all possible ways God could prevent the evil. It states that the only way 
God’s allowing an evil could be morally best is if there is no possible way that God’s preventing 
the evil could result in a better world. But if there are moral considerations other than the 
promotion of good and the elimination of evil then it is prima facie possible that these moral 
factors could in some circumstances make one way God could prevent the evil less than morally 
best even if it resulted in a better balance of good over evil. So NBA, by making a claim about 
all possible alternatives to God’s permitting the evil, namely that none have a better balance of 
good over evil, excludes the possibility that any moral considerations could justify God’s 






This seems to preclude all non-consequentialist considerations, not only absolute prohibitions 
against preventing types of evil.
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To repeat my argument in terms of an application: an absolute moral prohibition against 
God’s intervening to prevent a certain type of evil based on justice would mean all ways God 
could intervene to prevent the evil would be unjust. But NBA requires much less for a 
counterexample. A counterexample would be one way of preventing the evil that is both unjust 
and results in a better world. So Reitan need not have appealed solely to absolute deontological 
prohibitions against preventing a type of evil (whose permission is therefore permissible or 
morally best). He need only have appealed to a non-consequentialist consideration against one 
way of preventing an evil and stipulated, not implausibly, that that way could actualize a better 
world than permitting the evil. This seems to be a significant difficulty for the commonly held 
No Better Alternative interpretation of NGE. 
The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, by contrast, does not preclude the possibility that what 
is morally best and what achieves the best balance of good and evil may not coincide. One 
reason the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis is less restrictive in this way is that it says much less 
about possible ways God may prevent the evil. It only states that there must be an offsetting good 
that requires God’s permission of the evil (or one no better) and hence at least one actual 
offsetting good that all alternatives to God’s permitting the evil (or one no better) do not include. 
It does not make a statement about all the goods and evils or all other possible moral 
considerations involved in all the different possible ways God could have prevented the evil.
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NBA states that no alternative to God’s permitting an evil could have an optimal balance of good 
over evil. The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, by contrast, does not imply that no less than morally 






In still other words, the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis states that if God permits an evil 
there is some good God’s permitting the evil (or one no better) is necessary for. This of course is 
incompatible with moral views that state its opposite, that there need be no offsetting good. But 
this is much less restrictive than stating that that good must be the specific good of actualizing a 
world that is optimal in the divine choice circumstance, as NBA does. The Sufferer’s Good 
Constraint and the Good Life Constraint both assert there must be offsetting goods (for the 
sufferer) as per the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis though, as I have argued, they give reason to 
think God may need to forfeit greater goods to abide by them, contra NBA.  
The fact that this deontological consideration does not threaten the Evil Offsetting Good 
Thesis does not mean no deontological considerations pose a threat to the Evil Offsetting Good 
Thesis, however. If Reitan’s argument is correct, perhaps God must permit an evil even if doing 
so is not necessary for any good. Let us now more closely consider both Reitan’s argument, 
which may be applied to both NBA and the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis, and my argument, 
which targets only NBA. 
The Inscrutable Divine Providence Response 
It is important to note that the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not state that if God 
permits an evil He does so in order to bring about a good that offsets the evil. In a narrow sense 
then the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis does not assume any moral theory because it does not make 
any claims about divine moral motivation. It only states there is a correlation between God’s 
permission of evil and the existence of an offsetting good that requires it. If it makes assumptions 
about moral theory, it only does so in the broader and less direct sense that its plausibility 




thesis states that if God allows an evil, He could not have prevented it in a way that would have 
resulted in a better world. It does not state that God’s only possible motivation for allowing evil 
is to bring about the best world He can. So NBA does not logically imply that the only divine 
moral motivation is improving the balance of good over evil. The issue to be addressed then is 
whether a consequentialist morality is the only good reason to think there is such a 
correspondence. 
Perhaps belief in a correspondence between God’s justified permission of evil and God’s 
maximizing the balance of good over evil, as per NBA, or between God’s justified permission of 
evil and there being an offsetting good that requires that permission, as per the Evil Offsetting 
Good Thesis, may be reasonable without assuming consequentialism.  The coincidence of what 
is morally optimal for God with what is most valuable may be thought to manifest a kind of 
excellence in the ordering of creation and so be posited as a feature of God’s creation. More 
specifically, one may hold that God governs the world in a way that both satisfies deontological 
requirements of justice and also makes the world the best it could possibly be (given the 
creatures in it and the choices they make), which would mean there is never a conflict between 
what is morally best for God to do and what divine choice results in the best world. I accept as a 
tenable position the view that the examples I have given as challenges to NBA are merely 
abstract possible choice circumstances that God is never in fact in, due to His ineffable 
sovereignty and wisdom. This possibility also undermines Reitan’s claim that NGE assumes a 
consequentialist morality. 
This seems to be Eleonore Stump’s view. She describes what she calls the “fractal” 
nature of the world’s story of redemption in reference to the book of Job and other biblical 




permitting this collective suffering results in a better world than His preventing it in large part 
because Job’s suffering provides Job the best opportunity to be united with God, as per Stump’s 
illumination of the Book of Job. It may seem to us that what is best for Job and even best over-all 
may conflict with what is fair or just or benevolent divine treatment of Job’s children. It may 
therefore seem to us that a compromise between Job’s good and that of his children would be 
morally best even if that actualizes a sub-optimal world.
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 However, one may also hold, as 
Stump does, both that the suffering of Job is best for Job, and also that the suffering of Job’s 
children, a component of Job’s suffering, is also what is best for them (the best means God has to 
either prevent them from worse (spiritual) harm or for them to be united with God).
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 Again, 
what may seem an unimaginably difficult feat of coordination to us: that the demands of justice 
and love are satisfied in such a way that what is morally best for God to do is also what is most 
valuable, may be attributed to divine providence. Moreover, one may think that divine 
providence construed in this way better honors God’s unsearchable wisdom and providence. For 
this reason, and possibly for similar reasons, such as belief in a correspondence between what 
God desires and what is objectively desirable or valuable, non-consequentialist moral views are 
not incompatible with NGE. Rather, non-consequentialist moral perspectives complicate our 
appraisal of NGE, requiring an examination of whether it must assume either consequentialism 
or something like Stump’s perspective on divine providence.  
A Benevolence Objection to NGE?  
Could God desire something other than what is most valuable?  Could what is good for 
persons and what is most valuable diverge so that God wills the former over the latter, for 
example? If so, and only if so, divine benevolence could conflict with NBA. If an evil one person 




A as the good is good for B, and B’s good requires the evil that befalls A, divine benevolence 
may require the permission of A’s suffering for the good of B, even though the evil outweighs 
the good. Could the suffering of Job’s children be best for Job, as Stump describes, yet also 
outweigh the good of Job’s opportunity for union with God? If this is possible it constitutes an 
additional objection to NBA. (But I do not think this is possible. I think that what is of ultimate 
value is the person, and so what is really of value is what is good for persons, not their 
experiences. One may object that spiritual goods need not outweigh physical evils if the former 
are slight and the latter great, but either opportunities for spiritual improvement are finite, in 
which case no spiritual good is slight because it has potentially eternal effect or such 
opportunities will never cease, in which case God’s willing spiritual goods need not trump his 
desire to prevent non-spiritual evils.)   
The Deontological Goods Response 
I have argued that commonly held non-consequentialist views suggest that by permitting 
evil, God could justifiably actualize sub-optimal worlds, worlds that have less value than some 
worlds in which God prevents the evil. Do any non-consequentialist moral views entail, or make 
plausible, the claim that God could justifiably permit an evil even if doing so is not required by 
an offsetting good? That is, are there reasons to think the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis assumes a 
consequentialist morality? Can a deontological prohibition against God’s preventing an evil, or 
any other non-consequentialist consideration, make God’s permission of an evil justified or 
morally best without there being an offsetting good that requires that permission, as required by 




There are (at least) two related reasons to think this is impossible. One is that God is 
thought of as the creator of a world that is on the whole good. The other is the idea that 
deontological constraints have a metaphysical basis. I will call their joint import my 
“Deontological Goods” defense. The Deontological Goods defense argues that because every 
deontological requirement is due to some created good, if God exists, the Evil Offsetting Good 
Thesis is plausible, given any moral theory, consequentialist or non-consequentialist. This 
defense also refutes Reitan’s deontological challenge to NBA. 
According to traditional theism, God has freely chosen to create the world and to keep it 
in existence for His own good purposes. God’s providence ensures that His ultimate purposes in 
creating are not defeated by evil and that creation is on the whole good, despite the evil it 
contains. Also, according to traditional theism all evil in existence is part of creation, not part of 
God. Any evil God permits would have been avoided by God’s choosing not to create. Let us 
call an evil that subsequent to creation is morally better for God to permit due to deontological 
constraints a “required evil”. Why did God allow required evils by creating this world rather than 
prevent them by not? Evidently, and by tradition, because He judged creation worth all the evils 
it would (or might) cost. According to traditional theism, the world God has created is a good 
that offsets and outweighs the evils it contains. Required evils are permitted rather than 
prevented by God in one way, post creation, for non-consequentialist moral reasons and they, or 
the risk of them, are permitted in another way, by creating, for the good of the existence of the 
world. Can the good or goods of creation be considered an offsetting good that God’s permission 
of those evils is necessary for in a sense that appropriately satisfies the Evil Offsetting Good 




On one traditional understanding of God’s goodness, moral requirements are necessarily 
satisfied by God. On this view God is necessarily perfectly good and this means God cannot be 
evil or do what is wrong or even choose what is not morally best. The other understanding is that 
God can do what is wrong and what is not morally best but his perfect goodness consists in His 
always, in fact, not doing so. On both views God’s perfect goodness, essential to His being the 
greatest possible being, is a good incomparably greater than any finite good or evil.
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If indeed there is a moral prohibition against divine “interference” to prevent evils, such 
as Reitan describes, and if God is necessarily perfectly good, then there is one, and only one, 
way God could have prevented those evils: by not creating the world that gave rise to them. If 
God, because of His own perfect goodness, must permit an evil, given it would occur subsequent 
to creation, then the good of that creation, a good that outweighs all evil, makes God’s 
permission of the evil necessary, given it would occur subsequent to creation, in satisfaction of 
the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis.  
If, on the other hand, God is not necessarily good, and there is a moral prohibition against 
divine “interference” to prevent evils, then God could have prevented those evils either by not 
creating the world or by forfeiting His own perfect goodness. That is, if God could do what is 
wrong or less than morally best then deontological prohibitions cannot necessitate God’s 
permission of evil. But if God were to violate these moral prohibitions, He would not be 
perfectly good. On any traditional conception of God’s goodness, if God could and did change 
from being the greatest possible being, of unlimited goodness and deserving of worship, to being 
a finite imperfect being of limited goodness, the loss of value would be a loss to reality to which 




requires God’s permission of those evils whose prevention would violate moral requirements and 
this good outweighs all such evils.  
I had said that the world good-making properties that NBA refers to should refer to 
creation so as to make NBA informative. This is satisfied here. According to traditional theism, 
because God is unlimited in goodness, creation does not add to the value of reality. Even if this is 
not accepted, according to traditional theism creation certainly does not have value that would 
outweigh the unimaginable disvalue of God’s becoming morally imperfect. It would be better for 
God not to create than to become imperfect in goodness. So even if God could prevent required 
evil by violating moral requirements, God’s permitting required evil is necessary for a greater 
good that refers to creation: the compound good of the existence of creation and the avoidance of 
the incomprehensibly bad evil of God’s becoming imperfect. 
Appeal to the goodness of creation itself and to the unlimited goodness of God may seem 
a technical defense only, one that does not engage the dialectic of the problem of evil. If one 
asks, “Why did God allow this instance of innocent suffering?” the view that deontological 
considerations make it morally better that God permit it makes the pertinent answer (pertinent in 
the sense of satisfying the questioner): ‘because it would be wrong or morally worse for God to 
prevent it,’ and not: ‘because the existence of the world is a good that outweighs all evil and God 
could only have prevented the evil by not creating the world.’ But before examining this 
criticism in order to continue my argument, I wish to clarify what has been stated so far. 
The Deontological Goods Defense does not assume the contingency of creation nor 




these the reply, if successful, would still show NGE does not entail a consequentialist morality. 
(NGE would be shown to entail only either consequentialism or one of these assumptions.) 
The argument thus far does not assume that God did not have to create. What if (contrary 
to tradition) God’s necessary perfect goodness implies God had to create and to continue to 
sustain the world in existence (because that is morally better than not)? Then, given evil would 
occur subsequent to creation, including evils it is morally better for God to permit, God’s 
necessary goodness would imply it is impossible for God to have avoided those evils (though if 
they are due to chance or free will they might not have occurred).  
Perhaps God’s necessary creation and sustaining of the world in which such evils arise 
and His subsequent necessary permission of them mean that God cannot be said to permit those 
evils. If so, NGE would not be applicable; it is a moral requirement for God’s permission of evil. 
So let’s suppose God permits required evils even if He necessarily creates. One may then object 
that if God necessarily creates and sustains the world in which required evils arise and 
subsequently necessarily permits them, God cannot be said to permit those evils for the sake of a 
greater good. This thought is clearly mistaken. The necessity of God’s permitting those evils (for 
deontological reasons given such evils would occur) is due to an explanatorily prior necessary 
choice to bring about good. So the permission of those evils, given they would occur, is still 
necessary for that greater good and God may be said to permit them because He wills that good. 
Even if God’s necessary goodness implies God must create, the reason it is morally better for 
God to create is that it is better to produce good than not. It is not morally better for God to 
create because not doing so would violate justice or any other non-consequentialist moral 
requirement. So, on the supposition of divine necessary goodness and a consequent necessity of  




creation (a good He freely though necessarily has chosen). Moreover, even if deontological 
requirements constrain which world God had to create (because that is morally best) it still 
remains true that the specific world God had to create is a good whose existence makes it 
necessary for God to permit all the evils He is morally required to permit. Furthermore, as 
mentioned, NGE states there must be an offsetting good, not that God permits the evil for the 
sake of that good. 
My preliminary argument also does not assume God has middle knowledge.  It does not 
assume God knew prior to the act of creating what evil would result from each of His creative 
options. What if prior to creation God could not, and so did not, base his creative decision on His 
knowledge that these required evils, evils whose permission is morally best for non-
consequentialist moral reasons (i.e. evils He is morally prohibited from intervening to remove), 
would arise? One might think that if this is the case, God cannot be said to have permitted 
required evils for the sake of the good of creation itself. He only permits them when He knows 
they will occur after He has created and He then permits them because it would be wrong not to, 
even though no good is achieved or evil avoided by doing so.  
Although my argument thus far does gain some rhetorical force with the assumption that 
God knew what evils would result for each of His options in creating, it is not weakened if this 
assumption is denied. If God did know what evil would result for each of His options in creating, 
then God knowingly permitted the evils that were to come into existence for the sake of creating 
the world of His choice. However, even if God does not know which evils or how much evil 
would occur subsequent to creation, there is still a sense in which God permits the evils of the 
world in the act of creation. God knew evil of such kind and amount might occur and He also 




be on the whole bad). And, His knowing the goodness of this world would outweigh its evil 
explains why He chose to create the world. The good of creation requires God’s allowing the 
possibility that evil will occur that He will be required by moral goodness to permit. When those 
evils occur it may be said that God has allowed them for the greater good of creation. He could 
have ensured no such evils ever occurred but He chose not to in order to bring about a greater 
good.  
Also, even if God did not in any sense permit the evils of the world for the sake of a 
greater good, there is still a sense in which God’s permission of those evils is necessary for a 
greater good. The Evil Offsetting Good Thesis states that for every evil God permits there is an 
offsetting good that necessitates that permission. As noted, it does not state that every evil God 
permits is permitted by God in order to bring about, or not lose, an offsetting good. It also does 
not state that the offsetting good must come into existence subsequent to God’s decision to 
permit the evils its existence requires. The greater good of the existence of creation makes it 
necessary, via moral goodness (that is by God’s necessary goodness or in order for God to 
preserve His own perfect goodness), for God to permit required evils. If the world did not exist 
such evils would not be possible. The only way God could have avoided such evils (given they 
occur subsequent to His act of creation), was either by not creating the world or by forfeiting His 
own perfect goodness. Therefore, God’s permitting such evil (given it occurs subsequent to His 
act of creation), is necessary for a greater good. So, even if God does not knowingly permit the 
world’s evils in the act of creation for the sake of a greater good, the existence of creation, a 
good that outweighs all evil according to traditional theism, given necessary truths about moral 




necessary goodness or for God to preserve His own perfect goodness), given the evil would 
occur subsequent to creation, in satisfaction of the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis.  
Let us now revisit the objection that appeal to the goods of creation and of divine perfect 
goodness is a technical way of satisfying the Evil Offsetting Good Thesis (and NBA) that does 
not adequately address the implications of deontology for this thesis and for perspicuous 
discussion of the problem of evil. One way to frame this objection is to point out that the 
existence of the created world is a necessary condition for there being any divine choice to 
permit or prevent any evil and that what necessitates God’s permission, as opposed to 
prevention, of a required evil is the moral requirement to do so, given God’s necessary goodness. 
This moral requirement is also what makes God’s permission of the evil necessary for God to 
remain perfectly good. So though the existence of creation is of course a necessary condition for 
God’s permission of any evil, the moral requirement is more explanatorily relevant. 
It may be thought, then, that appeal to the good of creation and God’s goodness does not 
engage the dialectic of the problem of evil. If one asks, “Why did God allow this instance of 
innocent suffering?” one is not asking for the circumstance or context required in order for such 
a divine choice to be possible, but rather why God permitted rather than prevented it in the given 
context. On the view that deontological considerations require God permit it (such as the non-
interference requirement Reitan appeals to) the pertinent answer (pertinent in the sense of 
satisfying the questioner) is: ‘because it would be wrong for God to intervene,’ and not: ‘because 
God’s knowingly permitting it or the risk of it was required for God’s creation of the world’ or, 
as per the denial of divine middle knowledge, ‘because the fact that the world exists makes it 
necessary for God to permit it.’ So (one may argue) though God’s permitting a required evil is 




creative act, and given God’s continued perfect goodness, not adding a  deontological clause to 
NGE would obscure the immediate explanation for why this is the case, namely, the 
deontological constraint involved. 
One response to this objection is that the Deontological Goods Defense need not offer a 
satisfactory answer to the question “Why did God allow this instance of innocent suffering?” to 
adequately defend NGE. It defends NGE by demonstrating that NGE is consistent with the 
supposition that God has non-consequentialist moral reasons to permit evil and so defends NGE 
without undermining or supplanting the significance of deontological considerations. If an 
atheologian presents, as evidence against theism, an instance of evil whose permission by an 
omnipotent being seems to him pointless, one who employs this defense may respond that since 
God may be morally required to permit that evil, perhaps He could only have avoided it by 
losing the greater good of creation. Its permission by God would not then be pointless. He may 
add that pointlessness need not be construed narrowly as only referring to permissions of evil 
that do not improve the world and so a consideration of deontology may make the evil no longer 
seem pointless. This response offers no additional insight as to why God allows evil. The only 
insight it offers is the same as that given by Reitan’s appeal to deontology, which it includes. 
Reitan states, “in order to fully understand what a morally perfect being would do we would 
need a moral theory to tell us which deontological principles can and do influence the morality of 
God’s evil-eliminating acts.”  Just as Reitan states that something more specific about divine 
deontological moral requirements would need to be added to an appended deontological clause 
to make it helpful for discussion of the problem of evil, this response may acknowledge 
providing little insight into why God may allow an evil. Reitan is right then that a moral theory is 




may include deontological reasons, but wrong in thinking that the possibility of divine 
deontological moral reasons undermines the plausibility of NGE. Whatever deontological 
reasons there may be there must also be the greater good of creation in order for there to be 
anything for deontological constraints to apply to. So my initial response is that the 
Deontological Goods Defense as so far presented adequately defends NGE and is no more 
unhelpful in understanding God’s relation to evil than Reitan’s positing the possibility of 
deontological constraints on God’s prevention of evil. 
With these clarifications, I now more fully develop the Deontological Goods Defense. 
Although I’ve introduced my argument in the most general terms, namely, the existence of the 
world, it can be parsed further. The goodness of the world encompasses a variety of goods, some 
of which are the basis for deontological constraints. For example, a prohibition against God’s 
interference in human choices, as Reitan describes, is grounded in and explained by the inherent 
worth and dignity of the human self, a good which is part of Reitan’s description of the 
prohibition. God could have avoided the evils of the abuse of free will by not creating free 
creatures, but God judged the existence of created selves worth the cost (or risk). The existence 
of created independent selves is the good God’s permitting moral evil is necessary for, given the 
choices people make, the deontological constraint Reitan describes, and God’s perfect goodness.   
It is plausible, especially given theism, that every deontological requirement has a 
metaphysical basis in the sense that the existence of the deontological requirement is explained 
by some good. How could there be a deontological prohibition against violence if human beings 
did not have an intrinsic value or sanctity that should be respected? Likewise, the Sufferer’s 
Good Constraint view that one person should not be used merely as a means to a good end is 




God’s permission of an evil, given God’s necessary goodness, it is plausible that God’s 
permission of evil is constrained by moral requirements or duties only because of the existence 
of goods God has created.  
Reitan points out that adherence to a deontological constraint may result in violations of 
that constraint by others and may result in a worse world than violating the constraint would. 
This is true in the human case but it cannot be that the good that moral goodness requires 
honoring in ways expressed by these prohibitions, such as the good of the existence of rational 
free persons, is not worth the costs of its being honored. This would mean that God chose to 
create a good it was on the whole bad to have created.  
Perhaps one who denies divine middle knowledge may say, contra traditional theist 
opinion, that God’s creating rational free persons was worth the risk of the moral evil the world 
contains, and so was justified, but not worth its actual cost in moral evil. He may think God is 
now bound by deontological obligations incurred by His past act of creation, though no good 
both requires and outweighs the resultant evil that He must now permit. As already remarked, 
one may respond that God’s permitting such evil is necessary for the outweighing good of God’s 
continued moral perfection. Putting this aside, a proponent of NGE may simply grant that the 
denial of this abstract possibility is a newly discovered assumption of NGE. This assumption is 
benign. Most theists do not share the value judgment contained in this objection. Also, this 
purported possibility is in direct tension with the view that God’s creation is on the whole good. 
Of course if the world is on the whole bad either NGE is false or God does not exist, but the 
goodness of creation is a central tenet of traditional theism. If the goodness of creation is 
accepted, this objection offers only the abstract suggestion that individual deontological goods 




weaker objection is only an objection to my expansion of the Deontological Goods Defense. It 
does not impugn the core defense appealing to the good of creation itself. 
Just as creation is a good that is worth the evils it contains, we have reason to think the 
goods that comprise the goodness of the existence of creation, such as the existence of beings 
with reflective self-awareness and the ability to direct their own lives and character, must be 
worth their net costs. Translated in terms of the metaphysical foundation of deontological 
obligations, Reitan’s deontological challenge is that because it may be morally best to honor 
deontological goods by not preventing certain evils, the existence of these goods may morally 
require the permission of evils even if dishonoring those goods by divine interference to prevent 
those evils would result in a better world. But the permission of such evils would not be 
gratuitous in the sense given by NGE, on either the Evil Offsetting Good or the No Better 
Alternative interpretation. The alternative to permitting these evils is either to not have created 
the “deontological goods”, which would result in a worse world (since deontological goods are 
worth their costs) or else for God to forfeit His perfect goodness, which would obtain only in an 
incomparably worse world. Although reference to the “no creation” alternative to permitting an 
evil may seem to merely technically evade identifying an evil as justifiably permitted and 
pointless (due to deontological consideration), the global goods, such as the existence of beings 
of intrinsic moral worth, that ground divine deontological requirements are clear reasons for 
thinking God’s permission of required evils is necessary for the existence of greater goods and so 






Why Aren’t Deontological Goods Generally Recognized as NGE Greater Goods? 
 Many philosophers, including William Rowe, have not considered the possibility that 
goods such as the existence of rational agents might necessitate, via deontological constraints, 
God’s permission of all of a type of evil, in satisfaction of NGE. Why might such “deontological 
goods”, goods that entail deontological requirements, not be considered as possible offsetting 
goods? One reason, mentioned earlier, may be that no one has described plausible goods that 
would make it impermissible for God to prevent common examples of seemingly gratuitous evil, 
such as the unjust consequences of evil choices. Another reason would be a failure to appreciate 
a deontological perspective. This obviously is not true of Reitan who has helpfully highlighted 
the relevance of deontology. So why didn’t Reitan consider the goods that ground deontological 
constraints to be goods that outweigh the evils God must permit to honor them, in satisfaction of 
NGE?  
 Toward the end of his essay, Reitan argues for the relevance of deontological 
considerations by considering atheist arguments from moral evil. He argues that the 
consequentialist account for why God permits moral evil acts seems faced with potent 
counterexamples that deontological accounts are not. He agrees with Bruce Russell that: 
while a world where people have significant freedom to act may well be better than a 
world without significant freedom, it doesn’t follow that a world in which God never 
intervenes to prevent the evils brought on by human freedom is better than a world in 
which God does so intervene. … was the free will of the Nazis so valuable that the good 




Reitan agrees with Russell that though the good of there being moral freedom in general 
may outweigh the totality of moral evil, in specific cases the value of the freedom inherent in an 




then argues that Russell’s taking this to be evidence against theism misses the relevance of 
deontology to the evidential arguments from evil. According to Reitan, deontology offers an 
answer not available to Rowe’s (unemended) No Gratuitous Evil Thesis: it may be intrinsically 
immoral for God to ever interfere in human free choice. Therefore God may justifiably permit 
individual free actions whose evil consequences outweigh the value of the person’s making the 
choice.  
However, although Reitan’s appeal to a deontological perspective is illuminating, he 
misidentifies what is at issue. The relevant contrast is not between a consequentialist account and 
a deontological one but between an absolute requirement and a non-absolute one. A plausible 
good that requires that God never prevent moral evil would avoid these counterexamples as well 
as an equally plausible deontological prohibition against God’s preventing moral evil. And, 
since, as I have argued, the latter cannot obtain without the former, both are available to NGE.  
Contrasting the NGE prohibition of pointlessness with deontological moral constraints on 
God’s preventing certain types of evil, so that the latter must be appended to the former, as 
Reitan argues, misrepresents the NGE moral requirement. God’s permitting an evil in order to 
honor a deontological requirement and hence a deontological good makes his permission of that 
evil non-gratuitous in the sense given by NGE. How do deontological goods differ from other 
goods requiring divine permission of evil that might make it seem evils permitted to honor 
deontological goods are gratuitous? Unlike some other goods, deontological goods, issuing 
requirements to permit types of evil, may not require any specific evils nor any specific amount 
of evil. A good that requires God never prevent a certain type of evil will be a general good and 
so may not require very specific evils as opposed to others of the same type. But NGE does not 




that specific evil rather than some other. It states that there must be an offsetting good that 
requires that evil or some other evil no better. So one reason NGE might falsely seem to preclude 
deontological considerations is if it is misinterpreted as stating there must be an offsetting good 
that requires God’s permission of the specific evil under consideration. 
Another reason Reitan may think evils God is morally required by deontological goods to 
permit may be gratuitous is that he thinks of gratuitous evils as evils that are not necessary for a 
greater good. This is suggested by some of his concluding remarks:  
The question most frequently asked in connection with AE is this one: “Is there some 
outweighing good which justifies God in permitting each of the evils of the world?” And 
this question amounts to asking whether or not there is some evil in the world which is 
pointless – which is such that no outweighing good is served by it. Advocates of AE have 
tended to hold that if we have good reason to believe that there is pointless evil, then we 
have good reason to believe that there is no God. A deontologist would object to this 
inference on the grounds that, even if we have good reason to believe that there is 
pointless evil, there is a further question we need to ask. The question is this: “Is there 
any non-consequentialist moral obligation which prevents God from intervening to 




Here and elsewhere Reitan thinks that a pointless evil is an evil “which is such that no 
outweighing good is served by it.” The word ‘served’ suggests Reitan thinks an evil is pointless 
if it does not contribute to, enhance, or bring about any good. Reitan seems to think that if an evil 
is not necessary for a greater good it is pointless and that since a deontological prohibition 
against God’s preventing an unnecessary evil would justify His permission of such evils, 
deontology offers reason to think God may allow pointless evil, a reason not compatible with 
NGE. But this is not the notion of pointlessness that NGE describes. NGE  is distinct from the 
following No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, as described in chapter one: 
The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis: God would only allow an evil if the evil is necessary 





According to NGE if God exists evils may be unnecessary for greater goods; they would 
only be pointless or gratuitous in the requisite sense if God’s permission of them is not necessary 
for a greater good. As described in chapter one, God’s choosing to permit rather than prevent an 
evil implies the evil occurs, so to say God’s permission in this sense  is necessary is, strictly 
speaking, to say the evil is. But NGE’s referring to God’s permission of the evil rather than the 
evil itself  being necessary can only be charitably interpreted as shorthand for claiming that if 
God permits an evil, an offsetting good must require God’s permission of the evil, given the evil 
occurs unless God prevents it. So, given I choose moral evil, God must permit my evil choice for 
the sake of my moral freedom. Had I not chosen moral evil my having moral freedom would not 
require God’s permitting my (non-existent) evil choice. 
The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis would imply that each amount of evil permitted 
achieves a good, so that any general good that requires a type of evil could be partitioned into 
goods corresponding to each permitted evil. The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis is incompatible 
with a good’s requiring that all of a type of evil be permitted without requiring a specific amount 
of that evil. NGE, which only states that God’s permission of evil is necessary in the divine 
choice context, in which God must choose whether or not to permit a given evil, allows that there 
may be goods that require divine permission of a certain type of evil whose magnitude does not 
correlate with the number of divine permissions of that evil. The amounts of permitted evil the 
same good may require may depend on how much evil people choose to bring about or how 
much natural evil indeterministic natural forces happen to produce. If God’s permitting an evil is 
only necessary for a greater good given God must choose whether or not to permit the evil, the 




amount in another, without there being any gratuitous evil in either. For example, if in world A 
natural forces produce more natural evil than in world B, the same good of the uniformity of 
nature requires God permit more natural evil in A than in B. If natural forces had produced no 
natural evil, God would not have needed to permit any natural evil for the good of the uniformity 
of nature. The natural evil in A and B is unnecessary but not pointless in the relevant sense.  
So deontological goods render evils permitted for their sake non-gratuitous in a 
straightforwardly meaningful and familiar sense. Perhaps they differ from other global goods 
only in their necessarily absolute character. For example, the good of a highly regular natural 
order may incur the cost of God’s permitting a great deal of natural evil, the actual amount of 
which may be inherently unpredictable, even by God (if we deny divine middle knowledge). If 
we think God can justifiably prevent some but not “too much” natural evil for this good, it 
cannot be intrinsically immoral for God to prevent such evil and this good of a highly regular 
natural order cannot then entail an absolute deontological requirement to permit all natural evil. 
Nevertheless, this good and deontological goods, such as the good of independent selfhood that 
Reitan describes as the possible basis for an absolute deontological divine prohibition, render the 
evils whose permission they require non-gratuitous in the same sense. If, say, indeterministic 
natural forces had not produced certain natural disasters, God would not have had to permit them 
or the actual amount of natural evil for the sake of the good of a highly regular natural order, and 
if someone had not chosen to harm someone else God would not have to permit the harm for the 
good of independent selfhood.  
If, then, one were to ask, “Why did God allow this instance of moral evil?” someone 
adopting the deontological perspective Reitan describes may answer: “Because God cannot, of 




moral evil, and God judged the existence of this good worth all the moral evil He would (or 
might) have to permit because of it.”  This answer is as plausible as the deontological 
requirement is. The sense in which NGE rules out pointless evil is captured by this answer. That 
is, a person who accepts this answer will not judge that God’s permission of the evil is pointless 
in this sense.  
Summary 
Reitan argues NGE should be replaced in atheist evidential arguments from evil with: 
A morally perfect being would eliminate, as far as He was able, all evils that could be 
eliminated without producing a greater evil, or losing a greater good, or violating any 




 I have argued that deontological reasons for God to permit evil are correlated with goods 
that are offsetting goods by NGE. So, although consideration of deontological requirements 
would help to identify possible offsetting goods, no additional clause allowing for deontological 
constraints is necessary. Emending NGE to include deontological considerations misrepresents 
NGE’s notion of gratuitous evil. 
In conclusion, I have argued that it seems impossible for a deontological requirement or 
any moral consideration to make God’s permission of an evil permissible or morally best without 
there being an offsetting good that requires that permission. If God necessarily does what is 
morally best then any evil that must be permitted for non-consequentialist reasons in order to do 
what is morally best, though sub-optimal, given God’s creation, is evil whose permission is 
required by the greater goods of creation that ground the non-consequentialist reason to permit 
the evil.
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could do otherwise, then any evil that must be permitted in order to do what is morally best, 
though sub-optimal, given God’s creation, is evil whose permission is required by the greater 
goods of creation and God’s perfect goodness. 
To place this point in a larger frame: a deontological objection to NGE overlooks the 
relevance of the fundamental difference between the context of human moral decision making 
and God’s. Because humans must choose in a given context we sometimes act so as to achieve 
what we think is good and sometimes that goal is trumped by the goal to avoid doing wrong in 
our given circumstances. God, as creator, always acts for the sake of achieving His good 
purposes. God’s governance of the world He has created and all the decisions that governance 
comprises are subsumed under His goal of achieving the goods for which He created. This does 
not mean God cannot be “subject to” deontological constraints, just that those constraints only 
have application because of the choices God has made in creating. Since God makes the decision 
to create in order to bring about good, we have reason to understand the ultimate rationality of 
God’s choices in purely “consequentialist” terms, namely, to produce good, sufficient to 
safeguard NGE, while accepting deontological requirements as more immediate explanations of 
God’s permission of evil. 
To put this in still other terms: according to tradition, the most basic divine moral 
motivation is love. Applied to the world the law of love may refract into different dictates, 
corresponding to different types of moral considerations of the goods there are, such as the “non-
consequentialist” honoring of various values as well the “consequentialist” promotion of good. 
But most fundamentally and primordially divine love aims at and creates goodness. So the 
ultimate explanation for divine choices may correlate with consequentialist outcomes even 




So although I think Reitan’s recommendation to consider deontological moral reasons in 
discussions of the evidential argument from evil is important and sound advice, I maintain he is 
mistaken about the implications of those considerations for NGE. NGE does not preclude 
deontological considerations. God’s permitting evils whose prevention would violate non-

















































In distinguishing NGE from various theses concerning divine providence in chapter one, 
I have argued that NGE is compatible with evil due to chance. As described, God’s permission of 
a particular evil rather than some other no better may be arbitrary or due to chance in three basic 
ways: First, NGE allows that God’s purposes may be instantiated in different ways. If different 
goods requiring the permission of different evils may equally well satisfy God’s purposes, the 
permission of those evils rather than others may be due to chance, just as the goods they serve 
may be. For example, if God does not govern the world in accordance with strong meticulous 
providence, His purpose of teaching someone her responsibility for the welfare of others may be 
satisfied by her learning from her own personal struggles, the timing, types, and individual 
lessons of which, may be left to chance. 
Second, a good may require the permission of a certain amount of a certain type of evil 
or, more generally, some number of a set of equally bad evils, rather than specific instances of 
evil. So God may allow a particular evil to serve a role in His purposes in satisfaction of NGE 
even if the occurrence of that specific evil rather than another of that type, or common set, is due 
to chance. For example, one’s beginning a search for meaning may be provoked by any of a 
variety of afflictions, the permission of any one of which would achieve this purpose. Moreover, 
NGE allows that the amount of evil God permits may be due to chance. This is because different 
amounts of evil may be offset by corresponding amounts of good in a set of equally good divine 
trade-offs between good and evil. A chance disturbance of one’s life may be necessary for a 
deepening awareness of one’s spiritual ill-health and a major life crisis due to chance may be 




value. So both God’s permission of a specific evil and of a specific amount of evil may be due to 
chance without contravening NGE. 
Third, the distinction between NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis allows for 
chance instances and amounts of evil. God’s permission of an indeterministic process may be 
necessary for some good, though the outcome of the process is unnecessary. Moreover, as 
explored in the last chapter, God's permission of an evil may be necessary for a good that 
requires God permit all of a type of evil, however much that may turn out to be. If God must 
never intervene in nature for some good purpose, and nature is indeterministic, then the amount 
of evil He must permit for that good purpose will depend on the amount of evil nature by chance 
produces. So NGE is compatible with the existence of pointless and regrettable evil, even in 
horrific amounts. This is because, again, unlike the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, NGE describes 
a requirement for God’s permission of evil rather than for the occurrence of evil, and some 
goods, perhaps deontological goods, may require divine permission of all of a type of evil whose 
specific amount may be due to chance. (These considerations do not mean NGE is unmotivated 
so that it should be replaced by the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. As outlined in chapter one, 
there are reasons for thinking the alternative No Unnecessary Evil Thesis is overly restrictive.)  
In general, if the good that requires divine permission of evil is due to chance or if a 
required divine permission of evil may be satisfied by different instances or amounts of evil, 
NGE may still be satisfied. In these circumstances, God’s permission of a particular evil may 
still be necessary for either a greater good, or the avoidance of an evil no better, or for obtaining 
an offsetting good and also avoiding an evil no better, in satisfaction of NGE, as described in 




So, why this lengthy chapter? One key issue concerning providence and apparently 
pointless evil is whether God’s plan can in some sense include contingent events, or, 
equivalently, whether any contingent events may be permitted by God for no reason at all.  In 
this chapter I further examine the relationship between chance and gratuitous evil by defending 
my position that considerations of chance are irrelevant to NGE against the arguments of van 
Inwagen and Daniel Howard-Snyder.  I will critique van Inwagen ’s widely referenced “The 
Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God” and Howard-Snyder’s defense of van Inwagen in 
““The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”. The difficulties illuminated in this chapter are not solely 
of interest to an evaluation of van Inwagen ’s work. They must be addressed by any attempt to 
relate chance and divine providence.   
Van Inwagen’s early essay does not mention William Rowe’s premise and is in fact 
ambiguous between targeting NGE or the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. However, because his 
argument applies to both equally well it is worth considering here. Basically, van Inwagen claims 
that many evils may be no part of God’s plan because many may be due to chance, and since 
what lies outside God’s plan serves no ultimate purpose, and perhaps no purpose at all, there may 
be pointless evils in a world governed by God. This argument applies equally well to gratuitous 
evil. Because every evil that occurs is an evil permitted by God, if there may be evils that are in 
no sense part of God’s  plan, there may be evils permitted by God that are in no sense part of 
God’s plan.  
This dissertation takes a metaphysical turn for the next few sections in order to follow 
van Inwagen’s weaving together proposed metaphysical possibilities and his notion of God’s 
plan and providence. In “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God”, van Inwagen  




leaves room for many events and states of affairs’ being due to chance. He then argues that this 
understanding undermines the meticulous view of divine providence according to which every 
event is specifically intended by God. van Inwagen  closes his essay with the further thesis that 
one may consistently believe both that God governs the world with maximal divine loving 
providence and that humanly significant events, including significant evils, may serve no 
purpose and be permitted by God for no reason at all. Howard-Snyder’s essay may be viewed as 
a buttress to van Inwagen’s, directly targeting NGE.   
Although van Inwagen’s essay is provocative and important, I will argue on several 
fronts that his reasoning is flawed and so his thinking about providence and chance does not 
undermine NGE. My criticisms divide into three categories. I will object to the consistency of 
van Inwagen ’s metaphysics, to the claimed conceptual connection between his metaphysics and 
the meticulous view of divine providence, and to his arguments that if his view of providence is 
viable a theist need not believe every specific evil serves a purpose.  
Summary of “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God” 
I begin with a summary of van Inwagen’s essay. Van Inwagen  describes in general 
terms, through a simplified model of creation in terms of basic particles possessing causal 
powers in a void, how we should understand both God’s sustaining the created world in 
existence and God’s special “interventions” in bringing about the miraculous. God creates the 
universe by bringing into existence its basic constituents (“particles”) and He sustains the 
universe by bringing about or decreeing their continued existence and the causal powers they 
have at every moment they exist. A “particle” exists and possesses causal powers at a given 




moment (though its effects are its own and not God’s). God may also decree other states of 
affairs besides the existence and powers of particles, such as events and the existence of things 
composed of such particles.  
Van Inwagen calls all God’s acts with respect to creation God’s “decrees” and holds that 
God’s decrees are closed under entailment: God decrees whatever contingent states of affairs His 
decrees entail.
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  For example if God decrees “Let there be rational animals” and this decree 
entails the existence of neurons, God thereby decrees the existence of neurons (though neither 
the decree nor neurons are metaphysically necessary). Miracles are departures from God’s 
ordinary sustaining activity only in that in performing a miracle God temporarily decrees causal 
powers to some entities that he does not ordinarily decree. So, according to van Inwagen, all of 
God’s activity with respect to creation can be thought of as His bringing about states of affairs, 
which include the existence of basic constituents (“particles”), their causal powers, and events, 
and all the contingent states of affairs such actualizations entail.  
Van Inwagen describes three possible sources of chance in such a divinely sustained and 
directed cosmos, namely: free will,
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 natural indeterminism, and the initial state of creation. He 
defines a chance event or state of affairs as one which is “without purpose or significance; serves 
no one’s end; is not part of anyone’s plan; and might very well not have been.” God’s plan is 
defined as the sum total of God’s decrees, other than decrees made only in response to events He 
did not decree. Events resulting from free choice then are not part of God’s plan, for if God 
decreed them they could not be free. The undetermined results of indeterministic natural powers 
would also not be a part of God’s plan. For example, supposing God did not directly bring about 
the existence of planet Earth and of humans, insofar as the existence of planet Earth and even of 




the laws of nature, their existence is not part of God’s plan. Van Inwagen holds that God may 
have decreed the existence of rational free creatures without having decreed the existence of the 
specific kind of rational creatures there are, leaving that to chance. Finally, another source of 
chance is the initial state of the universe. Van Inwagen  argues that if there are alternative 
possible, equally suitable, initial arrangements of particles, as he finds very plausible, then in 
order to create at all, God must either choose among them arbitrarily or decree that one of them 
be actual without decreeing which one. The latter may be termed an indeterminate decree. In 
either case, the specific initial arrangement of particles and all that follows from there being that 




Van Inwagen lists these different possible sources of chance in order to argue against the 
view that in a divinely governed cosmos the occurrence of every humanly significant event must 
have a purpose. He illustrates this by considering two specific evils: the suffering resulting from 
the existence of rabies, and an individual death resulting from a car accident. Putting aside 
(momentarily) considerations of God’s goodness, it seems that if many events may be due to the 
above sources of chance in a world sustained and governed by God, we have no reason to think 
these events are not among them. On his model of God’s metaphysical relation to creation, even 
if God has created and sustains all things and their causal powers in existence, it is reasonable to 
suppose the rabies virus might not have evolved. It might not have evolved because the initial 
arrangement of particles that make up the universe might have been different or because the 
evolution of indeterministic nature might have taken a different course or both. Rabies may exist 
without being decreed by God. Therefore the existence of rabies may very well not be part of 




The same may be said of a particular person’s accidental death: it may well be no part of 
God’s purpose. Suppose a woman, Alice, is killed in a car accident because she happened to 
drive into a street where there was an oncoming car whose driver had neglected to fix his brakes. 
Perhaps if nature or human freedom had taken a different course this event would not have 
occurred, and perhaps, even given all of God’s decrees, the combination of nature and human 
freedom in this case could have taken a different course. In that case this event is not part of 
God’s plan, happened by chance, and serves no purpose. And in that case, according to van 
Inwagen , if Alice’s husband were to ask, in desperate grief, “Why did she die?” there is no 
answer, not even one known only to God.  
Taking into account now God’s goodness, this account of humanly significant chance 
events in a world governed by God prompts the following question, as van Inwagen  recognizes: 
“Even if an awful event such as Alice’s death occurred by chance, musn’t its occurrence serve a 
purpose in order for God to permit it?” That is, one may think that although God’s goodness is 
not impugned by God’s plan leaving room for the possibility of evil, God’s goodness guarantees 
there is a reason God permits the existence of evil that is not part of His plan. (In fact, van 
Inwagen  thinks all evil may be due to chance and therefore not be part of God’s plan.) It is 
God’s permission of evil that is not part of His plan that truly obscures His goodness.  
Van Inwagen responds by making an analogy between reasons for the occurrence of 
particular events and reasons for God’s permission of particular events. He points out that on his 
model of God’s relation to creation, even if the existence of certain types of evils, such as 
agonizing death, are not due to chance, a theist has no reason for thinking an evil as specific as 
the disease rabies or Alice’s death in a car accident is not due to chance. He then says that 




for permitting certain types of evils, a theist has no reason for thinking God must have a reason 
for permitting an evil as specific as rabies or as Alice’s death. So such significant particular 
events may be no part of God’s plan or purpose and furthermore such significant particular 
events need not be permitted for some purpose for God to be justified in permitting them.  
He considers the objection that there could not be a general explanation of God’s 
allowing a type of evil unless there were, for each such event, an explanation for God’s allowing 
it, i.e. that a general explanation can only be a summary of individual explanations. He answers 
this by giving a counterexample. Just as, as most theists accept, God need not have a particular 
reason for allowing each particular sin to have a reason for allowing humans to sin in general 
(and hence for God to be justified in allowing particular sins), God need not have a specific 
reason for allowing particular evils of some other category to be justified in allowing evils of that 
type.  
He also considers the objection that it would violate justice for God to allow someone to 
die for no reason at all. He answers that just as most theists accept that God justly allows 
different benefits and harms, disadvantages and advantages, to be unequally distributed and 
without connection to merit, they should accept that God may justly allow this harm – the chance 
of accidental and pointless death – to be distributed in different amounts randomly.  
 Van Inwagen thinks the plausibility of his construal of the relation between divine 
action, chance, and evil shows that a theist has no compelling reason to suppose there is a reason 





If what I have said is true, it yields a moral for students of the problem of evil: Do not 
attempt any solution to this problem that entails that every particular evil has a purpose, 
or that with respect to every individual misfortune, or every devastating earthquake, or 
every disease, God has some special reason for allowing it. Concentrate rather on the 
problem of what sort of reasons a loving and providential God might have for allowing 
His creatures to live in a world in which many of the evils that happen to them happen to 




Analysis of van Inwagen ’s Metaphysics of Chance and Divine Action  
With the help of some interpretive analysis, I believe the metaphysics of van Inwagen ’s 
remarks on chance and divine providence may be summarized as follows. A fully adequate sense 
in which all of creation is completely dependent upon God while still possessing its own nature 
(causal powers) and order (while being a creation rather than a divine illusion) is its being 
metaphysically impossible for anything with causal powers to exist or possess its causal powers 
at any moment it exists without God’s causing it to exist with those powers. This suitably strong 
sense of created dependence still allows states of affairs and events to obtain without being 
intended by God. For example, a specific particles’ existence and powers may be willed by God 
without its specific attributes (such as location) and effects being so willed. Furthermore, this 
notion of created dependence even allows that a particle may exist by chance. God may cause a 
particle to exist even if He does not necessitate that the particle exist. He may bring it into 
existence by decreeing either that particle or some other exist. So a particle may be caused to 
exist by God without being specifically intended by God. And it follows from these views that a 
general state of affairs or event may be decreed by God without its specific instantiation being 
decreed by God: the specific particles and their particular attributes and effects that constitute 




So because it is metaphysically possible for different effects to result from precisely the 
same causes and circumstances, including God’s will and agency, and because God has the 
power to create things with such powers of indeterminate or inherently unpredictable effect, even 
if all of creation depends on God in the sense defined, at least three kinds of events or states of 
affairs may obtain that are not decreed by God:  
1. choices made by God-given free will,  
2. effects of God-given indeterministic powers of nature, and  
3. the specific results of God’s exercising His power to decree (solely) indeterminate 
states of affairs (or, alternatively, of His power to decree determinate states of affairs 




All three sources of chance, libertarian free choices, natural indeterministic powers, and 
God’s indeterminate decrees (whereby nothing determines the specific particularities of the 
results of God’s indeterminate decrees insofar as they are indeterminate), require that different 
effects may result from precisely the same cause.
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 So the implicit general metaphysical claim 
that precisely the same conditions, even with respect to God’s will and God’s act of making an 
arbitrary decree (if possible), may result in different outcomes, is the linchpin of his proposal for 
how the world can be completely dependent on God and yet be permeated by chance.
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 This 
claim may be articulated in terms of two related metaphysical distinctions.  
First, van Inwagen  implicitly distinguishes two Principles:  
Reason for Existence Principle: everything that exists has a reason for its existence, and  




and accepts the Reason for Existence Principle and rejects the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
The Reason for Existence Principle is weaker than the Principle of Sufficient Reason in that 
latter implies the former but not vice versa (because a state of affairs may be the existence of 
something (with certain causal powers) or something’s having certain properties, such as a 
specific location or undergoing a kind of change).)  
Second, van Inwagen  allows that the Reason for Existence Principle is not a principle of 
logically necessitating reason. van Inwagen  implicitly assumes the cause for the existence of x 
may be the complete explanation for the existence of x without necessitating that x exist. When 
God issues an indeterminate decree that X or Y exist, and that decree results in Y, God must be 
considered the cause of Y, though God did not decree that Y exist. Y’s existence rather than X is 
due to chance, but God is the ultimate cause of everything that exists, including Y. The initial 
state of the universe is solely caused by God’s decree though that decree may be indeterminate 
and so not necessitate that specific initial state of the universe, for example. Likewise if by my 
free action I bring about x rather than y, I am the cause of x although there is no reason for x 
rather than y beyond the fact that I chose it. Similarly for indeterministic causal powers: two 
different outcomes may result from the same powers so there is no reason why one outcome 
occurred rather than another but what did occur was caused by the particles involved. So van 
Inwagen  must accept non-necessitating causation for God and free and unfree creation. We may 
call this his Indeterminate Cause Thesis. 
Indeterminate Cause Thesis: The complete cause of B may not necessitate B. 
This thesis states that the obtaining of all states of affairs causally relevant to B may not provide 




affairs is an unqualified explanation for why that state of affairs obtains rather than any other. An 
unqualified explanation is an explanation that does not include an unexplained given. 
The rejection of Principle of Sufficient Reason also enables van Inwagen  to reject B, and 
so accept A and C, of the following initially plausible yet incompatible triad:   
A. There is no best possible specific instantiation God’s purposes.  
 
B. There must be an adequate explanation for why God’s purposes are instantiated one way 
rather than another.  
 
C. The only adequate explanation for why God’s purposes are instantiated one way rather 
than another is that one way is better than the other. 
 
 
In addition to these distinctions a key implicit assumption of van Inwagen ’s essay is his 
rejection (by omission) of the possibility of God determining that an indeterministic process 
produce a particular outcome, or a free agent a particular choice. This possibility was argued for 
by Thomas Aquinas (and defended by David Burrell, among others) on the basis of the 
difference between divine determination or causality and determination by created causes.  
So, to summarize, I interpret van Inwagen  as proposing the following argument for the 
possibility of pervasive chance in a world created and governed by God: If every substance or 
most basic existing thing (“particle”) exists because of God, every state of affairs’ (or accident’s) 
obtaining because of God, while making for a more meticulous providence, does not make for a 
“greater” sense of dependence. There must be a reason for the existence of anything that exists, 
though there need not be a reason why things exist one way rather than another. If every created 
thing with causal powers (every substance) exists because God causes it to, creation is wholly 




creation and ways God’s purposes are fulfilled may be left to chance. Given the Indeterminate 
Cause Thesis, even which particles exist may lack ultimate teleological and causal contrastive 
explanation, where x lacks ultimate contrastive causal explanation if and only if the unqualified 
causal explanation of  x does not entail x and x lacks ultimate contrastive teleological 
explanation if and only if the unqualified teleological explanation of  x does not entail x (which 
means God’s purposes do not entail x, and that is narrower than God’s purposes not “including” 
x, as we shall see). Again, an explanation is unqualified if it does not include an unexplained 
given. 
Further, if it is true that Principle of Sufficient Reason is false and also that there are 
equally good ways of fulfilling God’s purposes, it is metaphysically necessary that these are true. 
So it may be impossible for all aspects of creation to be determined or intended by God. Given 
van Inwagen ’s proposed metaphysics, what must be left to chance (in the sense of lacking 
ultimate teleological explanation) by God is the “choice” of equally good initial or later states of 
the universe and/or the “choices” of indeterministic nature or created agents. If God has no 
reason to prefer one possible state of affairs to another or if God has reason to give creation the 
power to choose, then such “choices” must lack ultimate contrastive teleological explanation and 
be left to “chance”. Yet, again, a theist may consistently claim this world permeated by chance is 
wholly dependent upon God in the sense required for God to be the greatest possible Creator, 
namely: it is absolutely impossible for anything (any substance) to exist without being caused to 









Both van Inwagen’s metaphysics of divine action and his definition of God’s plan are 
conceptually problematic.
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  This is not solely because of questionable metaphysical 
assumptions. I will argue that his metaphysical model precludes the possibility of natural causal 
powers, the inclusion of which was to be a central virtue of his account. Also, his description of 
the place of chance in the world is unrelated to the main features of his metaphysical model of 
God’s causal relation to creation. More specifically, his metaphysics offers purely rhetorical 
support for his main thesis by providing a convenient but problematic and question begging 
definition of God’s plan. His notion of God’s plan must be revised to avoid self-contradiction, 
and those revisions point to a more accurate definition that does not support his argument. It is 
difficult to see how these deficiencies can be remedied to make the case that the possibility of 
chance in a theistic universe undermines NGE. I will first critique the metaphysics that van 
Inwagen’s “Chance Argument” for the possibility of pointless evil in a theistic universe is 
embedded in to uncover its key premises. 
No room for secondary causation 
Van Inwagen’s identifying God’s purposes with God’s decrees seems to imply that God 
cannot act to fulfill his purposes in the world through nature. At least it is not obvious that it does 
not. Let us assume, with van Inwagen, that because the obtaining of any state of affairs God 
decrees follows with absolute metaphysical necessity from God’s decree, no other contributing 
cause is possible. So what God decrees God, and nothing else, directly causes. Can God decree 
that nature cause some effect y? By van Inwagen’s entailment thesis, all that necessarily follows 




that this decree is impossible. If it were possible, both God and nature could cause the same 
effect. One may reply that this objection to God’s decreeing nature produce some event y in its 
history is uncharitable, however. Perhaps God may decree that nature cause some instantiation of 
y. This would mean that what God decrees and directly causes is the existence of a state of 
affairs type (if that were possible) and what nature brings about, and God indirectly causes, is a 
state of affairs token. Although one may question the possibility of causing a type rather than a 
concrete something, this possibility is consistent with van Iwagen’s metaphysics. Perhaps to 
decree a type is to make an indeterminate decree. But this possibility is still inconsistent with van 
Inwagen‘s account.  
Suppose the existence of rational animals is not entailed by the initial state of the 
universe and there is no truth about whether rational animals will come into existence or not for 
God to know, as van Inwagen  assumes is possible. Can God at some “time” decree that one of 
the many ways in which the existence of rational animals could be satisfied by causal powers of 
existing particles is satisfied? On van Inwagen’s account He cannot. This decree must either be 
that nature brings about rational animals contingently, by miraculous or non-miraculous 
indeterministic powers, or that nature brings about rational animals determinately, by miraculous 
deterministic powers (we are assuming that the existence of rational animals does not follow 
from the initial state of the universe and God’s ordinary sustaining of particles and their powers.)  
If the former then there is no mystery about how a world pervaded by chance may be governed 
by God and van Inwagen’s criticism of meticulous providence amounts to the claim that there 
may be equally optimal possible worlds for God to choose between or leave to chance. If what is 
decreed by God may be brought about by nature contingently then an effect of nature may be in 




cannot decree that secondary causes bring about contingent effects. This is at the heart of his 
view that the possibility of chance undermines strict meticulous providence.  
If the latter, then God decrees that one of the many sets of causal powers that 
determinately bring about rational animals in the circumstances the particles are in be actual. But 
if so, then in what sense does nature produce rational animals? Either those circumstances the 
particles are in are decreed by God or not. If they are, the existence of rational animals is 
metaphysically entailed by decrees God has made and thus is decreed by God. If not, then God 
decrees that rational animals come into existence by natural deterministic causal powers on the 
basis of knowing what contingent circumstances there are or will be. If this is the case, then 
either God decrees all results of natural deterministic powers, for God always supplies causal 
powers knowing the circumstances they are in (and nature never produces its own effects), or 
divine decrees are delimited in terms of God’s intention and purpose. The former is the 
occasionalism he wished to avoid; the latter makes his definition of God’s plan viciously 
circular, for then God’s purposes are all God’s non-reactive decrees of God’s purposes. 
It seems that van Inwagen‘s account does not avoid occasionalism. According to the 
entailment thesis, God decrees all metaphysically necessary consequences of His decrees. 
Consider God’s decree of the initial state of the universe U0. Whether this decree is determinate 
or indeterminate, God is the sole cause of U0. In initial circumstances C, which include U0 and all 
God’s decrees at to, the deterministic powers of those initial particles metaphysically entail 
certain changes x. By the entailment thesis then, God decrees “If C, then x” (van Inwagen holds 
that God decrees conditional statements). Now if God causes C and also decrees that if C, x will 
result, how could the particles cause x? It seems that God causes x. van Inwagen  says God only 




seems He does so directly. The same applies to indeterminate causal powers. In initial 
circumstances C, the indeterministic powers of those initial particles metaphysically entail a 
disjunction: either changes x or changes y or … (and perhaps also a disjunction of probabilities). 
So by the entailment thesis God decrees “If C, then x or y”. Suppose y results. A complete 
explanation for the occurrence of y is God’s causing C and decreeing that in C either x or y will 
result. What is not explained by God’s direct causation is only C’s occurring rather than some 
other initial state that was included in God’s indeterminate decree and x’s resulting rather than y, 
but both these facts have no explanation. They are due to chance. By the same reasoning, the 
entire history of changes that make up the history of the natural world seems entirely due to 
God’s decrees and chance. So there seems no room for natural causation in van Inwagen  ‘s 
metaphysics, despite his claim that on his view God decrees causal powers and so grants nature 
its own causality.  
I repeat this argument as follows: 
1. The Entailment Thesis: God decrees all metaphysically necessary consequences of 
His decrees.  
2. Particle X’s  having Deterministic Power DP [Indeterministic Power IP] at t 
metaphysically entails that, for some set of circumstances C (that include God’s 
decrees): 
if C obtains at t, change Y [change Y or change Z] occurs at t. 
Therefore (from 2 and 3): 
3. If God decrees “Let Particle X have Deterministic Power DP at t”, God also decrees 
“If circumstances C, then change Y occurs at t.”; and If God decrees “Let Particle X 
have Indeterministic Power IP at t” , God also decrees “If circumstances C, then 
change Y or change Z occurs at t.” 
And: 
4. By decreeing the existence and causal powers of the initial arrangement of particles 
for time duration t which metaphysically entailed either change x or y or z in C, God 
thereby decreed that “If C at t, changes x or y or … occur over time t“ 




6. God caused (though perhaps did not decree) the initial state of the universe and all 
His decrees at to 
Therefore (from 4, 5, and 6): 
7. God caused the changes x that the initial arrangement of particles caused at time to. 
8. For any time t up until the first creaturely free action, all natural state of affairs result 
from divine decrees and circumstances which are ultimately caused by divine decrees.  
 
So although van Inwagen  aims to convey a relation between God and creation that is 
non-occasionalist, i.e., that accommodates secondary causation, his theses imply that all natural 
changes are directly caused by God (excepting perhaps free will if probabilities cannot be 
assigned to free options). van Inwagen’s simplified model of God’s relation to creation does not 
have the conceptual resources to distinguish God’s causal activity and natural causality.  
This argument clarifies the philosophical additions and emendations that could improve 
van Inwagen‘ s model to provide a consistent account of God’s relation to creation. The critical 
junctures are (1), (2), (5) and evaluation of (7).  Re: (1) van Inwagen  could abandon the 
Entailment Thesis and the attempt to describe God’s plan in terms of what God decrees, and 
instead define God’s plan in terms of what God wills. This is independently motivated as I will 
argue in the next section. Re: (2) The model could divide necessity into two types: absolute 
(metaphysical) and natural (and restrict the Entailment Thesis to absolute entailment.) This 
would also require a modification in van Inwagen ‘s definition of God’s plan so as to include 
what God merely knows will result from His decrees. Re: (7) The model could simply accept the 
apparent contradiction of (7), allowing that both God and nature causally contribute to the 
production of the same effect (a version of concurrentism). This would open up consideration of 




indeterministic natural powers, and so allow God’s plan to include events in some sense due to 
chance. Re: (5) later, in his discussion of miracles, van Inwagen explicitly lends (5) support.  
 To summarize, van Inwagen  claims to present a consistent non-occasionalist 
metaphysics of divine action according to which chance and purposelessness may be pervasive 
in a world governed by God, but his model of divine action does not have the conceptual 
resources to present such an account and is not internally consistent. Rendering it consistent 
would require abandoning his definition of God’s plan or making a metaphysical distinction 
between the mode of God’s causal contribution to events and nature’s. The former would be to 
abandon the reason he gives for thinking that purposelessness may be pervasive in a world 
created and sustained by God, as I will later explain. The latter would invite a consideration of 
whether God’s transcendent causation and creaturely causation can differ in such a way that God 
can determine that nature produce a specific change contingently. This would allow chance in a 
world in which  all events are decreed by God and are part of God’s plan in van Inwagen  ‘s 
sense. Perhaps van Inwagen  finds this view clearly contradictory, but given the difficulties 
involved in this subject, made apparent by the above analysis, it merits examination.  
The Irrelevance of van Inwagen’s Anti-Occasionalism.  
Van Inwagen’s metaphysics of divine action is not relevant to his definition of God’s 
plan and of chance. Van Inwagen  emphasizes that on his model God does not directly move 
particles, rather God supplies the powers by which the particles affect each other. For van 
Inwagen  this is an important difference. He illustrates it with an analogy: Electromagnets affect 
each other by the magnetic power given them by an electric current. The current itself does not 




that power that causes the magnets to move (toward each other). Analogously, God does not 
directly affect particles; He gives them powers by which they affect each other.  
How is this distinction important for van Inwagen’s depiction of the place of chance in a 
universe created and sustained by God? van Inwagen  doesn’t make the connection explicit, but 
it may seem as follows: If God were to directly bring about the positions and arrangements of 
particles, those specific positions and arrangements would be part of God’s plan, whereas, if God 
only brings about the causal powers those particles possess, then, the specific effects of those 
powers need not be part of God’s plan. If the effects of those powers depend on circumstances 
due to chance or if those powers are indeterministic, then the specific positions and arrangements 
resulting from the powers supplied by God are instead due to chance and not part of God’s 
plan.
88
 Since van Inwagen  defines God’s plan in terms of what God causes by decree, if God 
does not Himself move particles when he gives them causal powers to move each other, then 
those movements are not necessarily part of his plan. This may leave much of the specifics of 
nature’s causal activity outside God’s plan, as van Inwagen  desires.  
However, even this loose connection between van Inwagen’s view of God’s causal 
relation to creation and the place of chance in creation evaporates on closer examination. van 
Inwagen’s distinction between what God causes directly and what He causes indirectly, the main 
distinguishing feature of his account, does not mark the distinction between what is part of God’s 
plan and what isn’t, nor between what is part of God’s plan and what need not be. Both what 
God causes directly and what God causes indirectly may be part of God’s plan and both may be 
due to chance. What God causes indirectly may be part of God’s plan because of what we can 
call van Inwagen’s “Entailment Thesis”, namely, that whatever is metaphysically entailed by 




of what we can call his “Divine Indeterminate Cause Thesis” namely, that God may be the 
complete cause of an event without determining that that event rather than some other will occur. 
Consequently, there is a lack of connectedness between van Inwagen’s remarks on God’s activity 
in sustaining the world and his remarks on chance, contrary to his claim that the former is a 
prolegomena for the latter. 
Given his entailment thesis, indirectly caused events may be part of God’s plan because 
events caused indirectly may still be metaphysically entailed by events and circumstances caused 
directly. Consider the electromagnet analogy van Inwagen  uses to illustrate the distinction 
between God’s actually causing a movement and His doing so only indirectly. The electric 
current is thought to cause the movement of the metals only indirectly because something 
(apparently) distinct from the current, namely the magnetic field, is the immediate cause of the 
movement - by powers that belong to it and not the current. Note that this is not considered an 
example of indirect causation because that intervening power is indeterministic (which it is not in 
this case) or because the electric current is not sufficient for the specific form of the magnetic 
field it generates (ie. because it is only that current in those circumstances that generates the 
specific attributes of that field). It is not indirect because some element of chance is involved, but 
rather because there are two levels of power involved – the power that belongs to the metal and 
the power of the current to produce that power.  
Suppose God decrees the existence of planets with water and satellites. Suppose, given 
God’s non-miraculous decreeing of causal powers to the particles that compose them, it is a 
metaphysically necessary but not directly intended consequence of this that some specific planets 
have tides. It seems appropriate to say, and van Inwagen’s remarks would have us say that, as per 




Yet, by the entailment thesis, the existence of such tides are decreed by God and hence part of 
God’s plan. So what is indirectly caused by God may be part of God’s plan, and if it isn’t part of 
God’s plan this is due to either natural indeterminism or indeterminism of divine decree, not 
because it was indirectly caused. 
One might think that God’s decrees, including those concerning gravity, planets, 
satellites, and water, could not metaphysically entail tides because God could always perform a 
miracle. That is, natural deterministic causal powers decreed by God entail certain events in 
certain circumstances only given God does not cause a miracle, so the existence of planets with 
oceans and satellites cannot metaphysically entail the existence of tides. The example that van 
Inwagen  gives of metaphysical entailment is one of essential composition, namely, the existence 
of water’s entailing the existence of protons, and not of natural causality; whereas the 
composition relation may be a logical relation, the natural cause-effect relation, in a theistic 
universe at least, is not. But this consideration is misplaced. We are not considering what is 
entailed by natural powers and circumstances but what is entailed by the sum of all of God’s 
(immediate) decrees in a given situation. Divine non-disjunctive decrees of both circumstances 
and deterministic causal powers necessitate specific effects of those powers.
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 So events only 
indirectly caused by God may be part of God’s plan. 
As mentioned, one might mistakenly think that van Inwagen ’s direct vs. indirect 
causation distinction is related to his understanding of chance events as those outside God’s plan 
in that only indirectly caused events may be due to chance. That is, one might mistakenly think 
that, as a matter of definition, events directly caused by God are part of God’s plan, whereas 
events indirectly caused by God may or may not be. This is not the case, given van Inwagen’s 




could be chance in the universe by the issuance of divine indeterminate decrees concerning both 
initial and later states of the universe. Divine indirect causation only makes natural 
indeterminism possible, and that is only because it is synonomous with natural causation, 
simpliciter, given theism. If natural powers exist because God causes them to, there is divine 
“indirect” causation. If they are indeterministic then of course there is chance in the universe, but 
there would still be chance even if God was the real cause of those undetermined effects – a 
possibility provided by the Divine Indeterminate Cause Thesis. 
So why does van Inwagen  emphasize the distinction between God’s issuing causal 
powers and God’s directly causing the effects of those powers? Does it have relevance to his 
main thesis? van Inwagen  wishes to describe a completely adequate view of created 
dependence, according to which a particle is completely dependent on God for having the 
powers it has, that is not occasionalist. Of course if God did directly bring about every change in 
the universe such that His causality explains why each change occurred rather than some other, 
even those apparently due to created causes, and there is no other type of causality, there would 
be no room for chance in the universe. But van Inwagen’s proposed avoidance of occasionalism 
does not provide him room for chance within divine providence, for given van Inwagen’s divine 
indeterminate decree thesis, occasionalism is compatible with there being chance in the universe. 
An occasionalist would replace all reference to natural indeterminacy with indeterminacy of 
divine causation. Moreover, it is not clear that van Inwagen does avoid occasionalism, as we saw 
in the last section. 
Because of the Entailment Thesis and the Divine Indeterminate Cause Thesis, the direct 
vs. indirect causation distinction drawn by van Inwagen  is not conceptually relevant to the role 




due to indeterministic causes, whether divine or natural, of both initial conditions and subsequent 
states, and the existence of natural causality does not in itself make it any more so. Contrary to 
van Inwagen’s  claim of providing a prolegomena to a discussion of chance, there is a lack of 
conceptual connectedness between his description of divine sustenance and God’s “supplying 
causal powers” and his main theme of the place of chance in the universe.  
van Inwagen ’s Chance Argument for the Compatibility of Pointless Evil and Theism 
With the help of the above analyses I now more fully and clearly present the logical 
structure of van Inwagen’s argument for the possibility of pointless evil in “The Place of Chance 
in a World Sustained by God”: 
[A] In a world sustained by God many significant evils may occur for no purpose or 
reason at all.  
A is implied by: 
[B] In a world sustained by God many humanly significant events, including evils, may 
be due to chance, where being due to chance means being without purpose or reason. 
B follows from the following three claims: 
[C] A chance event may be defined as an event that a) is without ultimate contrastive 
causal explanation (without ultimate causal explanation for why it rather than some other 
event occurred) and b) is not part of God’s plan. 
[D] In a world sustained by God, many humanly significant events may be without 
ultimate contrastive causal explanation  
[E] All events without ultimate contrastive causal explanation are outside God’s plan.  
D is supported by  F and G together: 
[F] In a world sustained by God, there are three possible sources of chance: free will, 
natural indeterminism, and the initial state of creation. 
[G] The occurrence of many humanly significant events may be contingent results of  
free will, natural indeterminism, and the initial state of creation.  
(G in turn is supported by the scientific account of how events such as the emergence of 




E is the joint import of: 
[H] God’s plan may be defined as the sum of all of God’s non-reactive decrees. 
[I] All and only events God decrees have ultimate causal contrastive explanation. 
H in turn is implicity supported by the following together: 
[J] God’s plan includes all that, and only what, God wills. 
[K] God (non-reactively) decrees all that, and only what, God wills. 
I is implied by N, O, and P together: 
[N] Every event (whether due to determinate or indeterminate causes) is ultimately 
caused (though not necessitated) by God. 
[O] All and only events that are decreed by God are logically necessitated by their 
ultimate cause (a divine decree). 
[P] Only events that are logically necessitated by their ultimate cause have ultimate 
causal contrastive explanation. 
F is supported by:  
[L] A theist may accept that the complete cause of an event (whether a material cause, a 
free agent, or God) need not logically necessitate that event; and 
[M] A theist may accept that although the existence of every thing (substance) that exists 
has an explanation, there need not be an explanation for every state of affairs 
 
Criticism 
  “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God” is an understandably very popular 
essay. In it van Inwagen artfully and provocatively weaves together the topics of chance, 
providence, and the problem of evil, a project that is still very much needed twenty years later. 
Of course, in such a short and wide-ranging treatment overlooked subtleties must abound. It is 
my contention, though, that a close examination shows the essay is not merely not rigorous, 
which is to be expected considering its scope, but that it’s conclusions are fundamentally 




of argument above I have pointed out a lack of conceptual connectedness and of metaphysical 
consistency. I now argue that van Inwagen’s essay misrepresents the notion of purposelessness 
itself and so does not show how the possibility of chance in a divinely governed world supports 
the possibility of either pointless or gratuitous evil. 
Even if van Inwagen’s aim in this essay were only to present a coherent view of 
providence that allows the possibility of pointless evil, i.e. to argue that meticulous providence is 
not necessary (rather than that it is false), the set of ideas employed for achieving this are at 
cross-purposes. His core argument is that just as there may be no reason why one event rather 
than another occurs, there may be no reason for God to permit one evil rather than another. He 
may wish to add, though this is not sufficiently made explicit, that also, there may be no reason 
for God to permit one amount of evil rather than not. This means there may be evils such that 
God’s purposes could have been just as well achieved without His allowing them. Van 
Inwagen’s description of the possibility of chance in a world created and sustained by God is a 
description of the possibility of contingency and arbitrariness in the manner in which God’s 
purposes are fulfilled. But this possibility only conflicts with Strict Meticulous Providence; it is 
not relevant to the possibility of pointless evil. The possibility of pointless (though not 
gratuitous) evil is introduced by the distinction between an evil’ s being necessary for a good and 
God’s not preventing  it being necessary. If only God’s not preventing it is necessary and the 
evil’s occurrence is a matter of chance, then if it occurs by chance, it is a pointless evil in the 
robust sense prohibited by the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. If there are great goods that require 
God not prevent vast amounts of horrific evil whose occurrence is due to chance, then there may 
be vast amounts of horrific pointless evil. As also described in chapter one, God’s having no 




gratuitous. To be gratuitous an evil must be such that its permission is not necessary for an 
offsetting good, whether that is the good of an optimal world or some other net offsetting value 
that results from God’s permission of the evil.  
What van Inwagen’s metaphysics allows is that God’s purposes may be multiply 
instantiated. This only means that God may be morally neutral regarding different instantiations 
of them. To show that God’s purposes may be instantiated in different ways is not to show that 
different amounts of evil may equally well serve the exact  same good, which is what is required 
for there to be pointless evil. If God’s purposes may equally well be satisfied by two alternatives 
with different amounts of evil, one may suppose the alternative with more evil must have more 
good. Otherwise, they could not satisfy God’s purposes equally well and God could not be 
indifferent between them. Van Inwagen’s invoking the possibility that God’s purposes may be 
multiply instantiated  does not give any reason to think this may be the case.  
van Inwagen’s Argument Begs the Question against the No Pointless Evil Thesis 
van Inwagen says his model leaves room for three possible sources of chance, but indeed 
it seems obvious that any model of God’s causal relation to creation must allow for natural 
indeterminism or indeterminism of initial conditions or undetermined free agency for there to be 
chance in the natural world. van Inwagen  offers an argument for indeterminism of the initial 
conditions of creation (referred to above), but with respect to libertarian human freedom and 
indeterministic natural powers, van Inwagen ’s assertion that these could be sources of 
contingency even in a theistic universe seems true by definition. So what is original or distinctive 
about van Inwagen’s view? To answer this and understand what van Inwagen  hopes to 




‘chance’. Again, by a chance event van Inwagen  does not mean merely an event not determined 
by the prior causal history of the world, what we may call an ‘undetermined event’. He means an 
event that is also without purpose, one that is unintended, “not part of anyone’s plan”. So van 
Inwagen  seeks to make a conceptual connection between his description of God’s causal relation 
to the world and the existence of chance events in this sense.  
As indicated by my reconstruction of van Inwagen’s extended argument against the 
meticulous view of providence above, that connection is made by van Inwagen’s definition of 
God’s plan. According to van Inwagen , God’s purposes comprise God’s plan and God’s plan is 
comprised of God’s (non-reactive) decrees (H). That part of creation that is outside God’s 
purposes and plan is also all that “very well might not have been” (E). This is because only what 
God decrees is necessitated by its ultimate cause, i.e. has ultimate contrastive causal explanation, 
and, given the No Arbitrary Decree Thesis, only what God non-reactively decrees is caused for a 
complete sufficient reason (because it is best) and so has ultimate contrastive teleological 
explanation. So only what is not non-reactively decreed by God, i.e. what is outside God’s plan, 
lacks ultimate contrastive causal explanation and ultimate contrastive teleological explanation, 
and so might not have been. This is also seen by the fact that all that is not entailed by God’s 
(non-reactive) decrees, is the result of divine indeterminate cause (God’s indeterminate decrees), 
of created indeterminate causes, or of created determinate causes in circumstances ultimately due 
to indeterminate causes. So, though there are different intensional components of van Inwagen’s 
definition of chance, namely, being without ultimate contrastive causal explanation and serving 
no ultimate purpose, given van Inwagen’s definition of God’s purposes (God’s plan) as God’s 
non-reactive decrees, they have the same extension. van Inwagen’s definition of God’s plan as 




divine action (namely, events without ultimate contrastive causal and  teleological explanation), 
which his description of divine action makes easy to define, with chance events in the sense of 
serving no purpose. (Statements I , N, O, and P above) .  
To make his case against meticulous providence van Inwagen  must argue that at least 
some undetermined events (events that lack ultimate contrastive causal explanation) may not 
serve God’s purposes. By identifying undetermined events with purposeless events, via his 
definition of God’s plan, van Inwagen  thereby simply assumes meticulous providence is 
incompatible with the existence of undetermined events. He does not properly address the 
rationale or possible metaphysical grounding for meticulous providence or a rejection of 
pointless evil given the possibility of undetermined events. And, as we have seen, van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics only provides a conveniently simple vocabulary for defining God’s plan in this way, 
it does not actually support this definition. Even if van Inwagen  only aims to present a coherent 
alternative to meticulous providence and the No Pointless Evil Thesis rather than a direct 
criticism, the assumptions he makes and their grounds should be noted. That is, to make his case, 
van Inwagen  must argue for the reasonableness of his definition, but he does not.  
One rationale for rejecting the possibility of pointless evil despite the prevalence of 
chance in a world governed by God is that pointless evil seems to impugn God’s sovereignty, 
specifically His ability to redeem evil and achieve His purposes for creation. Theists may 
disagree about the sense in which God’s victory over evil in creation and in the lives of each 
individual person must be complete, but van Inwagen ’s argument does not even address this 
motivation for divine middle knowledge or the No Pointless Evil and related theses. Again, he 
defines God’s plan and purpose so as to preclude chance events, asserts the compatibility of a 




theism, and so makes it a matter of definition that evils may be without divine purpose. In this 
way, van Inwagen ’s argument begs the question against meticulous providence and the No 
Unnecessary Evil Thesis.
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Even before considering the specifics of van Inwagen’s proposal we have reason to 
suspect he cannot achieve his aim within the limited scope of his model of God’s relation to 
creation. To be sure, a metaphysical description of God’s causal relation to creation can have 
implications for providence. For example, if God specifically and solely determines all events 
then all must be part of God’s plan and none are due to chance in any meaningful sense. But the 
denial of divine determinism alone does not have implications for how individual events can or 
cannot fit into God’s purposes. For example, it cannot by itself undermine the view that God 
determined the states of affairs He did because He knew what undetermined events would or 
would likely result. It also does not suggest that God does not guide the world’s events through 
various types of permissions and preventions so that only what He specifically wills is 
actualized. Minimally, van Inwagen  would have to expand his model of providence to include a 
treatment of divine omniscience and the denial of middle knowledge to achieve this. 
To further illustrate, van Inwagen  thinks many theists would find his view that the 
existence of humans was not part of God’s plan shocking, but given van Inwagen’s definition of 
God’s plan, this only means that God’s decrees alone are not sufficient for the existence of 
humans. This means that natural indeterminism played a role in the historical emergence of 
humans, and/or that the initial state of the universe and laws of nature did not make the 
appearance of humans naturally inevitable or that the initial conditions that did make humans 
inevitable were not entailed by God’s decrees. But many theists accept natural indeterminism 




even though they think (rightly or wrongly) God intended the existence of humans. So the denial 
of van Inwagen’s notion of God’s decrees seems  widely accepted. van Inwagen identifies being 
non-reactively decreed by God (in his sense) with being intended by God, but this equivalence 
requires argument.  
So, how could the existence of humans be part of God’s plan if the existence of humans 
is undetermined (lacks sufficient reason)? Because God knew that if He determined other states 
of affairs, humans would come about, and God determined those states of affairs because He 
knew humans would come about. Or because the existence of humans is a divine goal and so 
God timelessly selected our universe’s contingent history out of many others because it satisfied 
this goal. To get clear on the possible coherence of, or even pre-reflective origins of, views that 
accept chance and yet think the existence of humans is part of God’s plan would fix the target of 
van Inwagen‘s essay, yet van Inwagen does not do this. 
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Again, van Inwagen  thinks that God can and does issue decrees concerning what 
happens or comes into being in the history of creation. Some such decrees may have been 
entailed by His initial act of creation. Perhaps God decreed the initial creation decree, whether 
determinate or indeterminate, He did because that decree entailed rational animals, for example. 
Then God decreed “Let there be rational animals” (Decree RA) in decreeing the initial state. But 
suppose God knows which initial arrangement would produce rational animals, though 
contingently, and decrees that initial arrangement (in part) because it will produce rational 
animals. Then, as mentioned above, according to van Inwagen, the existence of rational animals 
is not part of God’s plan. It is not decreed by God or entailed by God’s decrees. But even on the 
basic blueprint for creation notion of God’s plan, it should be included. The specifics of how it is 




reason He issued the initial creation decree He did. So, as mentioned, if middle knowledge is 
possible, this is a basic defect in van Inwagen’s notion of God’s plan, even a technical definition 




As van Inwagen  points out, planning to do something is one’s plan in a sense that 
planning for something (planning for a contingency or having a conditional plan,  planning to do 
something if some possibility occurs) is not. But if one foreknows or at least fore-believes some 
contingency and decides on a response beforehand then one is planning to make that response 
(because I believe that if I expose my queen, he’ll take it giving me checkmate, I plan to expose 
my queen) So the response may be considered part of one’s plan in a less narrow sense. In a 
footnote van Inwagen  says his definition may be called “God’s unqualified or eternal plan” and 
that a broader notion of God’s plan would include what God decrees in response to 
contingencies. But this remedy masks a deeper flaw. Van Inwagen must say that all events that 
are part of God’s qualified but not unqualified plan are without purpose or significance (!) 
because they are all ultimately due to chance. If what is ultimately due to chance may have 
purpose in a meaningful sense then van Inwagen’s linkage between chance and pointlessness is 
broken.  
God’s plan is what God wills, not necessarily what God does 
Indeed, apart from the possibility of divine middle knowledge, we can see that van 
Inwagen’s definition of God’s plan is deficient. If God unqualifiedly wants E and because He 
knows that in circumstances C, x’s having power P entails E at t, God decrees the miracle ‘x has 




not. This shows that God’s plan should be defined in terms of what God wills, not how God 
brings about what he wills. Defining God’s plan in terms of one way He may bring about what 
He wills, namely by decree, unnecessarily restricts the scope of God’s plan and/or how He brings 
it about. 
Also, van Inwagen really offers two definitions of an event or state of affairs’ being due 
to chance in a theistic universe: its having no ultimate contrastive teleological explanation, and 
its not being directly intended by God. But these do not necessarily coincide. If it is better, all 
things considered, that event x occur, than not; and, x can only occur if God allows x, then there 
may be an ultimate contrastive teleological explanation for the occurrence of x even if x is not 
intended by God in van Inwagen’s sense. The teleological explanation for the occurrence of x 
would be: it is better that x occur than not and God wants what is best. Suppose x is humanity’s 
falling into sin. If the greatest possible world is one in which humans sin then even though the 
fall is not part of God’s plan (eternal or qualified) in van Inwagen’s sense and is not directly 
intended by God, there is a teleological explanation for the occurrence of the fall: God’s willing 
the best possible world. The fall did not have to occur: it very well might not have been in the 
sense that humans did not have to sin. If all possible creatures capable of choosing between 
sinning and not would in fact never choose to sin, then the greatest possible world would not 
have been a world God could actualize. But given that some creatures would sin if given the 
opportunity, sin exists because it is better that there be sin than not, all things considered, and 
God wants what is best – a teleological explanation. The distinction between theistic chance 
events and those that are not is not the distinction between events God intends and events God 




We may also see this by examining the possibility of arbitrary divine decrees. Although 
van Inwagen  favors the view that God makes indeterminate rather than arbitrary decrees, he 
allows that there may be divine decrees God lacks sufficient reason to make, i.e. arbitrary 
decrees. But van Inwagen’s definition of God’s plan does not permit this. According to van 
Inwagen, if God makes such an arbitrary decree that decree is due to chance. But van Inwagen 
defines God’s plan as the sum of His non-reactive decrees, and so the results of the decree are 
both part of God’s plan and due to chance. van Inwagen  cannot then define being due to chance 
as not being part of God’s (or anyone’s) plan.  In other words, God’s plan entails the No 
Arbitrary Decree thesis so he cannot consistently allow for the possibility of arbitrary decrees. 
Van Inwagen may respond to this inconsistency by either further refining his definition of 
God’s plan as God’s non-arbitrary, non-reactive decrees, or by fully committing himself to the 
No  Arbitrary Divine Decree Thesis, emphasizing that he finds it more plausible that God has the 
power to issue indeterminate decrees than that God’s choice may lack sufficient reason.  
Let us consider the possibility of arbitrary divine decrees. If God decrees “Let there be 
humans”, though He is indifferent between decreeing this and decreeing the existence of some 
other rational free organism, then since God decrees whatever contingency is entailed by his 
decrees and the existence of a new species of rational free animal is entailed by this decree, He 
thereby decrees the existence of a new species of rational free animal. This decree is not 
arbitrary: it is a good God has a preference for over relevant alternatives and the reason He 
makes the immediate decree He makes. So the decree “Let there be humans” is not a part of 
God’s plan but the decree entailed by this: “Let there be a rational free animal” is. Defining 
God’s plan as God’s non-arbitrary, non-reactive decrees would be more adequate then than 




By instead committing to the No Arbitrary Divine Decree Thesis God’s plan can be 
defined as God’s non-reactive decrees unproblematically because it expresses only God’s 
unqualified will (parts of God’s perfect will that God can and will bring about). If God only non-
reactively decrees what He has sufficient reason to decree, God only non-reactively decrees what 
God views as best. The reason this definition of God’s plan initially seems promising then is that 
on this view no part of God’s plan is due to chance and no part of God’s plan is outside God’s 
perfect will.  
These considerations suggest a more perspicuous and accurate definition. The reason 
precluding divine arbitrary decrees or defining God’s plan as God’s non-arbitrary, non-reactive 
decrees is more adequate is that it captures more accurately what God wills, in the required 
sense. The required sense of God’s will is distinct from the intentional component of God’s 
action in issuing an arbitrary decree or in His knowingly permitting a particular instantiation of 
His will. If God arbitrarily decrees “Let there be humans” then He wills that there be humans in 
the sense that He has the intention that humans come about; but since His having that intention is 
arbitrary, it is not part of God’s will in the appropriate sense. Likewise, if God permits a 
particular event though He could equally well have permitted another for the same purpose, the 
event is in one sense a part of God’s plan, namely considered as the fulfillment of God’s 
purposes, and in another sense not. The qualification “non-arbitrary” or asserting the 
impossibility of arbitrary divine decrees  is helpful because it excludes from God’s plan events 
God brings about that are not unqualifiedly willed by God. The disadvantage though, again, is 
that by restricting God’s plan to what God decrees or causes, God’s plan excludes what God 
unqualifiedly wills but only weakly actualizes.
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 Why not then define God’s plan directly in 




thought of as what God wants and is expressed by how God brings about what He wants. Such a 
definition would avoid assumptions about how God actualizes His plan; it corresponds more 
closely to the idea of a plan as a kind of blueprint for action.  
Does Not Address the Issue of God’s Sovereignty 
Van Inwagen’s chance argument for pointless evil defends the compatibility of pointless evil 
with creation’s dependence on God, but does not address the compatibility of pointless evil with 
God’s sovereignty or control over the narrative of creation’s history.  
Let us recall the following claims about God’s relation to evil discussed in chapter one:  
If God exists: 
Strict Meticulous Providence: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for a divinely 
unqualifiedly willed concrete instantiation of a greater good (and so is unqualifiedly willed 
by God).  
The No Chance Role for Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil serves a greater good 
that is specifically willed by God. 
The No Unnecessary Particular Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for 
a greater good. 
The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis: Every particular instance of evil is necessary for a greater 
good or the prevention of an evil no better. 
 
I recall these theses to point out the complexity of defining God’s plan. Clearly, the 
accuracy of a definition of God’s plan depends on which of the above theses is correct. So, for 
example, most safely, we may begin with the claim that out of all (abstract) possibilities, God 
prefers some above all others. These preferences may be considered God’s perfect will.
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God’s plan to what God causes, one’s definition of God’s plan is simple: God’s plan is the actual 
world. On this view, the occurrence of actual events that are in themselves regrettable is still 
best, all things considered, and so are part of God’s plan. God wills what is best and the actual 
world is what is best. 
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One may instead think God’s perfect will includes possibilities that are not available to 
God. For example, the possibility that all free creatures always obey Him. In other words, one 
may think God may wish He could actualize some possibilities that He cannot. But it would be a 
misuse of words to define God’s plan so as to include states of affairs God knows He cannot 
actualize. So, if there are possibilities God prefers but cannot actualize, God’s plan is not simply 
God’s unqualified preferences. One may therefore think God’s plan should be defined simply as 
what God prefers out of the possibilities He knows He can actualize.  
This definition is not adequate if the No Pointless Evil Thesis is false, however. If there 
may be pointless evil, God might wish He did not “have to” actualize some states of affairs: He 
only brings them about because of regrettable circumstances that are no part of His will. (This is 
why van Inwagen  restricts God’s plan to God’s non-reactive decrees.) One may therefore 
consider God’s eternal plan to be those states of affairs that are part of God’s perfect will that 
God can (and therefore does) actualize. This rightly excludes entirely regrettable evils from 
God’s plan. The difficulty with this definition is that it may exclude a great deal of creation, 
including salvation history, from God’s plan, again depending on whether one accepts the Strict 





It is also noteworthy that this definition of God’s plan may be inadequate even if the No 
Pointless Evil Thesis that every evil serves an offsetting good if God exists is true. An evil 
produced by free will or natural indeterminism may be required for a greater good even if more 
good would have resulted if no one chose the evil or if natural indeterminism hadn’t produced 
the evil. For example, Jo’s suffering resulting from a rabies infection may lead to Jo’s 
development of the outweighing good of patience, even if it would have been better for Jo if he 
had never contracting rabies (because then he would have developed some other virtue). If it is 
good for God to follow a general policy of allowing natural indeterminism take its course, it may 
be better for God to allow Jo’s suffering due to rabies than prevent it. It still may have been even 
better if natural indeterminism hadn’t produced rabies. 
Nevertheless, if the occurrence of every evil is necessary for a good that outweighs the 
evil, then though the occurrence of the evil may not be part of God’s perfect will, the evil may 
still be in at least one meaningful sense part of God’s plan. Though evil may be regrettable for 
the loss of good it entails, perhaps God’s plan was to create a world He knew would be (or could 
be) imperfect in ways beyond his control and turn all its evil to good so as to make the world the 
best it could be (given its autonomy). As a final proposal, then, we may consider God’s plan to 
consist of all states of affairs that serve good, i.e. that are good or that are necessary for good, 
even if, had they not occurred, more good would have been served. These are all willed by God, 
though whether they are willed in a suitably strong sense is debatable. 
Not surprisingly, defining God’s plan is a complex matter. The adequacy of one’s 
definition depends on which of the above theses one accepts and that in turn depends on how one 
thinks God’s will may be thwarted, if at all. Perhaps an adequate definition is not even attainable. 




definitions should at least be addressed. Otherwise, van Inwagen’s chance argument for the 
compatibility of pointless evil and theism, even if sound, would demonstrate coherence with only 
an impoverished set of theistic claims. 
NGE Allows Pointless Evil Due to Chance 
If only the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis and not the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis is true, evil 
in a theistic universe may be entirely regrettable. I have argued for this in chapter five in relation 
to deontology and in this chapter’s opening paragraph. If it would have been better that x not 
occur (by chance) than occur (by chance), then even if God has a reason for allowing x, x’s 
occurrence would only serve God’s qualified preferences and hence be without ultimate 
teleological explanation. God’s reason for allowing it would not give its occurrence purpose, it 
would only give His allowing it (given it would occur by chance if He permits it) a purpose. In 
this sense the event in a significant sense very well might not have been and may serve no 
purpose. Perhaps God’s allowing an evil, given it occurs by chance, is better than not, and 
perhaps its better that the possibility of x obtain than not, but by NGE no purpose need be served 
by x’s actually occurring given that possibility. Its occurrence may be just a net loss, period. 
And, as I have argued, if a sufficiently great good requires that God permit all evils of a certain 
type and the amount of that type may be due to chance, then even horrific evils, such as the 
accidental death van Inwagen mentions, may be due to chance, serve no purpose, and happen for 
no reason that could satisfy the grieving. The existential import of this possibility cannot be 
underestimated.  
What would those who think every evil must have a purpose object to about this abstract 




which van Inwagen’s chance argument relies on. Of course if one had a reason to believe in 
determinism or the Principle of Sufficient Reason then one would have a reason to believe that 
every event has an ultimate teleological explanation and purpose. But if all van Inwagen wanted 
to point out is that you can believe not all events occur for a purpose if you give up determinism, 
or even that you cannot believe not all events occur for a purpose unless you give up 
determinism, he has succeeded but achieved little. What a proponent of the No Pointless Evil 
thesis would dispute is that God’s sovereignty is compatible with the occurrence of any 
ultimately unredeemed evil in this way. Again, one may think that even if God must allow such 
seemingly pointless evil, God, by His sovereignty, would then bring good out of the occurrence 
of the evil, a good that would otherwise not occur. To hold this is to hold the No Unnecessary 
Thesis, held by the trust that God is able to “turn all evil to good”.  
As I have argued in chapter four, to deny NGE is to challenge our understanding of 
God’s goodness in a very fundamental way. The No Unnecessary Evil Thesis offers an 
additional constraint on God’s providence. As I have also argued, if one rejects this constraint 
and also accepts the possibility of undetermined events (events without ultimate contrastive 
causal explanation) in a world created and sustained by God, one may accept pointless evil (evil 
unnecessary for an offsetting good) in a world governed by God in accordance with NGE. So I 
have already offered an argument from chance to pointless evil, where pointless evil is evil 
whose occurrence (not its divine permission) serves no purpose. According to my argument both 
chance and pointless evil do not undermine NGE. van Inwagen ‘s argument from chance to 
pointless evil is entirely different. He argues against the No Pointless Evil Thesis on the basis of 
the possibility that there may be no complete contrastive causal and teleological explanation for 




teleological, is not to lack purpose. The distinction between Strict Meticulous Providence and the 
No Pointless Evil Thesis shows this, as I will argue at length in the next section.  
Lack of Ultimate Contrastive Teleological Explanation Is Not Pointlessness 
Undetermined events in a theistic universe need not also be chance events in the sense of 
not serving God’s purposes. Events left to chance in the sense of not being determined by God or 
anything else may be equally suitable alternative ways God’s purposes may be achieved. If 
God’s purposes may be general, as van Inwagen ’s perspective maintains, the specific 
instantiation of those general purposes by undetermined events necessarily serves those purposes 
(they instantiate them!) even though they are not required for them. An evil left to chance may 
serve the unintended instantiation of an intended purpose. In a quite ordinary and unmysterious 
sense then it could serve a purpose.  
Again, on van Inwagen’s definition of God’s plan, parts of God’s actualized will may be 
outside God’s plan. That is, the specific concrete instantiation of God’s plan which results from 
God’s indeterminate or (if possible) arbitrary decrees is not what God decrees, which is more 
general. But, as just mentioned, surely the instantiation of God’s will is in some meaningful 
sense part of God’s plan. It certainly cannot be said to be without purpose and “serve no one’s 
ends”. Such events may be due to chance qua token events but considered as the instantiation of 
a role in God’s plan they are not due to chance.  
In still other words, a particular state of affairs may be desired by God only qua an 
instance of a more general good that God prefers over relevant alternatives. That is, God may 
desire it insofar as it serves one of His purposes. It may lack complete teleological explanation: it 




preferences but itself is not one of God’s preferences. There is a reason why it occurs but that 
reason does not explain why it rather than another equally suitable event occurs.  
The claim that if God allows an evil, there must be some good that requires that specific 
instance of evil seems motivated by a meticulous view of providence, according to which all 
events or at least all humanly significant events are specifically intended by God. NGE allows, 
and it seems true that, the permission of a specific evil may be justified by that evil’s serving a 
general purpose. For example, the permission of the evolution and continued existence of the 
rabies virus may be justified by the good of the uniformity of nature, even if some other natural 
evil could have been permitted for that good instead. A specific evil’s being due to chance, or 
being such that God has no reason for allowing it rather than some other equally bad evil, does 
not mean that God has no reason for allowing it, that it serves no purpose, or that it is gratuitous 
or pointless in any meaningful sense. If a divine purpose may be brought about by the permission 
of either of two evils, and which evil occurs is a matter of chance and indifference (because of 
moral equivalence), then the evil that is in fact permitted serves a role in God’s purposes and 
hence cannot meaningfully be considered pointless. That purpose would be God’s justifying 
reason for permitting that specific evil, even if that purpose could equally well have justified 
God’s permitting the alternative evil instead. Of course, if one defines God’s plan and purpose in 
such a way that excludes states of affairs due to chance, as van Inwagen  does, then the evil will 
in no such sense be part of God’s plan or purpose, but this just shows that God’s plan should not 
be defined in this way.  
If God has some purpose and decrees that some function or role be filled for the sake of 
that purpose, then whatever in fact serves that role is serving God’s purpose, whether what 




fact that which event serves a role is left to chance renders the event serving the role pointless, 
then if Sol jumps on a live grenade to save his comrades, his sacrificial act is not pointless, but if 
one of his comrades could have done the same (but perhaps by chance was too late) this fact 
renders Sol’s sacrifice of his life pointless. In general, serving a meaningful role is meaningful, 
regardless of how many possible ways that role may be filled. There being no reason why x 
rather than y does imply that x might very well not have been. It does not imply that x is without 
purpose, does not serve God’s ends, or is not in some sense part of God’s plan. There being no 
reason why x rather than y implies only that the fact that x serves God’s purpose rather than y 
serves no purpose, is not part of anyone’s plan, and serves no one’s ends. The underlined phrase 
should not be confused with the fact of x’s occurrence. I think van Inwagen misrepresents the 
notion of ultimate purposelessness itself, which is central to his project, and so fails to show that 
humanly significant events may be pointless in a world created and sustained by God. 
To briefly sum up the last few sections, contra van Inwagen, if God’s eternal plan 
consists of all the unqualified preferences of God that God can actualize, then some (chance) 
events may serve God’s purposes without being part of His eternal plan (those that serve a role 
that could have been served by a different event); and some events not decreed by God may be 
part of God’s plan (those that God intentionally brings about by decreeing circumstances in 
which they will occur) . 
The Chance Argument Applied to God’s Permission of Evil 
The above criticisms apply equally well to van Inwagen’s discussion of God’s permission 
of pointless evil and so also show why considerations of chance are irrelevant to NGE. A purely 




serve His purposes, even if it may imply that God may have no reason for permitting His 
purposes to be served one way rather than another. 
Van Inwagen claims to lay out some implications of his views of providence and chance 
for the problem of why God allows evil (though his essay is intended only as a “prolegomena” to 
this problem of evil and not a direct treatment of it). However, his essay does not seem to have 
any direct implications to this problem; it seems to offer only an important analogy: namely, that 
just as there may only be general reasons for the existence of particular evils (on a view of 
providence according to which God leaves much to chance), there may only be general reasons 
for God’s permission of particular evils. The reason that it offers an analogy and not an 
implication is that though one may argue for the possibility of various sources of chance in a 
theistic universe, as van Inwagen does (that God may have no reason to prefer one possible 
world state over another before either are actualized, for example) whether or not God must have 
specific benevolence reasons for allowing or preventing evils to befall particular individuals once 
they exist is a separate consideration. 
If van Inwagen’s Chance Argument shows the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis is false, then 
if the same reasoning may be applied to NGE,  it also shows NGE is false. But the Chance 
Argument does not show either are false. van Inwagen holds that there may be no reason, relative 
to God’s purposes, to allow Alice to die in an accident rather than Phillip, only a general reason 
for allowing the specific evil of Alice’s death, and of course if there is no such reason than even 
God can’t have it. But again, showing that the meticulous view of providence may be questioned 
in this way is not to show that God may permit evil for no reason at all. If the permission of 
either Alice’s death or Phillip’s is necessary for a greater good, and Alice dies instead of Phillip, 




for no reason. To show God may permit evil “for no reason at all”, one would need to show that 
God may permit an amount of evil in a net loss of good for no reason at all.  
Now, van Inwagen  does not explicitly mention William Rowe or NGE in this essay; so 
he may be understood to target only the claim that if God allows an evil, there must be some 
good that requires that specific instance of evil. The difficulty is that this does not have the broad 
relevance to the problem of evil van Inwagen claims for his conclusions.  
In addition, I think van Inwagen misrepresents the judgments that are most likely behind 
the objections he considers, or at least does not consider related more forceful objections. He 
considers the objection that it would be unfair for God to allow pointless evil to befall someone 
for no reason and responds that this should be accepted on the same basis that one accepts God 
may allow other types of harm to be distributed unequally at random. However, though it may 
indeed be fair to allow unequal chances of being harmed if no one is given privileged treatment, 
a more forceful objection is that it seems unjust for God to allow truly pointless harm, no matter 
what the distribution of probability of receiving such harm. Justice is not fairness. One may treat 
all others equally unjustly and thus fairly. If God allows someone to be harmed for absolutely no 
reason at all, then such allowing manifests a complete lack of concern and respect for that 
person. This complete absence of consideration is not only a complete lack of benevolence;  it is 
also an injustice in the sense that whether  one deserves the harm or not is not even treated as a 
consideration. 
Van Inwagen also considers the objection that an explanation for God’s permission of a 
type of evil in terms of divine general policies must be the sum of explanations for God’s 




sin, without necessarily having a specific reason for permitting every individual sin, we should 
not think God must have specific reasons for permitting specific instances of other types of evils. 
Van Inwagen here treats an explanation for God’s permission of an individual evil as necessarily 
distinct from an explanation for God’s permission of all of that type of evil, and perhaps, then, as 
an explanation for God’s permission of that evil rather than some other.  But if God’s purposes 
can be instantiated in different ways, as we are assuming, why would someone object that in 
order for there to be such a divine general policy requiring that type of evil there must be 
contrastive explanations for every such evil? One reason would be that God’s goodness to each 
individual sentient being requires this, at least with respect to many evils, as mentioned earlier. 
This seems a valid objection, though not linked to the possibility of divine general policies. 
Putting this aside, the objection is weak and unnatural to pose. What one might object instead is 
that the general explanation for God’s permission of a type of evil is an explanation for God’s 
permission of each evil of that type, and so its not true that because of general policy and global 
good considerations God may permit individual evils for no reason, as van Inwagen claims. This 
is my own view. 
Howard-Snyder’s Chance Argument against the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis  
Daniel Howard-Snyder has defended van Inwagen’s view that God need not have a 
reason for permitting the specific evils He permits. In “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”
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he argues that just as a sport coach does not need to have a reason for permitting a specific injury 
rather than some other in order to be justified in permitting it, God need not have reasons for 
permitting the specific evils He permits. Howard-Snyder thinks NGE must be reformulated to 
accommodate this. Against both van Inwagen  and Howard-Snyder I argue now from a new 




reasons for specific evils does not carry the weight or import for the problem of evil they think it 
does.  
In the first three pages of “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil”
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 Daniel Howard-
Snyder presents a refutation of NGE that elaborates on van Inwagen ’s work.  He begins his 
essay with a quote from Dostoyevsky, who raises the inscrutability of God’s permission of evil 
most acutely by referring to examples of horrifically cruel suffering inflicted on children. I will 
mention only one such example: a boy’s being hunted and eaten alive by a general’s hounds at 
the general’s command. 
These examples are especially forceful because they focus attention on the suffering of 
individual persons and the gross injustice done them rather than on abstract and general evils. 
Considering the individual innocent person who suffers apparently completely debilitating evil at 
the hands of another raises the issue of divine justice acutely, for even if a great good for others 
somehow mysteriously depended on that suffering, it may well seem a violation of justice to 
allow it nonetheless. It also raises the question of how God may be considered benevolent, for 
again, even if permitting such evil somehow mysteriously increased the total goodness of 
creation, permitting seemingly utterly destructive suffering for such a purpose may seem 
contrary to care for an individual as a beloved with inestimable intrinsic value. Just as it seems 
each child deserves an individual answer for why his or her suffering was allowed, it seems each 
instance of such injustice must have its own God-justifying reason for its permission by God.  
Furthermore, focusing on an individual case of unjust suffering brings to our attention the 
contingency of such evil: how if perhaps only a few choices or circumstances had been different 
it would not have occurred and how it seems the world as a whole would have gone on much the 




could be necessary for some suitably great good. The combination of these factors make such 
examples seem stridently pointless and therefore offer a good starting point for discussion of the 
strength of evidence, if any, particular instances of evil offer against theism. Howard-Snyder 
expresses the force such examples lend atheism in the form of a succinct argument: 
 
If God exists, He must have some reason for permitting, e.g., the boy to be eaten alive by 
the general’s hounds. But no reason we know of justifies his permitting that evil. So it is 
very likely that there is no God. 
   
Howard-Snyder’s essay responds to this argument, which he calls “The Appeal to 
Particular Horrors”, in two stages. First he targets the first claim that if God exists, He must have 
some reason for permitting, e.g., the boy to be eaten alive by the general’s hounds. He then 
revises this claim to make it less specific, referring to the permission of that specific evil or some 
other evil at least as bad, and then claims to cast doubt on the revised claim. He concludes that 
The Appeal to Particular Horrors fails and spends the remainder of his essay considering the 
epistemological merits of what he calls The Argument from Inscrutable Evil, which appeals to 
the enormous total amount of horrific evil that exists but no horror in particular.  
 
The No Contrastive Explanation Argument 
Howard-Snyder begins by asking “But must God have a reason for permitting that evil, if 
He exists?” He answers by making a formal analogy between God’s permitting a boy to be eaten 
alive by hunting dogs and a coach’s allowing a player to get injured in a game. Just as it would 
be unreasonable to demand the coach have a reason for permitting that player rather than some 
other player to get injured, or for allowing the injury to occur at that time rather than some other, 




for allowing that boy rather than some other child to get eaten alive, or for allowing the incident 
to occur at the time it did rather than some other time, etc. Howard-Snyder  concludes from this 
analogy that: “As astonishing as it initially sounds, God need not have a reason to permit that e, 
in any natural sense in which the demonstrative “that e” might be used.” He then says, “No 
philosophically sophisticated atheist asserts of any particular e that God must have a reason to 
permit it, rather than some other particular e. Rather, she will say that if God exists, then some 
good justifies Him in permitting that e or some equally bad or worse e.” Howard-Snyder then 
goes on to argue that this “more sophisticated” claim is open to question. Before considering 
this, let us examine his first argument. 
Howard-Snyder thinks the Coach Analogy yields two related lessons:  
 
(1) It is not true that for each particular evil God must have a reason for permitting that evil “in 
any natural sense in which the demonstrative “that evil” might be used.”, and  
(2) One can be justified in allowing an evil even if there is no good that requires the permission 
of the evil.  
 
Because of this Howard-Snyder thinks the Coach Analogy shows the thesis "If God exists, 
necessarily, for every particular evil, there is a good that justifies God's permission of that evil." 
is false. 
Consider the following two theses: 
 
The Exclusivity Requirement: For any particular evil, God must have a reason to permit that 





Generic NGE: For any particular evil, God must have a reason for permitting that evil (in a 
natural sense in which the demonstrative “that evil” might be used). 
 
Are these different? Howard-Snyder treats them as equivalent, but they are not. While 
Howard-Snyder’s coach analogy may illustrate why it is unreasonable to assert the Exclusivity 
Requirement, his analogy does not carry the lesson for the problem of evil that he thinks it does. 
Howard-Snyder has not given any reason to disbelieve Generic NGE. 
While it is certainly true that no philosophically sophisticated atheist asserts of any 
particular evil that God must have a reason to permit it rather than some other particular evil, and 
Howard-Snyder’s analogies illustrate why this is so, it is not natural for even a philosophically 
unsophisticated atheist or theist to think God must have a reason to permit a specific evil rather 
than some other particular evil of the same type. This is especially so should a plausible good 
that requires either evil be proposed, but is so even if none is available. And, although some may 
believe the Exclusivity Requirement because they think God can leave nothing to chance or 
make morally arbitrary decisions, this requirement is neither implied by nor a motivation for 
Generic NGE. Therefore Howard-Snyder has not shown that, and it is not true that, Generic NGE 
must be replaced by a related but more sophisticated claim that takes the falsehood of the 
Exclusivity Requirement into account. Furthermore, while it would be “astonishing” to find that 
Generic NGE is false, it is not at all surprising to realize the Exclusivity Requirement is false. 
Typically, and in the sense relevant to the question of whether evil counts as evidence 
against the existence of God, when someone asks why God has allowed a particular evil the 




not allowing this particular evil; and, the relevant state of affairs that could be part of the answer 
to this question in this context would be the good that this particular evil in fact serves, whether 
or not another instance of evil could have served equally well (as the Exclusivity Requirement 
excludes). Having a reason for permitting a specific evil should not be equated with, or be taken 
to include, having a reason for permitting that evil rather than some other.  Here I will 
disentangle what I believe are sources of confusion in Howard-Snyder’s thinking about what 
Generic NGE assumes and the alternatives to it.  
Let us first consider Howard-Snyder’s concluding statement: “G need not have a reason 
to permit that e, in any natural sense in which the demonstrative “that e” might be used.” This 
says that for all senses or uses of “that e”, God need not have a reason to permit that e. His 
evidence is the analogy given above. Now, what is the relevance of the different senses/uses of 
‘that’? They do not determine or describe what needs explaining. They are the means of referring 
to what needs explaining. There may be reasons answering to each sense and there may not, but 
the reasons for allowing e that address ways of specifying e do not necessarily exhaust reasons 
for allowing e. This is clearly seen by way of example. I allow the following event: my 
daughter’s riding that horse now. I allow it now because the time is convenient; I allow her to 
ride that horse because it is gentle, etc; but the main reason I allow this is, say, that learning to 
ride a horse will boost her self-confidence. Likewise, there may be no way to refer to the evil e 
under discussion without using some adjectives for which no explanation can be given because 
the available adjectives are very specific, but the correct and fully adequate explanation for e is 
general. By analogy, if I say “I like the girl in the red coat”, I’m not claiming my liking her has 
anything to do with the red coat. In other words, reasons for why an event has the features that 




event) are neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfactory explanation for why that event 
occurred.  
To illustrate in the present context: suppose we ask for an explanation for God ‘s 
permitting some instance of evil. In order to specify the evil we describe it as: the killing that 
took place in Manhattan on January first. This description is the means by which the evil is 
specified and should not be confused with that which needs to be explained, namely that being 
specified. What is in need of explanation? God’s permission of the evil just specified. What 
needs explaining is God’s allowing a particular event, which may be picked out by time and 
place by saying, e.g., “the January first killing” or “the accident yesterday on 4
th
 St and 2
nd
 Ave”. 
What needs explaining is the accident that occurred yesterday on 4
th
 St and 2
nd
 Ave, not the 
accident’s occurring yesterday or the accident’s occurring on 4
th
 St and 2
nd
 Ave.  
Now, once picked out, we may want to know: What is it about that event that needs to be 
addressed to explain why God permitted it? The full answer to this may be: Its being an instance 
of horrible physical suffering of an innocent, or its being an instance of cruel and callous 
disregard for human life, or of grossly unjust retribution, or of all of these. If we explain why 
God permits such evil in terms of a good that applies to all such evil, we have given a reason for 
God‘s permitting that specific instance. (Perhaps one may then ask, why not less evil of that 
type? or how can God’s permission of that evil be fair to that victim? but those are additional 
questions) We have not given a reason for God ‘s permitting that individual evil rather than some 
other instance of evil that meets those descriptions, but we don’t need to. (Similarly, if I have a 
reason for allowing Bo to get injured, my reason may have nothing to do with the fact that its Bo 
as opposed to someone else, but it is still a reason that applies to that particular event.) In 




can think of no reason, or there being no reason, that answers to the contrast class used in picking 
out x, in no way implies there is no reason for x. The contrast class used to identify x is not 
necessarily or typically the contrast class of relevant alternatives the request for explanation 
seeks to distinguish or to narrow down.  
Howard-Snyder often italicizes the word ‘that’ when articulating Generic NGE. I think 
this is telling. If one enunciates that in saying “that x” one means “that as opposed to some other 
thing of the same (suitably narrow) category x”. E.g. “Why did you pick that pitcher?” But of 
course ‘that’ can also be used as ostensive reference: just to pick something out from many other 
events or states of affairs. Presumably, Howard-Snyder’s italicized ‘that’ means the former. But 
when someone confronted with some evil asks “Why did God permit this?” he just means the 
particular instance, not this as opposed to some other evil. And the intuition behind NGE is that 
if God exists there must be some good that answers this question.  
Howard-Snyder’s interpretation of the “unsophisticated” request for explanation misses 
the question at issue and is unnatural. This is obvious when applied to more mundane 
circumstances. For example: Why did you throw the ball just now? Now? Because I couldn’t 
throw it later … The ball? Because it has a more controllable trajectory than anything else 
nearby.. Throw? Because I didn’t want to kick it … These answer all the particularities by which 
the action may be specified in order for the question to be asked, but of course the fully 
satisfactory answer to the specific question asked, to have fun, perhaps, need not involve any of 
them. Howard-Snyder’s Coach Analogy and discussion has given us no reason to doubt Generic 
NGE, the claim that for each particular evil, God must have a reason for permitting that e (in a 




So Howard-Snyder’s illustrations are interesting, but they do not evidence the conclusion 
he draws. The lesson that should have been taken is: a person may be justified in permitting a 
particular evil by reasons that could just as well have justified permitting some other injury. Just 
as the coach, God need not have reasons for permitting that specific injury to be justified in 
permitting it, his reasons may be of a more general sort. That is just the lesson “general policy” 
theodicies should be taken to teach.  
Howard-Snyder thinks that because the Coach Analogy shows it is not true that for any 
particular evil e, God must have a reason for permitting e specifically, it also shows that (lesson 
(2)) God  can be justified in allowing an evil e even if there is no good that requires His 
permission of e.  
To begin our critique of this second claim, note that (Generic NGE) For any particular 
evil, God must have a reason for permitting that e does not deny  
(2)One can be justified in allowing an evil e even if there is no good that requires the permission 
of the evil e. To assume it does is to assume that a good can only justify God’s permission of an 
evil if the good requires that permission. Now, if by ‘evil e’ is meant a certain amount of a 
certain kind of evil, this is a plausible assumption. What needs explaining is why God would 
permit the evil of an evil state of affairs, “the evil” perhaps thought of as the manner in which a 
state of affairs is evil and the intensity or disvalue of it. The intuition is that if an omnipotent 
being could have obtained a good without an evil He cannot be morally perfect if He obtains that 
same good with the evil. However, the plausibility of this is due to the judgment that a morally 
perfect being would prefer less evil to more and govern accordingly, and so is only clearly 
plausible if 'evil' is taken to refer to a particular amount of evil, not a specific embodiment of 




the permission of that evil is not obvious if 'evil' is taken to refer to a specific instantiation of evil 
rather than the existence of an amount of a kind of evil. So Howard-Snyder’s view seems 
reasonable only because of an equivocation of “the evil”.  
Again, what requires explanation is the existence of, or permission of, the evil of the evil 
event, not necessarily the particular embodiment of that evil, which would include features that 
are not relevant to the manner in which the event is evil or the magnitude of the evil. A good 
may justify the permission of a particular evil e by requiring the permission of the amount of e 
without requiring the permission of e. It is ironic that Howard-Snyder assumes that a good could 
only justify the permission of an evil if it requires that permission of evil, which, when properly 
understood, is fundamental to NGE, in arguing against that thesis. 
Furthermore, this point is illustrated by the Coach Analogy itself. The lesson of the 
Coach Analogy is, in addition to (2), also that a good can justify allowing a particular evil e even 
if the good does not require allowing the evil e. That is, the reason one is justified in (2) is that 
one permits the evil for the sake of a good even though that good does not require the evil. 
Indeed, Howard-Snyder’s examples illustrate the opposite of the conclusion he draws. The coach 
does nothing wrong in allowing the player to sprain her ankle just because allowing the 
possibility of such minor injuries is necessary for the good of allowing the players to play soccer.  
My next criticism is that even apart from these observations and the consideration that a 
good cannot justify God’s permission of an evil unless the permission of that amount of evil is 
necessary for that good (and apart from Snyder’s thinking the analogy shows (2)) there remain 
good reasons for thinking Generic NGE is true. Suppose God may justifiably permit an evil 
without having a reason for permitting that evil rather than some other. What justifies such 




permitting an evil that is not necessary for a greater good, it seems that God's being justified 
must involve a good reason. All of God's choices are justified and all are ultimately related to 
good purposes and reasons so it seems that for every particular evil, some good purpose must in 
some relevant sense justify His decision to permit it. Generic NGE does not require that the 
permission of evil be necessary for the good purpose, just that there be some reason for the 
permission. Even if God only permits evil e because it is an instance of a type and has no reason 
specific to e as opposed to some other equally bad evil of that type, the specific divine choice 
(defined in terms of the individual evil permitted) must be made for a reason and it seems the 
reason would be whatever reason God has for permitting that type of evil. 
Finally, it is not obvious that the Coach Analogy or similar analogies do provide an 
example in which one is justified in allowing an evil even though allowing the evil is not 
necessary for a greater good, even if by “the evil” is meant the particular instance or token of 
evil. This was pointed out in chapter one: if a good implies God allows either evil e or e', then 
God’s allowing e is necessary for a greater good, namely, the more specific good: (g without e'). 
If winning the war implies either Joe dies or John dies, then Joe's death is necessary for the 
unique good of winning the war without the cost of John's life. If allowing all of a type of evil to 
which e belongs, such as possibilities of minor injuries, is necessary for a good then allowing e is 
necessary for that good. What if allowing most but no specific number, or specific amount, of a 
set of evils to which e belongs is required for good G? Is this a case in which allowing e is not 
necessary for a greater good? No, in this case although allowing e is not necessary for G it is 






The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis 
Much of the above section, arguing that Howard-Snyder has not shown Generic NGE 
false, also targets his claim that Generic NGE should be replaced by the following:  
The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis: If God exists, for any particular evil, some good 
justifies God in permitting it or some equally bad or worse evil. 
There are in addition special problems with his formulation of The No Gratuitous 
Disjunction of Evils Thesis and claim that it is a correction of Generic NGE that are revealing. 
These problems are: the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis is ill-formulated, the implicit 
reasoning for replacing Generic NGE with it is flawed, and the No Gratuitous Disjunction of 
Evils Thesis is a subspecies of Generic NGE.  
The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis is ill-formulated  
The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis  is ill-formulated. This is a result of 
mistaken thinking about God’s relation to evil, chiefly the  assumption that a good that does not 
require a specific evil cannot justify God in allowing that evil or be God’s reason for allowing 
that specific evil. 
 
The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis: If God exists, for any particular evil, some good 
justifies God in permitting it or some equally bad or worse evil seems to imply:   
 
NGDE1: If God permits some evil then some good justifies him in permitting that evil or 




NGDE1 seems to say that there need be no good that justifies God’s permitting e; an e 
God permits need not be connected to a greater good so long as there is a good that justifies God 
in permitting some other equally bad or worse evil. But of course that absurd claim isn’t what’s 
meant. So, alternatively, not distributing justification over the disjunction, DC should perhaps be 
read as: 
NGDE2 If God permits e, there must be some good that justifies God’s permitting the 
disjunction: either e1 or e2 (an evil no better). 
NGDE2 expresses the idea that God didn’t have to choose e1 to obtain the justifying good and 
may seem to express a weaker moral requirement than Generic NGE, in accordance with 
Howard-Snyder’s strong claim that there need not be a good or reason that justifies God in 
permitting e. But this effort is self-defeating. NGDE2 cannot express a weaker moral 
requirement than Generic NGE, as quite naturally understood. For consider: Why must the 
consequent of NGDE2 hold? Clearly, according to a proponent of NGDE2, because otherwise 
God would not be justified in permitting e. So God is justified in permitting e because e belongs 
to a disjunctive set that is required for a good. But if so, doesn’t that good then justify God’s 
permission of e? And if so then, contrary to Howard-Snyder, NGDE2 simply expresses one way 
(the only way, according to NGDE2) in which Generic NGE may be satisfied. It seems that 
Howard-Snyder’s discussion and his rejection of Generic NGE requires that a good satisfying 
NGDE2 does not justify God’s permission of e. But this is implausible. Of course, on NGDE2  e 
is not necessary for the good referred to, so if Generic NGE is taken to imply the Exclusivity 
Requirement that for any particular evil, God must have a reason to permit that evil rather than 
some other particular evil, then NGDE2 may be true and Generic NGE false. But what NGDE2, 




Requirement. After all, why propose or believe NGDE2 if not as a justificatory condition and 
reason for God’s permitting an evil? So if NGDE2 is true then for any particular evil, if God 
permits the evil He has a reason for permitting it, namely to actualize a good that requires a 
disjunction of evils including e. So NGDE2 does not express a weaker moral requirement than 
Generic NGE, it entails Generic NGE. Also, and ironically, in distinguishing Generic NGE from 
NGDE2, it seems Howard-Snyder has conflated e’s being permitted for a good reason with e’s 
being necessary for the good.    
But, apart from this incoherence, NGDE2 cannot be correct. Surely no one wants to argue 
there has to be such a disjunction. That may be true of some evils but is not plausibly or typically 
a requirement of just any particular evil. To correct this, we may render the No Gratuitous 
Disjunction of Evils Thesis as: 
NGDE3 For any particular horror, if God exists, some good justifies Him in permitting it, 
and it is possible that if God had chosen to permit some other equally bad or worse evil the same 
good would have justified Him in permitting that other evil. 
Or perhaps:  
NGDE4 If God permits e, there must be some good that justifies God’s permitting e and 
that also justifies God’s permitting the disjunction: either e1 or e2.  
But both of these are explicitly perfectly compatible with the Generic NGE claim that he 
meant to replace; for in both cases, it is required that there be a good that justifies God’s 
permission of e and this is just what makes NGDE3 and NGDE4 more plausible than NGDE1 
and NGDE2. This brings out the absurdity of rejecting Generic NGE. There is no reasonable way 




how can one state a necessary justificatory condition for God’s permitting an evil in terms of a 
good that does not justify God in permitting that evil? And neither NGDE3 nor NGDE4 
articulates the lesson of the coach analogy: simply that evil e need not be necessary for g to be 
justified by g, all that is necessary is that the disjunction e or e is necessary for g, where e2 is 
equally bad or worse. In other words, the permission of an amount of evil, though not a particular 
instantiation of that amount, must be necessary for a good for that permission to be justified by 
that good.   
Generic NGE  does not need to be replaced 
The difficulty in expressing the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis is not a mere 
stylistic flaw, but is due to mistaking the relations of necessity between God, goods, purposes, 
explanation, justification, and evils. For good g to justify God in permitting evil e, g need not 
imply (God’s permission of) e, it need only imply (God’s permission of) e or some evil no better. 
It seems that Howard-Snyder has reasoned:  
1. Evil e must be necessary for good g for g to justify God’s permission of e.  
2. Clearly, God may be justified in permitting evil e even if e is not necessary for any 
good. (by the Coach Analogy argument)  
Therefore, 3.  God may be justified in permitting evil e even if there is no good to justify 
God’s permission of e.  
But the goods that require the disjunction of evils just are God’s justifying reasons for 
permitting the particular evils He permits. Howard-Snyder has not so far argued that God may 
allow e for no reason at all, only that God need not have specific kinds of reasons. What should 




not necessary for g, provided permitting some member of a set of equally bad evils that includes 
e (perhaps an amount of a kind instantiated by e) is required for g.  
Consider the following propositions:   
Necessarily, if God allows evil e: 
i) some good  justifies God’s allowing e 
ii) some good justifies God’s allowing e or e’ 
iii) some good explains why God allows e rather than e’ (some evil no better) 
iv) God’s allowing e is necessary for good g 
v) God’s allowing e or e’ is necessary for good g 
Howard-Snyder seems to reason as follows: i) requires iv) and so implies iii). iii) is not 
necessarily true, as shown by the Coach Analogy, so i) should be replaced by ii). However, the 
lesson of the coach analogy is just that iv) (interpreted as referring to a particular evil rather than 
a certain amount of a certain kind of evil) should be replaced by v) because iii) is false. v) is not 
at odds with i) for the reasons given above. v) is a justificatory condition for God’s allowing e, 
stating that a good and an evil’s relation to that good, namely,  instantiating an amount of a kind 
of evil the good requires, is required for God to be justified in allowing e.  
ii) Necessarily, if God allows evil e, some good justifies God’s allowing e or e’  (some 
evil no better) is implausible: it does not seem to admit of any unproblematic reading that does 
not entail i). This misformulation was due to the error of taking i) to entail iii) so as to require a 
new perspective on the kinds of pointlessness God may allow. The appearance of being a 
sophistication of i) is misleading: it is not that rejecting i) in favor of ii) marks the acceptance of 




condition. Rather, the consideration that ii) was motivated by, though not recognized, is just the 
possibility of the multiple realizability of God’s purposes or of chance. That distinction marks 
the difference between iv) and v). But accepting or rejecting chance in a world created and 
governed by God has no bearing on the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, as I have argued.  
Framing this in terms of our earlier discussion, if the feature of evil e that requires 
explanation, or if what is referred to by e, is the amount of a certain kind of evil then iv and v are 
equivalent.  iv is distinct from v just if e refers to a particular instantiation of evil, and the 
possibility that God’s good purposes may be realized in different ways is granted, in which case 
v clarifies that it is some token of that kind in that amount that is required, not necessarily the 
particular token of evil itself. In other words, given the multiple realizability of God’s purposes, 
v, which describes a relation of metaphysical necessity (rather than a causal relation) states that 
good g requires a disjunction be satisfied. It does not state that either g requires e’ or g requires 
e’’. But ii refers to God’s being justified, which is an actual state of affairs. So what ii should say 
is that “some g justifies God’s allowing amount of evil e and so could justify God’s allowing e’ 
or God’s allowing e’’”. But to say that some good actually justifies a disjunction, some of whose 
disjuncts are not actual seems to make no sense. The attempt to avoid i. then, necessitated by 
Howard-Snyder’s discussion, results in incoherence. 
The No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis is a subspecies of Generic NGE 
What is the relation between Generic NGE, the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils 
Thesis, and the idea of pointless evil? Howard-Snyder  claims that his illustrations and analogies 
show the “astonishing” fact that Generic NGE is false. However, the ordinary intuition that if 
God exists He must not only be justified in allowing certain categories of evil but in allowing 




that there must be some greater good each evil is permitted for is not contravened by these 
examples. For, again, a reason for permitting an evil may justify God’s permitting that specific 
evil even if it could have justified God’s permission of some other equally bad evil. Moreover, as 
I will show, these examples do not show that the NGE claim that for every evil that God allows 
there is a greater good that allowing that specific evil is necessary for, requires adjustment.  But 
first, in this section, I will argue that Howard-Snyder has not refuted Generic NGE, even on his 
own interpretation of Generic NGE as implying the Exclusivity Requirement that For any 
particular evil, God must have a reason to permit that evil rather than some other particular 
evil,  
Howard-Snyder speaks of Generic NGE as a commonly held belief and seems to hold 
that although it initially seems very plausible, reflection shows it quite implausible. But why 
does Generic NGE seem so attractive? And how could it be astonishing to find it false, if its 
falsity is demonstrated by some quite simple, common, and straightforward counter-examples? 
What is the relation between Generic NGE, the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis and 
pointlessness?  
The main appeal of the atheist arguments from particular horrors Howard-Snyder  means 
to counter is that such evils seem pointless and it seems God would not permit pointless evils.  
Pointlessness is the central concept. So does the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis 
correct Generic NGE by better articulating that notion, so that both are formulated to capture 
basically the same view, with the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis being the more 
accurate expression of it? We may call this the “Rephrasing Interpretation.” On this 
interpretation, the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis avoids the possible 




Snyder’s argument against the Exclusivity Requirement is a prolegomena to the real issue of 
addressing God’s relation to pointless evil. However, Howard-Snyder’s claim that the falsity of 
Generic NGE is an “astonishing” result of his philosophical reflection discredits this 
interpretation. It would hardly count as astonishing to find that a common view can be inaptly 
expressed for lack of precision. Yet Generic NGE must prohibit some kind of pointlessness. If 
not, again, what could be astonishing about finding it false?    
This seems to leave a “Types of Pointlessness” interpretation, according to which the No 
Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis and Generic NGE counter different possible kinds of 
pointlessness, expressing substantially different views of God’s relation to evil.  One way to 
render this interpretation is to say that rejecting Generic NGE and accepting the No Gratuitous 
Disjunction of Evils Thesis concedes some measure of pointlessness in God’s providence. The 
difference here would be that Generic NGE involves a more meticulous providence, one that 
may seem to accord best with God’s sovereignty but that, on reflection of the kind Howard-
Snyder offers, is not necessary for a traditional theist to hold. An instructive parallel here might 
be articulations of omnipotence constrained by the concept of God as the greatest possible being: 
in the same way that thinking God can make contradictions true may initially seem devout, but 
on reflection detracts from rather than enhances our concept of God, Generic NGE may initially 
seem required of a perfect being, but on reflection is implausibly overly restrictive. Just as it may 
initially seem astonishing to find a “restriction” on God’s power, though careful reflection shows 
the appearance of restriction illusory, it may initially seem astonishing to find God may allow a 
kind of pointlessness, though careful reflection shows the apparent impossibility of that 




Howard-Snyder views himself as using one argument to remove an overly strict moral 
requirement and then a different set of reasons to cast doubt on a related less strict requirement. 
But against this interpretation, it just does not seem that anyone, naïve or sophisticated, 
would think that Generic NGE,  construed as expressing something at odds with the No 
Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis, namely the Exclusivity Requirement, would express a 
moral requirement. Perhaps it would be astonishing for many to find that simple reflections show 
the implausibility of a meticulous providence (according to which every event is specifically 
required for God’s purposes, perhaps as part of the greatest possible world God could actualize). 
But no one would find it astonishing that, if God’s purposes may be satisfied in different equally 
suitable ways, what we may call “Multiple Ralizability”,  as the coach analogy requires, God 
could have allowed different equally bad evils to achieve the same good purpose. Granting 
Multiple Realizability, the move from Generic NGE, as construed by Howard-Snyder to imply 
the Exclusivity Requirement, to the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis is a move from 
prohibiting whatever in fact satisfies God’s purposes if something else could have satisfied those 
purposes to prohibiting amounts of evil allowed for no reason at all. But, after all, once granting 
Multiple Realizability, it is of course just the permission of the amount and kinds of evil that 
require justification. Given Multiple Realizability, the former prohibition is not a moral 
requirement anyone would think to hold, and is certainly not a prohibition of a type of 
pointlessness. My dying in your place to save the world is not rendered pointless in any relevant 
sense by the fact that you could have died instead. So we have here a second reason for denying 
Howard-Snyder’s reasoning carries a lesson for the problem of evil as he claims: Generic NGE is 
only plausible as a view distinct from the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis if it is taken 




Howard-Snyder’s arguments against the Exclusivity Requirement assume Multiple Realizability 
without argument.  
Here is another way to make this point. The Exclusivity Requirement that for any 
particular evil e God must have a reason to permit that e rather than some other particular evil, 
can be trivially satisfied if “some other evil” refers to just any evil, including gratuitous evils far 
worse than e. So should the underlined phrase be “rather than any other evil”?  If Multiple 
Realizability is possible, this is implausibly restrictive and perhaps impossible to satisfy. How 
could God have a reason for permitting one evil e rather than another e’ if e’ could equally well 
take e’s place, for all God’s purposes and intentions?  
So my argument against Howard-Snyder’s appeal to chance against NGE is: the No 
Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis implies Generic NGE unless Generic NGE is interpreted 
as the Exclusivity Requirement that for any particular evil e God must have a reason to permit 
that e rather than some other particular evil. Howard-Snyder’s Coach Analogy against the 
Exclusivity Requirement in favor of the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis assumes 
Multiple Realizability, that God’s purposes may be satisfied in different equally suitable ways. 
But if Multiple Realizability is granted as a possibility, the Exclusivity Requirement is 
uninteresting because obviously false.  So, Howard-Snyder has not given reasons for replacing 
Generic NGE with the No Gratuitous Disjunction of Evils Thesis. 
In the second stage of his essay, Howard-Snyder argues that the No Gratuitous 
Disjunction of Evils Thesis is open to question because it implies that there is a minimum 
amount of horrific evil whose permission is necessary and sufficient for the realization of God’s 































If God permits an evil must that permission be necessary for some good? The answer 
may seem obvious: if permitting an evil serves no good purpose, why would a perfectly good 
being permit it? However, as we have seen in the last two chapters, some have argued that it is 
not necessarily true that an omnipotent and perfectly good being would only allow an evil if 
allowing it is necessary for some good. I have argued that these objections to NGE based on 
deontology and chance interpret NGE overly narrowly. In this chapter I consider the most 
influential objection to NGE: an appeal to the purported possibility that God’s purposes may 
require only vague amounts of evil. I will refer to the family of arguments that make this appeal 
as the “Vagueness Objection”. Van Inwagen is this argument’s chief explicit proponent, but I 
will argue in the next chapter that Hasker’s widely discussed argument against NGE based on 
requirements for significant moral freedom is essentially an appeal to vagueness. I maintain that 
all arguments against the Vagueness Objection have failed. Philosophers who have aimed to 
revise Rowe’s argument so as to avoid this objection, such as Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael 
Almeida, and Nick Trakkakis, have not safeguarded but instead replaced NGE. In this chapter I 
analyze and refute this objection and describe why vagueness is irrelevant to NGE.  
 
The Vagueness Objection as the No Minimum Claim 
Peter van Inwagen has argued against NGE as follows.
98
  There are various situations in 
which some evil must be permitted for an end it is morally permissible to pursue, but in which 
there is no minimum amount of evil that must be permitted for that purpose. For example, some, 
but no minimum, fine must be imposed to deter illegal parking. Some, but no minimum, jail 
sentence must be enforced to deter certain crimes. In these situations, one can prevent an evil 




worse evil (without loss of deterrent effect, for example), and one does nothing wrong in not 
doing so. Since there is no precise minimum effective jail sentence for a specific crime, the 
selection of a jail sentence must be somewhat arbitrary. Because God may be in an analogous 
situation with respect to the evils of this world, there may be evils that God allows that he could 
prevent without losing any greater good. In fact, it is likely that God is in such a situation. 
Therefore we have reason to think NGE is false.
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Van Inwagen thinks that just as it is not plausible to suppose there is a jail term that is 
optimally effective, such that any lesser term is less effective, it is not very plausible to suppose 
that: 
 
[T]here is a way in which evil could be distributed such that (i) that distribution of evil 
would serve God’ s purposes as well as any distribution could and (ii) God’s purposes 




So van Inwagen thinks it is plausible to suppose: 
 
The No Minimum Claim: There is no specific amount of evil that is necessary and sufficient for 
God’s purposes. 
 
This is one version of van Inwagen’s No Minimum Claim. In “The Problems of Evil, Air, 
and Silence” van Inwagen provides an illustration of his No Minimum Claim by considering 
instances of natural evil, such as Rowe’s famous case of a fawn’s suffering burn pains in a forest 






[God] could have prevented any one of them [natural evils], or any two of them, or any 
three of them … without thwarting any significant good or permitting any significant 
evil. But could he have prevented all of them? No - not without causing the world to be 
massively irregular. And, of course, there is no sharp cutoff point between a world that is 
massively irregular and a world that is not. … There is therefore, no minimum number of 
cases of intense suffering that God could allow without forfeiting the good of a world that 




Here the No Minimum Claim is  formulated as the claim that there is no sharp cutoff 
between amounts of evil sufficient for God’s purposes and amounts of evil not sufficient for 
God’s purposes.  
Van Inwagen finds denying the No Minimum Claim as implausible as supposing that if 
an impressively tall prophet is required for God’s purposes, there is a minimum height such a 
prophet must have.
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 In “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils” he compares the 
necessity of evils for God’s purposes to the necessity of raindrops for the fertility of nineteenth 
century England. Just as there is no specific number of raindrops required for the latter, no one 
raindrop cutoff between a fertile England and an infertile England, so we should not suppose 
there must be a specific number of evils required for God’s purposes.
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The No Minimum Claim Objection to NGE essentially involves Vagueness 
The implicit reasoning involved above may be abstracted from the use of the concept of a 
minimum amount: if there is no specific amount of evil necessary and sufficient for purpose G, 
and it is morally permissible to allow some evil to bring about G, then (because every instance of 
some amount of evil is a specific amount of evil) there is at least one specific amount of evil 
sufficient but not necessary for G that it is morally permissible to allow for G. And if that’s the 
case, there are some evils or quantities of evil God is justified in permitting for G that are not 
necessary for G.
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The distinctive feature of the kinds of cases van Inwagen adduces is they involve vague 
concepts. The amount of jail time required to deter a certain crime is vague (perhaps because that 
deterrent effect is vague, perhaps not). Likewise, the concept of nature’s being “highly regular” 
and the concept ‘tall’, given for purposes of illustration, are vague concepts. A concept is vague 
if there are cases to which it clearly applies, cases to which it clearly does not apply, and 
“borderline” cases about which it is unclear as to whether it applies, where there seems to be no 
sharp boundary between borderline and non-borderline cases. For each of these terms, it seems 
implausible that there is a unique specific amount to which the term applies such that the term 
does not apply to any lesser amount (or any amount lesser by an appropriately small magnitude). 
This would deny the indeterminate range of borderline cases these terms seem to have.  
So we may take van Inwagen to claim it plausible that the amount of evil required for 
God’s purposes is vague, where vagueness is understood in this way. This might be because 
God’s purpose itself is vague, as suggested by the example of nature’s being highly regular, or 
because His purpose depends on a vague circumstance, as in the tall prophet analogy. From this 
we can extract from van Inwagen’s work a more focused challenge to NGE: 
1. The analogies and examples given (in section I) are reasons to think the amount of 
evil required for God’s purposes may be vague and hence that the No Minimum 
Claim could be true 
 
2. These reasons for thinking the No Minimum Claim could be true are of roughly 
comparable force to, and are not undermined by (because independent of), the 
motivation for believing NGE 
 











My response to this argument is threefold: First, re: 1: if the multiple realizability of 
God’s purposes is denied or if ‘God’s purposes’ refers to the concrete instantiation of God’s will, 
then the analogies and examples given do not strongly suggest the amount of evil required for 
God’s purposes may be vague. I will argue that for these analogies to provide reason to think the 
amount of evil required for (the actual instantiation of ) God’s purposes is vague, they must be 
interpreted in a way that requires the intransitivity of the betterness relation. There are strong 
reasons for not interpreting them this way. Second, even if the multiple realizability of God’s 
purposes is accepted, and ‘God’s purposes’ do not refer to the actual instantiation of God’s 
purposes, there is reason to think God’s purposes, including the permission of evil for the goods 
God intends, cannot be vague (given the results of free and indeterministic causes). One reason is 
that God wills the goodness of entire possible worlds, whether thought of as possible world 
histories or as world-states, and one possible world is either better than or not better than another. 
This is a reason for believing NGE that indicates van Inwagen’s analogies for divine choice 
circumstances are incorrect. For these reasons, van Inwagen’s examples do not give good reason 
for thinking the No Minimum Claim is true, contra 1 and 2. Third, against 3, even if the amounts 
of permitted evil God’s purposes require could be vague, this does not conflict with NGE, 
because the vagueness described is really best understood as a vague boundary between optimal 
and sub-optimal divine options. All of this will be argued at length in this chapter, beginning 
with van Inwagen’s framing of his Vagueness Objection in terms of morally arbitrary choices. 






NGE and the No Minimum Claim 
The relation between NGE and van Inwagen’s No Minimum Claim is not as obvious as 
van Inwagen assumes. NGE does not imply there is a minimum amount of evil required for 
God’s purposes. NGE implies that if God exists every evil is such that God could not have 
prevented it without losing an offsetting good (or permitting an evil at least as bad), and 
therefore that for every evil there is an offsetting good that requires that that evil (or one at least 
as bad) not be prevented. But, as discussed in chapter one, preventing an evil in the relevant 
sense means the evil would have occurred if one hadn’t acted to prevent it. So what NGE implies 
is that for any evil, there is a greater good that requires either it’s not true that God is willing to 
prevent it or its not true that that evil would have occurred but for God’s involvement. In other 
words, according to NGE, if God exists, every evil is such that, given the evil would occur if 
God does not intervene, God’s permission of it (or some evil equally bad or worse) is necessary 
for an offsetting good (or prevention of some equal or worse evil). Accordingly, it is compatible 
with NGE that a theistic universe contain morally evil choices and harmful consequences of (an 
indeterministic) nature, as well as amounts of such evils, that are not necessary for any good 
purpose. It is only God’s willingness to permit them if they should occur that is necessary in all 
cases, as argued in chapters one and six. NGE describes a constraint on God’s choices and is 
only awkwardly translated as a constraint on kinds or amounts of evil in a theistic universe. 
Because of this, it is not obvious how to state what NGE may entail about amounts of evil 
required for God’s purposes. This is required to make clear just what the No Minimum Claim 
should deny in order to challenge NGE.
 
If God’s purposes are construed broadly so they may be 
satisfied by different combinations of goods and evils, the amount of evil required for God’s 




knowledge, on both NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, what God chooses, i.e. what His 
specific purposes are, may depend on how nature or creaturely freedom unfolds. On the No 
Unnecessary Evil Thesis, whatever goods God chooses, all possible worlds that contain them 
also contain no less than a specific amount of evil (because the actual amount of evil is 
absolutely necessary for those goods by that thesis). In the sense relevant to NGE, what evil is 
necessary for God’s purposes depends on what evil natural indeterminism or creaturely freedom 
brings about (or more accurately, what natural indeterminism and creaturely freedom would 
bring about unless God prevents it). So what NGE implies about amounts of evil required for 
God’s purposes may perhaps be rendered something as follows: If God exists, for every possible 
set of goods God may choose (which choice may depend on creaturely free choices or “choices” 
of nature), only one specific amount of evil is compatible, given creaturely free choices or 
“choices” of nature in the specific circumstances entailed by God’s choice of goods. So, given 
NGE, what amount of evil is required for God’s purposes instantiated in non-actual 
circumstances depends on what would be chosen and what would result from natural 
indeterminism in those circumstances.
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But are there facts about what free choices or natural indeterminacy would result in those 
different possible circumstances? If so, then it seems that God, knowing such facts, would 
choose goods that are parts of optimal trade-offs between goods and evils so that each set of 
goods that can satisfy God’s purposes requires a specific amount of evil. (However we must 
consider the possibility that God may have deontological reasons to prefer sub-optimal trade-
offs) But if there are no true counterfactuals of freedom (and of indeterministic processes), then 
given NGE but not the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, the amount of evil required for God’s 




indeterministic natural forces would bring about in non-actual circumstances, then the amount of 
evil required for God’s purposes in those circumstances, and the least total amount of evil in all 
possible circumstances in which God’s purposes are instantiated, is indeterminate.  
For the sake of clarity and of space, I will not attempt to specify the relation between 
NGE and the No Minimum Claim more precisely. We may suppose that van Inwagen’s No 
Minimum Claim can be understood as implicitly including some suitable additional qualification 
parallel to the distinction between NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis. 
Morally Arbitrary Choices 
In his Gifford Lectures Peter van Inwagen also frames his vagueness objection in terms 
of arbitrary choices. He faults the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis for forbidding the allowing of an 
evil when one has no moral reason for allowing it, for “forbidding the drawing of morally 
arbitrary lines”.
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 Van Inwagen thinks there are situations in which one must arbitrarily choose 
how much evil to permit and so cannot be faulted for doing so, despite violating Rowe’s 
theological premise. In this section I argue that van Inwagen’s examples do not show that the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis forbids morally arbitrary choices in any questionable sense. If God may 
make morally neutral choices, as van Inwagen thinks, the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis’s required 
“greater good” could be a merely offsetting good (as described in chapter one); and though van 
Inwagen’s examples may illustrate permissible permission of evil when that permission is not 
necessary for a greater good, they do not obviously illustrate permissible permission of evil when 
that permission is not necessary for an offsetting good. 
The following is one of van Inwagen’s several formally similar proposed 
counterexamples to the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis via this circumstance of permissible morally 
arbitrary permission of evil:
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and do not have enough for all the children who need it. After portioning out 100 doses you see 
you can increase the number of doses one more by very slightly lessening the amount of each 
dose. You realize that no greater good would be served by not doing so: very slightly lessening 
the amount of each dose will lessen its effectiveness only very slightly, if at all, and the next 
potential recipient will certainly die if she does not receive the medicine. Distributing 100 rather 
than 101 doses of medicine achieves no net good, then, but does result in the unnecessary evil of 
allowing the next child in need of the medicine to die. Because no greater good is involved in 
choosing 100 doses rather than 101 and because to make this choice is to permit the evil of a 
child’s death, this choice is prohibited by the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis (according to van 
Inwagen).  
Yet, in this circumstance, because of the limited supply of medicine, not increasing the 
number of doses to 101 may be morally permissible. This is because you must stop increasing 
the number of doses (by slightly decreasing the amount of each dose) at some point and it is 
implausible that there is one uniquely best stopping point. It seems rather that there is a 
permissible range of the number of doses between clearly too many (because too small) doses 
and clearly too few. You must choose some number within this permissible range, and wherever 
you morally reasonably stop, you will have faced a choice like that between 100 and 101. 
Therefore, according to van Inwagen, you will have made a permissible yet morally arbitrary 
choice. So, according to van Inwagen, the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis forbids the drawing of 
morally arbitrary lines, such as that of stopping the medicine distribution at 100 doses rather than 







Criticism: Types of Arbitrariness 
There being no good achieved by choosing 100 rather than 101 doses, no “greater good” 
that outweighs the additional permitted death, cannot by itself make permitting that evil a 
gratuitous evil by the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. This circumstance of achieving no net good 
may obtain even if also no net evil or loss of net good is achieved by choosing 100 rather than 
101, making choice 100 (choosing 100) no worse than choice 101 (choosing 101). Though 
choice 100 seems to involve no more net good than choice 101, no “greater good”, it is not 
equally obvious that choice 100 involves no offsetting good making choice 100 no worse than 
choice 101. That is, though choice 100 seems no better than choice 101, it is not obvious that 
choice 100 is worse than choice 101. After all, by stipulation, they seem equally good stopping 
points. 
It is important to keep in mind that in these examples one is not only arbitrarily choosing 
between amounts of evil, one is also arbitrarily choosing between balances of, or trade-offs 
between, goods and evils. One must choose between one trade-off between number of people 
given a certain probability of cure and number left unhelped and another, for example. One is 
caught between increasing the number of children potentially helped and not overly decreasing 
the likely effectiveness of each dose. Although the trade-offs involve differing amounts of evil, it 
is still possible that they are equivalent in net value.  
Also, it is important to note that there are goods involved in these cases that are distinct 
from, though instantiated by, the specific goods one must choose between. For example, to 
choose 100 rather than 101 doses is to choose to give 100 children 1/100th of the medicine rather 
than 1/101th and to give one child no chance of survival rather than that given by 1/101th of the 




people a good chance of survival, where goodness is relative to the given possibilities. The 
relation of different choices to this good may be an additional dimension of comparative value.   
So what could make choice 100 no worse than choice 101? This may not be as clear as 
that choice 100 seems no worse, but we may speculate that perhaps a slight increase in the 
likelihood of curing a large number of children at this point in the trade-offs involved in securing 
the (vague) good of giving a good number of children a good chance of cure is a good that 
offsets the evil of giving the next potential recipient no chance of survival rather than that 
indicated. Or perhaps there is some other way to construe the goods involved in this choice 
situation.  
In any case, a clear understanding of what could make choice 100 no worse than choice 
101 is not needed to make my present point, which is this: Whatever goods and evils are 
involved, choosing 100 is to permit a gratuitous evil only if choosing 101 is better than choosing 
100. Only then is the additional evil of the additional permitted death involved in choosing 100 
rather than 101 doses not offset.  
So the relevant question is not “Is choosing 100 doses as opposed to 101 morally 
arbitrary?” Choosing 100 may be morally arbitrary because it is no better or worse than choosing 
101. The relevant question is: “Are choices 100 and 101 equally good or is choice 101 better”? 
(And, if choice 101 is better in what sense could choosing 100 rather than 101 be morally 
arbitrary?) In other words, it is not enough to point out that permitting 100 is morally arbitrary. 
To determine whether choosing 100 is to permit gratuitous evil we must ask why or in what 
sense choosing 100 is morally arbitrary.  
Choices between amounts of evil may be morally arbitrary because they are components 




equally optimal trade-offs between goods and evils.
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 To choose a particular number of doses is 
to choose a particular trade-off between permitting a certain number of deaths (rather than a 
certain likelihood of recovery) and the goods involved in providing a certain likelihood of 
recovery for a specific number of children. Choosing from the permissible range of choices in 
our example would be morally arbitrary in this sense if those choices are equally optimal specific 
trade-offs between goods such as a “good” number of children helped and a “good” likelihood of 
cure. Choices may also be morally arbitrary because, even though one is only choosing between 
better and worse sets of goods and evils, one cannot choose an optimal set, because there isn’t 
one. This would be the case if, for every trade-off you may choose, there is a better trade-off.  
Van Inwagen’s Argument Requires No Optimal Option 
If choice 100’s permission of the death of the next potential medicine recipient is 
necessary for a trade-off between goods and evils no worse than any other, then permitting the 
evil involved in it is necessary for some good that makes that particular trade-off an optimal one. 
That is, if this option involves more evil than an alternative no less valuable (also optimal) 
option, it must also involve more good that offsets that additional evil. In this case, permitting 
this evil is not gratuitous by the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis and van Inwagen’s proposed 
counterexamples to that thesis fails. To make his case, van Inwagen must claim that in choosing 
within the permissible range of choices one must choose between better and worse trade-offs of 
goods and evils rather than between equally good trade-offs. That is, van Inwagen must adhere to 
the “no optimal option” interpretation of the moral equivalence of the choices in his example.  
Does the medicine distribution choice circumstance van Inwagen describes compel this 




because, even though there are a finite number of choices, every choice is sub-optimal? That is, 
do we think that every choice in the finite permissible range is worse than another and so we are 
justified in choosing any one of them because we cannot fulfill the moral duty of selecting an 
optimal choice? Or, instead, do we think that choices in the permissible range are equally 
justified because they are of equally good options? It is at least not obvious that the former 
interpretation is correct. 
The point of this introductory section is that van Inwagen’s move from having “no 
reason” for permitting an evil to the gratuitousness of the evil is made too quickly. The sense in 
which there is no reason and the corresponding sense in which the choice is morally arbitrary and 
the permitted evil pointless in his example is not obviously the sense his argument requires.
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Emergent Goods: A clarification of van Inwagen’s examples 
Let us now more closely examine van Inwagen’s Vagueness Objection to the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis and the implications of the arbitrariness invoked. Here is another of van 
Inwagen’s formally similar proposed counterexamples to NGE: Suppose you are in charge of a 
rescue boat from sinking Atlantis.
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 For every person allowed on the boat the boat’s chance of 
making it to safety is reduced by some very small amount, say .1 %. As numbers admitted 
approach one thousand there is therefore a correspondingly very good chance all will perish. So 
you should allow some but not too many people on the lifeboat. You should avoid admitting too 
few but also not overly diminish the boat’s chance of reaching the shore. It is reasonable to think 
that in this circumstance there is no specific number of people that is the correct number such 
that one less would be incorrect. This means you must arbitrarily pick some number within a 
permissible range of choices. In this circumstance, whatever number you decide upon, you could 




good significant enough to outweigh the evil of that person’s being left to certain death. So it is 
not true that necessarily, if one is in a position to prevent an evil without loss of a greater good 
then one is morally obligated to do so. In situations such as this, one must arbitrarily choose how 
much evil to allow and as a consequence no good results from allowing the amount chosen rather 
than some lesser amount. 
To retrace his argument, van Inwagen reasons as follows: the above choice situations 
have two notable features. First, it is reasonable to think that there may be no specific correct 
number of people to help. If so, this means that you must decide on that number (within some 
reasonable range) arbitrarily. Second, whatever number you pick, you could decrease each 
helped individual’s benefit (chance of survival or medicine amount) very slightly in order to help 
one more person. This decrease would be so small it would not have a significant effect (on 
chances for survival or the likely effectiveness of each dose). These features together imply that 
whatever number you reasonably decide upon, you could have helped one more person without 
significantly decreasing the good you do for the others you help. For example, whatever 
reasonable number of doses you choose, you will have permitted a child to die for lack of 
medicine who you likely could have cured and you will have had no good reason for permitting 
that child to die. No significant good worth the cost of the child’s death will have been gained. 
So for any reasonable and moral choice you make, you will have permitted an evil whose 
permission is not necessary for any greater good. The prevention of gratuitous evil cannot then 
be a general and absolute moral requirement, for in this choice circumstance to act morally you 






Illuminating Parallels to van Inwagen’s Cases 
Although the choice situations appealed to by the Vagueness Objection may initially 
appear to be counter examples to the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, close examination shows this 
appearance is illusory. A proper analysis of the goods and evils involved and their relations 
shows one does not permit any gratuitous evil in these cases. The greater goods justifying the 
permission of evil in those cases have been overlooked because the cases have been under 
described and the goods misidentified. Again, a fuller and more accurate description of the 
choice circumstances represented by van Inwagen’s examples reveals that the arbitrariness 
involved in them does not undermine the principle that if one is in a position to prevent an evil 
without loss of a greater good then one is morally obligated to do so. In what follows I offer a 
more complete and accurate description of the essential features of the examples van Inwagen 
offers, a clarification of what the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis does and does not entail, and an 
analysis of the relations between those essential features and the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. 
These analyses show van Inwagen’s reasoning is unsound. 
I begin by specifying the general features of the kinds of examples van Inwagen appeals 
to. Here are some additional examples of choice situations that I claim share all essential relevant 
features with van Inwagen’s, but which I propose are framed more carefully:  
 
The Safe Trench Suppose you are a soldier digging a trench while enemy combatants are 
near. Roughly one thousand shovels will yield a trench deep enough to be well worth the 
time spent shoveling. An individual shovelful, however, will not enlarge the trench 
enough to significantly increase your safety while in it, and, considered by itself, is not 
worth the time being exposed to potential enemy fire required to dig it. Suppose, as your 





Certainly this decision may need to be to some extent arbitrary. So, some shovelfuls may 
be unnecessary, even if you have chosen a perfectly reasonable stopping point. Does this 
reasonable arbitrariness also imply that some shovelfuls must be gratuitous in the sense that it 
would have been better if they had not been dug? Because van Inwagen’s examples are formally 
similar, his argument commits him to an affirmative answer, for unless the unnecessary 
shovelfuls are uncompensated risks they do not correspond to gratuitous evils. However, this 
does not seem correct.  
Again, the arbitrariness of this choice situation implies that however many shovelfuls you 
dig, you may have no good reason for not stopping slightly earlier than you did. Does it also 
imply that you had a good reason for not digging them, namely, that digging each was a net 
loss? Van Inwagen’s argument commits him to saying you had a good reason (albeit one you 
could not avoid contravening) for, again, unless the unnecessary shovelfuls are net losses they do 
not correspond to gratuitous evils. However, these answers seem incorrect.  
 
Expensive Pain Relief. Suppose you will be in continuous pain for the rest of your life 
unless you receive treatment. Being permanently relieved of your pain is well worth more 
than a million dollars to you. Roughly a thousand daily doses of a drug will significantly 
and irreversibly relieve your pain. A single dose will not make any noticeable difference, 
however, and each single dose costs one thousand dollars. Suppose, as you receive doses 
and begin to feel more comfortable, you must decide how many more doses to pay for.  
 
Again, this decision may need to be to some extent arbitrary, and certainly this 
arbitrariness implies that some doses may be unnecessary, even for perfectly reasonable stopping 
points. Does this arbitrariness also imply that some doses must be gratuitous in the sense that it 
would have been better if they had not been taken, that some dosage payments are net losses? 




The distinctions drawn by my questions about these parallel cases weaken the force of 
van Inwagen’s description of his own examples. The parallel strongly suggests that the 
arbitrariness he refers to is generated by there being equally good trade-offs between goods and 
evils, and not by every reasonable trade-off’s being worse than another. We may wish to stop 
here, therefore, and say van Inwagen has misconstrued the implications of the arbitrariness of his 
examples. This would be premature, though. All these cases share puzzling features that leave 
room for van Inwagen’s “no optimal choice” interpretation, as I will explain. This alternative 
interpretation is also compatible with NGE, however.  
To bring these examples into the context of NGE, I will focus on two types of theodicies 
and corresponding theodical goods: “Significant Moral Freedom” theodicies
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 that explain 
God’s permission of moral evil by its being required for humans to have significant moral 
freedom, and “Uniformity of Nature” theodicies
113
 that explain God’s permission of natural evil 
by its being required for the system of nature to have a consistent and predictable, or highly 
regular, order.  (This stable order of nature may be considered good for a variety of reasons: as 
good in itself, because an autonomous creation is better than a manipulated façade, or good 
because required for other goods, such as the possibility of scientific knowledge and human 
responsibility,
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 or for keeping God “hidden”, making knowledge of God’s existence a matter of 




The relations of these theodical goods to their costs, namely, the permission of evils by 
God they are invoked to explain, may be thought of as sharing the following general features 





1 There is a good that requires something bad.  
 A safe trench requires time being exposed to potential enemy fire. A 
diminishment of pain requires spending a significant amount of money. Alternatively, if the 
avoidance of something bad may be considered a good, these situations may be described as 
presenting a choice between two competing goods: the safety of the trench vs. less time being a 
potential target, the diminishment of pain vs. saving money.  
 Significant Moral Freedom theodicies propose that the good of humans having 
significant moral freedom can be had only at the expense of the competing good of God’s 
prevention of morally bad choices. If God were to adopt a policy of preventing all, or nearly all, 
significant morally bad choices humans in general would not have significant moral 
responsibility. Likewise, Uniformity of Nature theodicies propose that the good of the existence 
of a highly regular natural order can be had only at the expense of the competing good of God’s 
prevention of natural evils. One way to put this is that, given the system of natural forces 
required for the evolution of beings like humans, which entails the possibility of pain and 
suffering and other natural evils, if God were to adopt a policy of preventing all or nearly all 
natural evils, nature would not possess a stable natural order. 
 
2 Each single increment of one good, considered in isolation, seems not worth the 
expense of the competing good.  
Each additional increment of one good seems to make no significant good difference. 
One shovelful of dirt removed from the trench adds virtually no trench safety. One dose gives no 
noticeable reduction of pain. But each increment definitely comes at a significant cost. Digging 




An omnipotent being’s not preventing a particular moral evil, such as a murder, for 
example, in order to not diminish the good of humans in general having significant moral 
freedom may seem unjustified. This is because the murder’s prevention would definitely be a 
significant good, whereas the gain for the good of humans in general having significant moral 
freedom that is achieved by not preventing it seems negligible or even non-existent by 
comparison. Likewise, an omnipotent being’s not preventing a particular natural evil, such as a 
fawn’s suffering burn pains for several days, solely in order to not diminish the good of nature’s 
being highly regular, of having a stable order, may seem unjustified. This is because the fawn’s 
not suffering this way would definitely be good, whereas the gain for the good of nature’s being 
highly regular by not preventing it seems again negligible or non-existent by comparison. 
 
3 Many increments of one good is worth the corresponding loss of the competing 
good.  
By stipulation, the safe trench is worth the hours spent digging it. Living pain free for the 
rest of one’s life is worth more than a million dollars.  
Significant Moral Freedom theodicies propose that the good of humans having significant 
moral freedom is worth all the enormous amount of moral evil God permits for the sake of it. 
One way to understand this is as the view that human moral freedom and its value increases (at 
least eventually) the more an omnipotent being is willing to permit that freedom by not 
preventing morally evil choices. The magnitude of the good of humans having significant moral 
freedom is worth its cost in innumerable individual unprevented moral evils. Likewise, 
Uniformity of Nature theodicies propose that the good of nature’s being highly regular is worth 




system of nature and its value increases (at least eventually) as an omnipotent being is willing to 
permit increasingly more of the natural evil that issues from it.  The magnitude of the good of 
nature’s being highly regular is worth its cost in unprevented natural evil.   
From 2 and 3 we also have: 
4 One good seems greater than the sum of its parts.  
The value of many repeated slight increases in trench size and of many (properly timed) 
doses is greater than the corresponding sum of the values of shovels and doses considered 
individually. The removal of a thousand shovelfuls of dirt creates a trench that decreases one’s 
chance of being shot while crouched in it by more than a thousand times that of the decreased 
risk, if any, offered by a single shovelful. The significant and permanent decrease of pain is 
worth more than a thousand times the good, if any, of a single unnoticeable decrease. 
There is a sense in which the good of humans in general having significant moral 
freedom seems greater than the sum of the values of individual unprevented exercises of moral 
freedom, considered by themselves. For each of vastly many instances of horrific moral evil, the 
permission of that individual instance may not seem worth its contribution to the good of humans 
having significant moral freedom, yet, according to this theodicy, the permission of all of them is 
worth the measure of this good that would have been lost by preventing all of them. Likewise, 
for each of vastly many instances of natural evil, the permission of that individual instance may 
not seem worth its contribution to the good of the existence of a highly regular natural order, yet, 
according to this theodicy, the permission of all of them is worth the uniformity of nature that 






Finally, it seems reasonable to think: 
5 There may be no clear best number of increments of one of the goods, no obvious 
unique optimal trade-off between the two competing goods.  
A safe trench is roughly one thousand shovels in volume and, though some amounts of 
time spent digging are clearly too little and some amounts clearly unnecessarily long, there may 
not be one specific obviously best trade-off between dangerous time spent digging and trench 
size. A comfortable pain level requires roughly one thousand doses. Once one is relatively 
comfortable it may not be obvious how many thousands of dollars more one should spend for the 
drug.  
A divine general policy of preventing nearly all morally bad choices and of ubiquitous 
miraculous prevention of natural evil would cost the goods of the existence of significant moral 
freedom and of nature’s being highly regular, and would not be worth the loss, according to these 
theodicies. But a theodicist might also think that because significant moral freedom and nature’s 
being highly regular are vague goods that come in degrees, some divine interventions would not 
significantly diminish them. Now, God may have special reasons for preventing natural or moral 
evils, but even given those reasons, whatever they are, it seems reasonable to think that there 
may be no specific number of divine interventions that is optimal, that strikes just the right 
balance against these theodical goods such that that number of interventions is better than one 
less or one more.  
I will call goods with the above five relations to the costs required to achieve them 
“emergent goods”. I use the term ‘emergent’ both because the good seems greater than the sum 
of the values of its parts considered individually, and because of the related characteristic that 




Examples of such goods and relations abound. Any good that increases at definite cost 
increments and that is worth having only if it is sufficiently large in some imprecise sense of 
‘large’ can have these features. To offer another example: suppose one has the two goals of 
increasing income and of having a good family life. If one earns three hundred dollars an hour, 
working one hour may seem well worth the cost of an hour spent with one’s family, considered 
by itself (feature 2, above). However, as one approaches, say, roughly sixty hours of work every 
week, or, say, three thousand hours of work for the year, the value of that income increase may 
begin to be eclipsed by the cost to the value of a good year of family life. The latter good does 
not require any specific number of hours. That is, it seems reasonable to think there is no unique 
optimal trade-off between hours of work and hours of family time (feature 5). Whatever trade-off 
one chooses, one chooses the corresponding amount of family time because it seems worth the 
cost to income of all the hours it consists of (feature 3). In this sense, the good of a good year of 
family time seems to be of greater value than the mere sum of all the individual hours composing 
it. One hour devoted to family time, considered by itself, may seem outweighed by three hundred 
dollars income, but the whole year of family time, however many hours that consists of, seems 
worth the total income one could have had instead, i.e. three hundred dollars multiplied by the 
number of family time hours (feature 4). (It is not difficult to see why this would be so, as the 
value of familial bonds does not come in discrete and linearly additive units.) 
This parallel between these theodical good relations to evils and ordinary emergent goods 
relations to their costs is a redescription of the analogy van Inwagen draws between divine 
purposes and vague goods.   
I should note that my purpose in making this parallel is not to defend, criticize, or even to 




is the best understanding of how the goods of the existence of significant moral freedom and of 
the uniformity of nature relate to God’s permission of moral and natural evil.
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 I am not arguing 
for “emergent good theodicy” (though I maintain the coherence of this perspective).
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 I do think 
that the notion of an emergent good helps explain why non-gratuitous evils may appear 
gratuitous and this will be argued in chapter seven. 
Puzzling Features of Emergent Goods 
Let us examine the examples I began with and articulate some key aspects of them. The 
above-described apparently reasonable “emergent good” judgments concerning the relations 
between certain goods and the costs required to achieve them generate certain puzzles. For 
example, suppose you see no unique optimal trade-off between trench safety and digging safety 
or between comfort level and savings as per (5) and so feel you must decide between certain 
increments, say 1122 shovels or doses and 1123, arbitrarily. Does this choice’s seeming arbitrary 
imply that neither amount seems better or worse than the other? It may seem so, as mentioned. 
But how could 1122 shovels or doses not be obviously better than 1123 if each individual extra 
shovel or dose seems obviously not worth its cost as per (2)? If shovel 1123 adds negligible 
additional safety of the trench while definitely leaving one dangerously exposed as a target, why 
wouldn’t it be obviously better to stop at 1122 shovels? If the 1123rd dose of medicine makes no 
noticeable difference at all, how can it not be obvious that one should not pay a thousand dollars 
for it? There is also the puzzle of (4) itself. If it is true that every increment is not worth its cost, 
as it seems, how could many increments be worth their total cost? If it always seems better to 
choose the lesser of two increments of a first good for the sake of a competing second good, how 






How can the first apparent conflict, that between judgment (2), that each increment is not 
worth its cost, and (5), which entails that choices between some increments are arbitrary, be 
addressed? Could it be that choosing 1123 is worse than choice 1122 if one must choose only 
between 1122 and 1123 but not if one is considering a wider range of trade-offs?
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 If so, one 
possible response to the apparent conflict between (2) and (5) then would be to place one’s 
confidence in (2) and simply say that wherever one chooses to stop in such situations, one could 
have made a better choice by stopping earlier. This is true of all permissible choices, which is 
why none are optimal as per (5), and this is why one must choose among them arbitrarily. I will 
call this the “Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation” because it maintains that every increment 
of one good not only seems to be but is not worth the loss of the competing good, and so makes 
things worse, but that many such increments can still be better than the corresponding amount 
less. This is the interpretation implicit in van Inwagen’s arguments. 
But the puzzle of (4) points us in the other direction. As mentioned, one might think 
instead that some individual increments of one good are worth their corresponding cost despite 
their initially appearing otherwise. According to this response, although each increment (of 
chance of cure or trench size, etc.) considered in isolation seems not worth its cost, a wider 
perspective, perhaps one that takes into account the amount being increased and/or the role the 
increment plays in the larger good of which it is a part, is required to appreciate the full set of 
values involved.  
Perhaps the full set of values escapes delineation, but we may speculate as follows.
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 For 
example, perhaps 23 shovels has a value as a necessary component of a good-sized trench, a 
value that outweighs its cost, if one were to keep digging. This makes it a net gain and so 




good-sized trench. The underlined qualification is the wider context that reveals the hidden value 
of being a necessary component of a good sized trench. Perhaps then shovel 1223 is not 
obviously preferable to 1222 because it does not (clearly) have this value (it is not obviously a 
necessary component of the good-sized trench) and so is not obviously a net gain. In this way, 
perhaps the cost of additional digging time begins to outweigh the value of being a necessary 
component of a good-sized trench as it becomes less obvious increments possesses that value. 
Choices are then arbitrary because they are between roughly equally good increments. Rough 
equality is introduced because of the vague (and so indeterminately diminished) good of being a 
necessary component of a good-sized trench.  
I will call this the “Hidden Values” interpretation because it maintains values are 
involved that may not be conspicuous when only neighboring trade-offs are considered.
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 On 
this view, hidden values offset costs so that one choice is not definitely better or worse than 
another, making the choice between them arbitrary. If hidden values offset costs so as to make 
permissible options equally good, selecting a permissible option cannot violate NGE. (And if 
hidden values offset costs so as to make permissible options roughly equally good, selecting a 
permissible option cannot violate NGE, as seen in chapter one.) 
The Irrelevance of Vagueness to the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis 
Let us review what I term the “Optimal Trade-Off Interpretation”, illustrated by the 
lifeboat case, in a slightly different light. There are a finite number of choices, ranging from 
clearly impermissible because too few people are rescued (too little of one value) to permissible 
and then to clearly impermissible because the chances of successful rescue are too slim (too little 
of the other, competing, value). We can imagine an x axis indicating increasing amounts of 




goods and evils at each choice. If the situation can be represented this way, the goodness curve 
goes up from left to right and then down. If there is no best choice, as stipulated, there is no 
highest point. This would be congruous with God’s purposes requiring some but no specific 
amount of evil. Here differences in amounts of good (the y axis) supervene on differences of 
amounts of evil (the x axis). On this interpretation, an evil is permissibly permitted for no reason 
only in the sense that there is no moral reason to choose the amount of evil that includes it rather 
than one evil less, and this is just because allowing each such evil is necessary for a good that 
offsets, but does not exceed, it. One is choosing between equally good balances of goods and 
evils and so the greater evil in one set must be offset by the greater good it contains.
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One point in favor of the Optimal Trade-Offs Interpretation is that even if it appears as if 
permitting an evil is not necessary for any offsetting good, we have reason to think there must be 
such an offsetting good just because the choices between sets of goods and evils also seem 
equally good. Another point in its favor is that the betterness relation in general seems transitive. 
This gives one reason to think the values involved have not been tabulated correctly, i.e. that 
there may be hidden values. I believe the Optimal Trade-Off Interpretation is the most plausible 
description of the moral choice situation in the examples van Inwagen gives.  
In his earliest work on this topic, van Inwagen impugns the moral principle that “if one 
can prevent an evil without loss of greater good, one should” for leading to absurd conclusions, 
e.g. that one should let everyone on the lifeboat, thereby virtually guaranteeing a failed rescue. 
This judgment, implicitly holding that the stated moral principle errs by a failure to appreciate 
the intransitivity of betterness, actually supports the Optimal Trade-Off Interpretation: I respond 
to this argument that (in addition to the above considerations), by parity of reasoning, van 




considerations are the same between two choices A and B except that B results in more net good, 
then it is morally permissible to choose B rather than A”. For if each increment of evil is not 
offset by any greater good, then each decrease of evil corresponds to a better balance of goods 
and evils, and, by stipulation, there is no other consideration to distinguish these choices between 
increments. I add this criticism only as a coda because it targets only one way van Inwagen has 
formulated his criticism of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. 
 
The Optimal Trade-Offs Interpretation and Vagueness 
Van Inwagen claims that the amount of permitted evil required for God’s purposes may 
be vague, and so there is no specific minimum amount of required permitted evil. For his 
examples to challenge NGE he must hold that this means that for every trade-off God chooses he 
could have chosen a better trade-off ( ie. the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation). But even 
if we accept that the amount of required permitted evil may be vague, we need not accept this 
interpretation. On the Optimal Trade-Offs Interpretation the vagueness van Inwagen refers to 
implies only that there are a vague number of permissible options. That is, on the Optimal Trade-
Offs Interpretation if God’s purposes require only a vague amount of evil, God’s purposes can be 
satisfied by a disjunction of trade-offs (sets of competing goods, e.g. more people rescued and 
greater chance of survival) where
 
 the boundary between permissible trade-offs and 
impermissible is vague (on both sides). One may wonder how this boundary can be vague if 
differences in amounts of one good (chances of cure, e.g) supervene on differences in amounts of 
the other good of less evil (number left untreated, e.g.). The answer to this is that the 
instantiation of hidden values, such as a “good chance of cure for a good number” may be vague. 




This place for vagueness is innocuous for NGE. It has no implications for the 
comparative goodness of neighboring options that are (determinately) within the permissible 
range. That is, it is not relevant to understanding the arbitrariness involved in selecting a 
permissible option. That arbitrariness is simply due to all determinately permissible options’ 
being equally good.  So the vagueness invoked by van Inwagen to counter NGE, even if present, 
drops out of relevance for NGE on the Optimal Trade-Off Interpretation.  
 
The Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation 
There is an alternative interpretation, however, to which I now turn. Suppose instead then 
that the lifeboat rescue choice circumstance cannot be represented by a continuous goodness 
curve or even a goodness curve with undefined (vague) segments as depicted above. Suppose for 
every permissible choice or trade-off within the permissible range, there is a better trade-off. 
Again, I call this the “Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation” of van Inwagen, for on this 
interpretation, though, say choice 251 is better than 250, and 252 better than 251, and so on, 
eventually we arrive at a choice that is not better than 250.  
There are two ways this circumstance may be: it may be that there is a good gained for 
every allowed evil, but that that good does not offset that evil, or it may be that no good is gained 
by allowing that evil. This latter could mean that amounts of evil can be measured more finely 
than amounts of good. This would be one explanation of how God’s purposes could require some 
but no specific amount of evil. In this case, the same good could have been had with less evil 
than the amount actually permitted, but that is true for every permissible amount permitted.  By 
analogy, suppose sand must be dropped into the Grand Canyon for some good purpose. 




sand cannot diminish its beauty at all. Whatever amount of sand we drop for our purposes that is 
not “too much”, we could have dropped one more grain, and by analogy, that would have been 
better. We can call this “Apparent Gratuity by Incommensurability” because it is the 
incommensurability of values that generates the appearance of necessary gratuity. 
Necessary Excess Evil 
Now let’s consider choices involved in cases of Apparent Gratuity by 
Incommensurability. Following this I will consider the “commensurable” version according to 
which every allowed evil corresponds to some non-offsetting gain of good (rather than no good 
at all). Again, there is no optimal choice and for every choice of amount of evil actually made, 
the good actually achieved could have been achieved with less evil. (If this seems impossible, 
that seeming strengthens my alternative “Optimal Trade-Offs” interpretation)  Let us call the 
amount of evil that the permitted evil could have been diminished by to achieve the same good 
“excess evil”. If one choice involves more excess evil than a neighboring choice then it must be 
worse because that next choice then involves the same good and less unnecessary evil.
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 So a 
choice that involves more unnecessary evil than its neighbor cannot be permissible. Although 
every choice is worse than the next, such a choice is “more worse” than others. Since the 
permissible options all belong to a common (vague) range of neighboring options, the 
permissible options all must involve the permission of the same amount of excess evil, “EE”. EE 
may signify a vague amount.  
Here is the crux of my argument: if, necessarily, every reasonable choice involves evil 
that could have been avoided, as van Inwagen must claim to refute the No Gratuitous Evil 
Thesis, can there really be no outweighing good that requires that “unnecessary” evil? The 




expense in the given cases only obtains given one aims to dig a safe trench or rescue people or 
pay for pain relief. Doesn’t that good, the good of digging a safe trench, for example, then 
require and outweigh such “unnecessary” risks?  
On the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation, God’s allowing EE is necessary for a 
greater good. In order to achieve the good for the sake of which God must allow some amount of 
evil, that is, in order to allow the specific instantiation of the vague amount of evil required for 
his purposes, God must allow excess evil EE. If that evil must be permitted for God to realize the 
good of making some choice, and making some choice is better than making none, then allowing 
that evil is necessary for a greater good.
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 So EE cannot be a gratuitous evil. Now, the non-
excess evil of any permissible trade-off is clearly also non-gratuitous because by definition it is 
the amount of evil whose permission is necessary for the good of the trade-off. This evil is part 
of every trade-off that includes the same amount of good. So, in the circumstances van Inwagen 
describes, for any specific good g God permissibly, though perhaps arbitrarily, brings about in 
satisfaction of His good purposes G, His permission of the permitted non-excess evil is required 
for g and His permission of the permitted excess evil EE is required for G. Having accounted for 
EE as well as for the non-excess evil involved in bringing about these goods, there is no 
remaining evil for the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis to account for. So the Intransitivity of 
Betterness Interpretation of van Inwagen’s examples is also no threat to the No Gratuitous Evil 
Thesis.  
Again, although by definition the particular amount of EE in a given choice is not 
necessary for the actual specific good achieved, it is necessary for a greater good. This is all 




purposes, it is necessary for the actual particular good achieved, ie. the particular instantiation of 
God’s purposes, in satisfaction of NGE. 
This is a subtle point. What is deemed unnecessary depends on one’s frame of reference 
in describing purposes and one’s frame of reference determines how goods and evils are 
identified, individuated, and weighed. If every reasonable choice involves the same (perhaps 
vague) amount of “unnecessary” shovelfuls then that risk, though gratuitous with respect to the 
good of the degree of safety offered by the trench you have dug, is not gratuitous with respect to 
the good of digging a reasonable trench. Since every instantiation of the latter involves that 
“unnecessary” risk, that risk is necessary for that good. 
Perhaps van Inwagen overlooked consideration of EE because it is defined in terms of 
counterfactuals. For any permissible choice, EE is the (possibly vague) amount of evil by which 
the actual amount chosen exceeds the (possibly vague) amount whose permission was necessary 
for the good achieved by that choice. The latter evil is the lesser amount that could have been 
permitted instead for that same good. (Again, that there is such an amount is essential to the 
Incommensurable version of the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation. Any seeming 
incoherence belonging to it belongs to that view). EE does refer to a particular actual amount of 
evil in a given choice. It may be thought of as a variable whose domain ranges over instantiations 
of a determinate, albeit (for argument’s sake) possibly vague, amount. As argued in chapter six, 
section xx, the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis essentially and properly has to do with amounts of 
good and evil, perhaps of certain kinds, and not with individuated features of evils by which they 
may be referred to, so use of the notion EE is not suspect in this context. That is, EE refers to a 




As mentioned, EE and the non-excess evil may both be vague in amount, just as what 
counts as the same good may be vague. However, the possible vagueness of EE and of the non-
excess evil has no bearing on NGE. Whatever their quantification, the permission of both are 
required for greater goods. Both the permission of the non-excess evil and EE is required for the 
actual concrete instantiation of God’s purposes, even though (according to van Inwagen) the 
permission of no specific amount of evil is required for God’s purposes. 
To illustrate with the Expensive Pain Relief case, even if the particular reasonable 
amount paid, say $753,000, is unnecessary for the pain relief actually achieved, as is true of all 
reasonable amounts paid (on this interpretation), this amount can be divided into the vague 
amount that is necessary for that relief, say roughly $750,000 and the vague unnecessary amount, 
roughly $3,000. Every specific reasonable pain vs. expense trade-off must include this same 
“unnecessary” $3,000. That is, in each case the same good could have been achieved with this 
much less cost. Again, only trade-offs with the same unavoidable excess cost can be reasonable 
options. If a trade-off involves more than this $3000 excess expense one should have chosen a 
nearby option, or option of the same good, with the minimal $3000 excess expense instead. What 
justifies permission of the excess $3000 is only that it is unavoidable. So, for example, if a 
different equally good trade-off might be paying $650,000 for less pain relief, necessarily, this 
equally good trade-off could also have been achieved with roughly $3,000 less expense.  
Now, if one pays $753,000 the unnecessary expense may also be described as the 
additional expense of paying $753,000 instead of roughly $750,000 for the same relief. There is 
no good that requires one pay $753,000 rather than roughly $750,000 specifically, but this fact 
does not make this choice irrational. Analogously, NGE does not imply there must be a good that 




amount of permitted evil matters, as argued in chapter six. There is a good that requires one pay 
roughly $750,000, namely the amount of pain relief gained, and there is a good that requires one 
pay the excess $3,000, namely the good of choosing some desirable trade-off between pain and 
expense. If these payments correspond to evils, NGE is satisfied. 
 
The commensurate values version of the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation 
Now let us apply this reasoning to the commensurate values version of the Intransitivity 
of Betterness Interpretation. According to this understanding of Emergent Good Cases, for every 
permissible permission of evil one achieves a unique good but a better trade-off of good and evil 
could have been achieved by permitting less evil. (Here it is not the case that one value can be 
discriminated more finely than the other, as the incommensurable version may be interpreted as 
holding.)   
The above reasoning also shows that van Inwagen’s examples construed in this way are 
not instances of permitting gratuitous evil. If, for example, one distributes 100 doses of medicine 
to achieve the good of giving a good number of children a good chance of cure and one could 
have helped a few more children for a better trade-off, but one could have achieved a better 
trade-off by helping a few more children for any reasonable number of doses, then the 
permission of all the evil involved in this choice is necessary for greater goods. There is a good g 
that requires stopping at 100 doses, namely the good of giving 100 children 1/100
th
 of the 
medicine. Permitting the evil e of 900 children receiving no medication (rather than one with 
1/101th, another with 1/102th, etc)  is necessary for that specific good g and is offset by it. Evil e 
is not necessary for the good, G, of giving a good number of children a good chance of cure, 




unnecessary because a better good than g could have been gained with less evil, e.g. giving 101 
children medication. However, this “unnecessary” amount of evil is not gratuitous because its 
permission is necessary for G. The amount of the type of evil: permitting some more children to 
die with no compensating good, which is the “unnecessary” evil, is necessary for the good, G, of 
giving a good number of children a good chance of cure. The particular actual instantiation of 
this unnecessary evil, that of permitting 900 children to die rather than some less, is not 
necessary for G, but that is no violation of (the analogous version of) NGE. NGE only requires 
that the permission of every amount of every type of evil is necessary for an offsetting good. 
Both the amount of evil e and the amount of “unnecessary” evil are required for offsetting goods, 
on this interpretation. So the commensurate values version of the Intransitivity of Betterness 
Interpretation does not undermine NGE. 
What then is implied by the stipulation that for every permissible option a better good 
could have been gained by permitting less evil? Note that the better good here is a better trade-
off between good and evil. In our example, the good is not a better chance of cure, because that 
would be slightly worse for each additional evil permitted, but a better combination of number 
helped and chance of cure (which corresponds to a specific number left unhelped). This does not 
imply each choice involves gratuitous evil, for, as argued, all permissions of evil in these 
reasonable choices are necessary for offsetting goods. Only a mistaken individuation of goods 
and evils lends van Inwagen’s examples the illusory appearance of violating the No Gratuitous 
Evil Thesis. What is implied by this interpretation is only that for any choice one makes, one 
could have made a better choice. This is because, on this interpretation, for any permissible 
trade-off between the good of less evil and another good (perhaps a positive expected value), one 




lesser amount of the other good (the positive expected value.) The Intransitivity of Betterness 
Interpretation leaves us then only with an apparent counterexample to a different principle, 
namely, that a morally perfect being would always choose the better of two options. As argued in 
chapter three, this principle is not implied by NGE. 
 
God’s Purposes Cannot Be Vague 
Vague Choice Circumstances Cannot Apply to God 
There is also another category of reasons for thinking considerations of vagueness are 
irrelevant to the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis: it is not obvious that the circumstances van Inwagen 
describes in his Vagueness Objection, which essentially involve vague purposes, could apply to 
an omnipotent, omniscient being. Even if there are circumstances involving vague purposes in 
which humans permissibly permit gratuitous evil, as van Inwagen’s examples are meant to 
illustrate, there may be no possible parallel circumstances involving vague purposes in which 
God permissibly permits gratuitous evil. This is because it seems God cannot have vague 
(ultimate) purposes. That is, even if the principle that “if one is in a position to prevent an evil 
one should do so unless preventing it would make things worse” cannot be absolute and 
universal for the reasons van Inwagen gives, this does not undermine the thesis that God 
necessarily prevents such gratuitous evil.  
There are two main reasons for thinking that God’s (ultimate) purposes cannot be vague: 
One is that vague divine decrees seem metaphysically impossible. If vague divine decrees were 
possible, something could exist for absolutely no reason at all (or, more cautiously, it would not 
be definitely false that something could come into existence for no reason at all, as it must be). 




for any two possible worlds, one world is either better or not better than the other. Together these 
reasons make a strong case that God’s purposes cannot be vague.  
Vague Divine Decrees are Metaphysically Impossible 
We can see this as follows. If a divine goal may be instantiated in many different morally 
equivalent ways, van Inwagen  thinks God would issue a decree involving many disjuncts: either 
A exists with power y and  B exists with power z or C exists with power x , etc. In the case of an 
indeterminate decree “let x or y be” God is the cause of the outcome. Although there is no 
explanation for why x rather than y resulted, there is a complete cause of x’s resulting, namely 
God’s decree. So we may accept that God is the complete cause of an event resulting from a 
divine indeterminate decree (given van Inwagen’s metaphysics). However, if (per impossible) 
God makes a vague decree, it is not definitely true that God is the ultimate cause of an event 
resulting from it. It would not be definitely true that a “resulting” event or substance has a cause 
of its occurrence or existence. In a divine vague decree God does not specify which particles or 
events are potentially affected by, or potentially result from, His decree. That is left to chance. 
Again, what is left to chance here is not which of different involved disjuncts is actual, as per a 
divine indeterminate decree (that includes each potentially affected particle or event in a 
disjunct), but which set of disjuncts are possible. If there is no explanation for, or no fact about, 
which set of possible events or particles could possibly result from God’s decree, then for any 
disjunct (particle or event circumstance) that is not in all possible sets (i.e any non clear-cut 
appropriate amount), that becomes actual, there is not only no explanation for why it rather than 





In the case of an indeterminate decree the reason for its actuality is that it was included in 
God’s decree. God determined that that result of His indeterminate decree was possible by 
including it in His decree and is the (non-necessitating) cause of its actuality. By contrast, non-
clear cut fulfillments of divine purposes are neither definitively included nor excluded from a 
divine vague decree. If a divine vague degree is possible, necessarily, a non-clear cut amount 
may result from God’s decree though the amount was not included in God’s decree. We are to 
understand that “chance” determined what disjuncts (amounts) were possible; it was impossible 
for God to do so because which disjuncts are possible is not determinate. If God does not 
determine whether x could result from His decree or not, that being due to chance, how can He 
be said to be the explanation for why x in fact is actual? He can’t. And this is incompatible with 
God’s being x’s complete albeit indeterministic cause as required by traditional theism and by 
the Reason for Existence Principle.  
Again, van Inwagen thinks that God’s purposes may require only a vague amount of evil. 
He finds it plausible that there is no minimum amount of evil required for God’s purposes and so 
thinks it likely that God must permit some evil for His purposes even though less evil could have 
served equally well. If, in many cases, it really makes absolutely no difference to God’s purposes 
whether He performs one more miracle or not, then according to van Inwagen’s No Arbitrary 
Decree Thesis, He would have to, in each case, issue an indeterminate decree with a miracle as a 
disjunct: “Let these particles either have their ordinary powers or have extra-ordinary powers by 
which this horror is averted.” for example. But then, on van Inwagen’s view, He would have to 
issue a “meta-decree”, so to speak, that only some and not too many of those miracles occur. 
And, he would have to leave to chance just how many, within the appropriate range of some and 




interventions occur may be a matter of indifference to God. Again, according to van Inwagen, in 
some cases God’s purposes require no particular number of particles or events of a certain sort, 
only a vague amount. In such cases, God has no reason to favor one specific amount over 
another, and so it follows from the No Arbitrary Decree Thesis that He must leave the actual 
specific amount to chance.  
This actual specific amount cannot be the result of a divine indeterminate decree, only of 
a divine vague decree. This is because each indeterminate decree has a definite number of 
disjuncts and so to issue such a decree is to decide upon the number of numbers of particles or 
events that can satisfy the “some but not too many” requirement, that is, to decide upon which 
specific amounts satisfying that requirement are the alternatives whose actualization is left to 
chance. Since there is no clear-cut boundary between required and unrequired amounts and we 
are assuming God is not picking one, in such circumstances of divine indifference God cannot 
specify which amounts are the possibilities included in his decree. This would be to demarcate a 
clear-cut boundary between required and unrequired amounts. In such circumstances, God must 
issue a vague decree, such as “Let some of this water turn into wine.” This may perhaps be 
thought of as God’s leaving to chance which disjuncts of possible particle or event circumstances 
are included in His indeterminate decree. But, again, this is metaphysically impossible. Creation 
cannot depend on God in the sense required if God issues vague, as opposed to indeterminate 
decrees. If God cannot arbitrarily decree a specific amount from within a vague range but must 
issue a vague decree, the Reason for Existence Principle that everything that exists has a reason 






Incompatibility of van Inwagen’s Vagueness Objection and Chance Argument 
Furthermore, the impossibility of divine vague decrees means van Inwagen’s Vagueness 
Objection is incompatible with his Chance Argument. If an evil really may be permitted for no 
reason, and the amount of the evil may be permitted for no reason because God’s purposes only 
require some but no specific amount of it, yet God cannot make arbitrary decrees, then He must 
make vague decrees. Since vague divine decrees are metaphysically impossible, one of the 
foregoing purported possibilities is not really possible. Either God can make arbitrary decrees or 
His permission of evil for no reason, i.e.the existence of gratuitous evil, is not possible.  
To permit an evil for no reason is to make an arbitrary decree(s); it is for God to make 
decrees entailing an evil’s permission (in the given circumstances) even though He could have 
equally well, and in equal satisfaction of His purposes, made decrees that entail its prevention. If 
van Inwagen accepts the possibility of divine arbitrary decrees he cannot define God’s plan as 
God’s non-reactive decrees, since by his Chance Argument God’s plan must include only events 
with ultimate teleological contrastive explanation, as argued in chapter five. Due to the 
impossibility of vague divine decrees, either the Chance Argument, which depends on the 
prohibition of arbitrary divine decrees, fails, or God’s purposes cannot require the permission of 
only a vague amount of evil. If God’s purposes cannot require the permission of only a vague 
amount of evil, the Vagueness Objection to NGE fails. 
van Inwagen’ s defense of the possibility of gratuitous evil in The Problem of Evil also 
conflicts with his definition of God’s plan in “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by 
God” in another way.
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 In “The Local Argument from Evil” van Inwagen  provides a picture 
metaphor of how God can remove individual events from the world without cost by “smoothing 




would undermine some goods, such as the autonomy and regularity of the natural order, van 
Inwagen  holds that a single such additional miracle would make no difference whatsoever to 
God’s purposes (including the good of the world’s being autonomous and not “highly irregular”). 
So in this and related essays van Inwagen  argues that there may be actual events that God could 
have avoided without in any way sacrificing any of his goals.   
Now, if God could have removed one more horror from the world without sacrificing any 
of his goals, surely there must be at least some isolated events entailed by his actual decrees that 
He could have removed as well.
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 God could suspend his decrees concerning the causal powers 
of some particles and then make decrees that remove the consequences of this momentary 
suspension. He could temporarily suspend tides on uninhabited planets, for example. van 
Inwagen’s claim that a few more miracles would in no way sacrifice God’s purposes suggests 
that events entailed by God’s actual non-reactive decrees could also have been avoided by 
different, miraculous decrees without cost to God’s purposes. Such events are counterexamples 
to his definition of God’s plan because they are decreed by God (by the entailment thesis) but 
serve no purpose.  
This reasoning concerning the coherence of van Inwagen’s arguments taken together has 
broad significance because it concerns the relation between NGE and the rationality of God’s 
actions and providence. Given my argument that non-consequentialist considerations do not 
challenge NGE, if evil is permitted by God for a less than offsetting good, then God permits net 
evil for no reason. Non-arbitrary indeterminate decrees that result in the permission of an evil are 
not illustrations of God’s permitting evil for no reason, only of permitting one evil or trade-off 
than another for no reason, as argued. Only arbitrary decrees or vague divine decrees could 




vague divine decrees are impossible. So denying NGE, not just because of the Vagueness 
Objection, but for any reason, implies God can make arbitrary decrees. If arbitrary divine decrees 
seem implausible this fact gives credence to NGE.  
There Cannot Be a Vague Number of Possible Worlds Satisfying God’s Purposes 
What if we put aside the No Arbitrary Decree Thesis and hold that “arbitrary” divine 
decrees are possible (perhaps because free will involves selecting reasons for action), could 
God’s purposes then be vague? No. Even if God may arbitrarily select how His purposes are 
actualized, what He selects from must be a determinate set of possible worlds given in the divine 
choice context, where each world has a determinate, if unquantifiable, amount of goodness. I 
don’t know how to argue that possible worlds have determinate, even if unquantifiable, value, 
such that vagueness is a feature of the language we use to describe amounts of goodness rather 
than a feature of the goodness of possible worlds. This seems true to me, though. 
God aims at goodness of various kinds. Suppose we grant that some of His aims involve 
only certain general kinds rather than specific instances of goods, and these general goods 
require only a vague amount of evil and/or specific goods. Still, it is reasonable to think that God 
ultimately wills what is best over-all and so wills entire possible worlds. This distinction between 
what God ultimately wills (namely, the Good) and how that may be parsed in terms of (possibly 
competing) kinds of goods is significant, for although terms describing individual aims may be 
vague, it seems that relations between amounts of good or of net good (good balances of good 
and evil) cannot be vague, and that relations of betterness between possible worlds cannot be 
vague. Even if in addition to the relations ‘more than’, ‘less than’, and ‘equal to’, between the 
goodness of possible worlds there is a fourth relation of ‘rough equality’ or ‘being on a par’, this 
would not imply vagueness.
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amount of net good or for a possible world to be neither ‘better than’ nor ‘not better than’ 
another amount or possible world, and this does not seem possible.
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In other words, although our descriptions of God’s purposes may involve vague terms, 
these purposes are subsumed under God’s willing the Good or, it may be argued, an optimal 
possible world, and it seems impossible (to me) that two possible worlds may be such that one is 
neither better nor not better than the other (whether worse, equal, or incommensurable). So it 
seems reasonable to think that, regardless of whether or not God’s aims may be described in 
vague terms, there is either a unique best possible world (given the choices of humans and 
natural indeterminism) in which God’s purposes are satisfied, or there are a determinate number 
of morally equivalent optimal possible worlds in which they are satisfied (where two worlds are 
morally equivalent if one is not better than the other) or there are an infinite number of 
improving worlds. I will consider this last momentarily. 
Again, according to traditional theism, God’s purposes are subsumed under God’s willing 
goodness. That is, God wills what He wills because He wills what is good. So God’s individual 
purposes may be understood as components of (or perhaps abstractions from) His willing what is 
best. This means that what ultimately explains God’s will is the comparative goodness of entire 
possible worlds (whether these are thought of as entire world histories or not). Although our 
description of individual purposes may involve vague terms, it does not seem that comparative 
relations between amounts of goodness can be vague. One possible world is either better or not 
better than another. What could it mean for one possible world to be neither better nor not better 
than another? If some values are incommensurable, so that one possible world is neither better 
nor worse nor equal in value to another, it is not better than that other world. If a world with 




Inwagen’s example, this does not mean one is somehow vaguely better than the other, but that 
neither is better than the other.  
Given my extended argument in chapter four that because deontological goods are the 
basis of any divine deontological requirements, God’s satisfaction of deontological requirements 
cannot conflict with NGE, it is reasonable to think God wills what is (axiologically) optimal in 
His choice context. Because one possible world is either better, worse, equal, or 
incommensurable in value with another, a possible world in a finite set of worlds is either 
optimal or not. This means it cannot be that there are only a vague number of possible worlds of 
a finite set that satisfy God’s purposes; and this means that if there are a finite set of worlds 
satisfying God’s purposes, God’s purposes cannot be vague, even if God must arbitrarily select 
which possible world satisfies them. 
Van Inwagen writes: 
 
Two patterns of suffering may be morally equivalent even if they are comparable and one 
of them involves less suffering than the other … It may be, therefore, that God has had to 
choose some amount of suffering as the amount contained in the actual world, and could, 
consistently with his purposes, have chosen any of a vast array of smaller or greater 
amounts, and that all the members of this vast array of alternative amounts of suffering 
are morally equivalent. 
 
 
I think this passage does not illustrate how God’s purposes, or the amount of permitted 
evil they require, can be vague, as van Inwagen thinks. It cannot be that there is no moral reason 
to choose a lesser amount of suffering over a greater, all else being equal. There is no moral 
reason to choose a lesser amount of suffering over a greater only if the choice referred to 
involves unmentioned moral constraints or other gains and/or losses of goods and/or evils. If 




choosing the lesser of two evils, all else being equal, but this doesn’t mean there is no moral 
reason in the relevant sense to choose the lesser amount, just that God is justified in not acting in 
accordance with that reason. All else being equal, if A has more net good than B, then A satisfies 
God’s purposes better than B, whether God is obligated (or it follows from perfect goodness) to 
choose A or not. This may seem paradoxical but we must be careful to accurately identify the 
source of this seeming paradox, which I now attempt. 
Van Inwagen defines moral equivalence between A and B as there being no morally 
decisive reason to choose A over B and vice versa. But this notion confuses the issue. If by 
‘decisive’ is meant compelling or obligatory, then because of the impossibility of satisfying the 
principle in the entire divine choice context, God is not obligated to choose the lesser over the 
greater suffering, and so in this sense has no morally decisive reason for doing so. God is 
justified in not following the principle of choosing the lesser of two evils, all else being equal, in 
this instance because He cannot do so in the wider choice context. But what is relevant to 
considering whether God’s purposes may be vague is whether they may involve some but no 
determinate amount of net good. Again, all else being equal, if A has more net good than B, then 
A satisfies God’s purposes better than B. This is not indeterminate. If God is not obligated to 
choose better A over B because He cannot choose an optimal amount of good, then either His 
purposes cannot be satisfied or His purposes are whatever determinate amount of good He 
arbitrarily selects.  Differing net amounts of good may present a choice in a larger context 
according to which God may have no obligation to choose one over the other, but this is not 
because they equally well satisfy God’s purposes.  
Introducing the purported possibility that for every good God chooses He could have 




be wary of what this supposedly possible divine choice context implies. One might say that this 
possibility shows God’s purposes cannot be satisfied because God necessarily wills what is best 
and there is no best option. This means this possibility shows God cannot exist. Or one might say 
that whatever possible world God arbitrarily chooses is His purpose, in which case His purpose 
cannot be vague. Or one might respond that this supposed possible choice circumstance is not 
possible: a finite set of options must have at least one optimal member and if there are an infinite 
number of possible options the optimal option is to actualize all the good ones. In all these cases, 
God’s purposes are not vague. 
The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis is based on the fundamental moral intuition that a 
perfectly good being would prefer less evil over more unless He has a good reason not to, where 
a good reason must involve some good. I acknowledge that we can be mistaken about the 
applicability of fundamental intuitions in unfamiliar contexts.
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 However, I have argued that 
considerations of vagueness, as marshaled by van Inwagen, do not provide such a threat to the 
No Gratuitous Evil Thesis. 
 
The optimal joint satisfaction of vague purposes may not be vague 
The inter-connectedness of events means that individual evils are likely involved in 
different types of trade-offs, not because they are evil, but just because they are events. To trace 
just one thread, consider the exact timing of all the inter-related choices and thoughts of vast 
numbers of people and of innumerable other types of events necessary for the precise timing of 
the conception of a  particular human being. Clearly, the divine permission of a particular event 
in such a chain may influence which human beings subsequently exist and so influence the 




existence of parental love. This illustrates how the good that God’s permission of an evil is 
necessary for may be the good of fulfilling different divine purposes in highly complicated ways. 
Each such purpose may be describable in only vague terms. But even if each such good requires 
no minimum amount of permitted evil, so that its particular instantiation seems necessarily 
arbitrary, this does not mean there is no unique optimal instantiation or total maximal goodness 
of the satisfaction of all of them. Again, our description of God’s aim to bring about good may 
comprise different vague general goods, each of which may seem to admit of no optimal 
instantiation, but this does not mean there is no optimal instantiation of their joint satisfaction. 
Perhaps this optimization (perhaps constrained by free choices and indeterminism) is the total 
value of created reality. 
Mistaken Responses to the Vagueness Objection 
Some philosophers, such as Jeff Jordan and Jim Stone, have responded to van Inwagen’s 
arguments against NGE inadequately because they have not recognized their essential appeal to 
vagueness. The other philosophers who claim to rebut van Inwagen’s criticism of NGE actually 
endorse the vagueness objection to NGE. They offer replacements for NGE in new arguments 
from evil, but these replacements are both unnecessary and entirely different claims rather than 
revisions of NGE.  
Let us look at one example. In “On Evil’s Vague Necessity” Michael Almeida formulates 
van Inwagen’s No Minimum Thesis as:  
There is some i(i > 0) such that for any amount of evil kn, (k ≥ kn> 0) if kn is such that 
any greater amount of evil is unnecessary for divine purposes then kn−i is such that any 




He argues this thesis should be replaced with the “Vague Minimum Thesis” (which he also 
formulates in supervaluationist semantics):  
Vague Minimum Thesis: There is no discrete transition from the evil unnecessary for 
divine purposes to the evil necessary for divine purposes. 
 
Almeida thinks the Vague Minimum Thesis is a plausible thesis that is independent of 
van Inwagen’s argument. I have argued instead that the Vague Minimum Thesis is a more 
accurate rendering of what van Inwagen intended by the No Minimum Thesis (which I quoted as 
“For any amount of evil that would have served God’s purposes, slightly less evil would have 
served His purposes just as well”).  Interpreting the No Minimum Thesis  in terms of repeated 
diminishments of a constant amount of evil is incompatible with the presupposition that some 
permission of evil is needed for God’s purposes (as it implies no evil is needed), and interpreting 
it in terms of repeated diminishments of diminishing amounts of evil is incompatible with the 
finite diminishability of the pain referred to. The former overlaps with some of Almeida’s 
argumentation.  
In any case, Almeida thinks van Inwagen’s arguments fail because the No Gratuitous Evil 
Thesis may be rendered as the prohibition of amounts of (permitted) evil that are definitely more 
than what is required by God’s purposes and the plausible alternative to van Inwagen’s  mistaken 
No Minimum Claim, the Vague Minimum Claim, does not impugn this. 
But the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, as proposed by Rowe and others, and as I have argued 
it should be formulated, says more than this. It says that for every particular evil, God’s allowing 
that evil is definitely required for a greater good. So the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis says that what 




specifically as the slightest evil. If every amount of every evil, no matter how slight, is necessary 
for an offsetting good, as per NGE, then it seems there must be a discrete transition from 
amounts of evil required for those offsetting goods and amounts that are not.  
Van Inwagen’s analogies are meant to cast doubt upon the existence of such a sharp cut-
off between necessary and unnecessary amounts of evil. But these analogies only relate to our 
descriptions of God’s purposes, which are of course unspecific. I have argued that the 
plausibility of God’s intended purposes’ not requiring a discrete transition from necessary to 
unnecessary amounts of required (permissions of) evil does not give reason to think the concrete 
goods that instantiate them may not. One reason for this is that God’s intended general purpose 
may be only that some optimal trade-off between a good and evil obtain, not a specific trade-off. 
Another reason is that we cannot characterize what specific uniquely optimal trade-off God 
intends and so necessarily conceptualize divine purposes only in general terms. What is 
unnecessary for God’s general purpose, because that purpose only requires a vague amount of 
evil, may be necessary for a specific instantiation of that purpose. That specific instantiation is 
what is relevant to NGE, which states that there must be an offsetting good, not that there must 
be an offsetting good that God specifically intends or an offsetting good that we can directly 
conceptualize it in its specificity. Moreover, my analysis of trade-off relations between theodical 
goods and permitted evils in chapter six shows that the vagueness inherent in a description of a 
general or global good and its requirements is irrelevant to NGE.  
Almeida translates NGE into a claim about sums of evil and God’s purposes. It is 
understandable then that he thinks the most plausible interpretation of NGE allows that there is 




unnecessary for God’s purposes, that is, that the minimum amount required is vague. This is 
plausible if God’s purposes are understood either 
1. according to our (direct or intuitive) conception of them (and hence vaguely), or  
2. if it is accepted that God’s intended purposes may be vague (though I have argued 
that this is impossible), or 
3. individually (i.e. parsed by us and therefore vague), rather than collectively (as a total 
good) 
As van Inwagen’s analogies illustrate, these purposes, so construed as global and general and 
separable (individual), plausibly do not require a specific amount of evil. van Inwagen thinks this 
means NGE is false. Almeida thinks it means NGE should be translated as only prohibiting 
amounts of evil that are definitely unnecessary for God’s purposes, and not as prohibiting the 
possibility of amounts that are neither definitely necessary nor definitely unnecessary. But this is 
not correct. What about the goods that instantiate God’s purposes? Or God’s purposes considered 
in total? NGE says of each and every amount of evil that its divine permission is (definitely) 
necessary for some offsetting good, and not merely that its permission is not definitely 
unnecessary. By Almeida’s argument, NGE allows that a person’s suffering may be permitted by 
God even if it is not definitely true that its permission is necessary for an offsetting good, so long 
as it is also not definitely true that its permission isn’t necessary. I believe a theist should believe 
that a person’s suffering may be permitted by God only if it is definitely true that its permission 
is necessary for an offsetting good and that NGE should be taken to imply this. 
The generality of God’s purposes as described in our theodicies, and as illustrated by van 




minimum amount of evil (given the divine choice context). According to Almeida, because NGE 
remains silent on amounts that are neither determinately necessary nor unnecessary, the 
plausibility of this vague minimum required amount, rather than a specific minimum, is no threat 
to NGE. I have argued that even if we accept that there are such vague satisfactions of God’s 
purposes, however construed, and their requirements, this is irrelevant to NGE. The optimal 
satisfaction of God’s purposes does not involve vagueness because optimal trade-offs involve 
definite amounts of evil offset by definite amounts of good even if theodical goods are vague. 
And, if there are no optimal satisfactions of those purposes because even concrete goods may 
require only vague amounts of evil (due to incommensurability between goods and evils), the 
vagueness involved does not imply that God may permit evil that is not definitely required for an 
offsetting good, just that we must be careful to accurately identify offsetting goods in the divine 
choice context. So vagueness is irrelevant to NGE, which should be understood to state, as is 
most plausible, that every single evil is accounted for, because (definitely) required for, the 
goods that comprise God’s purposes. So Almeida’s version of NGE  is unnecessary and also 
does not include NGE’s essential content, which, by referring to every amount of evil, does 
imply a sharp cut-off between necessary amounts of (divine permissions of) evil and unnecessary 
(in the divine choice context). To concede the Vague Minimum Thesis to van Inwagen is to 
concede too much, though, as I have argued, accurately articulating the precise way in which it is 
false is a complex matter because what God’s purposes require may depend on what free choices 
would be made or what indeterminate causes would produce. 
 Similarly, in order to accommodate vagueness, Nickolas Trakakis, David O’Connor,  and 
Daniel Howard-Snyder argue that the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis should be replaced by the claim 






because the vagueness objection is mistaken, this “replacement” is unnecessary. Moreover, 
although the new claim seems reasonable and may serve an argument for atheism with different 
premises than Rowe’s, it is based on the same fundamental moral intuition as NGE. To think that 
this claim replaces or corrects NGE is to think that a morally perfect being is opposed to “large” 
amounts of evil but not “small”, which is absurd and incoherent. God is opposed to “large” 
amounts of evil because He is, by the notion of perfect goodness, opposed to evil. Howard-
Snyder offers his own version of van Inwagen’s No Minimum Claim vagueness objection to 


























The Illusory Appearance of Gratuitous Evils 
 
Chapter 7 
















Why Non-Gratuitous Particular Evils Appear Gratuitous:  A Novel Response to Rowe 
I return now to Rowe’s argument: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being 
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting 
some evil equally bad or worse. 
 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.131 
 
The main current of resistance to this argument, “skeptical theism,” rejects premise one 
by rejecting the inference from our inability to imagine a greater good to the belief that there is 
none. My defense of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis yields an alternative response. Whereas a 
skeptical theist appeals to our ignorance of goods or of how known goods and evils are related, I 
believe an understanding of how known goods and evils are related undermines Rowe’s first 
premise. An understanding of trade-off relations between emergent theodical goods and their 
costs reveals that the way in which the divine permission of a particular evil contributes to the 
theodical good (that explains it) is necessarily obscure. The degree to which a divine general 
policy issues in good is unspecifiable and perhaps vague, as are its increments, and analysis 
shows that the trade-off made with an increment of its cost (a divine permission of an evil) must 
be either some hidden value related to that good, a value that cannot be directly intuited as 
offsetting the permitted evil, or else, to me less plausibly, the compound good of that degree of 
the theodical good and the theodical good’s being realized at all, which also cannot be directly 
intuited as offsetting the permitted evil (because both are vague). These relations and attendant 




permission by God is necessary for greater goods we have already thought of. I have separated 
three inter-related aspects of this explanation under the different sub-headings below. 
Inability to Intuit the Emergent Offsetting Good 
If an offsetting good is an emergent good, weighing the badness of a particular evil 
against the contribution its permission individually makes to that good will likely make that evil 
appear gratuitous. This is because the contribution will likely seem both unnecessary and 
insignificant in comparison with the evil.  That is, if a good only requires the permission of 
vaguely many such evils the particular evil may be part of a set of morally equivalent optimal (or 
surpassable, as per the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation) trade-offs satisfying God’s 
purposes; and if the evil is part of a set of such trade-offs then it is not gratuitous, despite 
appearing so, as has been argued. If strict meticulous providence is not correct, there may well be 
such a set of multiple optimal trade-offs; and if strict meticulous providence is correct, the evil 
will appear gratuitous despite being part of a unique optimal trade-off. This is just as, in my 
opening examples of the last chapter, a single shovel or a single dose, considered in isolation, 
may seem not worth its cost even though, considered from a wider perspective, as part of a 
reasonable number of shovelfuls or doses, it does not seem so. This is still true even if there is a 
unique reasonable number of shovelfuls or doses. Traditional theodical goods are emergent 
goods, so it is not surprising if individual evils permitted for the sake of them appear gratuitous.  
Now, there may be evils whose permission does not seem justified by the fact that they 
belong to a broad type of evil required by a theodical good. For example, one may think that 
though God must permit the possibility of significant moral evil for the good of humans having 
significant morality, humans should not have been given the capacity to choose moral horrors. 




gratuity of particular instances of evil, or narrowly defined types of evils, that belong to a 
broader type required for an accepted theodical good, but whose severity or other morally 
relevant features do not put them into a separate category of evil, is illusory. The italicized 
qualification is crucial: the illusory gratuitous evils I refer to must be typical or representative 
instances of a category of evil required for a good. To omit this qualification would be to argue 
known theodicies adequately explain God’s permission of all evils. I do not claim to silence 
atheist arguments from evil, only to discredit the commonly perceived distinctive force of 
Rowe’s version of it. (My use of the plural ‘evils’ in “the illusory appearance of gratuitous evils” 
is meant to refer to this appeal to individual instances of evil.) I argue that Rowe’s argument is 
not an improvement on the basic argument that it is reasonable to think God does not exist 
because theodicies do not account for all evil.  
So, for example, if one thinks that the good of humans having significant moral freedom 
justifies God’s permission of moral evils as bad as unjust killing, the inability to see how a 
particular unjust killing is necessary for an offsetting good is not a reason to think it is gratuitous, 
not unless the particular unjust killing is so appalling that it seems the good of humans having 
significant moral freedom cannot justify God’s permission of moral evil of that type. In other 
words, though the permission of a particular moral evil may (1) seem, and indeed be, 
unnecessary for the good of humans having significant morality, and (2) any contribution that 
permission seems to make to that good seems insignificant or non-existent, and further (3) it 
seems there is no other type of good God’s permission of it could be necessary for, we 
nevertheless have reason to think it is non-gratuitous. If the good of humans having significant 
morality requires God’s permission of evils of that general type and exceeds the total of that evil 




way the  good of humans’ having significant morality is instantiated. The existence of this good, 
given the theodical good, can be recognized  indirectly, through a consideration of emergent 
goods. On the Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation we must further reason to the realization 
that the offsetting good may include also the good of God’s permitting humans to have 
significant moral freedom because the divine choice context may require God permit a certain 
amount of evil that is not required for the actual instantiation of the good of humans having 
significant morality for this general good. 
What then is the offsetting good that God’s permission of an isolated fawn’s suffering in 
a forest fire is necessary for? The answer need only involve a general good, such as the 
uniformity of nature, that requires divine permission of this type of evil, perhaps broadly 
construed, such as natural evil or animal suffering. It certainly seems as if God’s miraculous 
prevention of this instance of suffering, in any one of many different possible ways, would not 
compromise the uniformity of nature in any way that would outweigh the badness of the 
suffering, or perhaps in any way at all. So, failing to see any more specific good that might 
require this event, especially as it is stipulated to be relatively causally isolated from other 
sentient beings, God’s permission of it seems gratuitous. But, provided the evil belongs to a 
general type whose permission is required by a theodical good, our understanding of the relations 
between competing goods in an emergent good gives us  reason to think there exists an offsetting 
good, one that we can specify only in general terms.  
Again, what that good is depends on which interpretation of emergent goods is correct. 
On the Optimal Trade-Offs interpretation the good is some degree to which nature is permitted to 
be uniform. On the Intransitivity of Betterness interpretation, God’s permitting the fawn to 




uniformity of nature achieved,  is a necessary part of the total non-gratuitous natural evil actually 
permitted for the good of the uniformity of nature, and so is not gratuitous. The permission of 
that total evil is not gratuitous because it is necessary for two goods: the specific degree of 
uniformity of nature achieved and the good of God’s achieving the general good of the 
uniformity of nature. As argued earlier, on this interpretation every amount of the relevant type 
of evil permitted by God for some emergent good may be divided without remainder into the 
amount required for some degree of the good and the amount superfluous for that degree of 
goodness but necessary for the good of achieving the emergent good at all. 
One might have thought that the permission of the fawn’s suffering must be gratuitous 
given incommensurability between the relevant measures of good and evil. One might have 
thought it cannot be necessary for the degree of uniformity achieved for that could have been 
achieved with less evil (if evil can be measured more finely than good), and cannot be necessary 
for the good of God’s making some reasonable choice of permitted natural evils because the 
amount required for that is vague. But this objection presupposes an ordering of permitted evils 
that does not exist. It is not meaningful to ask which category the evil belongs to: that necessary 
for the uniformity or that necessary for a divine choice to be made. Each choice of a total amount 
of evil may include a vague boundary between the excess and non-excess evil, but the total 
amount is non-gratuitous and the permitted evil referred to is an amount of evil that is a 
necessary part of the total amount.  
 
The Special Case of Emergent Theodical Goods 
Emergent goods, which are ubiquitous, are defined by the fact that attention to the local 




by the permission of a specific amount of a competing good to some degree of specificity (the 
size of the trench, the degree of pain relief), the seeming superfluity of the last increment of the 
competing good may be mistaken for gratuity, as I have argued. But the obscurity of the 
existence of the offsetting good and of the non-gratuity is even greater in the case of evils 
permitted for theodical goods because we cannot know the specific manner in which theodical 
goods are instantiated.  
Theodical global goods suggested as divine purposes are described in necessarily vague 
terms. They, qua general good, may wholly constitute God’s reason for permitting a particular 
evil, in the case that God leaves its specific instantiation to chance, or they may not, in the case 
God intends their specific instantiation, but we cannot know specifically how such goods are 
specifically instantiated. Although we can know something about individual exercises of moral 
freedom, for example, we cannot know the specific degree to which humans in general possess 
significant morality and what that even means in any precise sense. In general, we do not have 
cognitive access to the global summations of value of instantiations of global goods which would 
be in fact served by divine permission of evils (if God exists) for their sake. So it cannot appear 
to us as if the permission of a particular evil is necessary for the theodical good that in fact 
justifies it.  
Part of my explanation for the illusory appearance of the fawn’s suffering then is also 
this: not knowing what the total amount of animal suffering is or even how to measure it, and not 
knowing much about the good of the uniformity of nature or how to measure it, the existence of 
a relatively specific degree of that good, for which an additional evil the size of Rowe’s fawn 
might be necessary for, is not something we could intuit or form a clear conception of, but can 




amount of moral evil is or even how to measure it, and not knowing how to measure the total 
good of humans in general having significant morality, the existence of a relatively specific 
degree of that good, for which an additional evil the size of particular morally wrong choice, is 
not something we could intuit or form a clear conception of, but can only infer from examination 
of the divine choice context. Though the divine permission of an individual moral choice may 
seem to make no significant contribution to the good of humans in general having significant 
moral freedom, and though we can’t see that any other good requires this permission, because we 
also know that many such permissions are worth their cost in permitted evil for the sake of the 
good of humans having significant moral freedom, we can see, after examination of the different 
possible interpretations of emergent goods, that this particular moral evil cannot be gratuitous. 
A global good may be the only good God permits certain evils for the sake of, but that 
intended good cannot be completely described in the specific way(s) it is actualized. God may 
not intend a particular instantiation of a general good; he may leave that up to chance, just as He 
may leave the amount and occurrence of evils to chance. But an unintended good may be a 
justifying good if it is the case that if that good did not occur in the given context God would not 
have permitted the evil. Though we may have only general terms with which to describe God’s 
possible purposes, the specific unknown way in which those general goods are actualized may 
require specific amounts of evil. 
Global theodical goods do not show what good is achieved by allowing one amount of 
evil as opposed to some other specific amount but this cannot mean they don’t encompass any or 
that there are none. After all, how could we describe nature’s being uniform to a certain degree 




revealed the necessity of God’s permission of the specific amount, kinds, and distribution of 
evils that actually occur?  
Furthermore, to anticipate the next section, these goods supervene on permitted amounts 
of evil or roles played by permissions of evil, or even permitted amounts of potential evil (given 
the distinction between NGE and the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis) not necessarily the 
permission of specific evils themselves. We cannot measure the above goods against the sum of 
all these roles so as to see that the role of a divine permission of a particular evil is necessary. 
We don’t even know what that would involve.  
Additionally, as described in chapter six, given the complexity of relations between 
events, and the consequent possible involvement of individual events in multiple trade-offs 
between different theodical goods and costs, the relation between a particular evil and an optimal 
satisfaction of multiple divine purposes is especially epistemically distant. Given this 
complexity, we certainly cannot expect to be able to measure the amount of goodness the role a 
permission of an instance of evil contributes to the value of an optimal satisfaction of multiple 
divine purposes nor conclude there is none from our inability to discern it. The familiar appeal to 
the possibility that an evil is connected to greater goods in ways we cannot discern (because the 
world is too complicated to know how things would have been if God had prevented it), gains 
additional force upon consideration of emergent good trade-offs. 
 
Lack of necessity may be mistaken for gratuity 
The other components of my defense of NGE contribute to this explanation of the 




compounded by several additional factors in the case of theodical goods. These were described 
in chapters four and five. 
First, NGE is not the Exclusivity Requirement. The permitted evil may be replaceable. 
The particular instance of natural evil of the fawn’s suffering need not be necessary for the trade-
off offsetting good invoked, but that evil or one no better is (if God exists), by NGE. As argued 
in chapter five, because it is the amount of evil that matters, not its specific embodiment, a 
specific evil may serve a role in God’s purposes even if its doing so is left to chance. 
Alternatively put, the good an evil may be necessary for may be the conjunction of a good and 
the avoidance of an evil no better.  The permission of an evil may serve a good by chance 
because there need be no necessary relation between the evil and the good that is a proper part of 
the total good the permission of the evil is necessary for.  
Second, NGE is not the No Chance Role for Evil Thesis. The amount of the permitted 
evil need not be necessary for God’s intended purposes. NGE allows that there may be multiple 
optimal trade-offs with differing amounts of good and evil. This does not mean God’s 
preferences may be arbitrary for the actual offsetting good may not be the intended good. God 
may not prefer the actual degree of uniformity of nature rather than one that is part of a different 
optimal trade-off, for example. The good that requires the evil (or one no better) is an 
instantiation of God’s purposes, but need not be intended by God. 
Third, NGE is not the No Pointless Evil Thesis. As described in chapters one and six, 
there is the possibility that a good, perhaps a deontological good or a specific degree of a global 
good, whether part of a trade-off or not, requires all of a type of evil, where the amount of that 
type, which may be horrific in both kind and amount, is due to chance or free choice. For 




must permit all very significant moral choices (whether good or evil). Though its permission is 
required for this good, the actual amount of very significant moral evil is pointless in the sense 
that its actual occurrence serves no good. In this way veridical apparent pointlessness, in the 
sense that the permitted evil does not serve an offsetting good, is readily confused with apparent 
gratuity, as I pointed out at the end of my discussion in chapter six.  
So, in addition to, and contributing to, our inability to directly intuit the individual 
offsetting good that requires the divine permission of a particular amount of evil, is the fact that 
the relation of necessity between the evil and possible general divine purposes (for achieving 
good) is possibly three steps removed. A non-gratuitous evil may be an unnecessary instantiation 
of an amount of evil that is unnecessary for God’s intended purposes or for any good at all. It 
may be difficult therefore to see how, without careful analysis, God’s purposes could require 
God’s permission of it, making it non-gratuitous. Applying this to Rowe’s example: 1. the 
fawn’s suffering may be replaceable, so only its role not the instance itself is necessary for the 
actual good achieved, and 2. the role itself, the additional amount of that kind of suffering added 
by the fawn’s suffering, may be unnecessary for the emergent (global and general) good that is 
God’s purpose (because some other trade-off may equally well satisfy God’s purposes), and 3. 
God’s permission of the type of evil the fawn’s suffering is an instance of, may be necessary for 
a good though the actual amount of that type of evil may serve no good. 
It is not surprising then that God’s permission of an isolated fawn’s suffering seems 
unnecessary. Given only NGE, and not additional constraints on divine providence 
corresponding to more meticulous providence, in at least three possible senses, it may well be. 




specific degrees to which global goods are satisfied, will be opaque to us so as to make the 
fawn’s suffering seem equally unnecessary.  
Again, since NGE is distinct from the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis, and also if my claims 
about NGE’s relation to deontology are correct, a good may require God’s permission of all of a 
type of evil. This means God’s permission of individual evils and amounts of evil may be 
necessary for goods they do not “serve”, i.e. increase, by NGE. If my claims about NGE’s 
relation to chance are correct, NGE allows that a justifiably permitted instance of evil may be 
replaceable (for God’s purposes) If so, there will be no necessary connection between God’s 
permission of that instance of evil and any good. It is not surprising then if such tokens of evil 
seem unnecessary. Only God’s permission of the type or role served by the evil, not the 
particular instance of evil, must be necessary for an offsetting good, according to NGE. And if 
my arguments concerning NGE’s relation to vagueness are correct, neither God’s permission of 
an instance of evil nor an amount of that type of evil need be necessary for God’s purposes for 
the evil to be non-gratuitous. (Though the amount of that type of evil may be necessary for a 
particular instantiation of those purposes) None of these ways in which an evil may be 
unnecessary for God’s purposes indicates the evil is gratuitous.  
The only way an evil can legitimately appear gratuitous is if it seems the permission of it 
is not necessary for an optimal divine trade-off between competing goods. The lack of necessity 
we often seem to detect by inspecting the local circumstances of an evil is not necessarily 
relevant to a possible lack of necessity of the permission of a total amount of that type of evil for 
an optimal trade-off. By referring to local circumstances Rowe’s argument invites a 
misapplication of NGE in this way. It is easy to mistake the former lack of necessity for the 




specifically described, and individual evils. So Rowe’s argument invites a misinterpretation and 
misapplication of NGE that induces a false perception of gratuitous evil, not because of any lack 
of clarity in Rowe’s writing, which is exemplary, but because of the complexity of possible 
relations between God’s purposes and individual evils. The greater specificity of Rowe’s 
argument, though fruitful for generating discussion, presents illusory evidence for the existence 
of gratuitous evil.  
In the previous section I have argued that our inability to intuit the instantiation of global 
goods that require the permission of a certain amount of evil, conceptualizing only the general 
global good’s requiring vaguely many evils, can falsely make an evil permitted by God  for the 
sake of a global good appear gratuitous: its permission seems unnecessary to us. In this section I 
have drawn on previous chapters to present types of lack of necessity that may be mistaken for 
gratuity. I think these are not merely additional sources of error but factors contributing to the 
same illusion of gratuity generated by the fact that general policy theodicies exemplify emergent 
good relations. To illustrate the difference between these types of errors: if we knew that a 
specific good required either of two evils, thinking God’s permission of one rather than the other 
means the permitted evil is gratuitous is simply to be mistaken about what gratuity means or 
should mean. We can see the relation between the role played by the particular permission of evil 
and the good but fail to identify it as what makes the evil non-gratuitous. This is different from 
falsely perceiving an evil as gratuitous. In the next section I will present my view that the 
different types of contingency, or appearances of them, described here contribute to the illusory 
appearance of gratuity described earlier. I believe our having no clear conception of what it 
would be for a global good to have a specific value contributes to our mistaking these types of 




contingency for perceived gratuity contributes to our failure to consider how a global good may 
be specifically instantiated in the world as an offsetting good, so that the two types of errors are 
mutually reinforcing. 
Mistaken search for explanations of individuating features of instances of evil  
 Our mistaking our inability to directly cognize the relevant emergent offsetting good for 
evidence of gratuity, and our erroneously taking its seeming that the permission of an individual 
evil makes no correspondingly significant contribution to any known theodical good to be 
positive evidence for gratuity (in cases where the permitted evil belongs to a type required by an 
accepted theodical good), is compounded by another intelligible related error. 
The possibility that the permission of different evils may equally well bring about some 
good (even if God specifically wills one of them) means that specific characteristics of a 
permitted evil need not be explained by the way in which God’s permission of it satisfies NGE. 
A good may require an amount of a type of evil, or, more generally, an amount of a set of evils; 
and so a general good may require evil qua some general description only and not qua some 
specific or individuating description. As argued in chapter five, a fully adequate explanation for 
why God permits some evil need not involve those features of it by which we may identify it in 
contrast to other evils. If the No Chance Role for Evil Thesis and the Exclusivity Requirement 
are false, as NGE allows, a general good may be the only good God permits an evil for the sake 
of. So according to NGE an evil may be permitted for the sake of a good even though no 
individuating features of the evil is required for any good. Confusing the necessity of amount 
required by NGE with the necessity of an instance required by the Exclusivity Requirement can 
lead one to think the particularities of an evil’s permission by God’s being unnecessary for 




is required for God’s purposes, these purposes may not be those of the good we think of in 
connection with that type of evil. This was argued in chapter six) This was the error described in 
detail in my discussion of Howard-Snyder’s objection to NGE. 
By appealing to individual instances of evil Rowe’s argument draws our attention to their 
individuating features. We naturally then look for explanation of those individuating features to 
try to understand why those evils occurred or were permitted. But the goods that explain why 
God permits an evil need not answer to those features by which we refer to the evil. Only the 
amount of a particular evil need be offset and the offsetting good may only require permission of 
a broad type of evil to which the particular evil belongs. This offsetting good, again, may be 
solely the specific instantiation of a global good such as nature’s being uniform to a certain 
degree or value or humans having significant moral freedom to a certain degree or value. 
 In discussing Howard-Snyder’s arguments against NGE I said that providing contrastive 
explanations for irrelevant individuating features of events is clearly, even humorously, 
unnatural in contexts of explanation that don’t require them. Stating why you threw the ball 
rather than the rock when asked why you threw the ball likely mistakes the question asked. How 
then do we fall into thinking they are required here in the context of the explanation for God’s 
permission of evil?  
 I answer that not only should we expect the existence of an offsetting good to only 
become apparent after careful reasoned consideration of the divine choice context, and not by 
direct inspection of our ideas of the possible goods and evils and their relations, but that because 
we lack that context when we attempt to directly imagine the good, the only goods it seems the 
permission of the evil could be necessary for are those answering contrastive explanations for the 




specific instantiation of that amount of that type. The appeal to a particular instance of evil leads 
us to search for goods of irrelevant contrastive explanations that need not exist.   
Of course, illustrating a type of evil with an example moves the discussion from the 
abstract to the concrete, and so more accurately conveys the evidential import against theism 
claimed for that type of evil. But to do this is to better convey the content of the appeal to that 
type of evil, not to newly introduce some feature of evil outside its scope. 
By appealing to an instance of evil Rowe’s argument invites us to ask: what good could 
this be necessary for? Lacking a frame of reference of goods of corresponding specificity, and 
because describing a specific instance of evil introduces a context of particularity rather than of 
generality, it is not natural for us to take the relevant referent of “this” to be an amount of a 
general kind of evil. We take it to refer to the particular instance. Rowe’s second theological 
premise then asks us to consider how the permission of the mentioned evil may be required by 
greater goods, leading us to consider the necessity, or lack thereof, of the particular example.  
So instead of taking NGE to most basically refer to an amount of a type of evil, as it does, 
we take it to essentially refer to the particular evil, which is to misconstrue it as a version of 
meticulous providence. Certainly what needs to be justified is God’s permission of the particular 
instance, but the feature of the particular instance whose permission must be necessary need only 
be its amount of evil, perhaps also its general type, whose permission we may be able to explain 
in terms of only general goods requiring evil of that general type. For all three reasons, that what 
is justified is the particular instance, that a context of particularity is introduced, and that we lack 
a direct intuition of specific degrees of goodness of various possible instantiations of the possibly 
relevant general goods, we take the relevant referent of “this” to be the evil considered in its 




relevant referent. The No Gratuitous Evil Thesis pertains to God’s preference for good and the 
amounts of evil whose permission is thereby required, not the specific embodiments of those 
goods and evils.  
Misconstruing NGE in this way makes it impossible to see that the relevant offsetting 
good may be contained in a considered global good, as a possible optimal instantiation of it. If 
we are looking for a good that requires a particular, perhaps random, evil, we will pass over 
global goods. Global goods do not even seem to require particular amounts of (permitted) evil, 
only vague amounts. Only when trade-off relations between global goods and evils are 
considered, where differing instantiations of differing amounts of evil may each be required by 
different equally suitable offsetting goods, could the possible justifying role of global goods be 
recognized. But that recognition requires a shift of perspective away from the particularities of 
the evil into its global context and a close analysis of that context that identifies its puzzling 
features and distinguishes them from gratuity. The surface simplicity of Rowe’s argument 
obscures the need for this task. 
Now, this search for explanations for the permission of the evil in its specificity may also 
be partially motivated by the requirement that God be good to each individual sentient being, 
which is essential to God’s benevolence. But the Evil Offsetting Good interpretation of the No 
Gratuitous Evil Thesis is only a requirement that God have a good reason for choosing more over 
less evil, where a good reason is constituted by its not being the case that a relevantly same 
offsetting good could be achieved without the evil. NGE is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition on God’s permission of evil, as Rowe originally stated. So the benevolence 
requirement may be added to NGE as an additional constraint on God’s permission of evil. One 




providence rules out such conflict, but in either case, the conditions of their satisfaction are 
conceptually distinct. How God is good to the suffering fawn may remain unknown, and perhaps 
this generates a different atheist argument from evil. (Though the permission of its suffering 
being necessary for an offsetting good may also help explain any appearance of God’s lack of 
benevolence.) 
So why does Rowe’s example of the isolated suffering fawn seem a powerful example of 
seemingly gratuitous evil? I suggest the following: by pointing to an instance of suffering and 
invoking the need for greater goods, Rowe’s premises incline us to ask “Why would God permit 
this suffering? What greater good could this be necessary for?” This is natural to ask because, 
after all, God must be justified in permitting not just general types of evils but every particular 
instance of evil. Also, Rowe’s detailed example is taken to only provide precision. So we look 
for a correspondingly relevant because specific explanation. Rowe’s example is characterized by 
who it is that suffers, when, and where. We look for a good causally connected to the timing and 
location of the suffering fawn scenario and find none. We try to connect this particular animal’s 
suffering with a good that requires it and, barring a fawn soul-building theodicy (that I do not 
reject but will assume rejected for the sake of argument), again find none. After perhaps a few 
more imaginative attempts the task then seems transparently hopeless. The stipulated relative 
causal isolation of the fawn’s suffering from other sentient beings rebuffs these attempts. Any 
ventured relation to a concrete good or even to expected utility can be reasonably stipulated 
absent. Perhaps we consider the good of the uniformity of nature or some other general good but 
note that preventing this particular relatively isolated evil seems to incur no significant cost in 
this regard. We then think our failure to think of goods that could explain God’s permission of 




God’s permission of them. A similar failed investigation attends other proposed examples of 
apparently gratuitous evils. An appeal to unknown goods or relations between goods and evils 
follows or it is accepted that the proposed evil seems gratuitous.  
But this is all a mistake. We should never have been led down this path. A perfectly 
adequate explanation of God’s permission of the fawn’s suffering may make no reference to the 
particularities of it. In general, a global good may adequately explain God’s permission of a 
particular evil. This is the lesson of global policy theodicies and the real lesson of Howard-
Snyder’s Coach Analogy. God’s permission of the fawn’s suffering or a natural evil no better is 
necessary for the specific instantiation of the general good of the uniformity of nature that God 
has actualized by permitting it (along with many other natural evils). That good offsets all the 
evil permitted for its sake, including the fawn’s suffering. If the uniformity of nature requires 
God’s willingness to permit natural evils, and is a good that outweighs all natural evil, the fawn’s 
suffering is likely not gratuitous, even if it occurs by chance.  
Divinely intended global goods, such as the uniformity of nature or the existence of 
significant morality, may justify God’s permission of particular evils, such as the fawn’s 
suffering or an individual misuse of moral freedom, without requiring the permission of those 
specific evils. Again, such justification satisfies the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis in a way that is 
not conspicuous in part because the specific optimal trade-off(s) in which those general goods 
are actualized, which do require the permission of the amount of those evils, are not specifiable 
by us. 
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 If we accept this theodical good, the fawn’s suffering should be regarded as possibly 
permitted for the sake of a good we can imagine. The lack of necessity of this particular 




counterexample to NGE by van Inwagen and is taken to be an apparent counterexample to 
theism because of NGE by Rowe and many others, but it is not, as I have argued. 
Of course if we don’t accept the uniformity of nature or any other global good that 
requires broad types of natural evil or animal suffering as adequate theodical goods for much 
natural evil then we should regard the fawn’s suffering as gratuitous. But in this case we should 
regard all or nearly all natural evil as gratuitous and Rowe’s appeal to this instance should no 
more incline us to doubt theism than an appeal to natural evil or animal suffering in general. This 
is what I mean by my claim that Rowe’s argument is no improvement on the basic claim that 
theodicies do not account for all evil.  
Again, recognizing the need for a good justifying God’s permission of the particular 
instance, having available no ready conception of an amount of any accepted general theodical 
good that would correspond to the amount of the evil, and introduced to a context of 
particularity, we naturally but erroneously interpret the need for explanation to be a need for 
explanation of the features of the particular evil that individuate that evil. But, as argued, there 
need be no divine explanation for the features that enable us to individuate an evil for God to be 
justified in permitting it in satisfaction of NGE. In this way the apparently distinctive force of 
Rowe’s appeal, because of its clarity and precision, is a kind of unintended deceptive red herring. 
I will call the explanation of the mistaken perception of gratuity due to the puzzling 
relations between emergent justifying goods and their costs that I have described in this chapter 
the “Local Gratuity Illusion”. Emergent goods as I have defined them describe general policy 
theodicies, as introduced in chapter one, and are ubiquitous in other contexts as well. The 
puzzling feature of these relations is chiefly that optimal trade-offs between global goods and 




contribution to the global good, though collectively they must be. This may be compounded by a 
lack of necessity of the (divine permission of ) specific evils or amounts of evil for those global 
goods.  
I have argued that these puzzling features may be explained either in terms of hidden 
values or by the intransitivity of betterness, and that on any careful interpretation of emergent 
goods, the perceived gratuity, or analogue of gratuity, evaporates. Although the appearance of 
gratuity may persist even after considering my explanation of the Local Gratuity Illusion, that is 
to be expected on this explanation. So I claim that the persistent sense that representative 
instances of a type of evil are gratuitous despite recognition of a general good that requires 
divine permission of (roughly) the actual amount of that type of evil is the unrecognized 
appreciation of the seemingly paradoxical relations of comparative value of emergent goods. 
Once light is shed on those puzzling features we see that they were mistaken for gratuity. This 
doesn’t mean they are no longer puzzling, just that the puzzle turns out not to be about gratuity.  
I believe the Local Gratuity Illusion has lent Rowe’s first premise, the empirical claim, 
illusory force, and has even led some theists to deny NGE. In the next chapter I argue that the 
two most influential critics of NGE, van Inwagen and Hasker, were unduly influenced by the 















Evidence for the Local Gratuity Illusion:  



















I have argued that Rowe’s argument from apparently gratuitous evils does not 
significantly add to the basic view that (1) known theodicies do not account for all evil and (2) 
this is evidence for atheism, and that this is because its seeming distinctive force is due to the 
Local Gratuity Illusion. Because of the complexity of relations between emergent goods and 
their individual costs, Rowe’s appeal to individual evils makes the task of theodicy seem even 
more difficult than it is. In this chapter I present evidence for the influence of the Local Gratuity 
Illusion on contemporary discussion of Rowe’s argument. I will argue that the two most 
prominent critics of NGE, van Inwagen and Hasker, articulate aspects of the problem of evil in 
inconsistent ways and that the Local Gratuity Illusion explains why.  
Apparent inconsistencies in van Inwagen’s presentation and criticism of the “Local 
Argument”, a version of Rowe’s argument, are best explained by the influence of the Local 
Gratuity Illusion. Similarly, the interesting thought experiments Hasker has introduced, and his 
understanding of them, are generated by the puzzling features of emergent good trade-offs and 
are misidentified by Hasker as a puzzle, and a problem, for NGE. If such accomplished and 
influential theist philosophers as van Inwagen and Hasker have been misled by the Local 
Gratuity Illusion into inconsistencies unnoticed by the philosophical community, the Local 
Gratuity Illusion is likely pervasive as a conduit for the near universal perception that Rowe’s 
appeal to particular evils is distinctively strong evidence for gratuitous evil.  
First let us take stock of what is at stake. NGE states that God would only prefer more 
evil to less if there were a good reason for doing so, where a good reason must involve some 
good. In my opinion NGE, when properly understood, is clearly fundamental to divine goodness 
and rationality, perhaps self-evidently so.According to traditional theism, God chose to create 




God’s good reason(s) for permitting evil must involve some good (regardless of which theory of 
human morality is correct), as we have seen in chapter four. That the good must offset the evil 
seems just trivially true: if it didn’t God would be preferring the disvalue of the amount the evil 
exceeds the good for no reason at all, which is just to prefer more evil over less for no reason. So 
we should examine claimed refutations of NGE with caution. Even if rejecting his reasoning 
were to entail some prima facie implausible alternative views or theses (though I do not think it 
does) we should keep in mind that denying NGE may be even less plausible or less intelligible.  
 
Van Inwagen’s Presentation of the Local Argument from Evil 
In The Problem of Evil Gifford Lectures, van Inwagen presents a debate over the problem 
of evil that  begins with the global argument from evil. The global problem of evil challenges 
“Theist” to explain God’s permission of the “vast amounts of truly horrendous evil” in the world. 
Theist offers the following “expanded free will defense”: 
When human beings misused their free will and separated themselves from God, the 
existence of horrors was one of the natural and inevitable consequences of this 
separation. Each individual horror, however, may well have been due to chance.  … Why 
doesn’t God miraculously prevent each horror? … [this] would have frustrated his plan 
for restoring human beings to their original union with him by removing an essential 
motive for cooperating with Him – namely, the realization that there is something 




Theist also says: 
 
For human beings to cooperate with God in this rescue operation, they must know … 
what it means to be separated from Him. And what it means to be separated from God is 
to live in a world of horrors. If God simply “cancelled” all the horrors of this world by an 
endless series of miracles, he would thereby frustrate his own plan of reconciliation. … If 







Atheist then responds to Theist (I have divided and labeled his response):  
[A] You, Theist, may have told a story that accounts for the enormous amount of evil in 
the world … But there is a challenge to theism that is … not simply [based on] what 
might be called the general fact of evil …  
[B] [E]ven if you have effectively answered … the global argument from evil, your 
response to this argument does not touch … local arguments from evil.   
[C] Let us consider certain particular very bad events – “horrors” I will call them … it is 
evident, at least in many cases, that God could have prevented the [a] horror without 
sacrificing any great good or allowing some even greater horror.  
[D] If evil can be, even roughly, quantified … it might be that there was more evil in a 
world in which there were thousands of millions of relatively minor episodes of suffering 
… than in a world in which there were a few horrors. But an omnipotent and omniscient 
creator could be called to moral account for creating a world in which there was even one 
horror.  
[E] And the reason is obvious: that horror could have been “left out” of creation without 
sacrifice of any great good or the permitting of some even greater horror …   
[F] Thus, the sheer amount of evil (which might be distributed in a fairly uniform way) is 
not the only fact about evil that Theist needs to take into account. He must also take into 
account what we might call  … high local concentrations of evil – that is, horrors. 
[G] And it is hard to see how the free-will defense, however elaborated, could provide 




There are at least three related prima facie inconsistencies in this exchange between 
Theist and Atheist:  
(1) Atheist introduces horrors (in C and F) as if they had not yet been considered by 
Theist’s expanded defense, yet an explanation for God’s permission of horrors is the 




(2) Atheist grants the expanded defense explanation for God’s permission of vast 
amounts of horrific evil, which is in terms of God’s permission of horrors (A and B), 
and then states that the expanded defense cannot account for horrors (G).    
(3) Slight evils of an “even” distribution of evil are as open to the objection of seeming 
gratuity (that typical instances could be prevented by God without cost to His 
purposes) as greater evils of an uneven distribution, yet Atheist presents this 
challenge as if it only applied to the latter.  (D, E, and F) 
 
I will elaborate on and attempt to explain these seeming inconsistencies below. First let 
us complete van Inwagen’s presentation of the debate. Atheist follows the above quoted remarks 
with the “Local Argument from Evil,” which parallels Rowe’s argument. I paraphrase it as 
follows: 
The Local Argument from Evil 
1. E, an example of a horror, could have been left out of the world by an omnipotent 
creator without making the world worse. 
2. “If a morally perfect creator could have left a certain horror out of the world he 
created, and if the world he created would have been no worse if that horror had been 
left out of it than it would have been if it had included that horror, then the morally 
perfect creator would have left the horror out of the world he created.” 
Therefore,  
3. God does not exist.  
 
 
Van Inwagen writes, in his own voice: 
 
[H] [The expanded free-will defense] story accounts for the existence of horrors – that is, 
that there are horrors is a part of the story. The story explains why there are such things 
as horrors, although it says nothing about any particular horror. (It in fact implies that 
many individual horrors have no explanation whatever.)  




[J] A general account of the existence of horrors does not constitute a reply to the 





In response to the Local Argument, Theist launches van Inwagen’s Vagueness Objection 
against premise 2, which I have detailed in chapter six. Van Inwagen then continues this 
criticism of NGE in the context of the expanded free will defense, arguing further and more 
specifically that premise 2, his version of NGE, should be rejected because there may be no 
specific number of horrors God must permit for the sake of humans realizing that to live in a 
world distanced from God is to live in a world of horrors.  
Departure from Rowe 
Van Inwagen’s presentation of the Local Argument is importantly different from Rowe’s 
presentation in ways that reveal the influence of the Local Gratuity Illusion on van Inwagen’s 
thinking. The evils the Local Argument appeals to are the same evils the expanded free will 
defense claims to account for. Van Inwagen’s remarks make it clear that the local argument 
appeals to a representative example of a horror, not only a representative example of an 
apparently gratuitous horror. One might survey horrors and pick out some exceptional cases to 
which known theodicies seem inapplicable as examples of apparently gratuitous evils. Although 
this seems Rowe’s approach, van Inwagen does not do this. A typical individual horror appears 
gratuitous, according to van Inwagen, and this is the fact about the actual distribution of evil his 
Local Argument refers to. Although it could be that divine permission of an individual horror 
seems necessary for a greater good, this is not typically the case, according to the expanded free 





This crucial departure from Rowe’s presentation is evidenced by several considerations.  
1. The expanded defense story about God’s permission of horrors is meant to address all 
horrors and so the horrors the Local Argument refers to as well. By “local” Atheist 
presumably means occurring across a relatively narrow stretch of time and space, so 
Atheist’s definition of a horror as a particular localized event may be narrower than 
what Theist meant by horrors. Nevertheless, Theist’s expanded defense certainly 
included all horrors as defined by Atheist. A specific very bad event is certainly a 
common meaning of a ‘horror’.  
2. When van Inwagen says individual horrors appear gratuitous because it seems they 
could be removed by God without cost to His purposes (in C above), he is referring to 
typical instances of horrors or high local concentrations of evil. The context of quote 
C suggests that by “even one” horror Atheist is referring to one representative 
instance.  
3. Likewise when van Inwagen prefaces the Local Argument by asking “Suppose there 
were an omnipotent and omniscient being and that this being acted just as God has 
acted in the expanded free will defense. Could any moral case be made against the 
actions of this being?” he is asking if there is an inherent difficulty with this 
description of God’s relation to the world’s horrors. He is not asking if there are types 
of horrors in the world this account fails to mention.  
4. That the Local Argument appeals to a particular representative example of the horrors 
the expanded defense purports to explain (God’s permission of) is also implied by his 
argument for the relevance of the distinction between even and uneven distributions 




the former does not just because the latter consists of horrors, construed as particular 
localized horrific events, according to van Inwagen. So the existence of horrors in 
general introduces the problem of gratuitous evil, according to van Inwagen.  
5. Van Inwagen’s accompanying visual metaphor for the possibility of God’s removing 
individual horrors without cost to His purposes is likewise based on very general and 
universal features of horrors, so defined. Their being individual events that take up 
relatively small portions of space and time is what makes their uncostly removal seem 
possible.   
For these reasons it is clear that the horrors the Local Argument refers to are not a 
previously overlooked category. Theist says in his expanded free will defense that the great good 
of humans recognizing the need for reconciliation with God requires vastly many such horrors.  
The dialectic here is very different from that in which Rowe posed his original version of 
the Local Argument. Rowe begins with what he thinks is an apparently gratuitous evil: the 
isolated fawn’s suffering burn pains. I have invoked the Local Gratuity Illusion to argue that the 
good of the uniformity of nature, which previously seemed inapplicable even if acknowledged, 
could in fact justify God’s permission of this and similar apparently gratuitous instances of 
natural evil. If Rowe were to accept my criticism and the uniformity of nature as a global good, 
perhaps he would withdraw his fawn illustration of his first premise. Van Inwagen, by contrast, 
begins with granting we can imagine a good that justifies God’s permission of all of a type of 
evil, namely horrors, including random horrors, and then argues that typical instances of that 
type still pose a challenge to theism. This is quite surprising because it seems clearly 
inconsistent. I will argue it is in fact inconsistent and that the Local Gratuity Illusion best 




In his presentation, van Inwagen alternates between the global perspective on horrors, 
considering them collectively, and the local perspective on horrors, considering them 
individually, in relation to the good of the expanded defense, without recognizing the emergent 
good relations between these perspectives. He says that the expanded defense accounts for the 
fact that there are horrors (and also the fact that there are vastly many horrors) (H and I), but that 
the local argument, which appeals to a representative example of a horror, is still a challenge to 
theism (J). But one cannot explain God’s permission of a type of evil without thereby explaining 
God’s permission of a typical instance of that type.  
Moreover, the expanded defense explains why there are horrors by explaining why there 
are vastly many horrors. If it offers an acceptable explanation of the former it also does so for the 
latter. As atheist grants, the expanded defense explains God’s permission of the total amount of 
horrors the world contains. But an explanation and justification for God’s permission of a total 
amount of a kind of evil is also an explanation and justification for God’s permission of each and 
every typical instance of that kind. So Atheist and van Inwagen’s view that the Local Argument 
is a challenge to theism, even given the expanded defense is incorrect. I maintain that van 
Inwagen’s failure to see that God’s being justified in permitting the horrors of the world, 
considered collectively, means He is justified in permitting each representative example of a 
horror, considered individually, is best explained by the influence of the Local Gratuity Illusion.  
Inconsistencies 
Let us examine why van Inwagen does not recognize that a justification for God’s 




horrors considered individually, or the relevance of this, by first reviewing the puzzling aspects 
of Atheist’s response to Theist’s expanded free will defense introduced above.  
(1) Atheist introduces horrors (in C and F) as if they had not yet been considered by Theist’s 
expanded defense, yet an explanation for God’s permission of horrors is the core of Theist’s 
expanded defense.   
Atheist asks Theist to consider particular very bad events or “high local concentrations of 
evil” which he defines as horrors. But Theist had just discussed God’s permission of horrors, 
labeled as such, at length, in presenting the expanded defense, so it is odd for Atheist to now 
draw Theist’s attention to horrors as a new consideration. Why does Atheist speak as if he is 
introducing a new category of evil when he is not? Atheist wants to draw attention to the 
apparent gratuity of high local concentrations of evil. On his view this is a morally relevant 
feature not previously considered or sufficiently appreciated by the expanded defense. Indeed, if 
the expanded defense had not considered this feature of some evils, then they might form a 
category not accounted for by that defense. But, as we have seen, this apparent gratuity is a 
feature of all typical instances of horrors, according to van Inwagen. Whether Theist explicitly 
considered this feature or not, if the expanded defense does account for the existence of horrors 
(which of course includes individual horrific events) as Atheist grants, then it accounts for 
horrors with that feature.   
To make an analogy, consider the following response to John Hick’s soul-making 
theodicy: “Hick does adequately explain why God permits innocent suffering and harm in 
general. The fact that God’s permission of innocent suffering makes possible the great (global) 




that the world so far contains. However, consider the Sufferer’s Good Constraint that any 
particular suffering endured would be permitted by God only if it benefits the sufferer. Every 
particular instance of permitted genuine harm violates this requirement. Because Hick’s 
explanation fails to account for this morally objectionable aspect of an omnipotent being’s 
permission of innocent suffering and harm it leaves open a new atheist argument from evil based 
on this constraint, the local argument from innocent harm rather than the global, which he has 
adequately responded to.” This response is not consistent and it is obvious why. If the Sufferer’s 
Good Constraint gives reason to think God wouldn’t permit any instance of innocent suffering 
and harm, despite Hick’s explanation, then Hick’s account does not adequately explain why God 
permits innocent suffering and harm in general or the actual total amount of it.  One could say 
that Hick’s theodicy would have adequately explained God’s permission of innocent suffering 
but for the Sufferer’s Good Constraint, but that is something different and is not what van 
Inwagen says regarding the expanded free will defense. The question we will examine is why 
van Inwagen (Atheist) didn’t give the consistent response. 
(2) Atheist grants that the expanded defense accounts for God’s permission of horrors (A 
and B), and then states that the expanded defense cannot account for horrors (G).   
To make this consistent, the first use of ‘horrors’ must refer to horrors in general and the 
second to horrors considered individually, which presumably is what Atheist means. However, 
as already mentioned, the expanded defense explains not only why there are any horrors at all, 
but also why God allows vast amounts of horrific evil. It explains why there are horrors as part 
of an explanation of why God allows vastly many horrors, considered collectively. Further, it 
also explains why there is the total amount of evil of all actual horrors, as required to answer the 




permitting all of a category of evils is to explain why God is justified in permitting all the evils 
of that category. So the expanded defense cannot adequately explain the former, why God is 
justified in permitting the vast quantity of horrors that the world contains, without adequately 
explaining the latter, why God is justified in permitting every typical horror the world contains. 
Yet Atheist claims it has done so.  
Again, the distinction between the category of horrors (the fact that there are horrors) and 
members of that category (the fact that there are the horrors there are) made here by Atheist and 
by van Inwagen (in H and I) is not relevant. The expanded defense purports to explain God’s 
permission of all the horrors of the world, considered collectively. If it does so, as granted by 
Atheist, then not only does it account for the quantity of evil of all the world’s horrors, it also 
accounts for every particular typical horror, even if aspects of each particular horror are left 
unexplained. Again, why would van Inwagen think that an explanation and justification for 
permission of all of a type of evil is not a justification for the permission of each instance of that 
total? I will attempt to explain this. 
(3) No answer to the global argument and no distribution of evil can avoid the (perceived) 
challenge posed by the local argument, by van Inwagen’s description of that challenge, but van 
Inwagen claims there is a way evil could have been distributed that would have avoided the 
challenge.  
The global argument challenges Theist to explain why God permits “vast amounts of 
horrific evil”. The answer must involve a general good that requires God’s permission of this 
vague amount of evil. It could not be described so as to require only the exact amount of evil the 




the actual amount of evil rather than one individual evil less. Van Inwagen claims the challenge 
posed by the Local Argument is posed by the manner in which the vast amount of evil the world 
contains is distributed. However, so long as that vast amount comes in increments of evil, the 
question of why God did not permit one less increment, i.e. the “local” challenge, can be posed. 
In all cases, one increment among vastly many of a vague amount required for a global good will 
seem unnecessary for that good. The difficulty is that the total amount may be considered as a 
whole of vague amount, apart from its summed parts or increments, (considered vaguely because 
that is the only kind of measure of it we have) and also as a precise, albeit unknown, sum. An 
answer to a question about the former cannot address the latter, whether the vastly many parts of 
that sum are construed as bigger or smaller. So there being many less severe evils rather than 
fewer more severe evils does not remove the challenge of the Local Argument as van Inwagen’s 
thinks. Each slight evil of an “even” distribution will appear unnecessary for the good of the 
expanded defense, just as each individual horror of an “uneven” distribution will.  
So it is not that evil should have been distributed in a better way that poses the quandary 
that sets the stage for the Local Argument. It is that there are individual instances of evil and the 
available conceptions of goods require amounts of permitted evil not as finely discriminated as 
individual evils so that those goods seem to be obtainable with at least slightly less evil. 
However, the simultaneous plausibility and perplexity of the claim that God must permit 
individual evils for the sake of goods that do not seem to require them raises the question of 
whether the (vague) goods that require not so finely specified amounts of evil may themselves be 
individuated into goods that do. This question is answered affirmatively by the hidden values 
interpretation of emergent goods. Even if answered negatively, pursuing this question leads to a 




least, the paradoxicality of seeming required gratuity should make one suspicious of that 
seeming. 
Although it is morally worse to permit a gratuitous horror than a gratuitous slight evil, 
whether God would permit any gratuitous evil is the logical point at issue and the point the Local 
Argument is based on. The distinction between many slight evils and fewer worse evils is 
intended to buttress the relevance of the distinction between the problem of the amount of evil 
(which is a problem only if the amount seems gratuitous) and the problem of the apparent 
gratuity of individual evils, but it does not because the problem of apparent gratuity is the same 
for both distributions.  
Perhaps a contrast between vague amounts of evil required for general purposes, such as 
that of the expanded defense, and specific increments of evil required for specific goods is really 
behind van Inwagen’s distinction between “even” and “uneven” distributions of evil (and he only 
misdescribes this as a distinction between many and fewer but more severe). If so, the mistake is 
in thinking that general goods cannot fully justify permission of specific evils (because they do 
not specifically require them). This is to mistake the plausible NGE for the implausible 
Exclusivity Requirement, as we reviewed in chapter five. 
Again, to make logical space for the Local Argument outside the Global Argument van 
Inwagen divides the problem of evil into the problem of the amount of evil, allocated to the 
Global Argument, and the problem of the distribution of evil, allocated to the Local Argument. 
But if general goods do not explain God’s permission of individual evils they do not explain 
God’s permission of (many general types of) evil at all. All evils are in some sense individual 




uneven distribution. The distinction between what general goods do and do not require, which 
seems the basis for van Inwagen’s distinction between the problem of the amount of evil and the 
problem of its distribution, does not divide the problem of evil into two types. As noted in 
chapter six, a general good may explain God’s permission of a particular evil without requiring 
that specific evil.  
The  Expanded Defense is a Rebutting Defeater of  the Local Argument  
As we have seen, van Inwagen’s inconsistent responses to Theist are, knowingly or 
unknowingly, attempts to avoid the entailment of God’s justified permission of typical horrors, 
considered individually, by God’s justified permission of horrors, considered collectively. But 
the latter does imply the former and so van Inwagen’s attempt to argue otherwise can only 
consist of misrepresentations to mask inconsistencies. He applies two distinctions to avoid this 
implication: the distinction between even and uneven distributions of the same amount of evil, 
and the distinction between the fact that there are any horrors at all and the fact that there are the 
particular horrors there are. Neither distinction is relevant in the context of the expanded defense. 
He incorrectly separates the expanded defense answer to why God permits the amount of “vast 
quantities of horrific evil” from its explanation of God’s permission of (individual typical) 
horrors, and then (inconsistently) misrepresents the expanded defense as only explaining the fact 
of horrors to show it does not explain God’s permission of individual horrors, when its 
explanation of both the existence and quantity of horrors means it does explain God’s permission 
of every particular representative horror (just not why there is one horror or one amount of 
horrors rather than another). The expanded defense explains God’s permission of horrors, 
considered collectively, which is the only way it can adequately answer the global challenge, as 




explains why God is justified in permitting every representative instance of a horror, thereby 
nullifying the Local Argument. This was implicit in my discussion of general policy theodicies 
in chapter one.  
Van Inwagen provides an argument to the contrary. He says the Local Argument presents 
a challenge to theism even if the expanded defense has adequately answered the Global 
Argument from Evil because the expanded defense does not indicate which premise of the Local 
Argument is false. He writes (J) , “. … A general account of the existence of horrors does not 
constitute a reply to the argument from horrors, because it does not tell us which premise of the 
argument to deny.” He is right that the expanded defense fails to address the Local Argument 
from Evil’s premises, but mistaken in thinking this means the Local Argument remains a 
challenge to theism even if the expanded defense is correct. Because the expanded defense is a 
rebutting defeater of the Local Argument it does not need to be an undermining defeater to 
remove its challenge.  
In this debate Atheist explicitly believes the following: 
1. The expanded defense shows God is justified in permitting all the horrors the world 
contains, considered collectively.  
2. E, a representative example of a horror, is gratuitous. 
3. NGE 
Does this constitute a challenge to theism? No. Atheist should infer from 1 that: 
  (1.5) The expanded defense shows God is justified in permitting E, a typical horror. So he 
cannot conclude from 1 and 2 and 3 that God does not exist because of E. He must now 




NGE. If God is justified in permitting E, as per 1.5, then either E is not really gratuitous or God 
may be justified in permitting gratuitous evil. That 1 implies 1.5 is far more certain than that the 
expanded defense is adequate, E is gratuitous, and even NGE. 
 Atheist could have consistently said that the expanded defense had seemed to be a good 
explanation for why God permits the world’s horrific evil, but that upon consideration of the 
gratuity entailed by that explanation, we see that it is not.  As a reminder, note that though more 
consistent, this position is mistaken for reasons already given. Every explanation for why God 
permits the vague amount of “vast quantities” of evil would encounter this same difficulty; every 
such explanation entails the occurrence of individual evils that seem removable without cost by 
God. So if Atheist impugned the expanded defense for this reason, he must hold that answers to 
the global argument are in principle impossible. This is suspect because the relations between 
quantities that generate this difficulty have general applicability outside the context of the 
problem of evil, as I have explained in chapter six. My point here is that Atheist and van 
Inwagen do not take this difficult and mistaken but more understandable position (that upon 
consideration of the gratuity entailed by the expanded defense, we see that it is not a good 
explanation for why God permits the world’s horrific evil). They claim instead the expanded 
defense is an adequate answer to the global argument but not the local and so make the more 
obvious mistake of rejecting the inference from (1) to (1.5). 
Van Inwagen’s thinking that 2 and 3 constitute a challenge to theism in the context of 
acceptance of the expanded defense means that he fails to see that the expanded defense does 
adequately explain God’s permission of particular horrors (qua horror, and this only is relevant) 
and that if God is justified in permitting the total amount of all horrors, as per the expanded 




defense does not show which premise to deny, it does show that at least one premise must be 
false. Again, since the divine permission of the evil E referred to is justified, given the expanded 
defense, either E is not gratuitous or God may be justified in permitting gratuitous evil. The fact 
that we cannot see how the permission of an individual horror contributes to the good of the 
expanded defense cannot be relevant, by the logic of the relations involved: for every typical 
horror e we cannot see how the permission of e is justified, yet by the expanded defense the 
permission of all horrors, which must include e,  is justified. The fact that we cannot see any 
explanation for God’s permission of a particular horror rather than some other, or rather than one 
less of that type, also cannot be relevant, especially given acceptance of an account of why God 
permits a vague amount of vastly many random horrors.  
The Influence of the Local Gratuity Illusion 
But how could a philosopher as astute as van Inwagen fail to see the relevance of this 
straightforward relation between justified permission of a whole and justified permission of its 
parts as I claim? I suggest, with appropriate modesty, this is the work of the Local Gratuity 
Illusion. Mistaking NGE for the Exclusivity Requirement (that a justifying good must 
contrastively explain God’s permission of an evil or an amount of evil), as a compelling 
justificatory requirement is part of that explanation, but there is more. Relations between parts 
and wholes of emergent goods have paradoxical features, as I’ve described in chapter six. In 
general, attention to one perspective in a paradox at the expense of the opposing can make 
denying what would otherwise be obvious seem reasonable. Here, what is true of cost totals, 
namely being outweighed by good, seems false of the cost increments that comprise it, and this 




A. There must be one or more optimal choices in a finite set.  
B. If a trade-off is optimal, each increment of it is worth its cost. 
C. Each increment of one value in an emergent good trade-off is not worth its cost 
of the competing value.  
It seems that (A) there must be one or more optimal choices in a finite set because the 
only way there could no optimal choice is if the betterness relation is intransitive and the 
betterness relation seems transitive. It also seems that (B) if a trade-off is optimal, each 
increment of it must be worth its cost because otherwise slightly less of one value would be a 
better trade-off. However, as we have seen by different examples, in an emergent good trade-off 
circumstance involving finite possible trade-offs, it seems (C) for every trade-off, each individual 
increment of one value seems not worth its cost; it seems only vaguely sufficiently many 
increments are worth their cost. So one must reject at least one of these prima facie highly 
plausible propositions. 
When the complete emergent good trade-off context is kept in mind the force of each of 
these propositions A, B, and C loses some lustre in the light of the others. (My own opinion, 
given in chapter six, is that C ‘each increment is not worth its cost of the competing good’ should 
be rejected in favor of postulating hidden values.) However, if the emergent good trade-off 
context were wholly unrecognized and so also the relevance of these propositions to each other, 
the truth of ‘each increment is not worth its cost of the competing good’ (thus considered 
“locally” rather than in “global” context) may appear almost self-evident. Regarding the pain 
relief case: how could it be reasonable to pay one thousand dollars for pain “relief” you can’t 




permission of horrors at the expense of belief in the inference from (1) to (1.5) becomes 
understandable if he failed to recognize the emergent good trade-off context. 
Of course, van Inwagen’s expanded free will defense itself says there is a trade-off 
between the good of humans recognizing their need for God and the amount of horrors God 
permits. What van Inwagen doesn’t recognize, I claim, is the parallel with the (ubiquitous) 
emergent good trade-off relations that I have drawn. As a consequence, he misses that there are 
the above compelling competing claims to the seeming self-evident gratuity that is the focal 
point and fulcrum of his position. To put it colloquially, I suggest the inference from (1) to (1.5) 
is overlooked because his conscious or unconscious thought is “Things can’t be that simple! 
What about this unrivaled challenge to justified permission of an individual horror: its obvious 
gratuity.” But that challenge is rivaled and with that understanding it is easier to see that the 
inference from (1) to (1.5) is obviously true. 
 Another consequence of van Inwagen’s not recognizing the emergent good – cost trade-
off relations exemplified by the expanded defense is that he misses that he is implicitly rejecting 
the transitivity of betterness in his interpretation of his alleged counterexamples to NGE. If this 
were recognized, he might reinterpret the purportedly necessary sub-optimality as necessary for 
the good of making a trade-off  (rather than not) and so reinterpret the divine choice 
circumstance he proposes as a counterexample to the principle that God always chooses the 
better of two options rather than to NGE. In chapter six I argued that van Inwagen did not 
properly distinguish two ways a choice may be morally arbitrary: because of equally good 
alternatives, and because one can’t satisfy the principle of always choosing the better alternative. 
There is further evidence of this in his criticism of NGE. When considering the choice of number 




six) he speaks of an optimal but unknown number.
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 But when considering the choice of 
whether or not to increase by one an already selected number he states it is always better to do 
so, implying there is no optimal choice.
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 I suggest he does not address the tension between 
these interpretations because he does not identify and analyze the intransitivity of betterness his 
account requires. And he does not identify this because he does not distinguish the two ways a 
choice may be arbitrary. He says one has no reason not to increase one’s selected number by one 
because one’s selected number was only a guess at the optimal number.
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 But if one is guessing 
at an optimal number then one also has no reason to increase one’s selected number; that would 
just be another equally good guess. The arbitrariness appealed to is not the kind of arbitrariness 
his account requires, which shows he did not see the relevance of the distinction between them. 
So I claim he does not see that the moral principle his account really says the existence of horrors 
shows God violates is that one should always prefer the better option. He does not see that this is 
not equivalent to NGE in this case, and that the satisfaction of NGE is what justifies God’s 
permission of horrors, even if that principle were violated. And I suggest he does not see all this 
because he does not recognize the relevance of the global context of these choice circumstances, 
i.e. the emergent good trade-off relations. 
To clarify, I should review my argument from chapter six that NGE is satisfied on the 
intransitivity of betterness interpretation of emergent good trade-offs. On the intransitivity of 
betterness interpretation it is the emergent good that justifies the choice of the amount within the 
reasonable range because that good requires the “excess” cost all such amounts possess. This 
means the total amount of permitted evil  is the sum of a required and hence non-gratuitous 
“excess” amount and “non-excess” (and therefore non-gratuitous) amount. Applied to the 




excess, is required for our specific  instantiation of the good of humans being able to recognize 
what it means to be distanced from God. Of course, seemingly incongruently, when one 
considers only neighboring choices of specific goods, and not what is required for the emergent 
good in selecting a concrete good, that total is not required for that specific amount of that good. 
Hence, no option is optimal. So on this view there are two distinct competing categorizations of 
the same permitted evil, one of which, when considered in isolation, appears a violation of NGE: 
the excess evil involved in any choice from a range of permissible yet sub-optimal options and 
the excess evil (and its increments) involved in any choice between two options for the (vaguely 
identified) same good. According to the former categorization the excess evil is not gratuitous 
given acceptance of global good theodicies, such as the expanded defense, for those global or 
emergent goods require it. This means the “gratuity” between neighboring options is not real 
gratuity. What NGE requires is that for every evil there is a good that requires God’s permission 
of it. It does not require that for every categorization of evil there is a good that requires God’s 
permission of the evil considered qua that categorization. In any case, what evil is permissible to 
choose in order to instantiate the emergent good is only what is required for the emergent good 
instantiation in the given choice context. To select from one of two ways of instantiating the 
(vaguely) same amount of the same good is not the choice context. So the latter “gratuity” is 
specious. (Further, it is not a gratuity that can apply to God since God necessarily chooses from 
the full range of trade-offs options not a restricted pair.)  
In light of these subtleties, it is not a mystery that van Inwagen thinks NGE is violated, 
given his implicit intransitivity of betterness interpretation of the divine choice circumstance 
involved in general policy theodicies. But my aim in this chapter is not to explain why van 




“Atheist”) thinks this violation is a challenge to theism even if God’s choice from the full range 
of general policy options, his choosing to instantiate the emergent good of humans recognizing 
their need for God by permitting horrors, is granted as non-gratuitous. He thinks a separate 
argument against NGE must be added to the expanded defense, when that defense is accepted as 
an adequate explanation for God’s permission of the total amount of horrors the world contains, 
in order to defend God’s permission of horrors, considered individually. This means he thinks 
that warrant for believing that a good justifies God’s permission of the total amount of horrors 
does not necessarily warrant believing that the good justifies God’s permission of a typical 
horror or of the specific amount of horrors the world contains. But a good’s justifying God’s 
permission of the total amount of horrors entails that it, that same good, also justifies God’s 
permission of every typical horror and of the specific amount of horrors the world contains. Van 
Inwagen’s failure to see this and its relevance is what requires special explanation. 
Putting aside NGE and thinking only about justification, van Inwagen must think that the 
same general theodical good cannot justify and explain God’s permission of both the total 
amount of evils and His permission of individual horrors. I have argued that this is a mistake. 
That the permitted individual evil’s justifying good is an instance of the emergent good is 
obscured by two mutually reinforcing factors, those described in the last chapter as generating 
the Local Gratuity Illusion: (a) mistakenly thinking the justifying good must explain apparent 
contingency of a particular embodiment of evil and/or of amount of evil (the Exclusivity 
Requirement error), and (b) a failure to properly analyze the global context of emergent good 
trade-offs. 
Re: (a): Van Inwagen’s thinking the justifying good must explain the apparent 




the expanded defense explanation of horrors as somehow deficient. This would lead him to think 
there are two different challenges to theism from evil, one answered (the fact of horrors and the 
total amount of evil of horrors), one not (the fact that there are the particular horrors there are); 
and so that there must be different evils or different ways in which an event is evil (the evil of 
amount and the evil of its distribution), not simply two different ways of referring to the same 
evil event or the same respect in which an event’s permission is morally objectionable.  His 
mistaking NGE for the Exclusivity Requirement would also explain his conflating the two senses 
of arbitrariness mentioned above: if there must be an explanation for God’s permission of one 
evil or one amount of evil rather than some other for God to be justified in permitting it, their 
being equally good alternatives doesn’t justify the arbitrariness of the choice. (But of course this 
Exclusivity Requirement is false of equally good alternatives)   
This is also suggested by the way Van Inwagen’s version of NGE differs from Rowe’s.  
van Inwagen’s NGE, as quoted above, is: 
If a morally perfect creator could have left a certain horror out of the world he created, 
and if the world he created would have been no worse if that horror had been left out of it 
than it would have been if it had included that horror, then the morally perfect creator 
would have left the horror out of the world he created. 
 
This thesis is accompanied by a loose visual metaphor of God’s inspecting the 
“blueprint” of the world and noticing he can remove a horror and then do “a little smoothing 
around the spatiotemporal edges to render the lines of causation in the revised blueprint 
continuous (or nearly so)” . Despite this visual assistance, van Inwagen’s NGE is difficult to 
interpret. First, because of the complex inter-connectivity between events the metaphor seems 
too unrealistic, even for a “rather fanciful” metaphor, as van Inwagen describes it. Second, the 




perfect being’s removing it, as van Inwagen’s NGE seems to claim, because the world might also 
have been no better without the horror (and the changes its removal requires). Third, if instead 
what van Inwagen means by “would have been no worse” is that the world would have been no 
worse without a horror than the world with the horror considered apart from the horror (minus 
the disvalue of the horror) then van Iwagen’s NGE states that if the world in which God prevents 
the horror is better than the world in which God permits it by no less than the disvalue of the 
horror God would prevent the horror. This is reasonable but narrower than Rowe’s version of 
NGE. It only prohibits divine permission of horrors that result in no unoffset good rather than an 
insufficiently valuable unoffset good.  
Why would van Inwagen express NGE as prohibiting morally neutral permission of evil? 
Why would van Inwagen express NGE as prohibiting evils whose permission would make no 
contribution to God’s purposes, rather than an insufficient contribution? Why would he leave his 
expression of NGE ambiguous between these two alternative interpretations? One answer to all 
three questions is that van Inwagen did not properly appreciate the relevance and applicability of 
the distinction between a choice that is morally arbitrary or pointless in the sense that there is no 
net good achieved by making it, in which case there may be no reason at all to make it (it is 
between equally good alternatives), and a choice that is morally arbitrary because there is no 
good at all achieved by making it, in which case there may be no reason to make it because doing 
so is “completely pointless” (to refer back to chapter one). There may indeed be no good reason 
at all why one amount of evil is permitted rather than another, contravening the Exclusivity 
Requirement, if both are part of optimal trade-offs, but this doesn’t mean there is no offsetting 




Re: (b): The analyses of chapter six show that the sense in which cost increments seem to 
outweigh their trade-offs increments in good does not conflict with NGE. This is because the 
offsetting good of NGE need not only be the trade-off good gained, as argued. If one does not 
make this analysis and so correlates apparently costly increments with apparently unjustified 
permission of cost increments, belief in justified permission of totals, and its implications for 
total increments, will seem to have a basis distinct from, and as compelling as, belief in 
unjustified permission of increments, such that answers to questions about the former are not 
answers to questions about the latter. If one also does not recognize the paradoxical nature of 
emergent good relations, the seeming unjustified permission of increments will appear to be 
grounds for a possibly compelling distinct argument. But it can’t be. Whatever seemingly 
obviously true propositions one must sacrifice regarding emergent goods and their cost 
increments, i.e. about amounts of good and whether they are offset or not, the proposition that 
justified permission of all x entails  justified permission of each x is not one of them. Only not 
recognizing emergent good relations and so viewing the apparent gratuity of individual 
increments of the vague amount of required permitted evil as evidence to be weighed against 
global considerations, rather than undercut by global considerations, can explain van Inwagen’s 
judgment that (1) does not imply (1.5) and his efforts to argue for this.  
To see how these factors are mutually reinforcing consider the Expensive Pain Relief 
Case from chapter six: 
Expensive Pain Relief. Suppose you will be in continuous pain for the rest of your life 
unless you receive treatment. Being permanently relieved of your pain is well worth more 
than a million dollars to you. Roughly a thousand daily doses of a drug will significantly 
and irreversibly relieve your pain. A single dose will not make any noticeable difference, 
however, and each single dose costs one thousand dollars. Suppose, as you receive doses 





This is analogous to God’s decision to permit horrors for the good of the expanded 
defense. Many permissions of horrors is worth the gain in human recognition of what it means to 
live in a world distanced from God, though each particular permission of a horror seems not 
worth its contribution, if indeed there is any, to that good. Similarly, many thousand dollar 
payments are worth the pain relief gained, though each one thousand dollar payment seems not 
worth its contribution to pain relief. Now consider someone to whom the expenses of the 
Expensive Pain Relief Case are all too real, but who has no idea what your payments are for. She 
may ask “What unknown good could possibly justify your spending one million dollars?” Once 
this has been answered she may then point to the latest payment and ask, “Why spend this $1000 
for no noticeable relief?” This seems to be a distinct challenge to the spending decisions being 
made. Following van Inwagen, the justified response is “I had to make a cut-off somewhere.” 
And, as we have seen, van Inwagen thinks this is analogous to God’s need to permit gratuitous 
evil. So there appears to be two distinct challenging questions in the pain relief case 
corresponding to two distinct challenges to theism: the global argument question of why God 
permits so much evil, and the local argument question of why God permits a particular evil.  
But if the answer to the first question is accepted, with the understanding that the pain 
relief consists of one thousand unnoticeable increments, then although the second question, 
namely “why spend one million rather than $999,999?”  has not been answered, it does not need 
to be. For if spending one million dollars for pain relief consisting of a thousand unnoticeable 
increments is accepted as justified, the spending of every part of that million dollars has been 
accepted as justified, despite the remaining perplexities of how that can be, given that each 
increment seems not worth its cost. Now, because the remaining perplexity seems to involve 




this “local question” (Why not one less?) still poses a formidable challenge to theism, even if the 
‘global” question has been answered. But this only seems so if the justificatory relation between 
the emergent good and the particular evil’s permission is not recognized. Van Inwagen does not 
recognize that the same good that justifies God’s permission of the total amount of evil justifies 
God’s permission of each evil because he does not see that he is implicitly rejecting the 
transitivity of betterness (and therefore the principle that God necessarily chooses the better 
option) rather than NGE. God’s having to choose sub-optimally may be a challenge to the 
existence of a perfectly rational and good being  in other contexts but here, since NGE is 
satisfied, it is not. (God’s having to choose sub-optimally really challenges the notion of a 
perfectly rational and good being, which distinction introduces another related line of criticism: 
van Inwagen treats the perceived deficiency of the expanded defense as an empirical matter 
when it is not.) NGE does not require the offsetting good to be the trade-off incremental good; it 
can also be the emergent good, given the intransitivity of betterness interpretation that God must 
permit “excess” evil for the sake of that good.  
The mistaken search for contrastive explanation of God’s permission of evils 
If Theist has accounted for the actual existence of horrors (which include all specific very 
bad events) and of the amounts and kinds of horrors there are, including their apparently random 
distribution, what is the additional problem raised by the manner in which evil is distributed that 
is seemingly separate from the problem of the amounts and kinds of evil which has already been 
addressed?  
Well, what is there left to explain? Theist has explained why there are horrors in general 




this feature: many evils are such that there seems to be no explanation as to why that particular 
evil as opposed to some other has occurred. This would be to understand an explanation for why 
God permits a particular evil as necessarily an explanation of why God permitted that evil rather 
than some other (as van Inwagen and Howard-Snyder both seem to hold). But there are two 
things wrong with this suggestion: one is that there is no moral requirement that God have a 
reason for why this particular evil occurred rather than some other no better (and the Local 
Argument as described by van Inwagen does not claim there is); second, there being no such 
reason is just what it means for an evil to be due to chance, and the expanded free will defense 
has explicitly been designed to account for why there are evils due to chance.  
So what else is left to explain? Could the reasons offered by the Expanded Free Will 
Defense justify God’s permission of the total amount of evil in the world without justifying 
God’s permission of the specific amount of evil? Could the reasons be deficient because under-
specific; because they account for vast quantities of evil but not for the specific vast quantity the 
world contains? Could Atheist then claim that although the response to the Global Argument, the 
Expanded Free Will Defense, adequately gives divine reasons for allowing roughly the kinds and 
amounts of evil the world contains, that looking at specific evils still warrants the belief that God 
could have and should have removed some evil? But it was granted that this story, the Expanded 
Free Will Defense, does account for the unimaginably vast amount of evil the world contains and 
it was supposed that Atheist is bringing up a fact about evil distinct from its quantity. So this 
can’t be the purportedly new type of evil the Local Argument and not the Global Argument 
appeals to. 
If we have an account for the amount and kinds of horrific evil as well as whatever 




being random and unjust horrific evil, what is left unaccounted for? If it would have been 
intrinsically better that a certain amount of evil be more uniformly distributed, then that itself is a 
kind of evil, a greater amount of injustice perhaps. But then this unequal distribution was already 
part of the expanded defense. Could it be that although the amount of permitted evil was 
accounted for and the existence of horrors was accounted for, the proportion of permitted evil of 
horrors was not accounted for by the Expanded Free Will Defense? No, because that defense is 
very general. It explains God’s permission of vast quantities of horrific randomly distributed 
suffering. Furthermore, it is not the quantity of horrors or quantity as a portion of the total 
amount of evil that Atheist points to here, but individual instances. 
So what van Inwagen describes in his transition from the Global to the Local Argument is 
the same evils the Global argument appeals to, only now through the filter of the local 
perspective, that is, considered individually rather than as a kind. Why does van Inwagen think 
the Local Argument is not answered by his expanded defense? It must be because the local 
perspective introduced raises new questions, questions such as: why this evil? and: why not one 
less of this type? But these questions are not relevant to gratuity. The different types of apparent 
lack of necessity the local perspective brings to light, which motivate such questions and van 
Inwagen’s presentation of the Local Argument, are just those described by the Local Gratuity 
Illusion. Again, a lack of answers to these new questions about evils is not an indication the evils 
are gratuitous, as I’ve argued in chapter five, six, and seven.  The local perspective may bring 
considerations of divine benevolence into the debate over God and evil, but this is not what van 
Inwagen argues. Only gratuity is relevant to the debate he describes. Van Inwagen’s own 




God’s permission of individual typical horrors considered individually due to gratuity must be 
illusory. I suggest that the Local Gratuity Illusion is the best explanation of the fact that it didn’t. 
Hasker’s Significant Morality Argument against NGE 
In Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God Hasker argues that NGE cannot be a divine 
moral requirement because if it were, God could not achieve a purpose reasonably ascribed to 
Him, namely, that rational agents (humans) have and value significant moral responsibility. He 
presents his argument in three stages, each examining the implications of a different divine 
providential policy for the existence of significant morality. 
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First, if God prevents all attempted harm that would not ultimately benefit the victim 
moral responsibility would be impossible. This is because truly harming someone would be 
impossible and moral responsibility essentially involves the possibility of harming and helping 
others, according to Hasker.  
Second, if instead God permits harm but necessarily prevents all evil that is not necessary 
for a greater good, then humans could only harm others if God judges that the harm is worth the 
good that it brings about. Although humans could unjustly harm in this case, Hasker thinks moral 
responsibility could not exist because he thinks the notion of moral principles prohibiting what 
God permits because He judges it best to occur is unintelligible.  
Third, if, instead, God may permit evil that is not necessary for a greater good, but 
necessarily prevents all evil whose permission is not necessary for a greater good (as per NGE), 
then humans could have some responsibility for the welfare of others but still not significant 
responsibility, according to Hasker. Humans could have some responsibility because a good may 
require God’s permission of an evil choice should that possible permission be in the divine 




occurring (along with its consequences) may be a net disvalue. What good is such that it is 
necessarily lost if God prevents an evil choice, but not necessarily if that evil does not occur for 
other reasons? The only plausible good, according to Hasker, is the good of our being able to 
freely choose between good and evil. This good is forfeited by God’s preventing an evil choice 
but not by our preventing it by not choosing it. But can the value of an individual exercise of free 
will outweigh the disvalue resulting from, and/or inherent in, significantly wrong choices, such 
as murder? This is implausible. So if NGE were true, although we could have some moral 
freedom, we could not make choices between significant goods and evils and therefore could not 
have significant moral responsibility. 
Hasker forcefully restates his argument against NGE with a thought experiment.
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Consider an individual contemplating whether or not to choose a severe wrong. If God governs 
the world by NGE and this individual knows this, then he can reason: Since God will adhere to 
NGE, the disvalue of the total evil I can bring about cannot be greater than the good that 
requires God’s permission of my choice. The good that requires God’s permission of my choice 
is the good of my having moral freedom and any other goods that would not occur if I don’t 
choose evil. My being allowed to commit this wrong is not of great value and will contribute only 
slightly, if at all, to the good of my possessing moral freedom. So if I am permitted to choose this 
evil, other goods that offset or nearly offset the evil must occur that otherwise would not. 
Therefore I can only negatively affect the welfare of others, or of the world, by committing this 
act, correspondingly slightly. This understanding would undermine his appreciation for the value 
of significant morality, which has essentially to do with helping or harming others. So NGE is 
inconsistent with the following inter-related divine goals: humans having significant 




responsibility, which would include NGE, and humans reasonably believing their moral choices 
can significantly harm others.  
I do not share Hasker’s view, expressed in stage two above, that moral rules 
prohibiting actions God permits because those actions result in net good are unintelligible. 
Hasker says that in this circumstance if a person is harmed “it will be only as a God-
approved means to the creation of a greater good”, but ‘God-approved’ carries the 
connotation of God-condoned and God-permitted does not mean God-condoned. It is 
intelligible that what is necessary for a greater good may not be condoned by, yet be 
permitted by, God; and moral rules prohibiting what is necessary for a greater good but not 
condoned by God are possible. Briefly, justice may be the whole of morality (for example, 
Aquinas subsumes an ethics of care under an ethic of justice), so if injustice is possible 
morality is possible, even if God must permit injustice for a greater good.  
There are, though, some tensions within traditional theism that Hasker here 
touches upon. In chapter five I mentioned that belief in God’s sovereignty motivates the 
requirement that all evil be “redeemed” even if not divinely intended. If the No 
Unnecessary Evil Thesis is false, it is difficult to see how this requirement is necessarily 
satisfied. If God draws good out of an evil (that He did not intend) and yet that same 
amount of good could have been had without the evil, the evil is still an unredeemed loss. 
So the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis has some motivation in this view of the completeness of 
God’s victory over evil. But if the No Unnecessary Evil Thesis is true, why should we 
prevent evil? And how can we, or God, be whole-heartedly opposed to evil? (I think this can 
be answered by distinguishing weakness of will, which is not necessary for a greater good 
(though its permission is), from all other evil, such as suffering, which is necessary for 




Also, and as a corollary, I think the view that an all-sovereign, omnibenevolent God 
would not allow anyone to really be ultimately or spiritually involuntarily harmed has 
merit. However, if I cannot harm anyone spiritually (though they can harm themselves) 
and spiritual harm is the only harm that matters, then how can I be responsible for 
another’s welfare? Hasker says if I cannot harm I cannot be responsible for helping, 
because to fail to help is to harm. He writes, “if it were supposed that we might have an 
obligation to do something to help another, such a supposition would be self-defeating, since 
it entails that we would be harming her by failing to fulfill the obligations” But to fail to 
help is not necessarily to harm and many theists may find that moral responsibility, even 
warnings against harm, must be translated into injunctions to benefit in the light of this 
view of what God’s sovereignty and benevolence implies. This also does not seem 
unintelligible to me. 
 
The Incoherence Objection 
There certainly seems to be something correct in Hasker’s argument. His following claims both 
seem true: 
 (a) The only good that could be lost by God's preventing a moral evil that would not be 
lost by the moral evil's not occurring for other reasons (such as someone’s choosing differently) 
is the value of that individual exercise of moral freedom. 
(b) The value of the freedom inherent in an individual exercise of moral freedom does not 
outweigh significant harm.  
If (a) and (b) are true, and NGE is true, humans cannot make the world significantly 




But there are puzzling features as well. Because NGE seems based on the fundamental 
and compelling intuition that a perfectly good being would prefer less evil over more, all else 
being equal, arguments against it, to be persuasive, should also help us understand why God need 
not abide by NGE. Hasker’s argument that NGE is inconsistent with divine aims does offer an 
explanation and justification for God’s not adhering to NGE, namely: the divine goal of humans 
having significant morality requires God’s permission of evils whose permission by God is not 
required for any offsetting good. But, as noted by Rowe, since God’s goals, and this one in 
particular, are goods, this, at first blush, seems contradictory. And if this is contradictory then 
what this argument shows is not that NGE is false but that either God cannot have such goals or 
God does not exist (because given theism, the existence of significant morality requires the 
impossible).  
Indeed, although Hasker’s aim is to argue that theists need not accept NGE, it seems as if 
instead he has provided reasons for atheism. Hasker’s rejection of NGE is based on its 
implications not its inherent plausibility. Just as Hasker thinks Rowe’s first premise that there is 
gratuitous evil lends some credence to atheism if not directly addressed even if theism entails it 
is false via NGE, by parallel reasoning, if Hasker has shown that theism and NGE and significant 
morality are incompatible, but has not dimmed the inherent plausibility of NGE, then to the 
extent we have reason to think we do have significant morality, we have a reason to think God 
does not exist.  
But let us take theism as a given, as does Hasker. Must the theist choose between NGE 
and significant morality? Let us first examine Rowe’s objection that Hasker’s argument is self-
defeating, in which case Hasker has presented a puzzle, but not a solution. I will then argue that 




How Can the Incoherence Objection Be Addressed? 
Let us call the objection raised by Rowe and noted by Hasker that it is contradictory to 
claim that the good of significant morality requires the divine permission of evils whose 
permission by God is not required for any good (and that God and significant morality exist) the 
“incoherence objection.” I will argue that the most consistent interpretation of Hasker’s view is 
that he implicitly invokes the possibility that significant morality requires God’s permission of 
only a vague amount of evil. I will then argue that this response ultimately fails.  
The only helpful way to remove the contradiction referred to by the incoherence 
objection is to distinguish (e1) the “gratuitous” evil God’s goal requires God’s willingness to 
permit from (e2) the gratuitous evil whose permission is not required for any offsetting good. I 
will now argue that the only way the incoherence objection can be addressed is if (e1) refers to 
the class gratuitous evil and (e2) refers to an amount of gratuitous evil. To address the 
incoherence objection this way is to make an appeal to vagueness.  
There are three possible referents of (e1) and of (e2): the class gratuitous evil (the fact 
that there are gratuitous evils), an amount of gratuitous evil, and a token gratuitous evil. A lack 
of necessity of a token evil is irrelevant to NGE. NGE states only that God’s permission of the 
permitted evil or another not of less disvalue must be necessary for an offsetting good. So NGE 
states only that God’s permission of the amount of evil of the permitted evil, not the particular 
instance of permitted evil itself, must be necessary for an offsetting good. Taking this into 
account, the possible referents of (e1) and (e2) are reduced to an amount of gratuitous evil and 
the class gratuitous evil. (e1) cannot refer to an amount of gratuitous evil because then (e2) refers 
to the class gratuitous evil and there can’t be a necessary amount of an unnecessary class of evils. 




to an amount of gratuitous evil. However, if there must be gratuitous evil but there need not be 
any specific amount, then there must be some but no specific amount of gratuitous evil, which 
means only a vague amount of gratuitous evil is required.  So to dissolve the contradiction 
referred to by the incoherence objection Hasker must hold that significant morality requires only 
a vague amount of gratuitous evil. 
 Hasker thinks other responses are available. He replies to the incoherence objection with 
an analogy: 
Suppose an excellent musical performance is being rewarded with sustained and 
enthusiastic applause. Each member of the audience who is applauding is contributing to 
the enthusiastic reception of the performance. But it is certainly not the case that, had one 
member of the audience been prevented from applauding, the performance would not 
have been enthusiastically received. In the same way, any single instance of gratuitous 
evil is such that God could have prevented that particular instance without undermining 
morality. If on the other hand God prevented all such instances, morality would indeed be 
undermined … God could not have prevented that class from having any members at all 




He says that the purpose of this illustration is only to demonstrate the coherence of the 
idea that gratuitous evil is necessary, and that this distinction between a necessary class of 
gratuitous evil and the gratuitous evil members of that class is not essential to his argument. But, 
again, a token of evil is gratuitous only if its amount is gratuitous. So if this illustration 
demonstrates the coherence of necessary gratuitous evil, it does so only by distinguishing the 
necessary class of gratuitous evil from the unnecessary actual amount of gratuitous evil. I have 
argued, contra Hasker, that this distinction, and hence an appeal to vagueness, is necessary to 
dissolve the contradiction invoked by the incoherence objection. Thinking the above analogy 
provides an alternative possibility is to miss what is implied by Rowe’s inclusion of the 
avoidance of an evil of no less disvalue as a possible offsetting good, namely, that it is the 




A Second Argument that Hasker Must Appeal to Vagueness 
The need for an appeal to vagueness can also be seen by an examination of Hasker and 
Rowe’s discussion of the incoherence objection. Rowe suggested the above token vs. class of 
gratuitous evil response, but does not think it is ultimately helpful. Hasker quotes Rowe: 
Consider E, a particular instance of Hasker’s class of gratuitous evils … Now if Hasker is 
right, a perfect being cannot prevent every evil like E, for then it would lose the greater 
good of significant morality. But could this being have obtained the greater good of 
significant morality without permitting E? As we’ve seen, Hasker’s answer is yes. For E 
could be deleted from the class without in any way undermining morality, so long as the 
rest of the class is left intact. How far could the class of gratuitous evils be depleted 




Rowe thinks God would necessarily eliminate those evils like E that could be removed without 
in any way undermining morality so that “eventually” a point would be reached where no further 
evils could be eliminated by God without undermining morality. But since all of the remaining 
“gratuitous” evils must be permitted by God for the sake of significant morality, there really can 
be no gratuitous evil after all. Only the “gratuitous” evils needed for preserving significant 
morality would be permitted by God, but then they cannot really be gratuitous. So the 
incoherence objection survives the non-gratuitous class vs. gratuitous token distinction, 
according to Rowe. 
 Hasker replies that Rowe’s assumption that God would necessarily eliminate those evils 
like E that could be removed without in any way undermining morality is based on NGE and that 
it is instead his own reflective agent argument against NGE that survives these considerations. 
He writes: 
… consider the situation of an agent who is contemplating the commission of a serious 
moral fault, given the state of affairs described by Rowe … [where] all of the evil that 
exists is non-gratuitous … it is still true that whatever harm and suffering may result from 
a serious moral offense she might commit, the greater part of this evil (and perhaps all of 
it) is compensated by good results which could not have been obtained had she chosen a 







Hasker continues in a key passage worth quoting at length. I have divided it below: 
[A] Can God permit “just enough” evil? …  So long as we are assuming NGE, the answer 
to the question has to be that God cannot permit “just enough” evil. For whatever amount 
of evil we assume to be “just enough”, and so the exact right amount that God should 
allow, turns out not to be enough after all, so that God must allow still more evil if 
morality is not to be undermined.  
 
[B] But once we abandon NGE (as the preceding argument shows that we should), 
another possibility arises. It is conceivable that there is a precise minimum amount of evil 
that is required to maintain the significance of morality, and God does indeed permit just 
that amount, preventing all evil in excess of the minimum. Morality would still not be 
undermined, so long as God does not tell us he is doing this! But of course, we cannot 
say that God must do this, or that he morally ought to do it, or that God would be morally 
better if he were to operate in this way, for this would imply that we are accepting NGE 
after all.  
 
[C] Furthermore, this possibility [Rowe’s] depends on the assumption that there exists a 
precise amount of evil that is needed by God. If however this is not so, if the amount of 
evil required is inherently vague and to some degree indeterminate, then God could not 
permit “just enough” evil, for there is no such thing as “just enough” evil. I am strongly 
inclined to think that vagueness does obtain here, and that God really does need to permit 





I will argue Hasker must claim significant morality requires gratuitous evil, not only its 
possibility, and must reject Rowe’s supposition of a minimum amount of permitted evil required 
for significant morality, contra B. This means he must accept that significant morality only 
requires a vague amount of permitted evil, contra C.  
Is God’s unnecessary permission of gratuitous evil possible? 
Hasker may respond to the incoherence objection that he does not claim significant 
morality requires the necessity of God’s permission of gratuitous evil (given it would occur 
unless God prevents it), only its possibility. As quote C above indicates, Hasker thinks he, unlike 




necessary and sufficient for significant morality, and that God permits only that minimum 
amount, because he holds that neither God’s permission nor prevention of gratuitous evil is 
necessary (quote B above). Presumably, if God need not prevent gratuitous evil and the agent of 
Hasker’s thought experiment does not know that in fact he does, the agent cannot reasonably 
believe that he will not make the world worse by his choices. Also, presumably, if God need not 
permit only that minimum amount it is really possible for the agent to make the world worse.
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However, if God need not permit gratuitous evil why would He? There doesn’t really 
seem to be a remaining alternative to the (supposed) necessity and the impossibility of God’s 
willingness to permit gratuitous evil, despite the availability of the label. Hasker’s agent 
argument requires God’s willingness to permit gratuitous evil, but it is not obvious that God’s 
willingness to permit gratuitous evil given this is not necessary makes sense. 
Before elaborating, I should make a point of clarification. Hasker says his argument 
requires only the possibility not the necessity of gratuitous evil because God’s willingness to 
permit it does not entail it actually occurs.
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 This is correct: Hasker’s argument requires only 
the possibility not the necessity of gratuitous evil because the actuality of gratuitous evil depends 
on free choices or possible indeterministic outcomes. To avoid confusion I wish to point out that 
this is different from requiring the possibility and not the necessity of God’s willingness to 
permit gratuitous evil. The incoherence objection claims it does not make sense to say evil is 
gratuitous even though God must permit it in the divine choice context (i.e. given it would occur 
unless He prevents it) (the incoherence objection). In this section, we are considering whether it 
makes sense to say God could permit gratuitous evil in the divine choice context if He need not. 
If God’s willing gratuitous evil is not necessary, then, because, all else being equal, it is 




possible but not actual, which means it is not really possible. It may be countered that God’s 
necessarily choosing its being merely possible but not actual is not possible because that is the 
same as God’s necessarily preventing gratuitous evil. But this is not a criticism of my 
reservation. It is a criticism of the claim that only God’s willingness to permit gratuitous evil is 
required and not the necessity of God’s willingness, which is equivalent to the claim that 
gratuitous evil must be possible but not necessary, given the divine choice context (i.e. given the 
evil is chosen (or indeterministically produced) unless God prevents it). It seems that if it’s not 
necessary it’s not possible because if it’s not necessary (given the evil would occur unless God 
prevents it) there is no reason for God to permit it. No reason has been given to think gratuitous 
evil is possible if not necessary (again, given the evil would occur unless God prevents it) and 
there is good reason to think it is not. The fact that Hasker’s arguments require this is not a 
reason. So Hasker cannot assume, and I think he should deny, that it may be possible but not 
necessary for God to permit gratuitous evil. This way of avoiding the incoherence objection is 
not available, at least not without argumentation for it. 
A minimum amount of permitted evil required for significant morality 
Let us now consider Rowe’s assumption that if significant morality requires gratuitous 
evil, there is a specific or minimum amount it requires. The supposed minimum amount required 
that Rowe refers to must depend on how much moral evil humans choose. It does not make sense 
to suppose there is a minimum amount of moral evil that must exist in order for humans to have 
significant morality regardless of how humans choose. As Hasker notes, humans could have 
significant morality without there being any gratuitous evil if humans did not choose evil.
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 So 
an agent who knows there is a minimum amount of moral evil God must permit (in order to 




my evil choice is part of an amount necessary for the great good of significant morality and/or 
other outweighing goods, by choosing evil I cannot make the world worse. If he chooses good 
instead of evil he changes the divine choice situation, lessening the minimum amount of moral 
evil that God must permit, possibly by the amount of moral evil he chooses. So Rowe’s 
supposition that there is a minimum amount of permitted gratuitous evil required for the great 
good of significant morality does not reinstate Hasker’s reflective agent argument; rather, it is 
incompatible with it.  
Hasker notes that he thinks it implausible that there is such a minimum amount of evil 
God must permit in order for humans to have significant morality. I agree, provided the good of 
humans having significant morality is construed generally, rather than as the good of humans 
having significant morality to some unknown specific degree. But if the implausible thesis were 
true, that is, if God must permit an individual increment of significant moral evil, should a 
particular choice be made, in order for there to be significant morality at all, then not only does 
God’s doing so not violate NGE, but the reflective agent has no reason to think it does. The agent 
contemplating that choice cannot reason that if he does not choose it, some great good must be 
lost. This is because significant morality requires its permission only if he chooses it. He also 
cannot reason that if he does not choose it God will have to permit some other instance of no less 
disvalue, because if he does not choose it God may not need to permit that (additional) amount of 
moral evil.  
Only if the good of significant morality comes in degrees requiring different amounts of 
permitted evil, given the divine choice context, could the reflective agent’s reasoning be prima 
facie sound, for only then could an instance of moral evil outweigh its permission’s contribution 




corresponding to different amounts of permitted evil, all of which are morally permissible for 
God to permit, Hasker must maintain that no minimum amount of evil is the unique amount 
morally permissible for God to permit for the sake of significant moral freedom. 
Suppose that Rowe, in his contemplation of the gratuitous class vs. gratuitous token 
response to the incoherence objection, assumed that if significant morality requires gratuitous 
evil it requires a minimum amount of gratuitous evil, regardless of how humans choose. In this 
case, if either significant morality, NGE, or this assumption must be rejected as Hasker argues, it 
is clear that it is the possibility of such a required minimum that should be rejected. NGE is far 
more plausible.  
There is an additional reason to think Hasker must deny there is a minimum required 
amount of gratuitous evil: the version of NGE Rowe assumes in his thought experiment is 
unquestionably correct. In the context of Rowe’s thought experiment, if there is a minimum 
amount of “gratuitous evil” required for humans to have significant morality (on either 
interpretation) then Rowe is certainly right to assert that necessarily, a perfectly good being 
would not permit any gratuitous evil above this amount. The class of “gratuitous” evils Rowe 
refers to is by stipulation not permitted for any reason at all except the preservation of significant 
morality. Not only are no other goods relevant, no other moral reasons are relevant, by 
stipulation. If amounts of this category of evil are not necessary for this good, then for God to 
permit them is for God to permit evil for absolutely no reason of any kind at all. Rowe only 
assumes here that a perfectly good being will not prefer more evil over less evil for absolutely no 
reason. 
Hasker thinks to assert this is to assume NGE. He says in response to Rowe: “as soon as 




possible doubt. For what Rowe assumes here is far more basic to goodness than even my 
opening defense of NGE as a candidate self-evident truth. Whereas one may reasonably question 
whether Rowe’s or Hasker’s or my formulation of NGE conceals avoidable commitments to 
certain relations between God, evil, and good or to specific moral theories (especially if one 
mistakes NGE for more restrictive views of divine providence), there really is no room for 
reasonable questioning of this assertion. If a perfectly good being may prefer more evil over less 
for no reason of any kind then a perfectly good being may not be opposed to evil considered in 
itself. What could ‘being good’ mean then? What could God’s being rational mean? 
Rowe’s assumption that a perfectly good being will not prefer more evil over less evil for 
absolutely no reason is a necessary condition for God’s being good that any characterization of 
God’s goodness must include. So if Rowe’s assumption that there is a minimum amount of 
gratuitous evil necessary for significant morality, and his assertion that God would not permit the 
class of gratuitous evil permitted solely for the sake of significant morality to contain more evil 
than necessary for significant morality together do necessarily and incoherently undermine 
significant morality as Hasker thinks, then it is again clear that Hasker must reject Rowe’s first 
assumption, that there is a specific minimum amount of gratuitous evil required for significant 
moral freedom. Again, if significant morality, the supposition of a minimum amount of 
“gratuitous evil” required for significant morality, and this “NGE” claim are incompatible given 
theism, then significant morality, the supposition, and theism are together incoherent. The thesis 
that God acts for reasons when He has reasons is basic to theism. So, given the incompatibility 
Hasker argues for, the supposition of a minimum amount, not the “NGE” of Rowe’s thought 




requires some but no specific amount of gratuitous evil (given the divine choice context), and so 
requires only a vague amount of gratuitous evil. 
Rejecting Rowe’s Thought Experiment 
One may object that I have overlooked an alternative. I pointed out that the class of evils 
Rowe refers to is stipulated to be permitted by God for no reason other than the preservation of 
significant morality. In arguing against Rowe, Hasker terms these “ostensibly gratuitous evils.” 
Although he does not do so, Hasker may reject the possibility of there being such ostensibly 
gratuitous evils, evils permitted by God solely for the sake of significant morality, and so simply 
reject Rowe’s thought experiment for assuming this possibility. He could then say that though 
Rowe’s “NGE” is correct, NGE is not because God may have some other reason, besides 
preserving significant morality, for permitting those “gratuitous” evils whose permission is 
required for no other good than significant morality.  
This response would be unacceptably ad hoc, however. Hasker’s challenge to NGE is that 
it conflicts with significant morality. Responding to the incoherence objection by stating that 
there may be some other reason, a reason that does not involve some other good, for God to 
allow gratuitous evil is unhelpful. This response would attempt to safeguard theism from 
Hasker’s significant morality challenge to NGE by simply asserting that God may have a reason 
for allowing gratuitous evil. Worse, it suggests theists do not have a concept of divine goodness 
at all, for what is this other reason?  
After the above quoted passage C, Hasker says that though his arguments show God’s 
goodness should not be characterized so as to entail utility maximization, he has left anew the 
task of articulating necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of “God is good”.
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view of God’s goodness. But NGE does not. Even if there were deontological constraints on 
God’s actions, such that God must permit an evil even if doing so does not (in some sense) result 
in the most good, this would not violate NGE. In this case, God could have avoided the evil only 
by either not creating the good whose existence entails the deontological constraint (such as 
human freedom), or by not creating at all, or by forfeiting His own perfect goodness (if that were 
possible). In each case, God’s permitting the evil is required by an offsetting good: the created 
good grounding the deontological constraint, creation itself, or the inestimable good of God’s 
perfect goodness.
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 So NGE does not assume a consequentialist moral perspective; it is 
compatible with a deontological moral perspective according to which God’s honoring goods 
may conflict with His promoting of goods.  To say NGE should be rejected (rather than the claim 
that significant morality requires divine permission of a minimum of moral evil) because God’s 
moral goodness may consist in something other than the production of good or the honoring of 
good is in my view equivalent to saying NGE may be rejected because we may have no idea 
what God’s goodness consists of. What could God’s moral motivation be that is neither the 
production of good (a “utility maximization” consideration) nor the honoring of good (a 
deontological consideration)?  
Earlier I noted that there is no room to question the prohibition of irrational divine 
permission of evil that Rowe’s thought experiment invokes, though questioning NGE may be 
understandable. Nevertheless, in my view, NGE, properly analyzed, is close to self-evident. I 
think that viewing it as debatable must be based on interpreting it overly narrowly. It does not 
imply the divine permission of every instance of evil must be necessary for an offsetting good, 
only that the divine permission of every amount of evil must be. It also does not imply the divine 




permission of every amount of evil must be required by some offsetting good. And, as just noted, 
it is compatible with both consequentialism and deontology. Surely responding to Rowe’s 
thought experiment by saying God may have a reason for permitting gratuitous evil that involves 
no greater good is a less promising interpretation of the implications of Hasker’s significant 
morality considerations than the alternative, which I have argued is an appeal to vagueness.  
I conclude that Hasker’s criticism of NGE is best understood as follows: God must have 
reasons for permitting evil as Rowe assumes, but NGE is false. God’s reason for permitting 
gratuitous evil is simply that He must, given He wants humans to possess significant morality. 
Significant morality requires humans have the capacity to significantly worsen the world. 
Because the value of an individual exercise of significant moral freedom does not outweigh the 
significant evil it brings about, an individual exercise of significant moral freedom may be (and 
typically is) a gratuitous evil. So God must permit gratuitous evil in order for humans to have 
such freedom. Of course, the existence of significant morality is a great good, so God does 
permit gratuitous evil for the sake of a good, but this does not mean the permitted moral evil 
cannot really be gratuitous. What significant morality requires is that there be gratuitous evil, 
given the divine choice context, not that there be a particular amount of gratuitous evil, given 
that context. In other words, God must permit gratuitous evils because significant moral freedom 
requires God’s permission of some, but no specific amount of gratuitous evil, given the choices 
humans make. If God and significant morality exist, the amount of gratuitous evil is gratuitous 
and the existence of gratuitous evil is not. 
Hasker’s Significant Morality Vagueness Objection to NGE 
I have argued that the coherence of Hasker’s presentation of his Significant Morality 




morality requires a vague amount of gratuitous evil, given human choices. In this sense, the 
unrecognized core of Hasker’s argument against NGE is the same appeal to vagueness made by 
van Inwagen. Hasker says that humans’ having significant morality consists of our having all the 
innumerable free choices we actually have.
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 On Hasker’s view, our having significant morality 
must be a good that is worth all the moral evil of the world. Otherwise, why would God act so as 
to preserve significant morality? If he is correct then in thinking that individual exercises of free 
will contribute only slightly to the value of significant morality and that in general the individual 
disvalue of morally wrong choices exceeds the value of their contribution to significant morality, 
then his argument requires that the sum of the values of individual choices for moral evil is less 
than the value of God’s permission of all morally evil choices, which is a net good. This means 
that the good of significant morality, or of God’s permission of all moral evil is greater than the 
sum of its parts, which in turn means that although individual additions to the number of 
permitted free choices result in no net good, large numbers, say on the scale of human history, 
do. This corresponds to what I have called the “Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation” of 
emergent goods of van Inwagen which I have argued is not at odds with NGE.  
Responding to Hasker’s reflective agent who knows NGE is true 
So what should we respond to Hasker’s reflective agent who knows NGE is true and 
considers that the value of his individual exercise of moral freedom cannot outweigh significant 
moral evil? First, it does indeed seem that the value of someone’s being able to make a particular 
moral choice does not outweigh a very significant moral evil, such as murder. In fact, it seems 
absurd to think otherwise. However, significant morality is an emergent good, and so we should 
expect non-gratuitous particular moral evils permitted for its sake to seem to make at best a 




is true of emergent good cost totals, namely being outweighed by good, seems false of the cost 
increments that comprise it, and this requires rejection of one of the following prima facie 
plausible propositions: 
A. Each trade-off increment is not worth its cost of the competing good.  
B. There must be one or more optimal choices in a finite set. 
C. If a trade-off is optimal, each increment of it is worth its cost. 
D. The betterness relation is transitive.  
If the emergent good trade-off context were wholly unrecognized and so also the 
relevance of these propositions to each other, the truth of  ‘each increment is not worth its cost of 
the competing good’ (thus considered “locally” rather than in “global” context) may appear self-
evident. This certainly seems true of the contribution to human moral freedom made by God’s 
permission of an individual horrific moral evil, such as murder. But when the complete emergent 
good trade-off context is kept in mind the plausibility of each of these propositions is 
undermined. My own opinion, again, is that ‘Each increment (divine permission of significant 
moral evil) is not worth its contribution to the good of significant morality’ should be rejected in 
favor of postulating hidden values. So my first response to Hasker’s reflective agent is to review 
the merits of the Optimal Trade-Off Interpretation of emergent good puzzles.  
But even if we suppose, along with Hasker, that there are no optimal trade-offs between 
the good of humans having significant morality and permitted moral evil and so no hidden 
values, such that the divine permission of a typical significant moral evil is a net loss, we have no 
reason to question NGE. As argued earlier, this Intransitivity of Betterness Interpretation implies 
every instance of moral evil permitted by God must be part of a non-gratuitous amount that may 




having significant morality to a particular degree (given human choices) and a possibly vague 
amount unnecessary for that good but necessary for God to permit humans to have significant 
morality at all.  
So I would respond to Hasker’s reflective agent as follows: 
Though it does seem that the good of your being morally free in this instance is not 
significant enough to outweigh significant evil, the apparent conflict between your 
capacity to bring about significant evil and NGE is illusory. 
 
First, if God did not in general allow humans to make significantly morally wrong 
choices, humans in general would not possess significant moral freedom. So the good of 
significant morality requires God’s permission of vastly many of typical instances of 
significantly wrong moral choice. So you should expect your own choice to be permitted 
by God despite the significant evil you will very likely be able to bring about. Most 
likely, it will be one of the vague vast amount God must permit for this greater good.  
 
Second, though it does seem that God’s permission of slightly fewer morally evil choices 
would not entail a correspondingly significant diminishment of the great good of humans 
possessing significant moral freedom, this seeming does not impugn NGE. A 
consideration of the relation between emergent goods, such as the existence of significant 
morality, and their costs shows that each such permitted evil must either be part of an 
optimal trade-off (between permitted moral evil and the degree to which humans possess 
moral freedom) or part of an amount of evil whose permission is necessary for humans to 
possess significant moral freedom (though unnecessary for a specific degree of that 
freedom). Though each individual choice of significant evil may seem gratuitous, just as, 
in the Pain Relief Case, each individual pain relief payment seems to be, my above 
analysis shows it isn’t. So NGE does not conflict with your ability to choose significant 
evil.  
 
I maintain that the persistent sense that representative instances of significant moral evil 
are gratuitous despite recognition of this general good that requires and justifies divine 
permission of significant moral evil is the unrecognized appreciation of the seemingly 
paradoxical relations of comparative value of emergent goods and their costs. Once light is shed 
on those puzzling features we see that they were mistaken for gratuity. This doesn’t mean they 




of the divine choice context shows there is no conflict between the existence of significant 
morality and NGE. This is a happy result for the theist, who is hard pressed to deny either. 
Conclusion 
My aim has been to clarify the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, defend it against all 
challenges, which I claim are based on deontology, chance, and vagueness, and show that this 
defense provides an undercutting defeater for an evil’s seeming gratuitous because its permission 
by God seems to contribute insignificantly, or not at all, to a good it may otherwise be permitted 
for the sake of. So my clarification and defense of NGE undermines the evidential force of 
Rowe’s appeal to the seeming gratuity of instances of evil by identifying pervasive illusory 
appearances of gratuity.   
Again, this does not mean the seeming gratuity of all instances of evil is illusory. 
Instances of evil may seem gratuitous because we cannot imagine any offsetting good that would 
require God permit the actual amount of that type of evil. So there remains untouched the 
traditional question of theodicy: are there goods that justify God’s permission of the kinds and 
amounts of evil that exist? My thesis does aid the project of articulating possible divine reasons 
for permitting evil, however. This is because my defense of NGE, by explaining why particular 
evils may appear gratuitous even if they are not, undermines (though does not entirely remove) 
the force of Rowe’s first premise.  
My defense also shows that Rowe’s appeal to seemingly gratuitous particular instances of 
evil (his “evidential” first premise) is (inadvertently) a kind of red herring. It invites 
misinterpretation and misapplication of NGE. The ostensive clarity and precision made possible 
by the simplicity of Rowe’s premises conceals an underlying complexity which requires further 




of examples Rowe adduces for it.  By NGE an evil can only veridically appear gratuitous if it 
seems that it is not part of an optimal trade-off between amounts of that kind of evil and goods; 
only if we cannot imagine an offsetting good that might require God’s permission of the actual 
total amount of that type of evil. The type of evil may indeed be narrow and some horrific evils 
may be sui generis. What I have argued is that the apparent gratuity of a particular evil can be 
illusory because the local perspective in which it is viewed obscures the global context of the 
offsetting good and the fact that it is only the permission of the amount of that evil that need be 
required by that good.  
The notion of an emergent good that is key to my arguments is not esoteric. As 
mentioned, examples of what I call emergent goods are clear and abundant. Explanations  
invoked by familiar theodicies, especially general policy theodicies, readily fall under this 
description. It is their proper analysis, and so their definition and identification as such, that 
escapes common recognition, perhaps because of their puzzling features. The emergent good 
explanation just is an unpacking of the conceptual content of the appeal to familiar general 
policy theodicies, exhausting the alternatives of that unpacking. So I am not defending an 
idiosyncratic philosophical position to undermine the appearance of gratuity. I am pointing out 
that general policy theodicies, if accepted, are sufficient to explain why apparently gratuitous 
particular evils appear gratuitous without being so. Perhaps the generality of our description of 
God’s general policies may in part correspond to different ways God’s purposes may be equally 
well satisfied or perhaps God selects a unique optimal choice in His choice context. In either 




I believe I have exhausted candidates for proper analysis of emergent goods in chapter 
six, but note that even if my emergent goods account is not correct or exhaustive, its viability by 
itself undermines the evidential import of an evil’s appearing gratuitous.  
In my view, the fact that such capable philosophers as van Inwagen and Hasker reject the 
No Gratuitous Evil Thesis for reasons tied to the local perspective corroborates my claim that a 
powerful illusion is at work. Upon clarification of what NGE does and does not entail, as made 
in chapters one through three, it becomes hard to believe NGE could be false, not because these 
clarifications render NGE less substantive, but because clarification reveals the centrality of 
NGE to our notion of God’s goodness as creator.  
A consequence of this clarification is the understanding that for certain specific examples 
of evils, such as Rowe’s fawn, nearly universal judgments that we cannot imagine any good their 
permission by God could be necessary for arise from failure to carefully consider the possible 
complexity of relations between specific evils and global goods (though that appearance may 
persist despite its recognition as illusory). If my analyses correspond to reality, we can explain 
why, upon attending to the specifics of a particular evil, it will seem that the goods we know of 
cannot justify God’s permission of it by understanding the way in which they do. Because the 
goods general policy theodicies appeal to are emergent goods, we should expect non-gratuitous 
particular evils to seem to make at best a negligible contribution to those goods that justify God’s 
permission of them. If we can explain why a particular evil likely seems gratuitous despite not 
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illness no worse than His preventing it, however. Only the comparative goodness of Lor’s 
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69
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illusory. 
70
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claim about the value of that good relative to other possible goods or any comparison across 
possible worlds. 
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actual 
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79
 Van Inwagen writes, “I shall suppose that whenever God brings about some state of affairs 
involving created beings, His doing this is the same action as His issuing a certain decree – a 
pronouncement of the form ‘Let such-and-such be” or “Let the following be so: …’ The most 
straightforward construal of van Inwagen’s notion of a divine decree is to equate God’s decrees 
with what God (immediately or mediately) brings about or causes. But the Divine Indeterminate 
Decree Thesis conflicts with this interpretation. If God decrees ‘X or Y’ and X comes into 
existence then God’s decree that X or Y is his directly and immediately bringing about X, but 
though God caused X God did not decree X, on van Inwagen’s understanding. Only if God 
caused X as the complete explanation for X does God decree X. We may then wish to say that 
according to van Inwagen , what God decrees God directly causes but not all states of affairs 
God causes are decreed by God. This is also not without difficulty, however. If God decrees ‘X 
or Y’ and X results then God causes X by his decree. Does God also cause the state of affairs ‘X 
or Y’ ? This seems problematic because a disjunction is an abstraction, not a concrete reality 
Also, suppose x obtains as the result of God’s decree “let x or y be at t”, where x is the 
existence of a particle or a particles existing with specific causal powers. In what sense is state of 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
be at t”, could have brought about x. Given God has no reason to prefer x over y, if we grant God 
cannot decree ‘let x be’ without sufficient reason, we might think God’s decreeing “let either x 
or y be” is necessary for x. However, couldn’t God have chosen different goals so that He might 
have preferred x over y or have decreed ‘let x or z be at t’? If so, then although x could not be 
without God making a decree involving x, the action God actually made was not necessary for x. 
Nor is that decree sufficient for x. Given that decree, x may not obtain: y might exist instead.  
Perhaps van Inwagen  holds that just as a natural indeterminate power may be the complete cause 
of its effect without there being a complete explanation of why that effect rather than some other 
occurred, God may be the complete cause of x without there being an explanation for why x 
resulted from God’s act rather than y. But if van Inwagen  tries to cohere complete dependence 
on God with there being no reason for preferring x over y in this way – it seems there is an 
alternative to saying God would not subject himself to chance. God chose x because God valued 
x is the complete explanation for why God chose x. If God had chosen y it would have been 
because God valued y. (See Pruss (2006)) There is no reason for choosing x rather than y and 
there doesn’t need to be. We have an explanation for why God chose what He in fact chose. 
80
 It is odd to describe events resulting from free choice as events due to chance, for presumably, 
they are due to the agents power to bring about the event. And there may be a teleological 
explanation for these events in terms of the motives of the agent. The point would be that there 
would be either no complete explanation of why a particular choice was made (rather than 
another) or at least none in terms of the prior causal history of the world, and that God did not 
directly intend that event. 
81
 In a way then van Inwagen  thinks God is subject to a principle of sufficient reason because 
according to van Inwagen, the alternative is to be subject to chance.  
82
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83
 In the case of God’s bringing about the cosmos itself or its most fundamental nature and 
parameters, a divine indeterminate decree would require the (according to van Inwagen, 
epistemically possible) absence of a unique best possible - for God’s chosen purposes - initial 
state of the world. Also, van Inwagen leaves open the possibility that free will is compatible with 
determinism. If there is only one possible future, given the initial state of the universe, then, 
since according to van Inwagen  the implications of God’s decrees are part of God’s plan, for a 
result of free will to not be part of God’s plan the initial state of the universe would have to be 
due to chance. This would undermine the motivation for determinism, of course. 
Although van Inwagen  labels the three sources: free will, natural indeterminism, and 
equally suitable initial states of the universe, the last seems to be a necessary condition for a 
special use of God’s power to decree indeterminate states of affairs (3). God’s power to bring 
about states of affairs without directly bringing about their specifics may be exercised regarding 
the universe’s initial conditions as well as regarding what the universe itself produces in the 
course of its history, given those initial conditions. 
84
 It is initially surprising that van Inwagen  describes libertarian free will as a source of chance, 
but libertarian free will is clearly a source of contingency, which is what van Inwagen  means by 
chance here.  
85
 Of course, our descriptions of how God creates are metaphorical at best, as van Inwagen  
notes, but unless the initial state of the universe is the result of all of God’s decrees concerning 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
universe do not play a role in all of God’s decrees concerning the universe. So the above 
categorization is more complete. 
86
 There are also the following tensions in van Inwagen’s account: van Inwagen  himself rejects 
or disfavors the idea that God may make arbitrary choices because that would seem to make God 
subject to the “god of chance”. But if God’s decree’s being “the result of chance” is repugnant to 
van Inwagen  because that would seem to make God dependent on something other than 
Himself, then by parity of reasoning shouldn’t a natural outcome’s being “the result of chance” 
also seem to make nature dependent on something other than God? Also, there is a difficulty for 
his notion of divine indeterminate decrees: a disjunction does not seem to stand in causal 
relation. There is also a tension between his libertarian freedom view and his finding arbitrary 
divine decrees implausible. Perhaps a reasonless choice model of freedom would suit his 
purposes better. (see Pruss (2006)) Also, the feature that no new basic constituents come into 
existence helps him circumvent rather than address one motivation for an alternative conception 
of divine providence, namely, concurrentism. van Inwagen  asks whether a natural cause is 
responsible for its effects or not. We may ask if a natural cause can produce a novel substance or 
causal powers. If it cannot, creation seems diminished. If it can, what of dependence on God in 
the way van Inwagen  describes? His simplified model seems simplified at just those junctures of 
interest.   
 
87
 van Inwagen’s model invites many metaphysical questions that can only be addressed with 
subtle medieval scholastic metaphysical distinctions and that cannot even be properly framed in 
a short essay. For example: Is it really metaphysically possible that nothing at all, neither God 
nor nature, explains why one possible event or state of affairs rather than another occurs? If the 
existence of a particle is inherently unpredictable, does God’s sustaining that particle the first 
moment it exists require middle knowledge? If God causes the existence and powers of 
everything that exists can any causal powers be produced by created casual powers? On this 
model how is God’s sustaining the universe different from God’s continuously re-creating the 
universe? Van Inwagen reasons that since it seems implausible that there be a unique optimal 
way of fulfilling God’s purposes in creating, unique to the precise amount and distribution of 
every particle and power, God must have the power to bring about indefinite states of affairs 
without bringing about their specifics, to create “incomplete” states of affairs. But it also may 
seem simply metaphysically impossible that there be no sufficient reason for some states of 
affairs, no reason at all for why A occurs rather than B, for any A and B. Of course, in an essay 
of such broad sweep, overlooked distinctions must abound. However, for van Inwagen’s model 
of providence to serve as a “prolegomena” to his discussion of the problem of evil, as he claims, 
we should at least be able to extract from his essay answers to the following very general 
questions: What is the conceptual connection between his remarks on the way in which creation 
depends on God and his remarks on the possible sources of chance in creation? How does van 
Inwagen’s picture of how God relates to the created world leave room for chance in a way that 
alternative construals do not?   
88
 If the specific effects are metaphysically necessary given divinely decreed powers and 
circumstances, they are part of God’s plan. Also, if we say that what God causes need not be 
what God decrees but must be included in God’s decrees, then it seems that in a parallel sense 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
included in God’s plan, which is the sum of God’s non-reactive decrees.  This would undermine 
the crux of van Inwagen’s argument against the Meticulous view of Providence. 
 
90
 This is the misleading rhetorical relation: his model provides a convenient way of defining 
God’s plan, a definition that leaves events due to chance in the sense of lacking complete 
contrastive causal explanation outside the scope of God’s plan - in van Inwagen  restrictive sense 
- and thus be due to chance in the sense of lacking purpose should his notion of plan be accurate. 
But the convenience of defining God’s plan in the way he does should not obscure the many 
difficulties and inconsistencies it involves. 
91
 Every actual state of affairs that is part of God’s eternal plan has a complete teleological 
explanation – namely it obtains because it is best that it does. But God brings about what God 
prefers in the way He is able to. Perhaps some state of affairs that are part of God’s eternal plan 
can only be weakly actualized by God, but they are part of God’s perfect will nonetheless. So 
van Inwagen’s definition of God’s plan excludes states of affairs from God’s eternal plan that it 
should not. Such states of affairs may lack complete causal explanation, but their occurrence is 
not due to chance in a sense that makes them bereft of purpose or significance – nor the kind of 
purpose that would sufficiently justify and explain why God allowed that particular evil rather 
than some other. 
92
 Should the existence of rational animals be considered due to chance in such a case? Yes in 
one sense and No in another. It is not by chance just because it is a basic divinely freely chosen 
desiderata for any created world: it is because God intended there be rational animals that there 
are. It is by chance relative to the actual created world, however. That this creation produced 
rational animals is contingent. This is a distinction between de re and de dicto contingency. 
(Necessarily, rational animals emerge in the history of creation, and not: rational animals emerge 
of necessity in the history of creation.) This distinction is one way of describing God’s relation to 
chance. Again, on one notion of divine providence, God atemporally selects one among many 
possible contingent histories of the world.  
93
 Strong actualization or decree is one way God may bring about his preferences, but His eternal 
plan should be identified with the unqualified preferences that God can and therefore does bring 
about, not with one way in which He may bring them about. For God may also make a decree to 
bring about a particular state of affairs that is only desired by God qua an instance of or a means 
to what He prefers. Such states of affairs lack complete teleological explanation. 
94
 Many such states of affairs will be conditional if there is no divine middle knowledge. (If God 
has this knowledge these conditionals describe God’s order of preferences but not His actual 
plan.) 
95
 Again, since one may hold this view and think that some events are due to (libertarian) free 
will and natural indeterminism, van Inwagen ’s excluding events due to chance from God’s plan 
by defining God’s plan as what God decrees begs the question against the meticulous providence 
view. 
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. Note, however, that although the evil is not necessary for G, God is justified in permitting 
those evils for the sake of G.  
105
 Which counterfactuals of freedom (and of indeterministic events) are true at those possible 
worlds is also relevant to what purposes God would choose. 
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109
 (Choices between amounts of evil may be morally arbitrary because they are components of 
(implicit in) choices between roughly equally good sets of goods and evils. ) By an optimal 
option I mean an option than which there is no better. An option may be optimal without being 
uniquely optimal. 
110
 In chapter one I argued that the “greater good” phrasing of Rowe’s No Gratuitous Evil Thesis 
obscures the compatibility of a kind of pointlessness, namely moral arbitrariness, with that thesis, 
and that this misrepresentation is significant enough to warrant replacing the term ‘greater good’ 
with ‘offsetting good’. This section illustrates this significance. I have drawn attention to that 
permissible type of pointlessness to undermine the coherence and therefore persuasiveness of 
van Inwagen’s “permissible moral arbitrariness” criticism of the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis and 
his related purported counterexamples to it. 
111
 This is an example van Inwagen uses in footnote 11 of “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of 
Air, and the Problem of Silence” The Evidential Argument From Evil, chpt. 8 
112
 Such as those offered by William Hasker (2004) and Richard Swinburne (1998) 
113
 Such as those offered by Peter van Inwagen (2006) and Bruce Reichenbach (1976) 
114
 Swinburne (1998) 
115
 John Hick (1967) 
116
 So, for example, I will not argue this understanding is more plausible than either of the 
following versions of those theodicies, which may be offered in response to Rowe’s Gratuitous 
Particular Evils Claim: “All or Nothing” God must permit all moral and all natural evil for the 
goods of human moral freedom and the uniformity of nature. This may be because of moral 
principles of fairness whereby it would be unfair for God to be selective in his preventions of 
human suffering or perhaps because of a deontological constraint of respect for persons whereby 
it would be wrong for God to ever remove free will once given, no matter what the 
consequences.  “Evils as Components of Goods” Goods requiring significant moral freedom, 
such as eternal union with God, and requiring the uniformity of nature, such as the autonomy of 
creation, defeat rather than offset moral and natural evil. On this view the optimization of trade-
offs described above is not a divine motivation because every individual evil is an essential part 
of a good whole and is permitted for that reason. Perhaps only the purposes of creation could 
justify exceptions to preserving the autonomy of the natural order. I will not argue for or against 
any of these possibilities. 
117
 Rather, I will later argue that if the goods of significant moral freedom and the uniformity of 
nature may be considered emergent goods, a particular evil’s seeming gratuitous because its 
permission seems either unnecessary for, or not worth its contribution to, those goods is not 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
Theist answer to atheist arguments based on the Gratuitous Particular Evils Claim that appeals to 
unimagined goods. 
118
 This is a version of the sorites paradox. 
119
 Of course the same would have to be said of choices 1122 and 1121 and so on, but perhaps 
one can find some way to adhere to both (2), individual increments are not worth their cost, and 
(4), many increments are worth their cost, with an untainted philosophical conscience by 
accepting some corresponding answer to sorites paradoxes. 
120
 Again, we should be careful in tabulating the goods and evils involved. Choosing to stop at 
putting 250 people on the lifeboat rather than 251 is to choose the good of 250 people having a 
75 % chance of making it rather than 74.9 % and for person number 251 to have a 0% chance 
rather than 74.9%. So we may call the choice that between balance of goods and evils (75% for 
250) + (0% for 1) and (74.9% for 251). If choosing 250 over 251 is to allow a gratuitous evil, 
then 74.9% for 251 is a better trade-off of goods and evils (for then there must be additional evil 
in choice 250 that is not offset by a good) than 75% for 250 
121
 This interpretation still leaves the puzzle of why vague hidden values offset costs when the 
trade-offs compared both instantiate them. For example, what is the hidden value involved that 
makes it seem that tradeoffs including 800 (doses or shovels) and 801, both of which instantiate 
the desired good of having an adequately safe trench or a comfortable level of pain, roughly 
equally good? So what value does # 801 have that could overturn its otherwise net cost to make 
it not obviously worse than 800? If 800 clearly instantiates that vague good it is necessary for it 
and the good of increasing within amounts required for that good trumps their costs.   
122
 It should be noted that the good that offsets the evil need not be intended by God, as God may 
have no reason to prefer one instantiation of His purposes (one trade-off) over another, and that 
that is in harmony with the No Gratuitous Evil Thesis, which only states that there must be a 
good, not that the good is specifically intended by God.  
123
 Notice that this is unlike the case of incommensurable goods requiring the permission of 
different amounts of evil in chapter one because here the goods are of the same type and are 
stipulated to be the same in amount. And, even if they were not determinately the same amount, 
as per the commensurable version, a greater excess evil by definition makes the choice worse, 
because the excess is the evil beyond what is necessary for the good. 
124
 More precisely, though (even) less eloquently: “ … if making some choice is no worse than 
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morally equivalent alternative, van Inwagen’s arguments concerning God’s possible removal of 
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required for the volume of water to turn into wine. Even if their specific locations were not 
decreed by God, their having special causal properties at that time were, and so the event of 
those particles having those properties at that time is part of God’s plan. It seems God could have 
issued different decrees concerning them – continuing to decree normal powers, for example – 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
the changed decrees, or at least to a state of affairs equally good as far as God’s purposes are 
concerned. If there could have been a miraculous intervention to prevent the events constituting a 
particular horror without cost to God’s purposes, including that of preserving the autonomy of 
the natural world, then it seems God could have performed a miracle to prevent some such 
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